# Situation Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Changes</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. A New Twist to Personnel Changes?</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Party and Government Reshuffle</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shortages</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Ceausescu Descends on Bucharest Food Markets</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Relations</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Romanian-American Exchange of Views on Human Rights Continues</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. US Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci Visits Romania</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Economic Relations</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. Economic Relations with Greece</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7. Synthetic Diamond Production</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Copper Mining and Refining</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. Rice Paddies and Cotton Plantations in Romania?</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Student Help with Harvesting Proves Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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GOVERNMENT CHANGES

1. A New Twist to Personnel Changes?

On October 8 Romanian party and state leader Nicolae Ceausescu addressed a plenum of the RCP Central Committee. It was in many ways a typical performance: wordy; laudatory of party, that is, his own, policies; admitting shortcomings in implementation but not fundamental flaws in the design; and making dubiously ambitious predictions for the performance of one economic branch or another, despite the shortages and often gross mismanagement in virtually all sectors, all of which has been the result of Ceausescu's unrealistic policies, his centralized and egotistical style of rule, and his refusal to admit that this is the fundamental reason for the country's current malaise. His only responses are regularly to urge better application of his policies and periodically to shuffle high officials to provide an illusion of change and to set up scapegoats. (1)

And so it was with the latest speech. The steel industry was praised but without mention that the leadership's virtual fixation on this area, an old Stalinist favorite, has led to an overproduction that is often unmarketable abroad but that has frequently been produced from costly imported raw materials. The harvest of 1,000 kilograms of cereal per capita was also singled out for favorable mention, but there was no reference to bread rationing or to the absence of bread throughout much of the countryside. Some administrative palliatives were offered: the Supreme Council for Economic and Social Development is to be transformed into a sort of economic parliament and given legislative powers, although existing Romanian law reserves truly parliamentary prerogatives for the Grand National Assembly. Another such measure was Ceausescu's call for the convocation of a RCP National Conference for December 16 to 18, although, again considering the proven nature of his rule, such a gathering is unlikely to offer more than carefully choreographed cheerleading in yet another mobilization exercise for the leadership's economic strategy and programs.

Again, foreign scapegoats for the country's problems were cited, including the CMEA. Ceausescu has long called both for an expansion of the organization's activity but on Romania's terms, that is, technology transfer and an adequate supply of cheap energy and raw materials, and for a top-level meeting on a wide array of issues, especially energy and raw materials. In his latest speech he announced that "a meeting will soon be held on these questions," (2) but he did not elaborate on the level or competence of the gathering.

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(2) Agerpres, 8 October 1982.
Finally, the plenum announced some personnel changes. The most interesting are the following:

Cornel Burtica, former Minister of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation and lately party First Secretary in Prahova County, also lost his seats on the Political Executive Committee and the Central Committee. In the last 11 months the PEC has been reduced in various "purges" from 27 to 21 members. (3)

Burtica, who is believed by some to be a member of the Ceausescu clan by marriage, was said "to bear utmost responsibility" for "serious deviations registered in foreign trade activity, which considerably harmed the national economy." For months the hardy Romanian rumor mill has been predicting that he would eventually be put on trial as a demonstrative warning to other officials, and this latest move could well be yet another step en route to such a development. If so, together with the earlier complete eclipse of Virgil Trofin, this could suggest a new trend toward sending officials into oblivion and not just to a lesser job.

Ilie Verdet, former Prime Minister and another reputed member of the party and state leader's extended family, was "kicked up the ladder" in May to a figurehead Vice Presidency of the State Council. Many predicted his eventual demise as well, especially as the real reason for removal from the prime ministership was widely thought not to be administrative failure as charged, but rather supposed criticism of Ceausescu's basic economic policies. Verdet has now been named a party secretary, which hardly suggests that he has completely fallen from favor. In this context it is worth noting that elsewhere in his speech Ceausescu admitted that "many even among our friends have suggested to us that we concern ourselves too much with industrialization." (4) Might he be referring to "friends" within the RCP, such as Ilie Verdet? (5)

Virgil Cazacu gave up his job as CC Secretary to replace Burtica in Prahova, a post he had already taken up in August. This could be a routine rotation, as Ceausescu frequently moves powerful officials between Bucharest and the provinces lest they acquire an institutional or regional political base. A promotion seems, however, to be involved for Miu Dobrescu, a Political Executive Committee alternate member who now becomes a CC secretary.

In short, Ceausescu's speech and the accompanying personnel changes reflected his established practices in dealing with the country's social and economic problems. The possibly new twist is that at least one openly critical "friend" may have been allowed to stay in good political graces, and another official may be destined, for the political scrap heap.

Patrick Moore and George Cioranescu

(4) Radio Bucharest, 8 October 1982, 1900 hours.
(5) See his similar remarks on June 1 as cited in Romanian SR/11, RFER, 15 June 1982, Item 2.
2. Party and Government Reshuffle

Shakeups in the Romanian party and government have become almost routine, as Ceausescu often uses sudden personnel changes in order to keep officials on their toes and to retain his own power and control over party and state affairs by preventing potential rivals from acquiring power bases. This time the purges seem to be more significant and to be far more basic than the usual juggling of positions. In the past, when he was moving his staff around allegedly to give them the chance to learn various aspects of party and government affairs, Ceausescu also intended to stifle the anger and corruption in the higher party and state echelons. Now, with Romania's economy on the skids, the agricultural situation extremely serious, and staples in even shorter supply than last year when sugar, cooking oil, and bread rationing was introduced, it has become necessary to take firm measures, so Ceausescu has set up scapegoats. This is his typical reaction to the country's internal malaise, and, as is usual with the East European countries, the government, rather than the party, is being held responsible for the failures.

Last May, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and Chief of the Department of International Economic Cooperation Alexandru Margaritescu, and Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Doina Ardare were dismissed along with Deputy Ministers of Agriculture Adrian Rogojan and Enache Sirbu. The reason given for their removal was serious infringements of state laws and violation of financial and party regulations. Six days later a government reshuffle, one of the biggest in years, started and culminated with the ouster, after two years in office, of Prime Minister Ilie Verdet and seven of his aides. The same day Cornel Burtica, the Minister of Foreign Trade and a Deputy Prime Minister, was dismissed from both his positions. Later, Ceausescu said that "the changes, which included the replacement of Prime Minister Ilie Verdet and the dropping of Foreign Trade Minister Cornel Burtica, were not just a reshuffle and that must be well understood. The government had failed to carry out its job." (Both men, by the way, are widely believed to be members of Ceausescu's extended family.) Ceausescu added that the dismissal of the First Deputy Minister of Trade and two high officials in the food and agriculture sector, as well as the demotion of some top party officials, were not made because of shortcomings in these branches, but because "in foreign trade activity, state money was embezzled and stolen. Therefore we took those measures and dismissed a number of people working there." The new Prime Minister,

(6) Buletinul Oficial No. 47, 17 May 1982; and Romanian SR/9, AFER, 21 May 1982, Item 3.
(7) Scinteia, 22 May 1982.
(8) Ibid., 3 June 1982.
Constantin Dascalescu, who replaced Ilie Verdet on 21 May 1982, is a long-time associate of Ceausescu and is expected to be more thorough in executing his duties. Dascalescu threatened in his inaugural speech that his government would instigate inflexible discipline and take firm actions against those who infringed the law, no matter who they were or what their position in the hierarchy might be. (9)

As a result of this new policy, Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Constantin Popescu was released, (10) as were Deputy Minister of the Machine Building Industry Gheorghe Nestorescu and Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Marin Traistaru. (11) Two months later First Deputy Minister of Light Industry Magdalena Filipas, Deputy Minister of the Metallurgical Industry Stefan Constantinescu, and Deputy Minister of Transportation and Telecommunications Gheorghe Airinei also lost their jobs. (12) At the same time, three Deputy Prime Ministers were given additional duties and responsibilities: Ludovic Fazezakas was appointed Chairman of the Council for Coordination of Consumer Goods Production; Alexandrina Gainuse, Chairman of the Council for Coordination and Orientation in Providing Supplies and Services to the Population; and Gheorghe Petrescu, Chairman of the Governmental Commission for Economic and Technological Cooperation and Romanian Representative to the CMEA. Minister of Finance Petre Gigea was also made Chairman of the Finance and Banking Council. (13)

On 1 August 1982 Minister State Secretary for North American Affairs with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation Dumitru Bejan was replaced by Alexandru Rosu, who had been Deputy Minister of the Machine Building Industry. (14) No official explanation was given for this change. No new assignment for Bejan has been announced, and his dismissal could be connected with Ceausescu's accusations of theft and embezzlement in foreign trade activities.

On September 10 Romanian Minister of Tourism and Sports Ion Tudor, who had been appointed to this post only on 9 March 1982, was replaced by Nicolae Gavrilescu who had been a Vice-Chairman of the Galati County People's Council since January 1982. (15) On October 3 Nicolae Ceausescu paid a visit to the Bucharest markets where he criticized shortcomings in the sale, storage, and classification of the market products. (16) He dismissed three officials on the spot. (17) Following Ceausescu's visit,

(9) Ibid., 22 May 1982.
(10) Buletinul Oficial No. 54, 9 June 1982.
(11) Ibid., No. 60, 30 June 1982.
(12) Ibid., No. 74, 30 August 1982.
(13) Ibid., No. 74, 30 August 1982.
(14) Agerpres, 1 August 1982.
(16) Romania Libera, 4 October 1982.
(17) For details, see Item 3, below.
a "command" of the Bucharest Obor Market was established to coordinate the supply and sale of vegetables, fruit, and other produce and to organize the stands in order to avoid overcrowding, according to Dumitru Milea, chief of one of Bucharest's commercial services. (18)

Just two days before the RCP CC plenum (7-8 October 1982), there was again a rash of dismissals and changes. Central Committee Secretary Marin Enache was released by presidential decree from his post as Chairman of the Central Council of Workers' Control over Economic and Social Activities. His position was taken over by Ilie Verdet. (19) Gheorghe Blaj was released as Chairman of the Central Council of Artisans' Cooperatives (UCECOM), but it was announced that he would receive another appointment. He was replaced by Petre Danica, a candidate member of the RCP Political Executive Committee. (20)

On October 8 "sweeping changes" were announced in top party bodies. At the plenary session of the RCP Central Committee, former Minister of Foreign Trade Cornel Burtica was expelled from the Political Executive Committee and the Central Committee. His ouster did not come as a surprise, as he had been accused in May of "gross infractions" in the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Political Executive Committee member Virgil Cazacu was replaced as Central Committee Secretary in charge of foreign relations by Miu Dobrescu, a candidate member of the PEC. Cazacu was named First Secretary of the Prahova County RCP Committee, Burtica's last position before he was ousted from the party leadership.

Marin Enache, who lost his position as Chairman of the Central Council of Workers' Control over Economic and Social Activities two days before, was dismissed as CC Secretary by the plenum but was appointed a candidate member of the PEC. At the same time, Petre Danica and First Secretary of the Brasov County Party Committee Gheorghe Dumitrache were relieved as candidate members of the Political Executive Committee. Ovidiu Maitec (b. 1925 in Arad), a noted intellectual from the Hungarian minority, was released from CC candidate membership and expelled from the party because of deeds incompatible with party membership. Victor Zglobiu, a CC candidate member, was also expelled from the party because of abuses and for "overstepping legal provisions" while he was Director of the Mangalia state farm. (21)

(19) Ibid., 5 October 1982.
(20) Ibid., 6 October 1982.
As the CC plenum ended, it became clear that the big loser in the party and government reshuffle was Cornel Burtica. Nothing was said about any future job, and it might be possible that he is sinking into oblivion. Formerly in charge of propaganda and information and head of the Romanian Radio and Television Council, Burtica, once one of Ceausescu's closest associates, has been made a scapegoat.

At this point it is hard to say precisely how these dismissals are related to Romania's complex difficulties, but one thing is certain: after 17 years of rule, and with his image tarnished, Ceausescu is attempting to prove that the fault lies not with his policies but with the officials who have been too timid to take any initiative, after he had set down the directives.

Rene Alecu de Flers

SHORTAGES

3. Ceausescu Descends on Bucharest Food Markets

Nicolae Ceausescu, the untiring Secretary-General of the RCP, recently paid a quick visit to no fewer than eight food markets in Bucharest to acquaint himself with the citizens' food supply and to nurture his public image both at home and abroad. This sudden inspection followed his recent trips to many towns, enterprises, and agricultural units in Dobruja, Transylvania, and Moldavia, where he expounded again and at length on the domestic and foreign situation, expressing his views on a wide range of issues.

On October 3, the day of his visit to the Bucharest markets, he found the shelves of some of the state food shops abundantly provided with fine farm products. In contrast to this occasionally profuse supply of meat, milk, vegetables, and fruit in certain markets, Romanian consumers usually face severe food shortages everywhere, worse than ever in the past. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General looked with ostensible satisfaction at the 424 tons of meat, 160 tons of meat products, 24 tons of butter, 2,000 tons of sugar, 3,000 tons of potatoes, and 2,000,000 eggs, exhibited only during the very day of his inspection, and concluded -- undoubtedly for the foreign press -- that the Romanian people's standard of living had notably improved. Ceausescu, like Potemkin, believes that false opulence is preferable to visible penury.

Earlier, Ceausescu had advanced his thesis that Romanians eat too much and are too fat, although he knew that hungry people had attacked trucks transporting food abroad, thus stealing from the state what they could not buy on the market.

To free himself from any responsibility for the agricultural sector's failure to feed the people, Ceausescu shifted the blame to some of his subordinates and, because of shortcomings "discovered" at some of the markets, fired three of them on the spot: Augustin Todea, Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Director-General of Horticulture; Nicolae Ganea, First Vice-Chairman of the Executive
Committee of the Bucharest Municipal People's Council; and Gheorghe Preda, Vice-Chairman of the same body. By punishing the executors of his agricultural policy Ceausescu placed himself above blame for the difficulties he has produced, creating the image of a decisive leader who cares for his people.

One of the important goals of civilization is the existence of an adequate supply, if not a surplus, of food for all members of the nation. Market-oriented societies create an atmosphere of relaxation, easiness, and comfort by supplying their citizens with the food they need. In contemporary Romania, this feeling is restricted to the communist privileged class. The party and government offer to the rest of the population nothing but optimistic food statistics and disingenuous speeches about the people's high standard of living. Is this really the progress Ceausescu repeatedly promised the Romanian people they would enjoy in a "multilaterally developed society"?

George Cioranescu

FOREIGN RELATIONS

4. Romanian-American Exchange of Views on Human Rights Continues

On June 2 President Reagan approved a waiver of the US trade law that would give Romania most-favored-nation status and credits for another year. The waiver is necessary under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the US Trade Act of 1974 which says that no "nonmarket economy" country can obtain MFN unless it allows its citizens to emigrate freely. In issuing the waiver for 1983, President Reagan warned Romania that MFN would be in serious jeopardy unless there were a noticeable improvement in emigration procedures in general and the level of Jewish emigration in particular.

Resolutions opposing the renewal of MFN for Romania were introduced in both the House of Representatives and the Senate but were defeated, so Romania's MFN status became effective on September 1. During the debates on MFN, American Congressmen asked Romania for credible assurances that the number of emigrants to the US and Israel would increase, the procedures for emigration be shortened and simplified, and the right to free expression be granted to religious groups and ethnic minorities. (22) Romania agreed to discuss problems related to Jewish emigration in Bucharest beginning in September and emigration in general sometime in October.

Following this agreement, the International President of B'nai B'rith Jack Spitzer, made a five-day trip to Romania, where he met with government and religious leaders and was promised that all applications by Romanian citizens to emigrate to the US or Israel would

(22) Romanian SR/16, RPER, 22 September 1982, Item 3.
be processed and ruled upon within six months of the filing of the initial application. Spitzer was told by Romanian officials that in certain "strategic" cases people working in scientific areas that involved national security applicants would be placed in other jobs and not be deprived of a livelihood while awaiting a passport, a policy that has been a deterrent to emigration in several socialist countries. Chief Rabbi of Romania Moses Rosen told Spitzer that 1,204 Jews had already received emigration permits and the majority of them would be gone by the end of November. Spitzer raised the issue of 129 Jews who had applied to leave Romania before 1981 but who have not yet been allowed to leave. He received assurance that this number was greatly exaggerated.

Spitzer also inquired about the number of Jews in Romania. Some Jewish groups have put the figure as high as 80,000; but Rabbi Rosen estimated it at close to 30,000, while Israeli Ambassador to Romania Aba Gefen, who conducted his own survey, told Spitzer that there were about 32,000.

Although Spitzer's trip was made primarily to deal with Jewish emigration, he also spoke with Ceausescu about the alleged persecution of Christian groups, such as the neo-Protestant, fundamentalist Evangelicals. Of particular interest was the case of 11 Romanians allegedly involved in Bible smuggling and distribution. The 11 were arrested this summer and then were amnestied by the Romanian government, during the MPN hearings. Ceausescu informed Spitzer that the 11 were "guilty of economic crimes" and not religious ones, as several witnesses testified during the hearings. He asserted that they had sold Bibles for their own profit, thereby undermining religious groups that depended on the sale of Bibles to maintain themselves. The President of B'nai B'rith recommended to Ceausescu that Romanian Ambassador to the US Mircea Malita should submit a memorandum to American lawmakers explaining the circumstances surrounding the Bible-smuggling cases. (23)

On September 15 another American visitor arrived in Bucharest: Max Kampelman, the head of the American delegation to the Helsinki review conference in Madrid. The principal aim of his trip was to discuss human rights and the emigration issue with Romanian officials. Speaking in Bucharest at a question-and-answer session of the National Association of International Law, Kampelman stressed the importance the US accorded to human rights. He asserted that any attempt to exclude human rights from the Madrid discussions would turn the Helsinki Final Act into a "simple piece of paper." (24) In his opinion there was no sense in signing new agreements if the existing ones were not respected. (25)

The head of the US delegation to the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe went from Bucharest to Cernauti, where his parents were born. (Cernauti belonged to Romania from the end of

(23) RFE correspondent, 9 September 1982.
World War I until 1940, when it was annexed by the Soviet Union, (26) which was expelled but recovered the territory in 1944.) Romanian officials did not comment on Kampelman's trip, and the state news media remained silent on this part of the journey.

Before leaving Romania Kampelman met with President Ceausescu and Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei. They agreed on the importance of bilateral contacts and US-Romanian consultations at a high level in the interest of international peace, security, and cooperation. (27)

More recently, on October 4 and 5, an American delegation headed by Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Elliot Abrams held talks in Bucharest on human rights with Romanian State Secretary at the Foreign Ministry Aurel Duma and Deputy Foreign Minister Maria Groza, daughter of postwar "Ploughmen's Front" Prime Minister Petru Groza. (28)

Abrams also had meetings with the Patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church Justin Moisescu and with the head of other religious denominations. Radio Bucharest said that Abrams had also attended a round-table discussion with Romanian university lecturers, research scientists, and journalists but gave no details. (29) In recent times official contracts between Romanian intellectuals and Westerners have become increasingly rare.

A more detailed account of the Bucharest meeting was released by the American side. The New York Times reported that Abrams and the Romanian delegation had worked out an agreement that would ensure continued MFN for Romania (30); but US State Department spokesman John Hughes denied the report, stating that no final accord had been reached, and the MFN status for Romania for next year was not assured. (31)

Abrams said that according to his impression Romanian officials wanted to make progress, but "time alone is going to tell whether what we got were empty promises or promises that are going to be fulfilled." (32) Abrams said his discussion had centered on reducing the lengthy delays in processing emigration applications. With the present procedures people had to wait two years or even longer before they knew whether they could leave the country. Abrams was optimistic that in the future the average cases would take only six or seven months.

With regard to harassment of potential émigrés, Abrams stated that American Embassy officials in Bucharest would be able to learn of this through applicants' complaints.

(26) AP, 16 September 1982.
(27) UPI and Agerpres, 17 September 1982.
(28) AP, 8 October 1982.
(30) 15 October 1982.
(31) RFE Correspondent, 15 October 1982.
During his talks with leaders of the officially recognized religions in Romania, Abrams discussed the issue of religious freedom and raised some specific issues such as the availability of Bibles in Romania and seminaries in which to train future clergymen. He made it clear that the religious problem was a matter of great concern to congress and to the president himself.

Abrams also raised the question of minorities' rights, in particular the treatment of ethnic Hungarians. Romanian officials denied, as always, that there was any religious or minority problem in Romania.

Abrams said the overall human rights situation in Romania ranged from "poor" to "terrible," and he described Romania as "a repressive communist society." He added that the Romanian government had been given formal notice that unless it improved its emigration procedures, it would not receive preferential tariff treatment from the US next year.

Although no formal document was drawn up in Bucharest, Abrams said the understandings reached would be put in some documentary form before next year's renewal came up. President Reagan will not have to decide whether to recommend MFN for Romania until next spring. In any case the president's recommendation will depend not on Romanian pledges but on Romanian performance in the area of human rights.

George Cioranescu

5. US Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci Visits Romania

On October 11 and 12 US Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci visited Romania at the invitation of the Romanian Ministry of National Defense. He called on Lieutenant General Constantin Olteanu, Minister of National Defense, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Andrei. The meetings were attended by Colonel General Marin Niculescu, Deputy Minister of National Defense, and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Maria Groza, as well as by US Ambassador to Romania David Funderburk.

During the meetings, reference was made to the good relations between Romania and the United States and the hope was expressed that they would continue to develop on the basis of the understandings reached at previous high-level meetings.

International questions of mutual interest were also discussed. (33) Although Ceausescu meets a wide variety of foreign guests, even lower level personalities, he did not receive Frank Carlucci, perhaps because of the state and party leader's official visit to Bulgaria on October 12. (34)

(33) Agerpres, 12 October 1982.
The only information released before Carlucci's visit came from the US (35) and only revealed that he had left for Europe on October 6 where he would meet the Defense Ministers of Romania, Denmark, Norway, Greece, and Portugal. The purpose of the 10-day trip to Europe was to discuss "defense issues and policies of mutual concern" with the pertinent ministers and their representatives, according to a Defense Department spokesman who was unable to elaborate on the nature of Carlucci's discussions with the Romanians. In the recent past, the Romanians have been in contact with people concerned with US military problems or army personnel. On 30 May 1981, for example, Ceausescu met with a delegation of the House of Representatives' Armed Services Committee, led by Chairman Melvin Price (D., Ill.). The visit was at the invitation of the Romanian Grand National Assembly. (36)

From 21 to 24 March 1982 a group of students from the National War College, headed by Lieutenant General John S. Pustay, paid a visit to Romania. The visitors attended meetings at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, the Stefan Gheorghiu Academy, and the Association for International Law and International Relations. They visited the Army Academy, the Central Army Museum, and economic and tourist points of interest in Bucharest. (37)

In June 1981 the US Naval destroyers Caron and Merril, under the command of Rear Admiral Henry C. Mustin, arrived in Constanta as part of the annual visit of US ships to the Black Sea and were received with the usual ceremonies. The Rear Admiral and the captains of the ships paid a formal visit to the Mayor of Constanta and the Naval Institute. (38)

Because of a paucity of information, it is not possible to determine the real aims of Frank Carlucci's visit. It could be connected with the recent Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Bulgaria to which NATO observers were not invited and in which Romania participated at "staff level"; or it might simply be a means for the US to show its presence in Eastern Europe while Romania demonstrates its "independence."

Arpad Gherghel

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

6. Economic Relations with Greece

Romania and Greece have recently had frequent economic contacts that were intended to improve the two countries' balance of trade, which deteriorated soon after Greece joined the EEC. (39) Until then, Romania had been one of several East European and Arab countries with which Greece carried out trade through bilateral clearing agreements, with the yearly exchange of goods and services

(35) RFE Correspondent, 6 October 1982.
(36) Agerpres, 1 June 1981.
(38) Scinteia, 3 June 1981.
Romanian SR/18

- 13 -

26 October 1982

determined in advance. Greek-Romanian trade from 630,000,000 lei in 1975 to 1,950 million lei in 1980, when Romanian exports to Greece were valued at 1,558 million lei compared with imports worth 392,000,000 lei. (40) After abolishing the clearing system following Greece's admission to the European Economic Community on 1 January 1981, however, Romania has built up a trade deficit with Greece that now stands at $65,000,000-$70,000,000. A Romanian promise that it would make up the deficit through exports has come to nothing so far, according to the Athens Chamber of Commerce (EVEA). The result EVEA said, was a freeze since May 1982 on the export of Greek agricultural products to Romania, which places the concerned firms in a difficult position, toward both the banks and the producers. EVEA emphasized the critical nature of the situation and suggested that Romania be "pressed" to put products on the Greek market at "international prices," while the Greek government could receive Romanian fertilizer, railway cars, and diesel engines, as well as contracts for exploratory oil drilling.

Bucharest has urged the Greek government to restore barter trade with Romania, despite the obligation it made on becoming the 10th member of the European Community to phas out this type of trade. It was considered necessary to resolve this issue before the official visit of Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou scheduled for November 1982. (41) Following Greek Deputy Minister of National Economy Ioannis Pottakis's discussions in Bucharest, the Greek government concluded with Romania a limited clearing agreement providing for the settlement of Romania's trade debts to Greece, currently $75,000,000. The Greek government agreed to meet certain state requirements from Romania without international tendering. The debt will be settled by deliveries of buses, helicopters, fertilizer, and oil refinery equipment, as well as Romanian oil prospecting work in Greece. A list has also been approved of products that are to be the basis of Greek exports to Romania in the immediate future, (42) but the Romanian media did not elaborate on this, only mentioning that Ceausescu had met Ioannis Pottakis.

Ceausescu has also met with Greek Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Evangelos Kouloubmis. (43) According to foreign sources, (44) the main purpose of the Greek minister's visit was to discuss the purchase of refinery equipment needed to modernize the state refinery at Aspropygos near Piraeus. The Romanian reports mentioned that new possibilities of expanding Romanian-Greek cooperation in the energy field were discussed. (45) Greek Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Karolos Papoulias visited Romania from September 17 to 21, (46) to clear up existing economic problems, as well as to prepare for the planned visit of Prime Minister

(40) Anuarul Statistic al RSR, 1981.
(41) RFE Correspondent, 6 October 1982.
(43) Agerpres, 7 October 1982.
(45) Agerpres, 6 October 1982.
Romanian SR/’18

26 October 1982

Papandreou. According to the Athens daily Acropolis, (47) another problem the Greek government was anxious to solve before the Papandreou’s visit was the recent defection of the two sons of Romanian chargé d'affaires to Cyprus Marin Alexie. One of the sons took his wife and his small daughter along.

Arpad Gherghel

INDUSTRY

7. Synthetic Diamond Production

According to Revista Economica, (48) since 1979 Romania has been one of ten countries producing synthetic diamonds. Not only has Romania succeeded in saving the $6,000,000 a year it formerly spent to import diamonds, it now actually exports them even to countries with a tradition in producing them such as Sweden, England, Italy, Greece, France, Austria, and Switzerland. Romania also exports diamonds to Yugoslavia and Hungary, but no information was released on these exports. Romania is a member of the European Federation of Abrasives Producers, which made it easier for it to enter the major markets.

Romania began preparations for the production of synthetic diamonds in 1974. After developing its own original technology, Romania set up the Dacia Synthetic Diamond Plant, which at present produces four types of synthetic diamonds.

The first group, the "micropowders," consist of diamond powder from 0.25 μ to 60 μ in size. (49) These products are included in pastes, suspensions, and sprays used in the finishing processes of a wide range of materials. The second group is the "friables," containing from 40 μ to 250 μ. These are used to process hard materials. The third or "medium" group has three main categories of items used in processing of glass, ceramics, ferrite, graphite, and reinforced plastic materials. The fourth and last group is "tenacious" diamonds with 3 types that range from 250 μ to 800 μ. They are used for the processing of some building materials and other special materials.

Romania intends to begin large-scale production and use of tools with synthetic diamond bits and blades. The use of such equipment in Romania has increased by 7 times from 1976 to 1981 and is 24% more efficient than the old equipment. Synthetic diamond bits are expected to play an important role in drilling for oil. Romania is also interested in the most recent achievements in this area such as the use of polycrystal diamond and polycrystal, cubical boron nitride.

Paul Gafton

(47) RFE Correspondent, 24 October 1982.
(49) One μ or micron is equal to one-millionth of a meter.
8. **Copper Mining and Refining**

In September 1982 the pilot plant of the Rosia Poieni Mining Complex for Processing Copper (Rosia Montana Commune), with a daily capacity of 1,000 tons of ore, was about to begin operations. (50) The Rosia Poieni Complex, which refines the copper ore of Tara Motilor in the Apuseni Mountains, is one of the important economic projects provided for by the directives of the 12th RCP Congress. It is the biggest investment in Alba County during the current five-year plan (51) and will be the most important copper mining and refining complex in Europe. (52)

Although the Rosia Montana area has yielded gold for thousands of years, it will now start providing the Romanian economy with large amounts of copper as well. Since the price of copper is continually rising on the world market -- a ton of this valuable metal costs about seven times as much as a ton of steel -- the new copper production at Rosia Poieni might prove to be as valuable as the old gold mining.

The Rosia Poieni open pit mine began operations on 27 March 1979, with the goal of removing more than 100,000,000 tons of overlying earth. Some 4,000 people have succeeded in removing 30 meters from the peak of the 1,255 meter mountain. So far 23,000,000 tons of overlying material have been displaced; the copper deposits begin at the 1,035 to 1,040 meter level at a point called Fundul Vaii (the bottom of the valley). (53) The Rosia Poieni has a low-grade copper ore that must be submitted to several stages of refining.

Romania is not a major copper producing country. Prior to World War II it only produced 1,462 tons of unrefined converter copper a year. (54) The main copper mines were located at Altin-Tepi in Northern Dobruja and at Baia de Arama in Mehedinti County. Because the yield there was inadequate, exploration was undertaken for other copper ore deposits. From 1951 to 1963 estimates of the copper ore reserves in Romania have increased by 90 times, as a result of the discovery of new deposits and of more efficient exploitation of the existing ones. (55)


(54) Anuarul Statistic al RSR, 1981, p. 188.

The old Altin-Tepe copper mine was also expanded; new copper pyrite deposits have been discovered at 550 meters below sea level, beneath the old galleries. (56) In 1981 copper deposits were rediscovered and are now being extracted from the lower levels at Baia de Arama (57) where copper has been mined since Mircea the Old's rule (1386-1418). (58)

An important copper deposit was discovered in 1964 in Moldova Noua in the Banat, where operations have already begun. In its first stage of development Moldova Noua was to have a capacity of 2,000 tons a day, about 4 times that of the entire country in 1938. (59) A new town was built to house the miners and their families. (60) The Moldova Noua mine opened in 1965. (61) The refinery there supplies the chemical industry with copper pyrite concentrates to be processed into the sulfuric acid needed to produce agricultural fertilizers. (62)

After 10 years of prospecting in the Suceava area, along the Moldova River, work began on a new copper mine at Fundul Moldovei, (63) which is to have an annual output of 1,000,000 tons of processed ore. (64) Copper ore had been mined in this area for more than half a century, but the galleries were obstructed and installations dismantled because of alleged unprofitability. (65)

(56) Ibid., 20 November 1967.
(59) Scinteia, 30 May 1963.
(64) Ibid., 5 May 1965.
(65) Agerpres, 6 July 1966.
The expansion of the copper works at Balan, in the Harghita Mountains, is also a part of the policy to exploit the old deposits. Two copper ore processing lines were added at the Balan mine, which was opened several centuries ago (66); and two new additional lines were built in 1967, so that the Balan mine had a total capacity of 1,000,000 tons of copper ore per year. (67)

New copper refineries have also been built, such as the Deva plant, which processes ore in the Poiana Rusca Mountains area (68); the Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej chemical and metallurgical complex (Baia Mare), which also has a sulfuric acid plant (69); and the Borsa plant in the Maramures area (70) for processing such nonferrous ores as lead, zinc, and copper.

Nevertheless, despite the investments and technical efforts, Romanian industrial needs could not be met by domestic copper, and Bucharest had to turn to foreign sources. It would have been quite natural to import copper from Poland, a neighboring socialist country with large copper reserves; but in the 1960s Romania was striving to avoid dependence on the other CMEA member countries for raw materials. Bucharest therefore signed an agreement with Chile to build jointly a copper refinery in each country. The agreement provided that each state was to have a 51% share in the plant located on its territory, with the copper being supplied by Chile and the finished products sold on the Romanian market. (71)

Romania also concluded a similar agreement with the Dominican Republic to establish a joint mining and ore processing enterprise with the Dominican Republic supplying 51% of the capital and Romania 49%. (72)

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(67) "Developing Mines," *ibid.*, 8 August 1967
(68) Radio Bucharest, 12 April 1965.
(70) *Romania Libera*, 20 August 1967.
(71) Romanian Unit "Romanian-Chilean Joint Stock Enterprise," RFE BR/16 (Romania), RPER, 7 September 1970.
(72) RFE Correspondent, 1 October 1970.
There are no data available from Romanian sources on the operation of the deals with Chile and the Dominican Republic. It is only known that, according to AFP, the Romanian state enterprise Geomin had asked for authorization to provide a Chilean mining company with $1,930,000 capital and $960,000 worth of equipment as its part in the joint copper venture. (73) Romania, which did not break diplomatic relations with Chile after the establishment of the military junta, therefore seems inclined to continue its investment projects in the Chilean copper industry. Nothing is known about the setting up of joint Romanian-Chilean enterprises on Romanian territory.

In 1973, during Ceausescu's visit to Lima, it was decided to establish a joint Romanian-Peruvian mining enterprise, called Antamina, to explore for copper and zinc in the Andean province of Huari, which reaches 4,250 meters above sea level. Geomin and Minero-Peru signed a two-year contract on 19 September 1973 to explore the deposits and draw up studies on how to exploit them. Serious difficulties have been encountered owing to the hard working conditions in the high area of the Andes. (74) The exploratory drillings lasted for 11 months and were completed in the fall of 1975; about 13,000m² had been excavated with Romanian machinery and equipment. (75)

Rich and plentiful copper ore has been discovered, but exploiting it has proved to be difficult, requiring the building of expensive refineries at high altitudes and transporting ore concentrates from the peak of the mountain to the coast or to the high capacity processing lines at a preparation plant. (76)

Finally, in 1970 Radio Moscow reported that Romania was also participating in the development of the Soviet Union's copper and nickel production. (77) It did not mention, however, whether Romania would receive deliveries of Soviet copper in exchange for its participation.

(74) "Fruitful Romanian-Peruvian Cooperation," Scintaia Tine-retului, 19 February 1975.
(75) Romania Libera, 13 September 1975.
(77) Radio Moscow (in Romanian ), 9 September 1970.
It is clear that Romania has made considerable efforts to meet the copper needs of a fully developed industry. Electric and electronic plants, such as Electroputereia in Craiova, the Bucharest factory for insulated electric cables and materials, and the Zalau insulating conductor plant are among the enterprises needing ever-increasing amounts of copper. The production of unrefined converter copper reached its peak in 1975 at 42,684 tons, after which it began to drop, reaching 40,675 tons in 1980. This production should have met about 80% of the copper requirements of Romanian industry. (78) The development of the copper industry has gone forward at considerable cost but has often suffered setbacks owing to "very serious deficiencies" — not a lack of resources but rather a lack of organization in building new copper mines. (79) In the light of the world economic crisis and of the rise in the price of raw materials, especially of copper, the national copper industry might eventually prove to be useful, despite the sacrifices involved.

George Cioranescu

AGRICULTURE

9. Rice Paddies and Cotton Plantations in Romania?

Because rice and cotton are warm climate crops, they are difficult to grow in Romania's continental climate. Ceausescu recently announced, however, that Romania had already begun two special programs for the cultivation of these crops in order to reduce or even eliminate their import. He said that this could be possible by taking advantage, with "boldness," of the country's soil and climatic conditions, which Scinteia claimed were good for this purpose. (80)

The Rice Program. According to Ceausescu, in the next two years Romania will double the area cultivated with rice. Although the size of this area was not disclosed, it will presumably be some 50,000 hectares, based on a 1981 Western estimate that Romania had 25,000 hectares sown with rice. (81)

The Ministry of Agriculture was empowered to pick out new areas suitable for growing rice. At the same time, the whole

(78) Constantin and Dinca, _op. cit._
(79) _Scinteia_, 1 June 1980.
(80) 22 and 25 September 1982.
system of agricultural machinery for rice cultivation is to be overhauled and a labor force trained to manage the increased activities.

There are, however, signs that growing rice will not be efficient in Romania. Similar attempts made after World War I proved inefficient. From 1934 through 1938 rice was grown on about 400 ha; in 1948 this surface increased to 17,000 ha and in 1952 to about 20,000 ha, remaining at that level for about 30 years.

The per hectare output during this period was discouraging, averaging 2,000 kg per ha. It reached its peak in 1975 with 3,130 kg per ha and dropped to its lowest level, 1,790 kg per ha, in 1976. Total rice production has been very uneven, rising to 68,500 tons in 1975 and dropping to only 38,700 tons in 1980, so Romania has had to import rice. The greatest quantity imported was 67,000 tons in 1979 and the lowest, only 57,000 tons, in 1980. (82)

Rice consumption is very modest in Romania. In 1980 domestic production and imports together amounted to 95,700 tons or only 4.3 kg per capita. The Oltenia State Agriculture Enterprise in Calarasi County, Romania's major rice growing enterprise, grew 3,500 kg per ha in 1980, a poor showing compared with the European average of 5,007 kg per ha. (83) Even with such a low yield, if Romania implements its special program for growing rice, it should produce about 175,000 tons a year by 1984, 1.8 times more than the total rice (domestic and imported) available in 1980, thereby eliminating the need to import this product.

The Cotton Program. Ceausescu's declaration that Romania intends to grow cotton is somewhat ironic, given the tortuous ways of Romania's agricultural policy. Two decades ago this idea was officially declared heresy: the November 1961 "de-Stalinization" CC plenum criticized Ana Pauker's policy of reducing the cultivation of maize in order to plant over 300,000 ha with cotton. This move, according to the plenum, caused great damage to the national economy and gravely affected the living standard of the populace. (84) Now Ceausescu, who played an important role in this "de-Stalinization" plenum, plans to sow 30,000 ha with cotton by 1985, with a planned yield of 2,500 to 3,000 kg per ha.

Romanian specialists have designated a long belt in the south, from Calarasi to Mehedinți Counties, for growing cotton; and Ceausescu has asked that the possibility of adding the southern part of Constanta County to this area be studied.

(82) Anuarul Statistic al RSR, 1965, and Ibid., 1981
(84) Speeches by Alexandru Sencovici and Alexandru Modioros, Scinteia, 10 and 18 December 1961.
Romania grew cotton on a small scale after World War I and increased production after World War II. In 1948 cotton was cultivated on more than 38,800 ha; this area was increased to 224,100 ha in 1953 but was later systematically reduced. By 1958 it had been reduced to about 6% of its maximum area, and after the November 1961 plenum it practically disappeared. Average Romanian cotton production was uneven: it peaked in 1962 at 880 kg per ha and declined to only 140 kg per ha in 1963. The largest crop, 89,000 tons, was reached in 1953, while only 100 tons were grown in 1961. (85) At present, the Cotton Growing and Processing Enterprise at Brinceni-Teleomancultivates over 500 hectares.

Industrial development forced Romania to import an average of 100,000 tons of cotton yearly, and in 1981 imports reached 118,900 tons. (86) According to Ceausescu, about half the imported cotton came from the USSR and the balance from nonsocialist states. (87) If Romania succeeds in implementing its cotton growing program, it should be able to produce about 75,000 tons a year by 1985, enabling it to reduce imports by 60%-70%.

It is unlikely that these programs will be as successful as Ceausescu hopes. They seem to be more a new and expensive, voluntaristic adventure in the unknown, at a time when traditional Romanian agriculture is still lagging behind in the agricultural "revolution" Ceausescu launched in 1981.

Paul Gafton

10. Student Help with Harvesting Proves Unsatisfactory

Tens of thousands of schoolboys and students are helping with the harvest this fall all over Romania, and the problems long associated with this "patriotic labor" appear to be as pronounced as ever. According to Scienteia Tineretului, 20,000 are working in the Salaj County, 25,000 in Dolj, 34,000 in Arges, 36,000 in Olt, and 53,000 in Buzau. (88) They are supposed to compensate for the labor shortage, which has been felt for years in Romanian agriculture. Despite the fact that the rural labor force is now over 3,000,000 or 30% of the total work force, (89) many of the peasants, displeased with socialist reality in the countryside, refuse to work. Revista Economica estimated that 34% of the able-bodied agricultural cooperative members failed to perform any work on the collective farms. (90)

(86) Agerpres, 15 February 1982.
(87) Scinteia, 17 October 1980.
(88) 4 and 8 October 1982.
(89) Agerpres, 28 September 1982.
This "disease" is also infecting the young people helping "voluntarily" in the harvest. Radio Bucharest (91) recently disclosed the reluctance to work of an undisclosed number of students who had been sent by their communist youth organization from the Bucharest School of Electronics to work on the fall harvest at the Uziceni State Farm, some 37 miles from their school. The parents of some of these students have offered to pay the farm the value of their children's work in order to have them home; but Radio Bucharest strongly criticized this attitude, saying that the farm had to send produce to the market, not money it got from parents.

The students' relationship with the farm executives, as well as with their leader, was not good. The lecturer in charge of the students complained about the discipline. Some of the students were gone overnight from the dormitory. Others played cards all night and were so tired the next day that all they could do was sleep in the maize fields or read books.

Almost all students refused to talk to a reporter the radio sent to gather information. One of the students who did speak to him complained that the rain poured into the dormitory. The most touchy controversy between the students and the farm executives was the length of the working day. The executives expected the students to work from dawn to dusk, as the Romania media said was necessary during the fall harvest. (92) Although some students agreed to work the long hours, others insisted on a six-hour working day, the same as in the factories. The students' overall performance was poor. They failed to harvest even enough to cover the cost of their food, much to the displeasure of the farm executives who maintained that they had given the students good food and housing and even warm water for showering after returning from the fields.

Was this Case Really an Exception? Radio Bucharest claimed that this situation was "an undesirable exception." At the same time, however, Scinteia Tineretului noted that throughout the country the young "voluntary" workers had fulfilled only half of their working obligations; (93) and for years the media have been reporting other stories of young people refusing to work "voluntarily." In order to avoid working under adverse conditions on the Danube-Black Sea Canal, 90 of the 111 students from Mihai Viteazu High School in Bucharest presented medical certificates declaring them unable to work, while others went to the hospital for an appendectomy or other operations. (94) The parents of schoolboys from Avram Iancu High School in Brad, Hunedoara, directly opposed sending their children to work "voluntarily" at the Iron Gates II Hydroelectric Plant construction site. (95)

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(91) 8 October 1982.

(92) E.g., see Scinteia Tineretului, 4 October 1982.

(93) 5 October 1982.

(94) Scinteia Tineretului, 4 June 1981.

(95) Ibid., 24 July 1982.
Apparently, this year some 500,000 young people refused to participate in such work; the party-controlled media praised the fact that in 1981 2,500,000 young people had participated in this work, (96) while this year the number was only 2,000,000. (97) Even determining this reduced number was possible only because of a tougher policy than in the past. Ceausescu asked that the young people's presence on the fields be ensured, even if it meant closing down the schools. (98) Education Inspectorate of Dimbovita County, for example, subsequently released an order forbidding the opening of the schools as long as the fall harvesting was not finished. (99) In Calarasi County all restaurants were effectively closed down during the harvest period, because their working hours were limited to 0600-0800 hours and 2000-2200 hours. (100)

This policy not only has provoked poor performance in agriculture but has compromised even further the educational system in Romania so much deplored in recent years by the media.

Paul Gafton

- end -

CORRECTION TO: Romanian SR/17 RFER, 8 October 1982.

The initials A. M. Should appear at the end of Item 1.

(96) Scinteia, 15 December 1981.
(97) Scinteia Tineretului, 6 October 1982.
(100) Scinteia Tineretului, 28 September 1982.