

PM/KG

1st draft

## Outline of CHAPTER V

### SECOND SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION 4 NOVEMBER - 8 NOVEMBER

(The Chapters are broken down in sections to facilitate the compilation of material).

#### Section 1: The Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Budapest.

Data regarding withdrawal of Soviet troops commencing 29 November. Indication as to their re-location. Evidence regarding the unsuitability of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary since 1945. Evidence as to bad morale of troops. Re-location of some units at Szekesfehervar under guard. Analysis of data (if available) of confusion prevailing in Soviet Military High Command. Seizure on 29 February of major Hungarian airports of Tokol and Budapest airport and departure of 200 Soviet 'planes for USSR.

#### Section 2: Movements of New Troops and Logistic Deployment.

Evidence of movement on 30 and 31 October in the Zahony area and Debrecen. Fighting in Debrecen 31 October. Concentration of troops in Oradea and Timisoara. Reports of troop concentrations on the Czechoslovak frontier in areas opposite Salgotorjan, Komarom, Magyarovar and Rajka. Soviet troops apparently were organised in three concentric circles, the first forming a crescent the arc of which started from Gyongyos through Szolnok, Keskemet and possibly Dunafonadvar on the Danube; the second with centres in Nyiresyhaza, Debrecen and possibly north of Szeged; the third were the advance bases in Rumania and the Uzhorod and in the east in the Carpatha-Ukraine. Conclusions drawn from above in the light of the conditions under which Kadar was brought to power, that Military High



Command and Soviet foreign policy acted conjointly for the overthrow of Nagy Government. Indication that Committee made effort to disassociate both these two moves but in the light of the evidence was unable to do so and that it must conclude that the second intervention was planned and had the full approval of the Government of the USSR.

Section 3: Soviet Military Tactics during Fighting.

From established bases advanced in three lines. The principal one was towards Budapest, the second towards the North and the mining and industrial areas of Miskolc, and the third advance <sup>by</sup> lightning tactics towards the Austro-Hungarian border. Method of fighting in Budapest. Blitzkreig tactics in the forced march of troops towards the Austro-Hungarian frontier and by-passing of obstacles on the way. Description of numerical strength, origin of troops, attitude of Soviet troops.

Section 4: Fighting in Budapest. Announcement by Premier Nagy. Call to Maleter. Appeal to the world by Gyula Hay. Visit to the Soviet Embassy.

Description of fighting at Killinan Barracks. Damage to houses in Budapest. Fighting at Gelhert Hill. General description of the fighting in the city. Terrorist methods used to impress the resistance.

Section 5: Fighting in the Provinces

Evidence of fighting in Pesterzsebet, Ujpest, 13th District and Csepel. <sup>etc</sup> Decomposition of Hungarian organised armed resistance. Description of Hungarian combatants, their social class, their weapons, etc. Description of fighting in Csepel up to 9 November. Fighting in Pecs for the control of uranium mines. Position of Dunapentele during 4-5 November. Appeals for Western assistance. Attack by Soviet troops on 6 November. Use of Tactical Air Force. Description of fighting in Miskolc, Keskemet, Gyor and



others. Description of the inability to fight in numerous centres owing to lightening tactics of Soviets, such as in Szeged. Attack on frontier cities such as Komarom and Gyor, via Czechoslovakia. Description of radio appeals.

Section 6: Extent of Organised Resistance by Hungarian Army.

Evidence by General Kiraly and others on the subject. Betrayal of Hungarian leadership through presence of Communist generals. Evidence on attitude of young officers and the fighting in the Buk Mountains and Matra Mountains, also in Budapest.

Section 7: Armed Resistance by the People.

The universality of the fighting and resistance of the Hungarian people to Russian attack. Leadership taken by workers in Budapest and other cities and support from the disorganized Hungarian Army. Contributions by the peasantry in food. Inability to continue actual fighting beyond 8- 9 November. Evidence of the maintenance of the spirit of resistance on the part of the population through organisation of small guerrilla warfare in the Komlo region, Balaton region, the Buk Mountains, also the development of passive resistance through the persistent strikes in factories and mines.