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THE ANTI-PARTY GROUP

Appendix:

Extracts Concerning the Anti-Party Group

- I. Nikita Khrushchev's Report of the Central Committee to the XXII Congress October 17, 1961 (Pravda, October 18) p. 1
- II. Speech Delivered by Soviet First Deputy Premier A. Mikoyan at the XXII CPSU Party Congress on October 20 p. 4
- III. Speech of Gennady Voronov, October 20 p. 8
- IV. Speech of Mikhail Suslov, October 21 p. 8

The resuscitation of the anti-party group as a whipping boy at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, and the vigorous repetition of old accusations along with some new ones raises the questions: Why? What is the significance of this repetition of an old drama? And what will be its probable consequences?

It had been thought by Western observers that the struggles of 1956-1957, which resulted in the exclusion of Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, "and Shepilov, who joined them," from high party office was now a dead issue.<sup>1</sup> It had also been concluded that Khrushchev's extensive and continuous purging of party officials at the lower and middle levels right up to the opening of the Congress on October 17 had so thoroughly confirmed his authority that there would be no need at this Congress of violent inner-party struggles. But on the opening day, Nikita Khrushchev bluntly read out the names of the anti-party group (adding retired Marshal Voroshilov to the list) and accused several of its members of a new crime (opposition to his Virgin Lands' venture). He also indicated that the group still has influence which must now be completely destroyed. Since Khrushchev's speech, speaker after speaker has mounted the podium to repeat and, in some instances, to add to Khrushchev's charges. On October 21, 1961, Pravda announced that the delegates to the Congress were "unanimously" supporting demands for the expulsion of the anti-party group from the party. Thus, it would appear, the drama now being presented at Moscow may have serious consequences for some

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<sup>1</sup> Resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the Anti-Party Group: June 1957.

high members of the party who may be expelled, or even tried at a show trial like those of the 30's. And, since changes at the top usually presage further changes down through the ranks, the present anti-party agitation may have very wide consequences throughout the party.

While it is obviously not possible to explain fully the reasons and the significance of the anti-party charges at this moment, some of the probable reasons may be suggested by a brief review of the developments of October. The first definite hint that the spectre of inner party controversy might be raised at the congress came late in September, when news leaked out that the Virgin Lands harvests were turning out badly (Kazakhstan-skaya Pravda, September 26). The inference made at the time was that, despite the rapid turnover of party workers in the Virgin Lands during recent years, heads would roll because of this most recent agricultural setback, and the people who could be held responsible, or who dared to criticize specifically the Virgin Lands venture would be fiercely attacked.

There was no other pre-congress hard evidence that serious inner-party controversy existed. This would appear to support the conclusion that the poor harvest of the Virgin Lands and the anti-party charges at the congress are closely related. The fact that all members of the anti-party group were charged with opposing the Virgin Lands venture by Khrushchev, when he renewed his attack on the anti-party group on October 17, is very strong evidence that the agricultural issue is one of the primary reasons for the revival of the attack on the anti-party group. This is particularly true because the Virgin Lands' crop failure is the only immediate and unexpected failure that can be identified in domestic affairs; and because it is a critical failure it is logical to expect that it must have immediate consequences.

The follow-up speeches of men like N. V. Podgorny, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee, and G. Voronov, Deputy Chairman of the Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee for the RSFSR, further strengthen the conclusion that agriculture is a primary cause. Both these men had much to criticize in agriculture.

The agricultural difficulties of the moment present the most obvious reason for the current anti-party charges, but the specific charges made by Khrushchev and others, as well as the character and habits of the CPSU and the multiplicity of its known difficulties make it necessary to search for additional reasons. Khrushchev himself listed several anti-party crimes on October 17. The anti-party elements, he charged, were "fervent adherents of the methods and system prevalent under the personality cult, of revisionists and dogmatists." He said that individual members of the anti-party group "bear personal responsibility for many mass repressions against party, administrative economic, military, and Komsomol cadres, of a like kind during the period of the personality cult." In the past, according to



Khrushchev, these men opposed "reclamation of the Virgin Lands, the reorganization of the management of industry and building, the extension of the rights of the union republics, the improvement of the well-being of Soviet people, and the reestablishment of revolutionary legality...." These were his specific charges. As will be seen, along with opposition to the Virgin Lands' farming, opposition to a good many other reforms are listed. All of these reforms are still in process, are still being developed and perfected. The conclusion indicated by Khrushchev's listing is that some communists (i.e., anti-party men) still actively and openly oppose them.

In less direct phrases on October 17, Khrushchev indicated that opposition to his industrial and financial policies exist and must be destroyed. As he explained, his "Leninist" policy is "dynamic, revolutionary, and always progressive...."

"The question of all questions," Khrushchev declared in one passage, "is capital construction." He is known to want smaller allocations for heavy industry than were habitual under Stalin, and to want more consumer goods for the immediate future. His speech of October 18 on the new Party Program gave concrete evidence that he has been forced to make some concessions.<sup>2</sup> It appears, however, despite the concessions made (and they are only moderate) he has left himself an escape clause that could permit him to change his figures later. Also, as he makes quite evident, he is irritated and angry with puffed-up, old-fashioned economists (i.e., those who oppose him). That he is actively at war with the supporters of old economic habits is demonstrated by the following passage from the speech of October 17:

"You remember what sharp criticism at the 20th Congress the conservatives, who regarded themselves as specialists in railway transport, were subjected to. Their ideologist was Kaganovich, who called himself an iron people's commissar. For a long time they stubbornly stuck to the steam engine, not giving an opportunity to either electric or diesel locomotives. Then we broke their resistance, and technical re-equipment of transport went on rapidly. The conservatives are still holding on to the old things, like the devil to a sinful soul, in some other branches of the national economy."

That Khrushchev is determined to break the old conservative economic habits, which as he indicates still exist, and that he is prepared to identify those who cherish them with the "sadist" and "degenerate" Kaganovich is quite clear. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that a second primary domestic reason for the revival of the attack against the anti-party group is a number of non-agrarian economic problems that range from the industrial-investment controversy to the question of improved industrial management.

<sup>2</sup> See Background Information, October 21, 1961: "Aspects of Khrushchev's Draft Program Speech" by r.r.g.

A third primary reason for the anti-party agitation, which stands above and behind the first two discussed above, may be tentatively identified. Running through Khrushchev's speeches, as well as those of the men and one woman (Furtseva) who have spoken after him, is clear evidence of his determination to rule the Communist Party, to rule it absolutely, without resistance or opposition from other party members who may not agree with him. This could be the main issue behind the constant accusations against the anti-party group for its continuing support of the cult of the individual. At the moment, anyone who does not support (or submit completely) to the "collective leadership" of Nikita Khrushchev appears to be guilty of the cult of personality (setting himself above Nikita). Similarly, anyone who goes beyond a certain limit in expressing views critical of Khrushchev-approved projects is a supporter of the cult of personality.

All members of the 1961 anti-party group are being characterized as ardent adherents of the cult, and, it will be noted, they are simultaneously characterized as being stubborn oppositionists, ruthless repressors, sadists, and men of violence. Thus, I. V. Spiridonov, speaking on October 19, said: "On Malenkov's conscience are the deaths of many absolutely blameless people and many repressions." Kiril Mazurov, First Secretary of Belorussia accused Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich of being "personally to blame for mass beatings of Party personnel and gross violations of Soviet Law." Similarly, Nikolai Podgorny, characterized Kaganovich as a "sadist" and "degenerate," and described how Kaganovich had set up his own cult of personality in Kiev, where he "surrounded himself with a pack of unprincipled people and fawners, got rid of personnel devoted to the Party, humiliated and terrorized leading workers in the Republic." (Tass, October 20) And Furtseva quoted Kaganovich's heartless comment when he approved the death sentence of 350 railroad men: "I welcome the death sentences."

In the sense that the anti-party attacks appear to be designed to preserve and strengthen Khrushchev's power to carry through his policies without resistance or criticism, it may be presumed that the third reason for this action is essentially political.

The role of the purge in the Communist Party and the Soviet system, the roles played by criticism and self-criticism (confession) encourage the postulation of a fourth probable motivation of the anti-party attacks. To attempt to discuss this problem is to move into a realm that is virtually incomprehensible to Western observers. It is a fact, however, that the party's absolutist need to be perfect and to present itself as the one truly dedicated servant of the best interests of its people has long enmeshed it in a series of semi-religious, almost mystical practices. As the only non-religious holy order in the world, its members constantly reveal human frailties and errors. Somehow the order itself must be absolved. The rituals of the purge are deep-seated, the ceremonies appear to be under-



stood by all party members. Someone must take the blame for errors or weaknesses, a sacrifice must be made so that the party may be saved. The accused communists of the purge trials of the late 30's appear to have a close relationship with old Marshal Voroshilov, sitting with the Presidium of the 22nd Congress.

While it would seem reasonable to expect that the rationalization of Soviet life, with its increased numbers of highly-educated technicians would have rendered these ceremonies unnecessary, just the opposite appears to be true. As the party finds itself unneeded (or less needed than before) by the new industrialized society and the managers it has created, it appears to seek (by these extreme means of condemnation and sacrifice) to prove that it is more necessary to the Soviet people than ever before. The party seeks to inspire others to follow it by proving its devotion and integrity. In the process men who have had the courage to hold and express contrary opinions are led into the sacrificial pit, like old bulls in the rites of Taurus, to be sacrificed before their former comrades for the good of the party.

To discuss the semi-mystical characteristics of the purge system is not to explain the anti-party agitation. But it must be emphasized that beyond the concrete and recognizable motives, there are others peculiar to communist habits and needs, and to the party's methods of ruling the Soviet Union.

There appear to be a number of possible motives behind the anti-party discussion that cannot now be documented. One widespread supposition (perhaps the fifth reason for the anti-party agitation) is that certain "Stalinists" want a more aggressive foreign policy than Khrushchev wishes to follow. This would include those members of the party who are presumed to support a closer alliance with China, more money for heavy industry and for nuclear weapons. While such elements may indeed exist, it is impossible to identify them, unless we accept the charges made against the anti-party group.

A final possibility appears to be that the anti-party agitation may have as its central cause, the determination of Khrushchev to rule world communist foreign policies. To put this more concretely, there are at least strong hints that the anti-party drama is being played primarily to subject the theories of Mao Tse-tung (and by implication Enver Hoxha) to detailed and devastating criticism, presumably as a means of bringing them under Khrushchev's tight control. Evidence to support this hypothesis appeared in the speech of Alexei Kosygin on October 21. Discussing the anti-party group, Kosygin said: "We are speaking about the anti-party group at our Congress not because it presents now some force or danger to our party. Our Party is strong and united as never before." In other words, there is no dangerous internal problem; therefore, the trouble must lie elsewhere. Where it lies, was suggested by Anastas Mikoyan on October 20.<sup>3</sup> In a carefully calm and reasonably-

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3 See Extracts from Mikoyan's speech in the appendix.

phrased speech, Mikoyan pointed to Molotov as the demon of the anti-party group. Making it clear that he was talking about views presently held by Molotov, Mikoyan described them at length and criticized them in detail. Molotov's errors are precisely those attributed to Mao and to Hoxha. If there is to be a great show trial of Molotov and his comrades-in-opposition, it could well turn out to be a trial of Mao and Hoxha in absentia.

Thus the anti-party agitation appears to be a consequence of a number of internal problems which literally force the party, if it is to preserve its position, to direct dire threats toward all who question, criticize, or oppose. In another approach it may be that this strange phenomenon is actually staged for some hidden purpose, like that of attacking Chinese theories of foreign policy. Precisely what the motives are cannot be said positively at the moment. What the outcome will be, whether this is a crisis of words alone, or whether it will involve a further active purging of the party leadership or rough conflict between the Communist Parties of the world remain matters for conjecture.



## EXTRACTS CONCERNING THE ANTI-PARTY GROUP

### I. Nikita Khrushchev's Report of the Central Committee to the XXII Congress, October 17, 1961 (Pravda, October 18)

...ruts and stagnation are alien to the very nature of socialist production, which is dynamic, revolutionary, and always progressive. We must more rapidly and fully utilize all that is being created by science and technology in our country, benefit more boldly from everything in foreign experience, develop more widely specialization and cooperation, speed up the rate of integrated mechanization and automation of production. In building the communist economy we cannot tolerate conservatism in technology. Riding an old horse one cannot clear high obstacles, as they say.

It is necessary to check carefully and painstakingly at every plant, factory, mine, and building site -- to see what sort of machinery is there, to replace that which is obsolete, to set up flow production lines where there are none. It is necessary to build new and technically re-equip existing enterprises, to produce the most modern machine tools, to create flow production lines, to introduce automation, to improve technological processes.

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...The question of all questions, Comrades, is capital construction.

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But there are still many shortcomings in construction. There are now in the country more than one hundred thousand building sites. Half of them are for production purposes. With the simultaneous construction of such an enormous number of projects, material and monetary resources are dissipated, many enterprises are commissioned two or three years later than technical facilities permit. Utilized funds are kept frozen for a long time, are not put into economic circulation, are not returned to the state.

Why does this happen? In this case the desire for more becomes the enemy of what is sensible and realistic....

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If we are to overcome this shortcoming, and its overcoming entirely depends on the ability to lead and on our will, then we shall create conditions for the further increase in the pace of construction. Obviously, one could adopt the policy of stopping, for some time, let us say for a year, laying foundations of new enterprises, while all the funds which accumulate during that period are turned to the speediest completion of the projects

already started. Exceptions could be allowed only for especially important building projects, subject to a decision of the union government. The Central Committee and the Soviet government have recently adopted a decision which determines the order in capitalist construction. It is necessary to organize matters so as to observe strictly the proportionate character in the development of national economy and use to the utmost all the reserves.

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You remember what sharp criticism at the 20th Congress the conservatives, who regarded themselves as specialists in railway transport, were subjected to. Their ideologist was Kaganovich, who called himself an iron peoples' commissar (zheleznyy narkom).

For a long time they stubbornly stuck to the steam engine, not giving an opportunity to either electric or diesel locomotives. Then we broke their resistance, and technical reequipment of transport went on rapidly. The conservatives are still holding on to the old things, like the devil to a sinful soul, also in some other branches of the national economy.

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Comrades: Restoration and further development of Leninist norms in party life and principles of leadership has been a very important aspect of our party's activity during the period under review. The Twentieth Congress condemned the personality cult, which is foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, opened up large areas for the creative forces of the party and people, and furthered the expansion and consolidation of ties between the party and the masses and an increase in its fighting power.

On the eve of the Twentieth Congress the question was: either the party will, in an open, Leninist way, condemn the mistakes and distortions which were permitted to take place during the period of the cult of Stalin's personality, and reject the methods of party and state leadership, which had become a brake on progress, or forces clinging to old things, which resisted everything that was new and creative, would gain the upper hand in the party. That is how sharply the issue was posed.

Was it necessary to criticize the major mistakes and grave consequences of the personality cult so sharply and openly? Yes, it was necessary. After the unmasking of the inveterate enemy and adventurer Beria, as a result of a careful analysis and profound study of a number of documents, instances of the most crass violation of socialist law (zakonnost), of abuse of power, instances of arbitrariness and repression in relation to many honest people, including outstanding politicians of the party and the Soviet state, were fully revealed to the Central Committee. The Central Committee, deeply aware of its responsibility to the party and the people, could not embark on a road of concealing or covering up the mistakes and distortions of the past.



Following Lenin's injunctions the Central Committee decided to tell the truth about the abuses of power during the period of the personality cult. It was the inner, moral requirement and duty of the party and its leadership. It was a correct decision and it was of enormous importance for the destiny of the party and the construction of communism. (prolonged applause)

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What would have happened to our country if the personality cult had not been condemned, its evil consequences not overcome, and Lenin's principles of party and state activities not restored? This would have threatened the separation of the party from the masses, from the people, serious violations of Soviet democracy and revolutionary legality, a slowing down of economic development of the country, a reduction of the rate of communist construction, and therefore of the improvement of the working people's well-being. In the field of international relations this would have led to a weakening of the Soviet Union's position in the world arena, to a deterioration of relations with other countries, which would be fraught with grave consequences. That is why criticism of the personality cult and the overcoming of its effects have been of tremendous political and practical significance. (applause)

Marxism-Leninism has always sternly condemned any manifestation of the personality cult, considered it alien to the spirit of the proletarian revolutionary movement, alien to the spirit of communism. Marx, Engels, and Lenin saw in the people the true creators of history. They stressed the leading and organizing role of the party of the working class. Marxism-Leninism does not deny the important role of leaders and heads of the working class, but it decisively comes out against the exaltation, and more so against the deification, of one personality or another. The exaltation of one personality will inevitably push the people and the party into the background, and belittles their role and significance.

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The Twentieth Congress instructed the Central Committee consistently to implement measures which would insure complete elimination of the personality cult and liquidation of its consequences in all the spheres of party, national and ideological work, and to insure a strict carrying out of the norms of party life and the principle of collective leadership as worked out by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin contained in his testament....

II. Speech Delivered by Soviet First Deputy Premier A. Mikoyan  
at the 22nd CPSU Party Congress on October 20

...Comrades, the Twentieth Congress constituted a turning point in the life of our party and of the whole worldwide communist movement. The political course of that congress and its theoretical directives have already produced good beginnings. This has been proved by the historic experience of the past few years. The ideological line of the Twentieth Congress emerged not just on the eve of the Congress, nor during the several days of the work of the Congress. It had been elaborated over a period of two years prior to the Congress in the process of critical reappraisal of certain ideological tenets, of reorganization of the practical work of the party and state, and of liquidation of the harmful consequences of the personality cult.

During that period there arose within the Central Committee differences of opinion on the fundamental problems of party policy and practical work. Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, and Voroshilov showed conservative thinking and proved unable to correctly assess the postwar international and internal situation and to understand the new line of conduct which was required of Marxists-Leninists. They were rejecting everything new and were taking a stand against the stipulations which were later put forward by the Central Committee at the Twentieth Congress.

Later the factional anti-party group, which had Molotov as its chief ideologist, was also joined by Bulganin, Pervukhin, Saburov, and Shepilov. Members of that group violently opposed the restoration of Leninist norms of party life and socialist rule of law. They opposed liquidation of the harmful consequences of the personality cult. They spoke against such urgent and vitally important measures as the reform of state administration and of economic management, the reform of planning, especially in agriculture, the reclamation and the use of the virgin lands, etc.

These differences with the conservative-dogmatic group were not just differences on some particular organizational or separate political questions. No. They concerned the definition of the party's entire policy at the new stage of historic development, in fact its basic policy line.

Some time ago Vladimir Ilich Lenin showed that the reorganization of rabkrin (rabocho-krestyanskaya inspektsiya -- workers and peasants inspection -- ed.) proposed in 1923 was more than a mere measure of organization, but affected our entire work, our policy, our tactics, and our strategy. What was involved then was preservation for the working class of its control over the peasantry in order to insure the victory of socialism in the USSR.

It is all the more true that under present conditions we were concerned not merely with measures of organization but with evolving a policy which could insure a successful building of communism in our country and which would make it possible to avert a world war.



What is the explanation of the resistance shown by the conservative dogmatic group? First it was the organic attachment of its members to the personality cult, which was alien to Marxism-Leninism, their lack of understanding of the fact that the country was entering a new stage of development -- the period of comprehensive building of communism, that the world socialist system was growing into a dominant factor in the development of mankind while the imperialist camp had lost its determining role in international relations.

Indeed, before the Twentieth Congress, Molotov, in a report at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, openly cast doubt on the fact of the building of a socialist society in the USSR. He said: alongside the Soviet Union, where the foundations of a socialist society have already been built, there are also some peoples' democratic countries which have taken only the first but very important steps toward socialism.

According to Molotov it emerged that in the first place socialism in the USSR had still not been built, that in the second place the first steps toward socialism were being taken only by some peoples' democratic countries, and in the third place that there were peoples' democracies where even these steps had not been taken. You yourselves understand that on the basis of such tenets it is impossible even to think about a plan for the building of communism.

Under the influence of criticism in the Central Committee, Molotov was forced to justify himself in the pages of Kommunist, reducing the question to a mistaken formulation. But it was not a matter of mistaken formulation. It is clear that if only the foundations of socialism have been built the question of transition to the comprehensive building of communism cannot even be posed. If only some peoples' democracies have taken the first steps toward socialism this means that the world socialist system has still not been formed, and consequently one cannot speak about its growing influence on the course of public development.

This was a basically mistaken un-Leninist appraisal of the distribution of the class and political forces in the modern world. Through minimizing the forces of socialism, and thereby exaggerating the forces of imperialism, Molotov was led to serious mistakes on questions of international development, on peaceful coexistence, the possibility of the prevention of a world war, on the diversity of the forms of the transition of various countries to socialism.

Molotov altogether rejects the policy of peaceful coexistence, reducing this concept merely to a state of peace, or rather to the absence of war at a given moment, and to negation of the possibility of the prevention of a world war. In its substance this view was close to that of the foreign opponents of peaceful coexistence, treating it as a variant of the cold war, as a state of armed peace.

A concept of this sort contradicts the Leninist concept of relations between two systems, it would lead to rejection of the extensive development of economic relations between them, to decreasing contacts and cultural ties.

Finally, this would be factual acknowledgement of the un-avoidability of war, a repudiation of active efforts at reaching agreement, directed toward easing of international tension and to disarmament. And it is not accidental that he rejects the historic tenet of the Twentieth Congress on the possibility of the prevention of a world war in the modern era.

He disputes the expediency of personal meetings which are being arranged by us between leaders of the party and government and leaders of capitalist states, considering this to be pure fancy, explained by excessive faith in personal contacts and conversations.

In spite of such a point of view the party proceeded to extend contacts between Soviet and foreign statesmen and public organizations and figures, and practice has shown the extent to which the party was right in taking these steps. Suffice it to refer to the tremendous political response and major benefits which have and which are still being derived from the meetings and speeches abroad made by Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev and other figures. (applause)

In spite of these differences, Molotov, as well as certain other people who had their own special point of view, did not expound it at the Twentieth Congress. They did not dispute the political line of the Central Committee, and voted with everyone else. The Central Committee considered that through this an end was put to the differences which existed before the Congress. We assumed that unanimity had been established on basic questions of party policy.

However, in effect it appeared that this was by no means the case. The attitude of Molotov and the others at the Congress was pharisaical. It has now become clear that, knowing that they would have remained in isolation at the Congress if they spoke out directly against the new tenets of the Congress, presented by the Central Committee, they selected other fighting tactics. These tactics were calculated to avoid defeat at the Congress and later at a convenient moment, to attempt by other means to bring about a re-examination of the party line.

So it happened that the Congress ended, but the differences remained. By now however, they concerned the policy line of the Twentieth Congress and its decisions.

For over a year a sharp struggle continued in the Central Committee against impelmentation of the decisions of the Twentieth Congress. The matter at stake was whether the party would follow the path of the period of the personality cult, condemned by the party, or along the Leninist path. While Comrade Khrushchev and others were occupied with creative work on implementation of the decisions of the Congress, these people were occupied



with one thing only: to put a log in the spokes, to hamper the work of the Central Committee, to attract supports for themselves from among the membership of the Presidium of the Central Committee, to knock together a group, doing this in profound secrecy.

When the party decided to abolish industrial ministries and to create sovnarkhozes, as well as to reorganize the MTS, the fractionist group considered it an opportune moment to seize power and to change the policy of the party by means of a coup d'etat at the top. Having lain low at the Congress, they began then to prepare a plot against the party at secret gatherings. And so in June 1957 the members of the group, having counted the votes in the Presidium which they might gather against the party leadership, went over to a direct attack. However, their calculations proved wrong.

The Presidium measured up to the Leninist standards. It crushed the anti-party opposition group, both in respect to ideology and organization. (applause)

The members of the group came forward with corresponding statements at the plenum, and then, one or one and a half years later, they wrote letters to the Central Committee condemning and admitting their mistakes. Molotov was the only one not to vote for the resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee. Neither did he in any way or on any occasion come forward with a criticism of his anti-party activity or his views, which caused great harm to the party. What he said in the primary party organization -- that he agreed with the decision of the plenum -- was not sincere. It was determined by tactical considerations. To this very day he has stubbornly adhered to his conservative, dogmatic views.

The Central Committee consistently bases its activity on Leninist norms of party life. This is also manifest in the fact that the struggle against the conservative-dogmatist group was carried out by methods of internal party democracy, without application of state measures of repression, as was done under the personality cult, whereas the victory of the anti-party group would have led to wholesale reprisals against all active supporters of the Twentieth Congress by methods which the party can never forget.

Without ideologically crushing the conservative-dogmatist anti-party group we would have been unable to implement the decisions of the Twentieth Congress and to achieve the colossal successes which have made our country greater, which strengthened its might and its authority in the world arena, and which insured the successful construction of communism. (stormy applause)

It was a victory of the Leninist spirit of innovation and principlemindedness. It was a victory of Leninistic orientation. It was a victory of the Leninist leadership of the Central Committee, headed by Comrade Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev. The party has reached its 22nd Congress united, monolithic, and stronger than ever before. (stormy, prolonged applause)...

III. Speech of Gennady Voronov, Deputy Chairman  
of the Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee  
for the Russian Federation, and candidate member  
of the Presidium of the Central Committee, October 20

...In recent years, the Party Central Committee has done a truly gigantic amount of work with a view to raising all the branches of agriculture. Now it is particularly clear how dangerous and shameful were the attempts of the anti-Party group to turn the Party and the people from the correct Leninist course. Our successes are confirming, time and again, the complete failure of the skeptics and whimperers thrown on the dump of history by life....

IV. Speech by Mikhail Suslov, Secretary  
of the Central Committee and member of the Presidium  
of the Soviet Communist Party, October 21

...In the first years after the 20th Congress the party met bitter opposition on the part of the anti-party group of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Bulganin, and others, who attempted to lead the party from its Leninist course and turn it back to the times of the personality cult.

That despicable group of factionalists, divorced from the people, as is known, stubbornly opposed the realization of such vitally important measures warmly approved by the entire Soviet people as the cultivation of virgin lands, reform in the management of industry and building, the development of internal democracy in the party, restoration of the revolutionary rule of law, and so forth.

Many members of that group are personally guilty of having carried out mass repressions against honest communists during the period of the personality cult. In foreign policy the anti-party group, especially Molotov, placed every obstacle in the path of the Central Committee's course, directed at the realization of the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and at insuring of a stable peace.

The activities of the faction could have done serious damage to the party and the country. The party ideologically routed and rejected the pitiful handful of oppositionists. Life has fully disproved their views and has revealed their complete bankruptcy. (Applause)