

CONFIDENTIAL

27 March 1957

Document No.16

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEM OF HUNGARY

REPORT ON THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

(communicated by the Permanent Representative of France
to the European Office of the United Nations)

Situation since Dec 1956

*p. 21.
p 29.*

MPH/9/57

CONFIDENTIAL

27 March 1957

IMPORTANT NOTE

The following texts communicated by the Permanent Representative of France have not yet been reproduced:

1. "The White Terror", or How the History of the Revolution was re-written by Communist Propaganda.
2. Chronology (Hungarian and Soviet Union aspects).

REPORT ON THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

REPORT ON THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

Communicated by the Permanent Representative of France
to the Bureau of the United Nations

REPORT ON THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

A - DIRECT FACTORS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

First factor: The violent outburst among the mass of the people of feelings of revolt that had been repressed for too long.

"Revolutions are not always caused by things going from bad to worse. More often than not, a people that has endured without complaint the most oppressive laws, as if unaware of them, rejects them violently as soon as the burden is eased".

TOCQUEVILLE.

Applied to the Hungarian situation in 1956, this remark of the historian of the Ancien Régime and the Révolution amounts to saying that the communism of Moscow, which for ten years had been tyrannically imposed on the European satellites of the USSR, could not become liberalized without at the same time compassing its own downfall.

In any case, it is difficult to conceive more "oppressive laws" than those which the dictatorship of RAKOSI had imposed on the Magyar nation.

A year ago, in the towns and in the country districts, peasants, small craftsmen, workers, employees, members of the intelligentsia or even lower-grade civil servants, the immense majority of the population, were enabled to lead an existence which was always difficult and frequently poverty-stricken only by the operation of a vast system of cheating the régime. Long before the revolution, the press, including the markedly semi-official organs, and on occasion even official speeches from time to time reflected the general apathy or exasperation of the people over matters that were nearly always trifling but infinite in number. Apart from a few thousand privileged persons, the whole nation longed to rid itself of the régime which was kept in being by the iron hand of a remarkably well-organized political security police (AVH). These profound revolutionary desires, however, were repressed at the very moment of expression:

- among the older people by a feeling of despair which lasted practically up to the outbreak of the revolution and which arose in particular from a deep and increasing disappointment at the East European policy of the Western powers;

- among the rest of the population and particularly the youth, quite simply by fear of brutal repression. For example, following the lively meetings of the PETOFI Club, the news of the Poznan riots, accompanied by a threatening message from Moscow by RAKOSI to the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party and the fear of the reaction of the police, dismayed even the most excitable among the youth who, although in the main of working-class and peasant origin, scoffed at the Marxist education that had been imposed on them and took a passionate interest in civilization and culture beyond the iron curtain.

For these young people and the more liberal trends of which they were the fore-runners, the fall of RAKOSI in the middle of July, against the background of a public opinion which still refused to believe in any prospect of freedom, came not only as a relief but as a success which seemed to presage further steps along the path of liberalization. That, however, does not seem to have been the target set by Moscow for the successor of the Hungarian Red dictator; but, to check the movement to which the Hungarian People's Democracy was committed in the eyes of a growing proportion of the intelligentsia and of a section of the Communist Party that became rapidly predominant, GERÖ could no longer, as his predecessor had done, fall back on uttering threats. It seems that, after much hesitation, he realized the necessity for bringing out his "big guns" when on 6 October the expiatory ceremony in memory of RAJK was turned into a demonstration at which the people, irrespective of party, gave silent expression to their disgust at the régime that the First Secretary had represented at RAKOSI's side. For the public, what mattered far more than the funeral orations of Communist speakers was the embrace given to RAJK's widow by the liberal Communist leader, Imre NAGY, a popular figure ever since his government in 1953, which had been followed by his downfall, his expulsion from the party and his persecution by the Stalinists.

Now that public opinion had been appeased by the rehabilitation of Imre Nagy, it can be said that GERÖ's main concern was to find some justification for a violent reaction against the trend towards liberalization of the régime.

Second direct factor of the revolution: A too risky operation

On 13 October, before leaving for Yugoslavia, one of GERÖ's suite confidentially informed Imre NAGY through a subordinate that RAKOSI's successor was thinking of allowing the students' boisterousness to degenerate into brawling.

Planning of the police tactics for that purpose was rapidly completed. On the morning of 21 October, at a Staff meeting, the general officers of the garrison and the heads of the different police forces were told that there was likely to be trouble, that it was hoped that the police would be able to maintain order unaided, but that if the Honved were called on to intervene their chiefs should not hesitate to open fire on the crowd. On 22 October, the cadets of the Military Academy, standing by in case they were needed to keep order, got wind of these instructions and, during the night, sent to the students of the PETOFI Club messages of sympathy.

It is a remarkable fact that about the same date ⁽¹⁾ Russian troops on leave from military areas adjoining Hungary, were recalled and mobilisation orders sent to reserve officers speaking Hungarian or German. Since GERÖ had been in Yugoslavia for nearly a week, it may be wondered how the Soviet Union commanders had been warned at the same time as the Hungarian military and police. Perhaps RAKOSI played some part in this; the Budapest press had often denounced the collusion between him and his former Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had become GERÖ's ambassador in Moscow, and it is also understood that, when an exile in the Soviet Union, the ex-dictator never ceased warning the Soviet Union leaders of the rashness of their Hungarian policy.

In fact, the recent Polish crisis and GOMULKA's final success, despite the Soviet Union's attempts at intimidation, aroused the wildest enthusiasm among the Hungarian students and kindled hopes of liberalisation in the ranks of the Magyar intelligentsia. Moreover, the official wireless station broadcast messages of congratulation to Poland and the Press did little to moderate the general excitement.

Nevertheless, until the evening of 23 October, among the public at large, no one either in Budapest or in the provinces, expected that this excitement would turn into a revolution.

*

*

*

In the events of 23 October, phenomena of crowd psychology and the too risky police tactics adopted by the Government were strangely woven together in a revolutionary pattern.

(1) A French journalist who complained to an officer of the Russian headquarters staff in Budapest that for several days he had had no news of his family was told in reply that the officer himself had been standing by in Ukraine since 21 October.

After being announced by the official wireless at 10 o'clock in the morning, a demonstration of students in honour of Poland was at first forbidden by the police, an action which certainly surprised no one except the students who had come in from the country for the occasion.

A few hours later, after the higher officials of the AVH had been informed of the University's request, the ban was lifted. It is typical that the great majority of the city police were confined to their barracks and that the AVH withdrew to their various places of safety. It was only about 9 p.m., when the broadcasting station was seriously threatened, that the political security police arrived in force and began to open fire, the first victim being a student of the University School of Engineering called Vizi.

By that time it was too late for police repression; GERÖ had miscalculated: the demonstration had become a revolution.

This transformation had begun when, amazed at seeing nothing done to check demonstrations by students who were shouting not only "Long live Poland!", but also "Down with the Government!", the crowd of onlookers of all ages and classes finally joined in. What was happening was the violent outburst among the mass of the people of feelings of revolt that had been repressed for far too long.

In the evening, around the Parliament Building, where the Cabinet meets, round Stalin's statue, near the broadcasting station, there were large crowds which - a culminating disappointment for the government - were reinforced by the very workers on whom GERÖ had perhaps relied for a counter-demonstration. Having arrived that very day from Belgrade, this was the moment that he chose to use the traditional language of peoples' democracies in a broadcast which was not particularly relevant to the situation. GERÖ concluded that it was for the Central Committee of the Party to make the appropriate decisions but the meeting of the Committee itself was postponed.

Towards 10 p.m., called to the scenes of fighting, the Honved fraternized with the crowd and, like the city police, distributed arms to them; the barracks were thrown open to the demonstrators in order to arm them, and the street battle began.

About 2 o'clock in the morning, the first Russian tanks appeared, perhaps called in by the Soviet ambassador, whose garden had been invaded by a hostile crowd. They were the advance guard of columns of tanks which, since the middle of the afternoon,

had filled the streets, coming in from the direction of Sombathely and Szekesfahervar; the main body entered the capital about 4.50 a.m.

Third direct factor of the revolution: Russian military intervention in the capital

Having been planned at least three or four days ahead and launched by the Soviet Union Command long before the demonstrations had got out of hand, Russian military intervention helped to raise popular fury to its peak. Given the degree of excitement which had spread through the crowd towards midnight and later, when many of the Honved were fighting alongside the rioters, the intimidation tactics upon which the Soviet Union Command had relied were a complete failure.

When, putting into practice the lessons of the Spanish civil war that had been drilled into them by the Marxist-Leninist teaching of the schools, the young people - often mere children - used with success very simple methods of anti-tank fighting such as the Molotov cocktail or the tramline pushed through the tracks, the violence of the rioters against the Russian troops knew no bounds. Finally, when the crowd succeeded in overwhelming the tanks, which had no infantry protection, it was delighted to find that the crews were willing to fraternize and on one occasion, when there was tragic bloodshed, even to join in the revolt against the AVH. Heavy fighting went on until the 28th, died down on the 29th and came to an end on the 30th.

As a result of the massive destruction caused by the artillery fire of the numerous tanks operating on the Russian side, after two or three days the order was given to the insurgents to try fraternizing with the Soviet Union troops rather than using arms against them and to concentrate the effort of the revolutionary commandos against the remainder of the political police who were still obeying the Government's orders.

B - ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN INTERVENTION

(a) Strategic aspects of Russian intervention

During the first stage of the armed revolt, i.e. from 23 to 26 or 27 October, intervention had obviously been regarded by the Russian Command as support for the forces at GERÖ's disposal for maintaining order. The Russian Command and the Hungarian Government probably had few illusions as regards the loyalty of the Honved, but it is not likely that they expected half its strength to go over to the rebels at the outset. Perhaps, since these were students' demonstrations, they had also counted on the help of armed workers.

Be that as it may, when its tanks had occupied the Hungarian capital, the Russian Command found that they were facing practically alone the armed rising of a whole people who rapidly and very effectively succeeded in cornering the political police in their various bolt-holes.

Patrolling the city or mounting guard at strategic points, the Russian tank crews were given no respite and in particular were short of rations.

On the 25th, the morale of the troops was shaken by the fraternizing tactics finally adopted by the rebels: "What are you doing here? Get out!" That was the theme reiterated to the Russian soldiers, either in Russian - because the Hungarian youth, having been compelled to learn Russian, knew enough of the language for that kind of conversation - or in Hungarian - because the majority of the troops occupying the capital came from divisions which had been stationed in Hungary for a long time.

Moreover, the rapid concentration in Budapest of the required tanks by using as far as possible the Hungarian road system had practically stripped all the Magyar territory west of the Danube of Russian forces. In addition, because the AVH had summoned help from the frontier guards, the Austrian frontier was open and the Russian Command might have believed that powerful reinforcements or assistance might reach the rebels across Austrian territory.

In those conditions it may seem logical that the Russian Command should have wanted to re-launch the operation on an entirely new basis. This would explain the withdrawal of its troops in reply to the official request by NAGY on 28 October and the removal of whole divisions to the east, culminating in a spectacular evacuation

of the capital on 29 and 30 October, which aroused the enthusiasm of the population and led the leaders of the revolt to reveal their identities.

On 31 October, the reserve divisions arrived from the Ukraine and entered Hungary in force. Had the withdrawal of the preceding days been merely a feint by the Russian Command? Was it a reflexion of the conciliatory intentions of certain of the Moscow leaders towards NAGY who, in the Parliament Building - no longer guarded by Russian tanks - several times reshuffled his cabinet in order to meet the demands of different political elements?

The fact remains that when, on 1 November, the President of the Council, NAGY, denounced the Warsaw Pact, insisted on Soviet Union military evacuation and finally appealed to the United Nations and the Western powers, the Soviet Union Command carried out what was purely and simply a lightning re-occupation of Hungarian territory.

On 2 November, Russian tanks, having passed through Slovakia, crossed the Danube at Komarom and set up road-blocks, first at Mosonmagyaróvár and then progressively along all the highways from Austria down to the Yugoslav frontier, where other divisions of tanks, having crossed the Danube to the south of Budapest or going down towards Szeged, completed the military blockade of Hungary.

On 4 November the Soviet Union tanks re-entered Budapest in force and, after a moment of dismay, their return to the capital led to a fresh outbreak of revolt which for two or three days was kindled by the Western powers' appeal to the United Nations. Until the 9th there was heavy fighting, which in certain districts persisted after that date, though less violently.

(b) Political aspects of Russian intervention

It may be said that, if the revolt was finally crushed because of the amount of damage done by the guns of the Russian tanks, from the outset - both in the first as in the second stage of the revolution - Russian military intervention brought the most disastrous consequences for Moscow's policy in Hungary.

On 24 October, the rage of the population at the appearance of the first Russian tanks inevitably recoiled on the HEGEDUS-GERÖ Government, to which they gave protection by mounting guard outside the Parliament Building. About noon on the

25th, when Imre NAGY, who had got rid of GERÖ, was at last in a position to broadcast a statement in terms which he hoped would damp down the revolt, the Russian tanks on guard opened fire on the crowd who, fraternizing with the crews of other Soviet Union tanks, had marched with them to the Parliament Building and, meeting with firing from a few of the AVH, had persuaded the mutinous crews to machine-gun the Hungarian political police.

This led to an appalling massacre outside the seat of the Government of Imre NAGY which was fatal to the popularity of its leader. It is no exaggeration to say that the officer who ordered one or two tanks on guard to open fire on the crowd had ruled out any possibility of a solution of the Hungarian crisis along the lines taken by GOMULKA.

In fact, during the succeeding days Imre NAGY vainly made all kinds of promises to the rebels in order to obtain their surrender; on the 27th or the 28th, there followed a truce of sheer exhaustion between the Russian tank crews, who were worn out, and the rebels, appalled by the destruction of the capital.

So far as he is concerned, KADAR is the political victim of the second Russian military intervention in Budapest. How could the population, which had not found it easy to rally round Imre NAGY, support a member of the Party who was not a popular figure like the liberal Communist in the early days of the revolution? Moreover, KADAR's "Government" was formed in the obscurity of Szelnok, whereas in the capital it was a Russian military Command which occupied the offices of Imre NAGY's Government in the Parliament Building.

(c) Russian interference

As soon as the fighting was over, moreover, the extent of the intervention in Hungarian domestic affairs by the Soviet Union authorities became considerable.

Not only were Russian troops guarding the bridges and the important places in the capital, they also controlled the roads and the frontier posts, at first alone and later in collaboration with stage army remnants of the Hungarian troops and political police, who gradually relieved them. For a long time, a Russian pass was officially required for any journey on Hungarian territory and even after the withdrawal of this measure it was as well to keep the document, which the Russian sentries demanded even from foreign diplomats on the road to Vienna. Telephone exchanges and central post offices were occupied and for some time the

wires tapped by the Russians; perhaps they still are: telephoning from Paris on 16 December 1956, a French official was answered by an operator who spoke only Russian and who, incidentally, refused to put him through. It is hardly necessary to say that in the Parliament Building the Hungarian Government was guarded by Russian troops accompanied by former members of the AVH in Russian uniform and that armed Russians were posted behind the air-vents (report by a Hungarian journalist now in the West).

On the return of the Soviet Union forces to the capital on 4 November, General GREBENNIK, commanding the army of occupation, instead of confining his activities to the military sphere, issued orders which were properly the concern of the Hungarian authorities. His Order of the Day of 6 November, for instance, prescribes "Immediate return to work, with severe punishment for all those in any way refusing to do so. Russian transport will supply the capital with food; all shops are to open from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m."

Shortly afterwards, in order to break a continuous strike, which in fact lasted until the beginning of January 1957, the Russian Command decided to station Red Army officers in factories and mines and the Hungarian Press admitted that there were some at Csepel and at Tatabanya. Eye witnesses speak of their presence in the Dorog mine, "where individual Russian soldiers promised the miners that, in exchange for food, they would not give them any trouble", and in a Buda factory.

Finally, during November the Red Army took over the duty of making arrests, including political arrests (arrests of writers). The "Nepakarat" of 24 November stated that a group of 650 persons arrested by the Russian troops had been handed over to the Hungarian Public Prosecutor.

At the end of October, small mixed commandos of Russian soldiers and members of the AVH particularly, organized the pursuit of young men and deportations to the Soviet Union. The starting point was the Kossuth military station. There were departures every night for Munkacs and Ungvar and thence to unknown destinations. There is no lack of evidence of these deportations: a journalist collected direct statements according to which at the beginning of December 1956 there were 1500 deported Hungarians at Ungvar and about the same number at Munkacs.

(d) Behaviour of the Russian troops

There were very few air raids during the week 4 - 11 November

Some looting was reported towards the end of the fighting; in particular the Materials Laboratory of the School of Architecture was removed and the residence of the Egyptian Minister was entered by Russian troops who indulged in a good deal of pilfering.

There were also some strange cases of incitement to loot. For instance, on 9 November, in Rakoczi Street, on the pretext that the Minősegi shop was on fire, Russian patrols invited passers-by to carry the goods into the street; no sooner had the crowd begun to do so than cameramen arrived in order to film the scene, obviously for the purpose of showing that Russian troops had come to Budapest simply to restore order and put down looting and anarchy.

Pilfering was more widespread and on occasion fairly systematic in character. For instance, in a large sanatorium in the mountains near Budapest a Russian patrol removed from the dispensary all the anti-biotics; a few days later these were replaced by anti-biotics of Russian manufacture.

On the other hand, it is quite certain that the Soviet Union troops sometimes failed to carry out the orders given them.

As an example, according to an eye witness, the crews of two tanks which had been entirely engulfed in the crowd in front of the Hotel Astoria on 25 October, went over to the demonstrators, who lavished cigarettes and salami on them. According to Mateotti, Russian troops guarding a bridge of the Danube went over to the rebels, and a recent refugee, who had an important situation, states that incidents of this kind were frequent. Nevertheless, they were isolated cases.

In general, however, according to qualified military observers, the attitude of Russian officers and men gave an impression of uneasiness and a lack of understanding of the tasks they had been given, and there were several cases of desertion.

Moreover, the overwhelming problem was the feeding of the Russian troops, who were generally compelled to live in the country; this would explain certain cases of collusion noted in Budapest, as in many other places, between the occupying forces and the rebels.

C - POPULARITY OF IMRE NAGY

In the course of a few days, NAGY's popularity underwent rapid fluctuations; the nation's only hope on the eve of the outbreak and enthusiastically called for by the crowd on 25 October, Imre NAGY suddenly lost favour, gradually recovered it in a few days and, at the time of the second Russian intervention in Budapest, was first favourite in the eyes of the public.

(a) Immense popularity of NAGY on the eve of the revolution

The "NAGY question", posed in public for the first time at the celebrated meeting of the PETOFI Club on 27 June 1956, dominates the whole of the pre-revolutionary period. Succeeding RAKOSI on 18 July, GERÖ was generally regarded as having much the same outlook as his predecessor, and it was thought by many that he would not be able to retain power for long. The attacks in the press were aimed at other friends of RAKOSI, the two FARKAS, Gyory NON, Erik MOLNAR; GERÖ was the target behind them.

In October, after Imre NAGY's re-integration in the Party, demonstrations in his favour became more frequent: in the University Department of Economic Sciences, where he resumed his lectures, in the Kossuth Club, where writers read poems in his honour, etc. In the Party, he had an active and devoted "guard". Peasants, workers, intellectuals pinned all their hopes on a revival of his programme of July 1953, i.e. the end of forced collectivization of small farms, of priority for heavy industry, of bureaucratic control in literature and art, and a return to support for individual peasants and small craftsmen and, generally speaking, a higher standard of living for the population combined with a more liberal government.

(b) Assumption of power, loss of popularity

At what precise moment did NAGY take office? At 10 a.m. on 24 October, Radio Budapest announced that the Central Committee, which had sat during the night; had proposed him as President of the Council; 50 minutes later, the same station broadcast a communiqué which read: "In view of the seriousness of the situation created by the destruction and crimes committed by bands of armed reactionaries, the Government has decided, in accordance with the Treaty of Warsaw, to request the support of Russian forces stationed in Hungary." But what Government? That of HEGEDUS, which was on its way out, or that of NAGY, in process of being formed - the NAGY who was not to read his Government statement until 12.10 p.m. or to issue the list of his cabinet until 27 October?

Public opinion was confused. Many people held NAGY responsible for calling in the Russians, to which he might have replied by recalling the facts. Engaged in fighting in Budapest on 24 October before dawn, the Russian units had received the order to intervene long before there was any question of HEGEDUS' resignation.

But he then became the target of another criticism; why assume power in such circumstances and appear to give his blessing to Russian intervention? NAGY confined himself to stating that for several days he had been a "prisoner". Are we

to understand from that that he was compelled to take office? This seems likely, because on 13 October, warned by a leakage from GERÖ's circle of the manoeuvre that the latter was planning, NAGY seems to have been reluctant to accept the leadership of the opposition movement of the 23rd; on the other hand, the anti-Nagyists, swept away by the wave of popular feeling, were probably obliged to turn, as to a saviour, to the man they wished to destroy.

The question can only be settled when the deliberations of the Central Council during the night of 23-24 October are known. One thing is certain: in taking, or in being compelled to take, office on the 24th, when the Russian tanks were in action in the capital, NAGY immediately lost his popularity. He was to attempt to regain it and would succeed, but at the price of his downfall.

(c) NAGY renews contact with the workers

NAGY's statement of 25 October (Radio Budapest 3.30 p.m.) still followed the Moscow line: "Against orders, counter-revolutionary groups have taken up arms ...". At the same time, however, NAGY gave assurances with regard to his Government's intention of obtaining "the withdrawal of foreign troops" and of attempting to establish with the Soviet Union "relations on the basis of equality". Once again, was NAGY a free agent? Was he not himself terrified by the sweep of events? The fact remains that from 24 to 28 October he threatened the resisters with martial law, but every day agreed to a further postponement of their surrender.

Then on 26 October a new feature appeared in the revolutionary movement: the "Nepszava", the trade union newspaper, published a vast programme of reforms and claims, which won the immediate support of the majority of the workers on the one hand and of Imre NAGY himself on the other. This most constructive programme (inter alia providing for the setting up of workers' councils) allowed the Head of the Government to make contact with the working classes. During the succeeding days, NAGY made frequent appeals to the workers, such as the metal workers of Borsod, the miners at Zala, and others.

On the 27th, although they still seemed very suspicious of him (evidence of a worker at Csepel), contact had been re-established.

In the provinces, however, several "free" towns refused to acknowledge his authority.

(d) The decisive stage: 28 October

28 October marks a decisive stage in NAGY's recovery of popularity. In a broadcast at 5.30 p.m., he discarded the thesis of the revolution led by "counter-revolutionary elements". "As a manifestation of the country's strength, a great democratic and patriotic movement has come into being, embracing the whole of our people and asserting its authority with increasing force. In future, Hungarian socialism must progress along the following lines: national independence and sovereignty and democratization of social, economic and political life." The talk was anticipated by a leading article in the "Szabad Nep" of the same day, which also rejected the thesis of the "Fascist putsch". "The rising is a popular movement for independence and freedom, uniting peasants, workers and intellectuals: that is what many Hungarian communists have failed to understand." This article showed that henceforth NAGY was the leading spirit in the Central Committee. Another decisive event of that day: at 3.30 p.m., the Ministers of the Interior and of Defence broadcast a cease-fire order which implicitly concerned the Russian troops. On the next day, 29 October, the order was confirmed and clarified: the rebels would surrender to Hungarian forces and would enjoy to some extent the honours of war, while the Russian troops would begin their withdrawal.

On 30 October, the Military situation became clearer; the last pockets of resistance led by Colonel MALETER went over to the Government and the Russians evacuated the capital, but remained in the eastern suburbs.

His political action of 28 to 30 October brought NAGY further support, which in certain cases was still conditional, because subject to the total withdrawal of the Russians. It was, however, decisive. Among NAGY's new adherents was the revolutionary council of GYOR, led by Attila SZIGETI, who on 30 October raised the council's status to that of the representative body of the whole of Trans-Danubia.

On 30 and 31 October, the position of NAGY, who very early on had received the support of the revolutionary committee of the Budapest intellectuals, was thus decisively consolidated among both peasants and workers. Although there was still some suspicion of him among the masses, the revolutionary authorities they had elected were increasingly rallying round the Government. The situation, however, was not yet stabilized.

(e) The last stage of the revolution

At 6.15 p.m. on 1 November, it was announced over the wireless that that morning NAGY had called on the Russian Ambassador in order (1) to protest against the arrival

of fresh Russian reinforcements, (2) to insist on the withdrawal of the troops, (3) to denounce the Treaty of Warsaw, (4) to proclaim Hungarian neutrality and (5) to announce the Hungarian appeal to the United Nations.

At 8 o'clock, NAGY himself went to the Radio-Budapest microphone and confirmed those decisions.

What was the result?

It may be that NAGY's attitude made the Russians hesitate, which would explain why the re-entry of the tanks into the capital took place only on the 4th. What is certain is that the whole country gave its backing to a man who had just given proof of his devotion to national independence. NAGY felt strong enough to arrest BUDAS, and on 2 November that group's paper "Magyar Függetlenség" announced its support of the Government. On 2 and 3 November, despite the week-end, there was an enthusiastic return to work, which seems to have become general on Monday 5 November. At 1.35 p.m. on 3 November, the formation of a genuine cabinet of national union was announced. Complete order had been restored, the National Guard, the majority of them workers and students, was being organized as well as possible and the ruins and damage were being energetically cleared away.

NAGY had brought off the feat of rallying Hungarian opinion to his own person. At the price of his downfall

(f) The massive intervention of the Soviet Union army and the fall of NAGY

The drama of Imre NAGY is very complex and the details are still not known. It is safe enough to say, however, that it may be interpreted as follows. Wishing to restore order and to achieve so far as was possible the major objectives of the revolution, while at the same time maintaining a Socialist regime in Hungary, NAGY had to re-establish his personal authority, the foundations of which had been undermined by the circumstances of his return to power. But in order to recover that authority, he was forced into direct opposition with the intentions of Moscow, in so far as the Russian leaders might finally choose the policy of the worse alternative.

NAGY fell, but his popularity was unshaken. He had kept the respect, and in certain cases the affection, of the people. The kidnapping of himself and of his companions on 23 November as they were leaving the Yugoslav Legation, where they had taken refuge on 4 November, gave rise to popular indignation and bestowed on NAGY a martyr's crown.

D. UNPOPULARITY OF KADAR. STALINIST "REACTION"

In the light of four months' experience, it now seems clear that what certain of the Russian leaders and GERÖ (not to speak of RAKOSI) felt was needed was not only to halt decisively the "de-Stalinization" of Hungary, but to turn back the pages both in the political, and in the economic field.

In all this KADAR has been but a plaything in the hands of the Soviet Union and its increasingly Stalinist followers.

For how can one explain so many political inconsistencies, so many contradictions on the radio and in his "governmental" action, except by the fact that KADAR is only a mouthpiece at the microphone and a puppet in the Government?

This is what he was, even before he came to power. It will be recalled, for example, that Pravda, on 4 November, published an open letter signed by KADAR, APRO, COSSA and MUNNICH, in which the signatories stated that, having observed the extent to which Imre NAGY was being "overrun" by the "forces of reaction", they had resigned from his Government as from 1 November. It was on this last date, however, at about 10 p.m., that KADAR, having followed NAGY's example by proclaiming the authentically revolutionary and national character of the insurrection, conjured up on Radio Budapest the prospect of foreign military intervention and of a Hungary destined to share the fate of Korea, in order to reach the conclusion that it was necessary "to close ranks around the Party". It is, of course, not unlikely that, during the discussions on 31 October between KADAR, MUNNICH and NAGY on the one hand, and MIKOYAN and SOUSLOV on the other, the Russians took KADAR aside in order to warn him of the course events would take on 4 November, and to let him know that Moscow was counting on him to replace NAGY as Prime Minister. It is, however, at least equally plausible that on the return of the Soviet Union forces into Budapest, the Russians compelled KADAR and his subordinates to antedate their resignation from the Cabinet of Imre NAGY. Only in this way could their propaganda have the valid excuse of an appeal to the Russian forces from a Hungarian "Government".⁽¹⁾ Whichever of these hypotheses is correct, it leads to the same conclusion: that it was only through

(1) A "Government" which, according to Radio Szolnok on 4 November at 6 a.m., apparently had its seat at Szolnok and not at the Palace of Parliament where Imre NAGY was in process of closing down his offices before taking refuge in the Yugoslav Legation.

the intervention of the Soviet Union that the KADAR "Government" saw the light of day. Since then, on the strength of certain evidence, its liberty of action has become more and more suspect:

1. The Palace of Parliament, the seat of the government, was up to 1 January guarded, inside and out, by Soviet Union soldiers who have now been partly replaced by civilians.
2. MUNNICH who combines the functions of Minister of the Interior and Head of the Police, has had forced upon him the co-operation of the Soviet Union authorities as well as that of the AVH whom they rescued. Certain Soviet Union elements are still to be found in the offices of his staff. His powers of decision are so restricted that in certain cases he refers applicants directly to the Soviet Union headquarters. He has made remarks to certain visitors, which led them to doubt even his liberty of movement.
3. There is every reason to think that KADAR had his hand forced at the time of the time of the kidnapping of Imre NAGY and his supporters. The documents published in Belgrade vouch for the fact that the head of the "Government" concluded, on 21 November, with the Yugoslav authorities, an agreement, which KADAR seems to have had all the less reason to evade, in that the tone of his references to NAGY and his supporters seemed at the time to imply a possible enlargement of his cabinet in the direction of the Nagy-ist wing of Hungarian communism.

On the 23 November "Nepakarat" states that, after the kidnapping, the "Cabinet" sat until 1.30 a.m.; after which KADAR took the whole responsibility for the deportation of Imre NAGY and his companions and accused them of treason and many other misdeeds.

But KADAR's vacillations in his dealings with the revolutionary committees and the worker's councils demonstrate equally well, how limited were his powers. There was, as we know, a moment when, the active fighting having practically finished, the resistance took on particularly dangerous passive forms, especially in the factories, offices, public services, etc. i.e. general strikes, revolving strikes, and constantly everywhere, go-slow strikes. Without a sufficient number of political police, it was doubtless difficult to use force as a means of quelling this extremely recalcitrant attitude of the workers. Apparently, therefore, the puppet government were given by the Soviet authorities the task of negotiating, as best they might, with the above-mentioned de facto authorities.

KADAR promised the negotiators almost anything, from increases in wages to free, multi-party, elections or the revision of the Warsaw Pact, from the evacuation of the Soviet Union forces after the re-establishment of order to the retention by Hungary of the proceeds from the mining of Magyar uranium.

Weeks went by in conversations of this kind, without work being anywhere seriously resumed. The Soviet Union authorities, having no doubt decided at a certain point, that that was quite enough, on 26 November KADAR more or less suddenly broke off negotiations, both with the revolutionary committees, whom he insulted before dissolving them, and with the workers' councils. (The Central Council of Greater Budapest, believing that they could continue their dealings with the "government", soon found that KADAR's tone was now quite different.) All the same, the situation was sufficiently embarrassing to cause KADAR, with the support of the "Provisional Central Committee" of the Party to get rid of the principal negotiator by simply having Ferenc MUNNICH relieve him of his post.

In the two-and-a-half months, which have gone by since, it is possible to measure the distance travelled by the Communist "reaction" since KADAR's various promises:

on 11 November KADAR still publicly asserted his intention to negotiate the withdrawal of the Soviet Union troops as soon as order was re-established. Now, when there has been a general resumption of work, there is not the slightest evidence that such negotiations are near at hand. On the contrary, in a speech on 5 February KADAR openly took to task those who were criticizing the presence of the Soviet Union army on Hungarian soil. "For us", he said, "the Russian soldiers are not foreigners". There is no longer any question, either, of a revision of the Warsaw Pact.

on 11 November KADAR declared that the A.V.H. was well and truly dead. In fact, however, it is only necessary to travel about the country to establish that, although absorbed in the police forces, A.V.H. has kept its traditional uniform and is more flourishing than ever. Numerous persons, who have had dealings with the political police in the past, have recognized their former interrogators or torturers.

on 1 January KADAR still admitted in public the principle of every schoolboy's and student's right to study the foreign language of his choice. In fact, however, the month had not passed, before the Finance Minister, KOSSA, was declaring that, if the "government" approved this freedom, there was no question

of its applying to young children. In the last few days it is the lack of teachers qualified to teach western languages, which is being invoked to justify the re-establishment of the obligatory teaching of Russian.

during the period when KADAR was still making the fantastic statements of the early days of his "Government", the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs confirmed to western diplomats who visited him the intentions attributed to the head of the "Government": there would be free elections in Hungary; the various political parties could then present their respective candidates; if the majority of votes was not communist the latter would relinquish control of the Government, etc. Now, however, there is beginning to be talk once more in the Government papers of the parliament elected under the RAKOSI régime. The deputies, it is explained, are beginning once more to fulfil their mandate as before the revolution. It is not exactly stated whether they are making contact with their electors nor what reception they have been given. The possibility cannot be excluded, however, that in the security of a palace partially guarded by the Soviet Union army, the so-called permanent commissions of this institution are being re-assembled with a view to a plenary session. As to new elections, they are never mentioned.

at the end of November, and even at the beginning of this year, as a counterweight to the preponderant influence of the workers' councils, the Soviet Union - Hungarian authorities made much of the role of the so-called "free" Magyar trade unions. The latter replied by demanding the setting up of electoral procedures for the constitution of trade union branches. The Government Press approved of these demands and meanwhile applauded the reforming of the central trades union organization. There were enrolled therein a majority of persons with socialist rather than communist leanings, but the Secretariat remained in the hands of the RAKOSI-ist Gaspar SANDOR. As in the time of RAKOSI, it is the latter who is still the unchallenged master of the trades union organization, and any electoral procedure for the reappointment of officers has been postponed on the grounds naively explained in the press that there are still in the trades unions too many "fascists", "counter revolutionaries" and "traitors" to the cause of the proletariat.

finally, it is necessary to examine the problem of the workers' councils, remembering with what extravagant eulogies KADAR greeted this achievement of the revolution. Now, however, the workers' councils are only allowed to function individually in each factory. No co-operation is permitted between them, nor any central body. Completely abandoned by a "Government" which on the morrow of the revolution promised its aid, exposed without guidance or defence to the hazards of a situation without precedent in the country, many workers' councils have got into such an impossible position that they have preferred to resign. Some at Csepel caused international repercussions. The Workers' Organizations, properly elected and themselves choosing the managers of the undertakings, were reproached by the Soviet Union-Hungarian authorities for dismissing or refusing to engage workers reputed to be Communists, banning the official paper of KADAR's "Workers Socialist Party" etc.

E - SOCIAL CATEGORIES AND THE REVOLUTION

(a) - The Peasantry

The pre-revolutionary period was marked in the countryside by a growing irritation on the part of the peasant masses towards the local Communist leaders. The latter were quite determined, even after the fall of RAKOSI, to disregard both the resolutions of the XXth Congress and the methods of applying them in Hungary decided on in July 1956 by the Central Committee of the Party. This unrest was especially noticeable during the public meetings in connexion with the rehabilitation of the "Kulaks" where the solidarity of the whole peasant population with their least poor or most rich members made a mockery of the charges brought by the local authorities⁽¹⁾.

The peasantry, freed from practically all State control while the revolution lasted, as soon as it could reach without too much danger the centre of Budapest brought in massive quantities of the food supplies which were so lacking in the last days of the street battles. The markets of Budapest were marked this autumn by an abundance unknown for many years. State food collection being, for all practical purposes, abolished⁽²⁾, the farmer no longer disguised the amount of his production and only stocked for family needs.

(1) In Hungary the collectivised part of the agricultural economy did not exceed a quarter of the arable lands before the revolution of October-November 1956.

(2) The Party newspaper "Nepszabadsag" echoed on 27 November the doubts of the peasantry as to the permanence of this abolition publicly proclaimed by Imre NAGY and KADAR.

To the nightmare of the permanent State food collection were added, under the pre-revolutionary regime, various types of persecution to which the peasant was exposed if he did not lend himself in one form or another to the collectivisation of agriculture. Last summer, however, the tragic necessities of the national food supply forced the regime, very much against its will, to take the desperate course of solemnly promising the individual farmers that they would be treated on the same footing as the collective farmers as regards the supply of equipment, fertilizers and credits. But the government, or rather those of its members who with the President Istvan DOBI supported this new policy, had the very greatest difficulty in getting the compliance of the representatives of the regime in the countryside and shortly before the revolution new and important credit discriminations were announced in favour of the co-operatives by HEGEDUS, prime minister under RAKOSI and GERÖ.

The revolution resulted in a decisive weakening of the agricultural co-operatives. More than ever the peasantry considered that the "Kolkhozi" were finished and we are now watching the collapse, perhaps the final collapse, of the whole of what in an artificial manner and with such difficulty was built up in this field during the last five years.

The KADAR "government" are thus faced with a fait accompli against which they have obviously decided that for the moment nothing can be done. They are simply trying to minimize their defeat either by putting the blame once more on the "criminal" policy of the RAKOSI - GERÖ clique "which acted in an illegal manner by force and fraud" (Nepszabadsag of 23 November) or by insisting that only the inefficient co-operatives have disappeared "which is no bad thing" (Nepszabadsag of 28 November).

In short, the peasantry was revolutionary and adapted itself perfectly to the anarchy which to a greater or lesser degree took the place in the countryside of the reign of the local tyrants. It kept the insurrection, the resistance and the maquis abundantly supplied but apparently it did not approve of the general strike and reacted against the fall in prices, which resulted from the insufficiency of means of transport to the towns, by the immediate and spontaneous reconstitution of the selling and purchasing co-operatives.

At the time of writing this report, purchase and leasing of land is still allowed and the peasants who have recovered their liberty as well as the "Kulaks" have not apparently suffered from any new measures of persecution. In the existing anarchy the one fixed point remains the gratitude of the peasantry for Imre NAGY.

(b) The workers The workers were the advance guard of the revolution and up to the beginning of this year its rear guard. The fierceness of the workers against the regime which never ceased to proclaim that popular democracy was, so to speak, at their service, must have caused surprise in some quarters. The most astounded were no doubt the Stalinists, who like GERÖ had worked ceaselessly to create a powerful industry with the intention of creating, through the influx of the peasants into the towns, a strong group of supporters and in case of need a militia ready to sacrifice themselves for the regime and to strike at the refractory elements in the other classes and particularly in the intelligentsia.

It should be noted that the participation of the workers in the demonstrations of the 23rd October is partly explainable by the fact that the students who took the initiative in these demonstrations had by reason of their social origin relations and friends among the proletariat of the workers' quarters of which GERÖ brought the youngest elements into the city in order to have them at hand for the moment when he calculated that the repression would commence.

Conversely the students had included from the 21st October onwards, in their statement of demands distributed to the public from the 22nd, items which more particularly concerned the workers: increase in wages; revision of the "norms" of work and above all the establishment of "workers' councils".

But the fundamental fact is that the workers, far from being the "spoilt darlings" of the regime were in fact its outcasts. Reacting against accusations of "fascism" or "counter-revolution" the trades union paper "Nepakarat" published on the 19th December a most revealing article justifying the insurrection of the workers by attacking the organization of industry before the revolution.

The action of the workers during the revolution had a double aspect. On the one hand they set up with an extraordinary rapidity the workers' councils, which had been authorized by Imre NAGY and KADAR, immediately after the trades union newspaper "Nepszava" had put forward the idea during the first days of the revolution. We have seen, above, how, after the 4th November, the Soviet-Hungarian authorities finally treated these councils, and the enthusiasm and efficiency with which the general strike of the 11th and 12th December (decreed by the Central Council of Greater Budapest, simultaneously with its suppression by the police) was observed showed the extent to which these councils corresponded to the desires of the Hungarian workers for emancipation. On the other hand the workers played a big part in all the street battles against the Soviet forces and their Hungarian associates. Thus it was, that, after ceasing in the city of Budapest itself, the struggle continued until the 9th November in the workers' suburbs such as Csepel. It was also at Csepel that there occurred in January the troubles caused by the resignation of the workers' councils of several important factories. From time to time the population of the capital was startled by heavy explosions caused, it was said, by workers' sabotage in the suburbs. Although work has now been resumed the spirit of resistance of the workers is still strong and they are determined at all costs to avoid falling back into the slavery of the RAKOSI and GERÖ regime.

Today on the political level the proletariat is as opposed to communism as the rest of the nation and it is for example inadvisable when trying to obtain or keep a job under the workers' councils to show communist leanings, to read "Nepszabadsag" or to be supported by the local branch of the KADAR party even if it is tolerated in the factory.

Effective resistance was, above all, located in the workers' battalions which were particularly favourable ground. The principal hero of the revolution, Colonel MALETER, was the commander of the battalions of miners, and it is certain that he has founded resistance groups within these units. From 1945 onwards, in each Headquarters, officers were secretly waiting for a favourable opportunity to show their anti-Russian feelings. The first signs of this way of thinking were noticed at the time of the demonstration in the PETOFI Club on 27 June 1956, which was held in the officers' institute and attended by numerous officers in uniform. From that date onward, the progressive liberalization of the Press was also doing its work in the army; thus on the 23 of October in the afternoon, numerous officers and soldiers of all arms were seen among the crowd wearing on their uniforms the emblem of Kossuth. At about 11 p.m., near the radio building, some officers abandoned their equipment and, perched on the lorries of the insurgents, harangued the crowd, assuring them that the army was on their side.

On the 24, 25 and 26 of October, arms were distributed to the population, while tanks with their crews spontaneously joined the insurgents, mostly on the spur of the moment and on the initiative of some of their members. From then on, the units, fully disorganized by the defection or absence of their cadres who had individually joined the insurgents in Budapest or in the maquis, were hardly usable on the one side or the other. For the most part, the army accepted with enthusiasm and took advantage of the declarations of NAGY on the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and the denunciation of the Warsaw Pact. The alleged movement of Horthyist officers, which is supposed to have been getting ready on the Austrian frontier, can only have been an affair of individuals with an absurdly small influence on the course of events. It should perhaps be recalled that an important section of the resistance movement inspired by MALETER was itself Communist in sympathy.

However, in the country as a whole and from the very fact of the dis-organization and disarray described above, the revolutionary action of the army could not have had that spontaneous character which was observed in the insurgent groups. Furthermore, although having accepted in general the aims of the first phase of the revolution, no important unit was in a position to fight a pitched battle with the Soviet forces. Nonetheless, many groups were heroically destroyed in unequal combat with the Soviet tanks, thus giving an irrefutable proof of the feelings of the immense majority of the army towards the occupying power.

(c) The small craftsmen

In 1948 the Regime announced its intention of proletarianizing the small craftsmen class which was a comparatively numerous one (particularly in Budapest) in an under-industrialized country, constituting an extremely conservative petite bourgeoisie.

In the absence of any effort to replace them by a development of light industry, the suppression of the small craftsmen class carried out between 1948 and 1953 caused serious disturbances in the economy (no one knew where to get his shoes repaired or his electric iron mended etc.)

It fell to Imre NAGY (June 1953 - March 1955) to reconstitute the small craftsmen class which, in spite of its official suppression on the economic level, had maintained its psychological and social cohesion. They came together every Sunday at the stadium to cheer wildly the KINISZI football club which was drawn from the areas traditionally inhabited by this section of the population. The first NAGY Government, therefore, issued licenses. The small craftsmen had many difficulties in procuring their raw materials but they managed to supplement them by many ingenious means.

The return to power of RAKOSI, in spite of certain official assurances, seemed once more to threaten the existence of the small craftsmen class who were systematically loaded with taxes. The small craftsmen therefore joined the October 1956 rising en bloc. Their quarter of Ferenczvaros, crossed diagonally by Ullof street and Ferenc boulevard, suffered more than any other in the whole of Budapest.

(d) The Honved (the army)

As a whole, the Hungarian army, which was set up in 1949, has always offered a passive resistance to the Soviet ascendancy which made itself felt down to regimental level by the presence of military commissars. Cases of individual indiscipline continued to increase, compelling the Government, in January 1954, to create special military tribunals. It was during this same period that the Minister of National Defence, desiring apparently to infuse new life into this dispirited army, appealed, when trying to build up its moral fibre, to the most ancient traditions of Hungarian history.

Nevertheless, at the time of the departure from Austria of the Soviet occupation troops, numerous officers no longer concealed the hopes to which this new situation gave rise and their desire to see the Soviet influence come to an end. At this period, qualified observers were referring to the difficulties which the Warsaw Pact Command would encounter in the case of hostilities.

The reconquest of Hungary by the Soviet Army and the Stalinist reaction taking place in the country are leaving practically nothing of the Hungarian Army as it was.

The militia units which have replaced it are a rather pitiable sight and it is necessary to pay large bonuses to the militia members in order to recruit volunteers for night patrols in the city.

(e) The intellectuals

Adopting the distinction used by the regime itself of "old" and "new" intelligentsia, it could be stated with little risk of error that the generation which finished its studies before 1948 was of bourgeois origin for the most part, with a few exceptions (the "workers'" writer Lajos KASSAK for example). The generation who began their higher education after 1948 and whose talents were not yet fully developed in 1956 included according to the official statistics nearly 60 per cent of young people of working or peasant origin.

As regards political tendencies, of the 300 members of the Association of Writers before the revolution more than half were members of the Communist Party (this proportion was clearly much less in other sections of the intelligentsia). Besides the communists there were the "fellow travellers" (recruited specially from among the former National-Peasants like Peter VERESS and Gyula ILLYES) and those without party, going from the right wing of the National-Peasants to two extreme right wing elements.

The October revolution gave expression to the deep longings of all sections of society but it is not exaggerated to say that the intellectuals and more especially the writers were the most active originators. To trace the revolutionary agitation of the Hungarian intelligentsia to its source it is necessary to go back a fairly long way. We will confine ourselves to recalling the memorable vote taken at the end of November 1955 at a meeting of the party organization of the Association of Writers: By 136 votes to 33 the communists of this association refused to give way to RAKOSI, who required them to repudiate a celebrated "memorandum" of the month of September. It was at this date that the positions were taken up which ended in the revolution of October 1956. A great majority of the communist intellectuals insisted upon de-Stalinization.

This militant wing of Hungarian communism took a decisive step in breaking with Stalinism. It remained for them to find allies, to extricate themselves from the

isolation in which their adherence to the regime had placed them and to regain contact with the people. It is to be observed in passing that this regaining of contact was not unrelated to strictly professional considerations. Since 1953 there was a ceaseless official denunciation of the ravages of "dogmatism". In order to renew their "socialist realism" many writers, leaving their ivory towers, greatly extended their sociological enquiries and their human contacts. The best known communist writers had their eyes opened to a reality which they certainly felt as tragic: the regime had no popular backing whatsoever.

The XXth Congress favoured the alliance between these anti-Stalinist Communists and the non-Communist but democratic elements, who were not lacking in the Intelligentsia. This alliance was a phenomenon of the greatest importance. It formed the basis of what was later to become the "revolutionary union". It was consolidated by RAKOSI's attempts to slow down the "march of history", or even to reverse its direction through, for example, the Central Committee's declaration of 30 June, referred to in part A of the present report.

This alliance was not limited to the Association of Writers who, at their General Assembly on 17 September 1956, made significant changes in their principal officers.

It showed itself also in University circles, to quote only the following instances:

The celebrated Marxist philosopher György LUKACS was to be seen acknowledging the applause of students hostile to the regime; the Marxist historian Erik MOLNAR broke with his Stalinist colleague Elizabeth ANDICS, and offered his hand to the non-Marxist historian Dominic KOSARY, etc.

The agitation, following upon the XXth Congress, redoubled itself on the fall of RAKOSI (18 July), which was hailed as a victory, though one which GERO was suspected of wishing to call in question. The students, at the beginning of the September term, were extremely restive and many of the demands which were to be publicly proclaimed on 23 October were first put forward at a multitude of meetings in the preceding weeks. The alliance between Communists and non-Communists was, in fact, followed by two other similar happenings, the effect of which was to strengthen still further the cohesiveness of the revolutionary forces: i.e. the alliance, on the one hand of the old intellectuals, and in particular of the old Communists, with the Youth, acclaimed, for example, at the celebrated meeting of the PETOFI Club on 27 June, by

Tiber DERY; and the alliance, on the other hand, between the intellectuals and the workers, due above all to the fact that a large proportion of the students were of proletarian origin. Were the Hungarian intellectuals hoping that the revolution would take the violent form which it did? Clearly not. On 26 October at 6.45 p.m., Gyula HAY, addressing himself to the Youth on the wireless, urged them to remain calm. But the die was cast; the people were not to be held back. The revolutionary instinct of the crowds, combined with the eagerness of the young militants, set aside the limits, which the "moderate" intellectuals sought to impose. What was going to be the attitude of the anti-Stalinist Communists? Would they, through loyalty to the Party, abandon the people? Or, through loyalty to the people, abandon the Party? They thought the dilemma could be avoided: to remain with the people was still the best way to help the party and save the country.

The Communist intellectuals were therefore bound to be completely opposed to the Soviet re-intervention of 4 November. For the same reasons those who, no doubt few in number, have still kept their Communist beliefs, are today partisans of NAGY.

Before the 23 October, the Writers' Association had for a long time been the only forum for exchanges of opinion: the PETOFI Club and the KOSSUTH Club were only founded in the preceding summer; meetings of various kinds did not take place extensively until September.

After the 23 October there was a flowering of revolutionary committees and other groupings, which all became platforms for the expression of the ideas and desires of the Intelligentsia. The most representative of these was the revolutionary Council of Hungarian intellectuals, founded at the end of November, under the leadership of the Communist György MARKOS, during a meeting of the delegates of a large number of intellectuals (members of the teaching profession, students, artists, musicians, etc.), and including a representative of the Association of Writers, the seniority of which remained nevertheless unchallenged.

The KADAR Government liquidated all these bodies. The decree of 5 December prohibited the revolutionary councils and committees. The Association of Students was brought to heel on 12 January. On the 17 January the Government suspended the activities of the Association of Writers and, on the 19th, the Association of Journalists underwent the same fate. These administrative measures were succeeded by police prosecutions. From the beginning of December the searches and arrests multiplied themselves. On 12 January, eight Nagyist members of the Executive

Committee of the Association of Students were arrested. On the 31 January it was the turn of a dozen young professors. About the middle of November, the journalists Ivan BOLDIZSAR, Miklos GIMES and Tiber PETO received the attention of the police. At the end of December, the Association of Writers had two more members arrested, Joseph GALI and Gyula FEKETE (Lajos TAMASI, Dezsö KERESZTURY and Andras SANDOR having been first arrested and then released); on the 20 January, the writers Tiber TARDOS, Gyula HAY, Zoltan ZELK, Balazs LENGYEL and Domonkos VARGA were arrested "for good" (four of them are Communists) together with the journalists Pal LOCSEI and Sandor NOVOBATZKY. At the beginning of December, a dozen mining engineers underwent the same fate.

One of the tasks which the KADAR Government set itself has therefore been achieved: the intellectual opposition has been muzzled. For the moment the only "intellectuals" who are making themselves heard are the youngest among them - the schoolboys, who are burning their Russian textbooks, "ragging" their Communist teachers etc.

But it is impossible to believe that the Hungarian Intelligentsia has said its last word. While waiting for the day when it can once more express itself freely, it intends to use all the means at its disposal to keep the "flame of revolution" alive. It counts especially:

1. on literature and the clandestine press (written and oral);
2. on infiltrating into and silently reconquering the chief cultural organizations of a country, whose regime is not so firmly in the saddle that it can afford to do without the assistance of its enemies.

The Hungarian intellectuals do not count the revolution as over: apart from a few hardened Stalinists, and allowing for the small number who have chosen to continue the struggle for their country from abroad (Tamas ACZEL, Pal IGNOTUS, Endre PALOCZI-HORVATH), the great majority of Hungarian writers, united among each other, united with the nation, have remained in their country to carry on.