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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!

DUNNING NATHAN

FROM PENN HAZELHOFF MILLER

RE NYC 52 OF 21 JANUARY. REGARDING YOUR PROPOSAL ABOUT CHANGING FORM OF MONTHLY DIRECTIVE, I HAVE INFORMALLY DISCUSSED IDEA HERE WITH DESK CHIEFS AND OTHERS. GENERAL FEELING IS THAT NEW APPROACH IS CERTAINLY WORTH TRYING AND COULD REPRESENT REAL IMPROVEMENT; HOWEVER, I STILL HAVE CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ALONG LINES EXPRESSED TO YOU IN NEW YORK, ESSENTIALLY THAT MUNICH WOULD RESERVE RIGHT TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON BOTH PARTS UNDER PROPOSED NEW SYSTEM.

FOLLOWING REPRESENTS CONSENSUS OF MEETING HERE TODAY AMONG DESK CHIEFS, PAO AND DIRECTOR'S OFFICE ON SUGGESTIONS FOR MONTHLY DIRECTIVE NO 17. SEPARATE SECTIONS AND PARAGRAPHS ARE COMMENTED UPON IN ORDER PRESENTED.

I, PARA 2. YOUR REFERENCE TO EMPHASIS "ALONG AGREED LINES OF PREVIOUS DIRECTIVES" SHOULD PROBABLY BE MADE EXPLICIT BY REFERENCE TO SPECIFIC DIRECTIVES, OR OMITTED. IN CONNECTION WITH "SETBACK WORLD COMMUNISM SUSTAINED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA", THERE IS SOME FEELING HERE THAT, ASIDE FROM INDIA, IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR THAT RECENT CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES HAVE NECESSARILY PRODUCED CLEAR SHIFT OF OPINION AGAINST COMMUNISM. ON THE CONTRARY, THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME REASON TO BELIEVE THAT IN SOME COUNTRIES WITH LARGE OVERSEAS CHINESE POPULATION, RED CHINESE AGGRESSIVENESS HAS HAD THE POSITIVE EFFECTS FROM COMMUNIST VIEWPOINT. (FATHERLAND ON THE MARCH, ETC.) WE THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT SOME CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THIS POSSIBILITY IN FORMULATING DIRECTIVE. SECONDLY, WE SUGGEST THAT EVER-PRESENT POSSIBILITY (ALTHOUGH NOT LIKELIHOOD) OF STRONG COMMUNIST SHOWING IN KERALA ELECTIONS BE CONSIDERED.

I, PARA. 3. WE ASSUME THAT BULK, IF NOT ALL, OF PROGRAMMING ON THESE LINES WOULD BE HANDLED BY NEW YORK DESKS. IN VIEW OF RECENT POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN US-CUBAN RELATIONS (WHICH MIGHT APPEAR INCONSISTENT WITH BASIC APPROACH OF DIRECTIVE), WE SUGGEST SOME THOUGHT BE GIVEN TO MENTIONING THIS PROBLEM.

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II. WE PUZZLED BY YOUR APPARENTLY RESTRICTIVE REFERENCE TO "SOVIET (AND POLISH) EXPRESSIONS OF PREFERENCE FOR ONE PARTY", SINCE THIS PREFERENCE IS EXPRESSED BY ALL REGIMES IN CAPTIVE COUNTRIES. REGARDING REFERENCES TO "REPORTING" IN LAST SENTENCE, WE FEEL THIS WORDING SHOULD BE CHANGED SINCE IT MIGHT BE INTERPRETED TO APPLY TO NEWSCASTS. WHILE WE AGREE WITH YOUR GENERAL APPROACH AND FEEL THAT RFE SHOULD NOT GIVE HEAVY PLAY TO COMPLICATED AND POSSIBLY CONFUSING PRE-CONVENTION ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS (EXCEPT, AS YOU PUT IT, FROM PERSPECTIVE), IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT THIS POLICY DOES NOT IN GENERAL APPLY TO STRICTLY NEWS REPORTING.

III. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD AGREE THAT TO EXPOSE AN OPPONENT'S DILEMMA IS OFTEN THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF COMBATting HIM, WE FEEL HERE THAT TO PROCEED IN THIS FASHION WITH THE LIBERALIZATION VS. TIGHTENING UP PROBLEM CONFRONTING US IN EASTERN EUROPE WOULD BE ALMOST COMPLETELY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. FOR ONE THING, WE FIND IT UNPALATABLE TO SUGGEST THAT CURRENT TIGHTENING IS, BASICALLY, THE RESULT OF EFFORTS TO IMPROVE MATERIAL CONDITIONS. MORE SERIOUSLY, WE SURELY MUST NOT ARGUE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE "COMPELLED" BY SOME SORT OF HISTORICAL NECESSITY TO TIGHTEN THE SCREWS. THE GENERAL THESIS (WHICH IS INDISPUTABLE) THAT SOVIETS ARE USING CURRENT ERA OF "RELAXATION OF TENSION" TO CONSOLIDATE GRIP ON EASTERN EUROPE IS MOST USEFUL WHEN DIRECTED AT WESTERN OPINION RATHER THAN CAPTIVE PEOPLES THEMSELVES TO WHOM IT IS (1) ALL TOO WELL KNOWN, AND (2) DISCOURAGING. IT IS USEFUL, HOWEVER, TO INFORM OUR AUDIENCE THAT WESTERN OPINION IS AWARE OF THEIR PLIGHT AND OPPOSES THIS CYNICAL SOVIET MANEUVER; ADDITIONALLY, THE CONCEPT CAN OCCASIONALLY APPEAR IN OUR COMMENTARIES ON ITS ANALYTICAY MERITS. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD NOT BE THE BASIS FOR A CONCERTED PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN. WE, THEREFORE, SUGGEST THAT THE FOLLOWING BRIEF PARAGRAPH REPLACE YOUR PARAGRAPH III, 2: THE SOVIET UNION, WITH THE FERVENT SUPPORT OF ITS PUPPET REGIMES IN EASTERN EUROPE, IS ATTEMPTING TO PERPETRATE A FRAUD ON WORLD OPINION BY PREACHING "COEXISTENCE" ABROAD WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY TIGHTENING ITS GRIP ON ITS EASTERN EUROPEAN EMPIRE. IN THE PERIOD SINCE THE SUMMER OF 1959 WHEN IT WAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE TOP-LEVEL VISITS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, THE INTERNAL SCENE IN ALL RFE TARGET COUNTRIES HAS BEEN

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CHARACTERIZED BY FURTHER STEPS DESIGNED TO CONSOLIDATE THE POSITION OF RULING REGIMES IN THESE COUNTRIES AND, IN TURN, TO BRING THESE AREAS UNDER CLOSER CONTROL BY MOSCOW. RFE SHOULD COMBAT THESE EFFORTS BY DENOUNCING MOSCOW'S DOUBLE-FACED POLICY AND ITS PERPETRATORS IN THE CAPTIVE COUNTRIES. OUR AUDIENCES SHOULD BE INFORMED THAT THE WEST IS AWARE OF THESE ACTION AND OPPOSED TO THEM.

III, PARA 4. WHILE WE AGREE WITH YOUR GENERAL IDEA REGARDING CPSU PROPAGANDA RESOLUTION, WE FEEL THAT EMPHASIS SHOULD STRONGLY BE ON PROJECTION OF WESTERN VALUES, RATHER THAN DELVING DEEPLY INTO FUNDAMENTAL REASONS WHY SOVIETS MUST STILL WORRY ABOUT ACCEPTANCE ABOUT COMMUNIST DOGMA. OUR REASONING IS THAT CAPTIVE PEOPLES ARE VERY WELL AWARE INDEED OF SHORTCOMINGS OF COMMUNIST THEORY AND PRACTICE, AND INHERENTLY ARE WELL-DISPOSED TOWARDS WESTERN CONCEPTS. THEY, THEREFORE, NEED LITTLE CONVINCING OF REASONS FOR SOVIET PROPAGANDA FAILURES (THEY THEMSELVES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH FAILURES IN CAPTIVE COUNTRIES) BUT WOULD WELCOME FURTHER PROJECTION OF WESTERN VALUES.

TWO FEBRUARY ANNIVERSARIES STRIKE US AS OUTSTANDING PROPAGANDA OPPORTUNITIES. FIRST IF KHRUSHCHEV SECRET SPEECH OF 1956 AND SECOND IS 1948 COUP D ETAT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. LATTER IS ESPECIALLY APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME SINCE IT VIVIDLY ILLUSTRATES FRUITS OF EFFORTS TO "COEXIST" WITH COMMUNISM. WE SHALL SEND OUR SUGGESTIONS ON THESE TWO POINTS TOMORROW. REGARDS.

END MSG  
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