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WHAT HAPPENED IN THE KREMLIN?

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Introduction

In the appendices below, three notable Kremlinologists give three widely contrasting opinions as to the meaning of recent events in Moscow. There is no way of proving which, if any, of these three analyses is correct, but a few observations on each theory may well be made.

The interpretation given by the Guardian (pp. 1-19 below) argues that Khrushchev's behaviour in Paris was due to the fact that he had lost his majority in the Presidium at some time after his departure from Moscow. If this were the case, it would be the most dramatic of the three views presented here. But there are a few pointers which cannot easily be fitted into the Guardian's analysis. In point of time, the first emerges from the testimony given by Mr. Herter in Washington, where he reported that on May 6th the Soviet Embassy there, prior to any statement by a US official accepting responsibility for the U-2, and prior to the President's statement on it, had withdrawn from the Soviet magazine which circulates in the US an announcement that Eisenhower would be visiting the Soviet Union in June.¹

¹ The Guardian, May 30, 1960.

Thus it is conceivable that a decision to make the President's visit impossible, using the summit as a sounding board, had already been taken in Moscow before May 6th.

The Guardian's case for thinking that Khrushchev went to Paris determined to climb the summit but had his instructions changed after his arrival (p. 2 below) rests partly on the positive statements made by Khrushchev at Orly Airport on May 14th. But it is possible that since Khrushchev wanted the maximum publicity for his extravagant demands on the US President, he felt that he must speak softly at first in order to be certain that the stage was properly set for what was to follow. It is surely not unusual for Soviet leaders to increase the scope of their demands as a conference begins to get under way.

Be that as it may, the other objection to the Guardian theory which might well be raised is that the "majority" in the Presidium against Khrushchev is extremely hard to identify. The Guardian points out that the five members of the secretariat are likely to have voted en bloc with Khrushchev on the issue of the "soft" versus the "hard" policy, and few observers would disagree, although it may well be asked whether the secretariat always votes as a unit. Certainly it is likely to have done so in this case, had the issue in fact arisen, but the implication must then be that at least six² of the following Presidium members voted against Khrushchev:

Aristov, Furtseva, Ignatov, Kosygin, Podgorny, Poliansky, Shvernik, Voroshilov.

A detailed study of these names does not produce any conceivable combination of six who would be likely to defy Khrushchev. It is true that Furtseva, Ignatov, and Voroshilov had all lost power or position as a result of the changes on May 4th, but equally Furtseva seems an improbable supporter of a "hard" foreign policy, and there is no demonstrable reason why any of the others should have turned against Khrushchev.

Lastly the Guardian's theory does not seem to accord with post-Parisian developments. Khrushchev has been careful to turn the heat off Berlin, has reaffirmed his belief in summitry as a means of furthering his foreign policy, and has told the world -- and the Chinese:

"I must say that I still believe that the President himself wants peace."³

² Based on the Guardian's assumption that members temporarily absent from Moscow have no vote.

³ Speech to workers of Communist labor brigades, May 28, 1960, Radio Moscow.

In other words while Soviet propaganda is naturally saying harsh things about "imperialists" in the US in order to exploit the U-2 incident fully, the actual course of Khrushchev's foreign policy remains as clearly towards co-existence as his domestic policy towards fewer soldiers, shorter hours, slightly better pay, and more consumer goods.⁴

At a different point in the spectrum from the Guardian's analysis is the New Leader article (pp. 26 et seq. below) in which Mr. Nicolaevsky argues that Khrushchev himself wanted to avoid a serious clash with the West on the Berlin issue, and therefore used the U-2 incident as a convenient excuse for postponing the summit. But the New Leader's theory also contains some weaknesses, in that it argues that Khrushchev was defeated at the December plenum of the CC CPSU on the issue of kolkhoz mergers -- and immediately goes on to say, rightly, that Khrushchev subsequently "continued his line." Since the latter statement is clearly true, it seems as improbable that Khrushchev was defeated in December as that he was outvoted on the more important issue in Paris on May 14th.

Secondly the New Leader theory of "very widespread" discontent in the Army as a result of the demobilization announced in January 1960 does not account for the fact that there had been no previous indications of a similar mood during the three previous demobilizations. The armed forces of the USSR had been reduced from 5.7 million men in 1955 to 3.6 millions at the end of 1959, and showed every sign of being passively resigned to their fate. Malinovsky's speech to the communist labor brigade workers⁵ contained the following familiar phraseology:

"Let us wish good health and much strength to our dear Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev (applause), to the great Leninist, our leader, friend, and teacher (prolonged applause)."

Thus the chief spokesman of the armed forces is now using for Khrushchev the same "leader and teacher" formula for which the praise for Stalin was once notorious. The New Leader thesis that the recent changes in the high command, which were carried through by Khrushchev and Malinovsky, were aimed at eliminating opposition to Khrushchev's policy seems less probable than that there was little significant opposition. The changes may have been caused simply by the fact that Marshal Sokolovsky's tour of duty as chief of

⁴ See F.A.Z. May 31, 1960 report of Khrushchev's conversation with Austrian parliamentary delegation.

⁵ May 31st, Radio Moscow.

staff had ended, providing the occasion for an intra-service rather than a politically motivated reshuffle.

Writing on the changes in the Presidium, the New Leader points out that Brezhnev's duties include Party surveillance of the Army (p. 29 below), and argues that this is "directly connected with the emergence of opposition in the military command." But it seems probable that Brezhnev has been responsible for military affairs in the Presidium since 1957, when he became a full member of it, and consequently his recent speech to the secretaries of Party cells in the Army does not seem to constitute any new departure.

Overshadowing these minor points, however, is the New Leader's warning that Khrushchev, in his reshuffle of the Presidium, "is concentrating both formal and factual power in his hands in a manner not yet seen in the Soviet dictatorship." This sombre prospect leads directly to the third, and most convincing, interpretation below (pp. 20-25) in which Mr. Lowenthal, writing in the New Republic, argues that Khrushchev:

"...is not the spokesman of a democratic committee but a dictator in full command of all the levers of power."

The Guardian (30/5/60), in a different article from the one reproduced here, has provided a new piece of factual evidence which tends to confirm the New Republic's theory. It is describing the scene on May 28th after Khrushchev had spoken:

"At the end of his speech, which was broadcast live from the Kremlin, Mr. Khrushchev received an ovation the like of which has never been seen or heard in Moscow. It was not the fervour of the plaudits -- which in Stalin's days could go on longer than Mr. Khrushchev's three minutes on Saturday -- but their manner, that made one think. The once familiar rhythmic shouting of 'Sieg Heil' now resounded in the Great Hall of the Kremlin in the form of 'Khrushchev-Khrushchev -- Khrush...' -- with all the frightening fervour that one associates with another dictatorship."

While it is natural to hope, perhaps to pray, that collective leadership is still with us, evidence of this type seems to make the possibility less and less plausible with every passing day.

r. r. g.

The Manchester Guardian
May 27, 1960
by Victor Zorza
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President Eisenhower believes that Mr. Khrushchev had concluded "before arriving in Paris," that progress at the Summit would be undesirable or impossible, and had therefore launched a premeditated attack aimed at "securing the failure of the conference before it could begin."

Mr. Khrushchev says that it became clear to the Soviet delegation in Paris that "the United States Government had decided to wreck the Summit conference."

While it is possible that both these statesmen believe their views to be true, it is not possible for both explanations to be true in fact. Nor need either Mr. Eisenhower's or Mr. Khrushchev's necessarily be true. There may be a third one - that Mr. Khrushchev had in fact gone to Paris anxious to save the summit, but was not able to do so because he was no longer in a position to shape Soviet policy.

Pressure on Mr. Khrushchev to Abandon policy of Restraint.

Mr. Khrushchev's version of the events in Paris between May 14 and 18 is that the Summit could have been saved if Mr. Eisenhower had accepted his conditions - if he had made a grovelling apology and had promised to punish those responsible for the U-2 overflight. In fact, those who had put forward those conditions knew that Mr. Eisenhower could not accept them - because he could hardly promise to punish himself, or those who had acted under his authority. Thus the immediate cause of the failure of the Summit to be held was the putting forward of the Soviet conditions.

But had Mr. Khrushchev in fact gone to Paris determined to wreck the Summit in this way? On arrival on Saturday morning, May 14, at Orly Airport, he read out of a prepared statement. The terms of that statement had been known to certain people in advance - as is sometimes the case with prepared statements - and there was therefore considerable surprise when Mr. Khrushchev was heard to add a reference to (Western) efforts to revive the cold war.

But apart from this last-minute addition, he also expressed the hope that the discussion at the Summit of such questions as disarmament, Germany, and East-West relations - that is, the questions which were on the agreed agenda - would yield useful results. He promised that the Soviet Union would exert all its efforts to make the "conference" a success. He expressed the view that Summit meetings "play a very important role" in international affairs. He said that the Summit meeting "that is to be held here" was an event of "great significance in international life." He recalled that the four Heads of Government had got to know one another fairly well at previous meetings, and thought that this would help the conference along. They were there, he said "to consider the most pressing international issues and to try to find ways of solving them in the interests of all the nations."

Was this the language of a man who had gone to Paris determined that there should be no discussion at all? That Mr. Khrushchev is well able to dissimulate, there is no need to doubt. But it is extremely unlikely that he would have given hostages to fortune in this way, that he would have expressed his readiness for the negotiations and indeed emphasized the need for them, only to declare 24 hours later that there could be no negotiations of any kind unless President Eisenhower met certain conditions which Mr. Khrushchev knew full well could not be met.

For it was on Sunday morning that he informed President De Gaulle of these conditions, and made it clear that they were put forward on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. To say on Saturday that he had come for discussions "at the Summit", and then to say on Sunday that there could in fact be no negotiations and no Summit until certain unacceptable conditions had been met, was to condemn his own public attitude out of his own mouth and thus to expose himself to a world-wide propaganda defeat - to say nothing of the opprobrium - which no such experienced propagandist would willingly risk. Hence the conclusion that Saturday's words were his own, while the words he spoke on Monday were dictated to him.

No longer in the seat of power.

What had happened during those 24 hours? What had happened was his departure from Moscow, and the opportunity given thereby to the party Praesidium to insist on the hard line for which a number of its members had been pressing. With Mr. Khrushchev no longer in Moscow to defend his own line, to use his powers of persuasion on them, and also his control of the levers of power if necessary, the majority vote could have easily swung against him. We know that Mr. Mikoyan, the Praesidium member most closely identified with Mr. Khrushchev's foreign policy, had left Moscow some days before for the Crimea. We also know that on Saturday morning, when the other Praesidium members gathered at Moscow airport to give Mr. Khrushchev the customary formal send off, there was an unexpected hitch in the proceedings.

At one stage, with the aircraft ready and waiting to take off, all the Soviet leaders retired into a private room of the airport building and held an ad hoc session of the Central Committee. Clearly, it had been found necessary to have yet another discussion about the Summit tactics. This would suggest that the line previously agreed was by no means firmly adhered to by all the members of the Praesidium.

The way the argument went at the ad hoc session may be surmised from Mr. Khrushchev's last-minute chilling addition to his Orly speech. But that Mr. Khrushchev had not by any means lost this round was shown by his retention in the Orly speech of the words that made it quite clear that he had come to Paris for a meeting "at the Summit." The fate of the conference was thus still in the balance at this stage. But once, it is assumed, word had come from Moscow to say that the Praesidium had held another meeting, and that the vote had gone against Mr. Khrushchev, there was nothing further he could usefully do - not from Paris.

No one knows better than Mr. Khrushchev, trained in the Stalin school of party struggle, that power resides where the machinery of power resides- and in this instance it resided effectively with the Party Praesidium in Moscow. It would have been worse than useless, indeed dangerous, to try to argue them out of their attitude by telephone or cable from Paris. In these circumstances Mr. Khrushchev would have had to give way, and to leave on General de Gaulle's table, as in fact he did, a document outlining the conditions on which the Summit meeting could be held, the conditions presumably dictated by Moscow which were drawn up in such a way as to ensure that the conference should not be held.

Until now the few facts that are available about this last stage of the proceedings have had to be linked with assumptions which these facts might or might not justify. Whether these assumptions are reasonable depends on whether it can be established that the Praesidium takes its decisions by a majority vote, whether this majority is variable as from day to day and as between one policy and another, and lastly, whether it can be shown that Mr. Khrushchev's Summit policy had been under fire during the period which preceded the events just discussed.

Mr. K's unstable majority

On the first point, Mr. Khrushchev is on record as saying that the Praesidium decisions are in fact taken by a majority vote. But there is no need to rely on his word alone, for what is now known of the struggles that preceded Mr. Khrushchev's defeat of the "anti-party group" of Malenkov and Molotov shows quite clearly that the majority had been shifting hither and thither, over a considerable period of time and over a whole range of policy issues, up to the very point when a clear Praesidium majority emerged in favor of voting Mr. Khrushchev out of power, whereupon he was only saved by having recourse to the larger Central Committee, where he had an assured majority.

On the second point, it is in fact known that when Mr. Khrushchev gave the Central Committee on May 4 the details of the U-2 incident and at the same time explained that this need not affect the Summit, since he knew Mr. Eisenhower to be a man of peace who could be trusted, a number of Central Committee members took it upon themselves to question Mr. Khrushchev's appreciation of the situation. The Central Committee session was a secret one, but these details were given to me in Paris by Russians who had come to Moscow for the Summit, and they had been earlier mentioned during the pre-Summit House of Commons debate by Mr. Konni Zilliacus, who had also obtained them from quite different but highly credible Soviet sources.

If it is objected that this might be a story that had been deliberately put about by Mr. Khrushchev's partisans to show him in a favorable light, there is sufficient "Kremlinological" evidence to dismiss the suggestion and even to show that Mr. Khrushchev continued to remain under pressure almost up to the moment he departed from Moscow for Paris.

On May 5, the day after the Central Committee meeting, Mr. Khrushchev gave a three-hour public address to the Supreme Soviet on home and foreign policy. While expressing some misgivings about the Western Powers' attitude on the eve of the Summit, he took care to note that "the necessity to ease international tension has been repeatedly stressed by Mr. Eisenhower," and he made his view of the President appear even more emphatic by adding, in so many words: "I do not doubt President Eisenhower's sincere desire for peace." Only then did he proceed to disclose in public for the first time the details of the U-2 incident, to be interrupted by an outburst of no doubt genuine anger from the audience.

The proceedings of the Supreme Soviet were being broadcast live by Moscow Radio, and at that point a number of not very clearly distinguishable shouts were heard. They were also heard, more clearly, by "Pravda's" reporter, and were inserted the next day into the paper's account of the speech. "Pravda's" note read: "Sounds of indignation. A voice: 'How is this to be reconciled with Eisenhower's unctuous speeches? Surely this is sheer banditry!'"

Policy publicly questioned.

It is not easy to imagine that a Supreme Soviet deputy, however great his indignation, would take it upon himself to question publicly in this way Mr. Khrushchev's view, asserted twice only a few minutes before, that Mr. Eisenhower had repeatedly stressed the need to ease the tension, and that he, Khrushchev, had no doubt of the President's sincerity. But it is conceivable that if, in the secrecy of the Central Committee the day before, that view had already been questioned, then the Supreme Soviet deputy would feel safe enough in emitting this "shout" - and safer still if he knew the strength of the opposition to the Khrushchev view. Thereafter even if the "story" of what had happened in the Central Committee is not readily accepted, the "shout" provides another reason for believing it.

It could still be argued that this was a natural and uncontrollable cry of indignation - but if so, why did "Pravda" choose to publish it? Why did other speakers, in their formal contributions to the "debate", repeat the question in so many words? At least two of them were Central Committee members and secretaries of some of the country's most important party organizations. The answer can only be that they were speaking for those forces which had argued against the Khrushchev line in secret session and were now stepping up the pressure in public, almost bringing the argument out into the open.

Nor were the points at issue confined to Mr. Khrushchev's view of Mr. Eisenhower, basic as this was to the whole argument. While Mr. Khrushchev had very carefully and repeatedly laid the blame for the U-2 incident on American "brass hats" there was at least one speaker, and an important official at that, who found it possible to talk of the American "government", to accuse it of conducting a double-faced policy, and of "taking actions directed at the breakdown of the Summit conference."

These words gave perhaps the most direct indication of the real issue in the background - was the Summit subject to "break-down," was it in fact right and proper in the circumstances for Mr. Khrushchev to insist on going to Paris? That this was a real issue has since been admitted by Mr. Khrushchev in his Berlin speech, when he said that "we nevertheless decided to go to Paris although we thought that, probably, we should not." The only convincing explanation of these words is that some people thought he should not go, but that he was able to prevail on them in the end.

That Mr. Khrushchev himself did not intend to wreck the Summit at that stage by laying down impossible conditions is indicated by his determination, expressed in the Supreme Soviet, to secure a "negotiated solution" of world problems. In a phrase that was to be repeated many times in the days remaining before the Summit meeting, he said that: "we are going to the Paris conference with open hearts and good intentions, and we shall spare no effort to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement."

In the same speech on May 5 he postulated two possibilities - that aggressive American quarters had lately been active in their efforts to wreck the Summit, "or at least" prevent it from achieving the agreements the world was waiting for. A few paragraphs later he came down firmly in favor of the second view, not the "wrecking" argument, but that "the purpose behind these actions is to prevent agreement on the issues in dispute." In postulating the two possibilities he was presumably reflecting something of the arguments that had been going on in secret, and taking his stand on the second argument. Yet a number of speakers in the debate plumped for the first, and it is specially noteworthy that these same speakers also appeared to differ from Mr. Khrushchev on some of the other issues in dispute.

After giving details of the U-2 incident, Mr. Khrushchev, still fighting against the pressure, declared that "it is not feelings but reason that must guide us." In the debate that followed, a Central Committee member declared that this was quite true - "but at the same time" it was "necessary to say" that the Soviet people were laboring under a feeling of tremendous indignation.

Was he not supplying a corrective to Mr. Khrushchev's too complacent view? And is it not noteworthy that the same speaker - the secretary of the important Leningrad Party organization - went out of his way to claim that the imperialists were bent on destroying socialism and establishing capitalism, without adding Mr. Khrushchev's customary rider that the Soviet Union was now too strong for such designs to have any hope of success?

But the anti-Khrushchevians did not have it all their own way. There was the speech by Mr. Ambartsumyan, the famous scientist, and also a member of the Armenian central committee, who said that he and other deputies "hoped" that the Soviet Government would "display the necessary wisdom" in the present

situation - clearly a call for restraint. There were many others who repeated in their speeches the Khrushchev views word for word, without the tell-tale qualifications made by those who held the other views.

There was, finally, the speaker - also a Central Committee member - who brought out into the open yet another of the issues that must have been raised in secret session, Mr. Eisenhower's forthcoming visit to Russia. Mr. Khrushchev had not referred to it in his opening address. But Mr. Struyev, a regional party secretary, made it clear that he did not share the view of those who might wish to see the visit cancelled. Mr. Eisenhower was expected in June, he said, "and he will certainly find a real welcome, because he will be the guest of our Nikita Sergeyevich and represents a great state."

Winding up the Supreme Soviet debate on May 7, Mr. Khrushchev gave the further details of the incident which later made it necessary for the Americans to admit that the flight had been an act of espionage. Yet at the same time he still went out of his way to acknowledge Mr. Hagerty's disclaimer on behalf of Mr. Eisenhower, and to say that he "fully conceded" that the President had known nothing about the matter.

To the hard-line speeches in the debate that reflected the hidden pressures, that had argued that the overflight was evidence of American war preparations, he replied: "This is so far not preparation for war, for a war of our times." It was merely an attempt to revive the "cold" war, to rack people's nerves; therefore, he said, he was appealing for "calm", for vigilance, yes, but at the same time for "good sense".

On the same day the State Department finally admitted that this particular flight had taken place, explained that it had not been carried out on the instructions of Washington, and at the same time justified such a flight by the need to prevent a surprise attack. So effective had been Mr. Khrushchev's appeal for "calm" that, although Tass carried the report the same evening, "Pravda" did not get around to publishing it until two days later, on May 9.

A lot of hard thinking was clearly being done in Moscow. The first public acknowledgement of the Washington statement was made later that day by Marshal Malinovsky, in a speech at a victory day rally that was broadcast by Moscow Radio at three o'clock (G.M.T.). The admission that Washington had not known about this flight, he said, was beside the point. It merely showed that there was no elementary order in the United States.

And as for the assertion that the United States had the right to continue such flights - as Marshal Malinovsky, and not he alone, understood it - this was just "insolence". But the hard thinking that had been going on in Moscow was not without some result. If any more such flights were undertaken from airfields in neighboring countries, Marshal Malinovsky said: "We have the right to take any measures against those airfields and we can erase them so that nothing remains of them."

The same evening, at a reception at the Czechoslovak Embassy, Mr. Khrushchev hardened the threat. He no longer talked about Russia's "right" to take action, but asked her neighbors to "note most carefully" that "we shall hit those bases." He deliberately played down the importance that some people in Russia might have attributed to the Washington statement, spoke throughout in a bantering tone, expressed his regard for the United States Ambassador, and reiterated that all that had happened was that "our strength is being tested". He did not, he emphasized, want to heat up passions. "Therefore", he said, "let us not draw conclusions that might aggravate relations between our countries" and hamper them in the future.

Summit Meeting still on.

At that state, it would seem, the Summit was still on as far as Mr. Khrushchev was concerned, and very much so.

The next day, May 10, Gromyko handed over to the Americans a formal reply to the Washington statement, rejected the claim that this particular flight had been made without the knowledge of Washington, and expressed the hope that the United States Government would stop such "provocative actions." By saying in the same paragraph that Russia and America could then seek with other interested countries mutually acceptable solutions of unresolved international problems, he was in effect saying that the suspension of flights was the only condition for the Summit being held - and even that he was not saying in the form of an ultimatum.

When Mr. Gromyko gave a press conference on the following day, May 11, he took account of a more recent statement by Mr. Herter, made two days before, in which, he said, the Secretary of State had "found it necessary to explain" that the overflight programme had been carried out under directives given by the President at the very beginning of his term. He noted that this statement meant that no special presidential permission was required for individual flights, such as the last one. He repeated that the Soviet delegation would go to Paris and would spare no effort in the search for a negotiated settlement of world issues. He did, it is true, lay down a condition for the Summit, but both the manner and the matter of it were eminently acceptable: "The Soviet Union does not wish this affair to lead to further complication, on one condition: similar provocations must be stopped." Still at this late date the Summit was on.

Mr. Gromyko had given his press conference at the exhibition of the wreckage of the U-2, and Mr. Khrushchev, not to be outdone, also gave one shortly afterwards when he came to inspect the exhibits, speaking to correspondents informally, using a chair instead of a soap box. For the first time he

gave some indication that he was finding the cross-fire - from Washington and from his own opposition - difficult to withstand. But he was still not giving up. Asked about his views on American policy, he declared himself an "incorrigible optimist" - this, evidently, for the ears of the pressure group.

The overflights, he repeated, were not preparation for war but "probing." Several times he was asked about his attitude to President Eisenhower and his expected visit to Russia and several times he avoided a direct reply. He would not like to be in the President's shoes "when" he came to Russia - but twice, in different contexts, he assured Mr. Eisenhower that there would be no excesses. Did he still want the President to come?

Again he gave no direct answer, but balanced his expression of "disappointment" in Mr. Eisenhower with the statement: "You know my attitude to the President. I have often spoken about it." And that attitude, of course, was that he had no doubt about Mr. Eisenhower's desire for peace. Yes, he said, he was still going to the Summit, and would do all he could to relieve the strain, to normalize the situation, and to restore good relations with the United States - if they contributed to it.

Normal Relations Wanted.

And finally, the most important question. Would the matter of the U-2 come up at the Summit?" It is already the subject of world-wide discussion. Therefore I believe there is no need to put it on the discussion schedule of the Summit." Once again, would he not prefer to put off the President's visit? They would exchange views on this in Paris, he said, and in the same breath he added: "We still want to find ways to improve relations with America. We want to have normal relations with the United States."

The next day, May 12, "Pravda", published a report of Mr. Eisenhower's press conference of the day before. The report mentioned his justification of overflights - which carried the implication that they would continue - but it also quoted Mr. Eisenhower's view that the U-2 incident would not change the Summit prospects, that it must not distract attention from the real Summit issues. It also carried Mr. Eisenhower's assurances on the other points Mr. Khrushchev had raised. The President had said that he would stay in Paris, as long as required, and would not leave Mr. Nixon in charge.

Mr. Khrushchev's honor had been satisfied and his questions answered. It remained for the Americans to give the assurance that the flights would be stopped - the only assurance that the Russians had so far asked for - and all would be well. Mr. Khrushchev was going to Paris two days before the scheduled beginning of the conference, to give the President the opportunity to negotiate privately and to provide the assurance.

That, as far as Mr. Khrushchev was concerned, appears to have been the situation on Saturday, May 14, when he arrived

in Paris. Next day he met General de Gaulle and Mr. Macmillan, and before they were able to tell him that the President would in fact give him the assurances required, he told them that these would be no longer enough. He wanted an apology in terms which, he must have known, no President of the United States would feel able to make. He wanted the punishment of those "responsible" - the President having said that the flight programme had been carried out under this authority. Or did he really want all that? Did anything happen since the last moves described here to justify any change of the Soviet attitude? On May 13 the State Department sent a Note to Russia which merely reaffirmed what Mr. Herter and President Eisenhower had already said, and what Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Khrushchev had answered in their earlier statements. There was not one new element in the American Note. Or was it the fact that, while already in Paris, the Secretary of Defence had put United States forces on the alert? But that happened later. And in any case, said Mr. Khrushchev at the press conference after the Summit breakdown, he had known nothing about the alert.

There had thus been no American moves or statements that could have produced a change in his attitude. The answer must therefore be that the change was due to something that happened in Moscow. It happened on May 4, when the Central Committee met in secret session.

Until that day the fifteen members of the Praesidium included ten secretaries of the party apparatus, the first among whom - always described in the Soviet press with a capital "F" - was Mr. Khrushchev. The secretariat had been Mr. Khrushchev's channel to power, as it had been Stalin's. He had built it up to the point where it was always in a majority of ten over the five other Praesidium members. On May 4 the number of secretaries in the Praesidium was reduced to six. Mr. Khrushchev's reduced block vote of six could now easily be overwhelmed by any combination of the remaining nine Praesidium members. He was no longer the supreme master. His policies could be questioned and voted down, and, as the foregoing account suggests, they were.

CONTROVERSY OVER MR. KHRUSHCHEV'S MISSILE DEFENCE POLICY

By Victor Zorza
The Manchester Guardian
May 30, 1960

If Mr. Khrushchev's position is as seriously shaken as is suggested by the view that he had to withdraw from the Summit under pressure from a "tough" group in the party Praesidium, what are the prospects for world peace, and for Mr. Khrushchev himself?

Mr. Khrushchev himself probably does not know, for the struggle is far from over and the issue is and will perhaps remain in balance for some time to come. When his power position was last shaken in Moscow, after the Hungarian rebellion in October, 1956, and a number of decisions were published which appeared to diverge from Mr. Khrushchev's views, it was several months before the struggle was decided. By June, 1957, he defeated the Malenkov-Molotov opposition and by October he secured the expulsion from the party leadership of Marshal Zhukov, on whose help he had greatly relied during the June crisis.

Can Mr. Khrushchev do the hat-trick and ensure for the third time the defeat of an opposition group that has been powerful enough to compel him to change his declared "Summit" policy? Judging from past performance, the betting should be on Mr. Khrushchev. The opposition, of course, will be prepared for the fight. It will know that any Soviet leader who has found himself crossed must inevitably try to remove from positions of power those who had crossed him, in order to prevent the possibility of repetition. The opposition will therefore

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have fortified its positions in anticipation of the struggle, and it may therefore be some time before the resulting stalemate is shifted.

What of Soviet foreign policy in the meantime? To answer this question the issues in the struggle have to be analysed anew, and the wrecking of the Summit by the "tough" group has to be put in the wider context of the Soviet policies over which the argument has ranged.

Light or heavy industry

To provide a full picture one would have to go back to the 1954-5 fights between Khrushchev and Malenkov on the issue of heavy versus light industry, which ended in Malenkov's first defeat and his demotion from the Premiership. But for the purposes of the present analysis it may be convenient to start with the last new year reception at the Kremlin, when Mr. Khrushchev announced to a startled audience of Soviet notables and foreign ambassadors that Russia might rely for her defences in the future entirely on rocket weapons, and reduce to an absolute minimum the personnel and equipment of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Within a fortnight Mr. Khrushchev presented to a specially convened session of the Supreme Soviet his proposals for the arms cuts, entailing the dismissal within two years of a quarter - 250,000, to be exact, - of the officers of the Soviet armed forces. In the days that followed the Army newspapers were loud in their assurances that all the released officers would be found well-paid civilian jobs - and at the same time lauded the merits of manual labour at the workbench, the nobility of such occupations as fitters and mechanics, and also warned the officers that they could not all expect to step straight into the positions of party and industrial administrators, officials, and obtain other posts of the kind that are the most coveted.

There was no lack of indications between the lines of the Soviet press that many of the officers were bitter and resentful, that they considered themselves cheated of the high income and status they had been taught to regard as their own for ever, and that they were prepared to voice their resentment. This is not to suggest that even if the 250,000 officers had been able to organise themselves into a pressure group, they could have then secured a change in Soviet policy.

What is possible, however, is that any group within the party leadership which did not approve of the arms cuts for reasons of its own could have found the means of focusing and channelling the officer resentment, and of winning the sympathies of the Army leadership, which itself would have been resentful of the treatment of the officer corps and of the retreat from conventional weapons. The transition to new and unconventional weapons systems has at all times and in all countries been resented by important segments of the military leadership, and there is no reason why this should not have occurred in Russia too. Certain comrades unconvinced

When Mr. Khrushchev, after giving fuller details of the U-2 overflight to the Supreme Soviet on May 7, said that "this incident should not, nevertheless, compel us to revise our plans and increase our appropriations for armaments and the Army" and that "it must not force us to slow down the process of reducing the Army," whom was he arguing against?

In his first speech, on May 5, he had put the argument even more forcefully.

Almost immediately afterwards he gave a clear indication, in so many words, that he was indeed arguing against "certain comrades". His proposals on arms cuts had been approved by the Supreme Soviet in January - and here he was, in May, still pressing on the doubters the view that they should at last grasp the simple truth that rockets were the only weapons worth having, because they were the least likely to become obsolete. Could it be that the "approval" he had obtained in January to cut down conventional armaments had been no more than formal, that those whom he had then been able to silence were now becoming more vocal, especially after his revelations about the overflights, made at the secret session of the central committee the day before?

In the public speech to the Supreme Soviet he conceded that "certain comrades may ask" - which meant that they were indeed asking, and that they were important enough to have their questions answered - whether it was not too early to increase capital investment in consumer goods industries. Would this not, they had asked, hold up the development of heavy industry, which provided the potential for further economic development, "and also, and above all, for the building of our country

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defence facilities?"

At last the cat was out of the bag - the old controversy about consumer goods versus heavy industry had now been revived, with Khrushchev this time taking the view for which he had once condemned Malenkov. On the previous occasion Mr. Khrushchev had presumably been able to secure the support of influential Army quarters which favoured heavy industrial development in the interests of defence. Now Mr. Khrushchev's opponents were turning the tables against him, and asking what was going to happen to the country's defence posture if his plans for more consumer goods deprived the armed forces of the resources they needed.

This time the issues are not, as they were in the Malenkov controversy, simply points of general principle on defence policy, but questions of immediate urgency that have been brought to a head by the U-2 incident. Mr. Khrushchev has said that when an American spy plane flew over Kiev in the summer of 1956 the Soviet Union decided not to protest to the United States, but instead "to improve our rockets, to improve our fighters." Soviet fighters could fly as high as 28,000 metres - equal to the performance of the U-2 - but, said Mr. Khrushchev, "the difficulties of a fighter are that though it can rise high, it is not so easy and simple to find the target in the air; a plane in the air is like a needle in the ocean. But the rocket itself homes on the target."

That was the conclusion Mr. Khrushchev says he drew in the summer of 1956. The American overflights have continued since then with impunity - because the fighters were not good enough - while he was "perfecting" his rockets. It must have been quite a shock to many people in the Central Committee to hear this, and perhaps even to some members of the Praesidium, for Mr. Khrushchev might easily have tried to confine the knowledge of this to the Defence Ministry and his immediate secretariat. And had he in fact "perfected" the rockets sufficiently?

There was another overflight on April 9. "This reconnaissance plane." Mr. Khrushchev said on May 9, "should have been brought down too. But our military to put it mildly, let the chance slip by. And we, as one says, took them to task for it." If the rockets are as perfect as Mr. Khrushchev makes out, why had the military failed

so miserably that they had to be taken to task for it?

Deep penetrations by U-2

Mr. Khrushchev claims that the U-2 which flew over Russia on May 1 was allowed to fly so far into Russia to see exactly what it was up to, but this is a claim that many of his party colleagues - or critics will take with a pinch of salt. Surely, if possible, the plane should have, been shot down at the first available opportunity? The Soviet military knew that the spy flights were occurring fairly regularly, and had seen what they were up to by tracking them before, they knew that the last spy-plane had got away on April 9, and that this one might similarly get away unless brought down straight away. And yet they let him fly over the Aral Sea area - Russia's "Cape Canaveral" - and brought him down only when he came within the range of the anti-aircraft rockets of Sverdlovsk, 1,500 miles from the frontier.

The conclusion is obvious. Sverdlovsk, one of the most important Soviet industrial centres, has defences which proved adequate on this occasion. But the country between the border and Sverdlovsk - including the Aral Sea area - has not.

Mr. Khrushchev has staked his defence policy on the deterrent power of Russia's ICBMs. But if much of Russia can in fact be reached by hostile bomber aircraft - a possibility that Mr. Khrushchev heatedly denied in his Kremlin speech on Saturday - the ICBM deterrent is not quite what it seems. And if the deterrent is not adequate, then the possibility of limited, local wars remains, and for that strong conventional forces are necessary. Yet Mr. Khrushchev had at the beginning of the year railroaded through the Supreme Soviet his plan to reduce these forces to a minimum - still a very large "minimum", but hardly large enough for a traditionally land-minded army like Russia's.

It is easy to see that in the view of the Soviet military - and not only the military, but perhaps also Presidium members - this would have been tantamount to the same policy that Mr. Duncan Sandys had laid down for Britain. If the reduced conventional forces were not able to deal adequately with a local conflict, the deterrent - which after all is meant never to be used - would in fact have to be brought into use and a world-wide holocaust would be in the making.

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This is the kind of argument that has been freely voiced about defence policy in the West, and no doubt it has also been heard in Russia, though in the more restricted circle of military experts and policy makers. But once the U-2 incident was brought up in the Central Committee, it could not have been easy, in the more relaxed atmosphere of post-Stalin Russia, to prevent the second-rank leadership stratum from discussing its implications for national defence. Could the discussion have taken any other turn but to deplore the inadequacy of the defences shown up by the U-2 incident, and to blame the man ultimately responsible for Russia's concentration on the costly, but from the point of view of immediate defence, unsatisfactory, deterrent?

Once such anti-Khrushchevian sentiments had been expressed - though not necessarily in the form of personal attacks - the authority and power Mr. Khrushchev had wielded for the past few years, with the ready consent of the Central Committee, would be seriously undermined. The Central Committee might have been originally expected to hear a formal report from Mr. Khrushchev on his proposed line at the Summit, but once the U-2 had been thrown into the proceedings it was inevitable that the question of the Summit, too, should become a subject for debate.

A Strong Line On Berlin

Mr. Khrushchev had throughout claimed that he was going to the Summit from a position of strength, he had made threats about what would happen if the West did not accept his proposals on Berlin, and now it appeared that the Soviet position was not as strong as he had so repeatedly told his followers and the world. He may have been prepared to brazen it out in Paris - a previous article showed as conclusively as is possible in the circumstances that up to the very last moment he was trying to save the Summit, and now even the State Department concedes that he appears to have been under pressure in Moscow.

He had worked for so many years to bring the West to this meeting, he had got to know the Western leaders almost to the point of cordiality there was a good chance that his efforts might be crowned at least with an agreement on the cessation of atomic tests. He might even have hoped that the outlines of some agreement on Berlin, which had become apparent at the last Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers, could be filled in a little more firmly at the Summit. The game was worth the

candle - to him, at any rate.

But not to the young post-Stalin generation of party officials, blindly confident in their strength, so proud of all the great changes they had wrought in Russia in the past few years, so inspired by the scientific lead they had obtained over America, in short, so nationally - if not chauvinistically - minded.

Ideal of a pax Sovietica

Mr. Khrushchev had become a world figure, a statesman who could charm and tease and persuade other statesmen and even nations. He wanted to play on the world stage, and he wanted to live the dream of so many statesmen - to crown his career by establishing a pax mundi, if not a sovietica.

Mr. Khrushchev gave something of the argument of the opposition - only to dismiss it - when he said on May 9: "The American military thought like this: 'If the April 9 flight passed off with impunity, that means they (the Russians) cannot hit it at such an altitude,' and the aggressive military wanted to demonstrate their strength once again 15 days before the Summit meeting. 'Well, Khrushchev they would say, what are you boasting of? We fly over your country and you can do nothing about it.'" Mr. Khrushchev dismissed this argument with the claim that the shooting down of the U-2 on May 1 had in fact shown it to be invalid.

But in his Berlin speech, after he had been made to wreck the Summit, he was no longer dismissing this argument - he was himself ramming it home. Mr. Khrushchev said: "Apparently there was a wry smile on the faces of President Eisenhower, Herter, Nixon, and above all Allen Dulles, when they anticipated the Summit meeting in Paris, where Eisenhower would think, glancing at Khrushchev: 'What is the use of trying to convince us here? American planes flew over the Soviet Union and you could do nothing about it - and still you came to Paris. Consequently, you cannot be so insistent (read: powerful enough) in pressing for agreement on disarmament, on concluding a peace treaty with Germany, and on other matters.'"

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In official quarters in the West the view is firmly held that not only was Mr. Khrushchev determined to wreck the Summit all along, but that the beginnings of this intention go back to his state visit to France, when General de Gaulle had made it clear to him that he must expect no concessions on Berlin. Therefore, it is argued, he preferred to wreck the Summit rather than be shown up as unable to keep the promise he had given to his colleagues at home and allies abroad - that he would wrest Berlin from the West.

But if it was so important to them to obtain immediate concessions on Berlin, how is this explanation to be squared with the announcement immediately after the Summit failure - without any pressure from the West, without any negotiations even - that no unilateral changes would be made in regard to Berlin for at least six or eight months, and possibly for much longer? No, the true explanation has been given by Mr. Khrushchev himself, now as the spokesman of the erstwhile opposition to him, when he drew an imaginary picture of President Eisenhower, sitting at the Summit table and thinking: "Our planes flew over the Soviet Union, and you could do nothing about it - and still you came to Paris." These are the most important, the most telling, and the most revealing of all the many thousands of words that Mr. Khrushchev has spoken in public in the past few weeks.

Before the Summit failure, when he was still fighting with his colleagues to be allowed to go to Paris, he was denying the relevance of any such thought. After the breakdown, in Berlin and again in Moscow last Saturday, he was affirming its relevance with all the fervour of a new convert.

The ovation that he was given at the end of his speech on Saturday may appear to suggest that, however much this position might have been shaken, it is now again as firm as ever. But ovations can be organised easily by a party secretariat - still firmly in Mr. Khrushchev's hands - that has forty years' experience in these things. But when it comes to the shaping of policy by the Praesidium, the six secretaries, who, under Khrushchev as the first of them, form the secretariat block vote,

will hardly be able to enforce his views as easily as when they were in a ten-to-five majority before May 4.

Party Presidium reorganised

But how, with a Khrushchev majority as decisive as this, did the opposition manage to reorganise the Praesidium to Khrushchev's disadvantage on May 4? That some changes were going to be made, and that they would entail the removal of Praesidium members Khrushchev wanted to get rid of - such as Kirichenko and Belyayev - had been apparent for some time. These two had once been his chosen and faithful assistants in his climb to power. Was he now throwing them to the wolves, to reduce the pressure that may have been building up against himself? There had been signals of failure from Khrushchev's pet project in the virgin lands - so the man who had been administering it, Belyayev, not Khrushchev, the man who had conceived it, had to go. There may have been dissatisfaction at the way the secretariat had become all-powerful - as the subsequent reduction of its power in the praesidium, would suggest - so Kirichenko, who had earlier managed the secretariat for Khrushchev, had to go too.

The other departures from the secretariat cannot be as readily explained, but their effect in reducing the block vote is obvious. If the other secretaries who have been transferred to lesser posts, while still remaining in the Praesidium, had in fact been removed at the instance of Khrushchev, they would not now vote with him as readily as they might have done once. And if their removal was the result of some anti-Khrushchev move, their departure from the secretariat would have deprived them of their identity of interests with it, and sooner or later they would stop voting with it.

Such are the possibilities. They are, like everything else in this article must be, owing to the nature of the evidence, purely speculative in character. The States Department now accepts the fact of pressure on Mr. Khrushchev, but refuses to believe that he had been trying to save the Summit to the last possible moment - after all, President Eisenhower had committed them still in Paris to the view that Mr. Khrushchev had come to the Summit determined to wreck it.

Mr. K's personal intervention

Mr. Khrushchev, too, has now entered the controversy in person. In his Saturday speech he ridiculed Western journalistic speculation about possible disagreements and pressures within the Soviet leadership. Mr. Malenkov, when he was demoted from the Premiership, had similarly ridiculed the journalistic speculation about disagreements to which his "resignation," he warned the Supreme Soviet, would give rise. He lived, not to put too fine a point on it, to rue the day.

What, now, of the future?

The Soviet leaders, having withdrawn from the Summit for six, eight, or more months - for as long, presumably, as the new "fantastic" weapon Mr. Khrushchev had spoken about in January takes to mature - also had to withdraw their threat to Berlin, now seen to be unenforceable. But in other ways - in the vituperation of the Soviet press, in the mass "indignation" meetings, in his own speech in the Kremlin on Saturday - they have veered right back into the very centre of the cold war.

They will now come back to the Summit and to real negotiations only when they believe that they have the whip hand. They may drag out and even allow the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of tests, they may conclude other agreements with the West that do not affect Russia's power position - but for real "negotiations" they will be ready only when they can talk from a position of strength. This is the new danger looming on the international horizon. For to speak from positions of real strength they have to give the appearance of being prepared to use it to enforce their views. This might mean that they will resort to bluff and blackmail - and if the bluff is called, they might find themselves in a position of having to use the force they had been threatening to use.

NO MOURNING FOR NIKITAHe Knows What He's Doing, and He's Boss

by Richard Lowenthal
The New Republic*
May 30, 1960

Why did Khrushchev, after two years of working steadily for a Summit conference, suddenly refuse to take part in it at the last moment? Why did he revert to the crudest kind of Cold War language just when his tireless campaign for an international detente seemed about to reach its ostensible goal?

The apparent change in the direction of Russian policy has been so dramatic, and so out of proportion to the spy-plane affair which officially occasioned it, that it has raised widespread doubts whether Khrushchev is still in command at all. The Western reading public is told by experienced correspondents, quoting anonymous diplomatic experts on Soviet affairs, that he has been virtually overthrown by a coalition composed of the Chinese Communist leaders, the "Stalinist" party presidium, and the Soviet army leadership. The party presidium, it is assumed, must have adopted new policy directives just before or even after Khrushchev left for Paris, and the enraged party boss who wrecked the Summit meeting in full view of the world's press was just carrying out these directives under the stern eye of Marshal Malinovsky. In short, the chubby cherub of peace has had his wings clipped by sinister Asiatics, into whose hands American blundering has betrayed him, and may never again be allowed out with an olive branch.

Now all of us, experts or non-experts, know so little about the internal maneuvering in the Soviet Communist leadership that even that moving fable may contain some truth. But for the record, it seems worth pointing out that what little facts we do know point in an entirely different direction. They suggest that Khrushchev is not the spokesman of a democratic committee but a dictator in full command of all the levers of power; that the officer corps, while probably discontented about recent cuts in the strength of Soviet conventional forces, has neither the ambition nor the possibility to influence the major policies of the party; and that the Chinese Communist leaders, while in open disagreement with some of these policies, have no substantial allies in Moscow. They also suggest good reasons why Khrushchev himself should have come to regard a Summit meeting as inopportune and indeed dangerous at the present moment -- dangerous

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from the point of view of his strategy; and why, while obviously compelled to modify his immediate tactics following the Summit fiasco, he is still free to pursue his major objectives and not yet, as of now, committed to precipitate a real -- as distinct from a verbal -- international crisis by authorizing serious action against West Berlin.

On May 4, three days after the spy plane crashed near Sverdlovsk and on the eve of Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet press announced a reshuffle in the top leadership that had been approved by a plenary session of the Central Committee. Its main result, apart from the known disgrace of Kirichenko and Belyayev, was a stricter separation between the three power machines that are represented in the party presidium: the Soviet Government, the Central Committee Secretariat, and the Party Bureau for the Russian Federative Republic. Henceforth, nobody would work in more than one of those three bodies -- except Khrushchev, who heads all three, with different deputies in each of them. There could be no clearer indication of the concentration of personal power in the hands of the man whom the Comintern veteran Kuusinen, now confirmed as member of the presidium and secretariat, had less than two weeks before described as "head of the Soviet state" -- a constitutionally incorrect but politically meaningful phrase. As for the formal head of state, old Voroshilov, the last survivor in office of the majority of the party presidium which had opposed Khrushchev in June '57, during the decisive battle of the post-Stalin succession crisis, he was honorably retired a few days later and replaced by Leonid Brezhnev, a proved Khrushchev supporter from the party secretariat.

All these changes, let it be remembered, were approved when the shooting down of the U-2 was already known. So was a whole series of new measures to increase the supply of consumer goods, raise lower incomes and reduce working hours, presented by Khrushchev in his speech to the Supreme Soviet and proudly referred to by him as valid Soviet policy in his final thunderous press conference in Paris. Before the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev also dispensed blame and praise to the military (for failing to bring down an earlier American plane, but succeeding the second time); and in his speech at the Czechoslovak Embassy on May 9, while stepping up the anti-American campaign, he poked gentle fun at the military leaders' anxiety about further cuts in their strength, which would nevertheless be made in due time. On the same day, 300 officers were promoted to general rank, and the decree was signed by Khrushchev himself; also on the same day, celebrated as the anniversary of the German surrender in the last war, Marshal Malinovsky in his speech went out of his way to praise Khrushchev and to support his consumer goods policy, his disarmament offers and his service cuts. Nor is this surprising: it was, after all, Khrushchev who appointed Malinovsky as Minister of War in the place of the more ambitious and politically-

independent Zhukov. Similarly, there is no reason to doubt the loyalty to Khrushchev of the military leaders who emerged on top in the latest reorganization, Zakharov and the Ukrainian Grechko, while one of the retiring chiefs, Marshal Sokolovsky, had long been associated with Malenkov.

There remains only one supposed indication of military "pressure" -- the conference of the party organization in the armed forces which was held in the days directly preceding the Paris conference, and was addressed by the formal chief of state, Brezhnev (who is an experienced political commissar), as well as by Suslov from the party secretariat and Ignatov, the party secretary just transferred to the government as a deputy minister president. It is perfectly plausible that this conference was at least partly concerned with the problem of maintaining morale in the officers' corps following the January cut in troop strength, and that the delegates' reports may have shown this to be serious. But I believe that such a conference, whose very purpose is to improve the Communist Party's guidance of the armed forces, could voice a demand for a reversal of major party policies is to mistake the Soviet Union for a somewhat chaotic and semi-democracy of the Latin American type. Even Zhukov, who enjoyed far more personal prestige than any of the present leaders, and who reached the peak of his career as a member of the party presidium toward the end of the post-Stalin succession crisis, never aimed at more than greater internal independence for the army. Now that party rule is consolidated with no military leader in the party presidium, and with party power visibly concentrated in an undisputed leader, the idea of military pressure influencing foreign policy is utterly fantastic. Malinovsky -- one of more than 100 members of the Central Committee -- was not sent to Paris by a mysterious new "majority" to "supervise" Khrushchev; Khrushchev took him along as a gangster puts a pistol on the negotiating table -- as a stage prop.

Yet while Khrushchev is in full control -- as much, say, as Stalin was in 1929, when he had defeated all his rivals but not killed them -- he still lacks the prestige of historic achievement; his authority is not yet independent of continuous, ever-renewed success. This distinction is vital in connection with the one major dispute in the Communist camp that is not speculative but demonstrably real -- the dispute with the Chinese Communists.

Criticism from Peking

That dispute, which first came into the open over a number of issues in 1958, and was temporarily bridged at the turn of 1958-59, has reached a new stage of acuteness since last fall when Khrushchev's American visit was followed by unconcealed disagreement with Peking. In their public documents, the Chinese never criticized the idea of "peaceful coexistence" in the sense of avoidance of world war as such, nor the use of personal diplomacy and Summit negotiation. But t

rejected Khrushchev's attempt to differentiate between "realistic imperialists" like Eisenhower who might make concessions for the sake of peace, and "militarist diehards"; and, sticking to Lenin's view that war was inevitable while imperialism lasted, they argued that the best way to avoid world war was to embarrass the "imperialists" by supporting national and colonial revolutions and local wars wherever possible, rather than to soft-pedal them for the sake of a good negotiating atmosphere. The discussion, excluded from the Russian-edited World Marxist Review in which no Chinese contribution appeared after October, 1959, has lately come to the surface in Chinese and Russian statements for the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth; and the Chinese documents, with their stress on "uninterrupted revolution" and the primacy of international revolutionary solidarity over diplomatic maneuvering are remarkable for a Trotskyite rather than a Stalinist flavor. Significantly, Khrushchev attacked the "Trotskyite adventurism" of the policy of "neither peace nor war" in his first major policy speech after returning from Washington and Peking, on October 31st last year; and he has enjoyed solid public support in his own party in the dispute ever since.

But the Khrushchevian alternative to Peking's "uninterrupted revolution" was never detente as an aim in itself, or for the sake of peaceful economic progress at home: It was detente as a means to achieve foreign policy gains with strictly limited risks. The "Berlin crisis" is as essential a part of the Khrushchevian concept as is the propaganda of peaceful coexistence -- both are aspects of an over-all strategy aimed at disrupting the Western Alliance and thus establishing a definite power superiority for the Soviet bloc without indulging in the kind of brinkmanship that is all too dangerous in the nuclear age. Khrushchev feels able and is willing to grant his people improved living and welfare standards, but he is no mere do-gooder -- he remains a Communist believing in continuous transformation of the collective farms at home and steady if cautious expansion abroad.

Yet expansion with limited risk presupposes an opponent who is ready to yield; the popular Western slogan of recent months, that Khrushchev "cannot have a detente and Berlin, too" is only true in the opposite case. It is here that Khrushchev's "differentiation tactics," his distinction between "realists" and "die-hards" in the imperialist camp, have their importance. After Camp David, the Bolshevik leader felt that the President of the United States could be brought to yield to Khrushchev's supposedly superior power -- if only he refrained from the cruder form of direct threats. As the Chinese Communists, fearful of an understanding at their expense, denied this possibility and insisted that American imperialism could not change, and that Eisenhower was "the chieftain of the US imperialists," Khrushchev allowed himself to be tied to his differentiation as if it were a

matter of principle. Yet as the Summit approached, the chances of obtaining substantial unilateral concessions on Berlin visibly diminished, and the risk of a failure which might endanger not Khrushchev's power in Russia, but his prestige in the international Communist movement and his authority in the contest against Peking, increased.

By the end of April, after Mr. Dillon's speech on Berlin and Germany (April 20), and after the exchange of conflicting interpretations of Leninism between the Chinese and his own mouthpiece Kuusinen (April 22), Khrushchev clearly perceived the danger and sought to step up the pressure on the West with his threatening Baku speech (April 25). It was at that stage that the U-2 incident intervened.

Effect of the U-2 Flight

At first, Khrushchev merely tried to use the incident tactically and propagandistically -- to increase the pressure on the Americans before the Summit talks, to improve his chances of gaining advantages by negotiation. But it is not true that he used it in masterly fashion. In his anxiety to prove right by proving successful, he leaned too heavily on the "differentiation angle" -- stressing incessantly that this was a provocation of the American "diehard militarists" intended to spoil the atmosphere for the peaceloving President Eisenhower. By insisting on this version, he achieved the opposite of what he intended -- he morally compelled the President to assume personal responsibility for the reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory.

This is said without the least intention to belittle the blunders committed by successive statements on the American side -- from the initial eager lie to the later untenable assertion that the flights over Soviet territory would continue. But the one element which Khrushchev's exploitation of the affair made inevitable was that, if American responsibility was admitted, the President himself had to do so. And when that happened, Khrushchev's differentiation tactics collapsed -- leaving him looking foolish in the eyes of all Communists who had followed the controversy with the Chinese.

The turning point, then, was May 11 -- the day when Khrushchev, speaking in Gorki Park, first reacted to Mr. Herter's statement of May 9 -- "The President has put into effect since the beginning of his Administration directives to gather by every possible means the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack....Programs have been developed and put into operation which have included extensive aerial surveillance. ..." The President promptly confirmed that statement in his press conference. After that news, the full text of Khrushchev's remarks at Gorki Park -- the remarks of a leader who

was no longer concerned solely with propaganda, but upset with the prospect of a major diplomatic failure -- was released the following day. Yet however bitter and aggressive, Khrushchev still did not abandon hope; he went to Paris determined to press for a personal apology from Eisenhower as a last chance to save his "differentiation tactics." When that failed, he knew that substantial negotiation could not now give him the visible victory he needed to recoup his loss of prestige.

There were, then, two possible courses before him: To enter the Summit talks and let them break down over Berlin; or to refuse to join the talks over the U-2. Of these, the latter may well have appeared to Khrushchev to be the less dangerous alternative. For with a breakdown over Berlin, he would have been politically committed to sign the "peace treaty" with Eastern Germany, and thus to precipitate a serious crisis. But with a noisy refusal to negotiate now, coupled with personal insults to the President, he kept his freedom to wait for another Summit next year, if he saw a chance of a better success then -- or not. Insults do not, in this century, lead to nuclear war; the attempt to interfere with allied planes may.

If this interpretation is right, Mr. Khrushchev has not only kept power, but has so far kept to his concept of limited risk. But if the West sticks to a policy of firmness on Berlin, as it must if it is not to foster its own disintegration, Khrushchev is sooner or later due for an "agonizing reappraisal" -- for the final choice between his expansive objectives and his wish to avoid fatal gambles. No Western policy that takes care of our own interests as free countries can spare him this choice. Likewise, no sound Western policy, avoiding all the recent blunders, could have spared his dilemma, before or at the Paris conference.

MANEUVERS IN THE KREMLIN

By Boris I. Nicolaevsky
The New Leader*
May 30, 1960

The summit meeting in Paris was wrecked by Nikita Khrushchev consciously, with premeditation and in a manner which makes resumption of such direct talks -- which Khrushchev had so persistently sought -- impossible for a long time to come. Khrushchev's deliberately rude and insulting personal attack on Eisenhower precludes all possibility of further top-level meetings between them.

But recognition of the hooligan elements in Khrushchev's conduct does not explain the motives and meaning of his behavior. Proper understanding of his conduct in Paris is possible only in light of his subsequent Berlin speech, which many awaited with great anxiety, but which caused sharp disappointment in the camp of the Communist aggressors. This speech removed the question of aggression against West Berlin from the order of the day and for the next few months.

The West Berlin question was the most dangerous on the Paris conference agenda and Khrushchev was so deeply committed by his statements on this question -- statements recently renewed in his speech in Baku -- that he was obliged to make every effort in Paris to obtain some concessions on Berlin. Undoubtedly, he was also formally bound to do so by direct instructions adopted at the top level of the Soviet regime. But the West could make no substantial concessions and hence conflict was inevitable; if the Paris conference had taken place, that would have been of far more serious long-range significance than Khrushchev's scandalous behavior. The question of West Berlin is now postponed, which not only eases the international atmosphere now, but also permits us to examine Khrushchev's plans for the immediate future.

What is the real meaning of Khrushchev's game in Paris? In larger perspective, Khrushchev has used the U-2 incident to sharpen the East-West conflict, deliberately giving it the character of a personal clash with Eisenhower (which made any compromise impossible, but committed Khrushchev to no binding action), and under this cover effected a postponement of the West Berlin question. That question could not conceivably have been resolved in any way acceptable to him, which would have made it necessary for him to take serious actions.

Not that Khrushchev is playing this game to preserve the peace. Rather, it is now certain that it is in his interest to obtain a long-term deferment in paying the numerous political promissory notes he has issued to date. And this is possible today only with a policy of "peaceful coexistence."

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The Soviet radio of the past few days is doing its utmost to persuade foreigners that all reports of internal conflict at the top levels of the Soviet Union are completely false. Even if there were no other indications, such insistent disavowals would be enough to convince the listener familiar with Communist practice that a rather serious struggle is indeed taking place. Moreover, there are a number of other indications to the same effect.

Khrushchev's policy of the last two years has from the very beginning been pursued in the midst of continuous conflict. The policy on the domestic scene is based on the desire to raise the general living standard, particularly that of the kolkhoz peasant, and on the foreign scene to insure "peaceful coexistence" with the West. These two elements are inextricably interwoven because "peaceful coexistence" is an essential prerequisite for improving the living standards.

The problems before Khrushchev were not easy to solve, nor has he had unalloyed success in trying to solve them. Nonetheless, his skill in managing the apparatus of dictatorship and his clever exploitation of the conflicts in the opposing camp have until quite recently assured his victory. Red China's open shift to Khrushchev's opponents in foreign policy was his first major setback. This shift was manifest in the absence of Khrushchev's portrait in the last May Day celebrations in Peking. (Of Soviet Communists, only portraits of Lenin and Stalin were featured.) Still more important was Khrushchev's defeat at the December plenum of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party (CPSU), when he was forced to put off the formation of the kolkhoz mergers planned at the time. On that occasion, the opposition came clearly from the ranks of the Party apparatus itself.

Despite these setbacks, Khrushchev continued his line. In January 1960, following the December plenum, he managed to get an important decision taken at a session of the Supreme Soviet reducing the size of the Soviet Army by more than a third (by 1,250,000 men, including 250,000 officers). This essential budgetary reform was to make funds available for beginning action toward raising the living standards of Soviet workers and kolkhoz peasants. It could not, of course, be popular in the Army command.

True, the budgetary reforms early this year were not directed at the Army alone; reductions in salary and personnel also affected other groups of the upper bureaucracy and technical intelligentsia, and for the first time in many years the specter of unemployment became a serious threat to members of this strata. But the Army suffered the largest cuts and the position of those eliminated was especially difficult because it is particularly hard for military specialists to change to other fields.

As a result, discontent in the Army was very widespread. Judging from available information, two closely related, but clearly distinguishable, groups felt the discontent: the large number of officers whose ranks were being reduced, who are closely allied to the unemployed members of the managerial and technical intelligentsia groups (increasingly important in the USSR); and the members of the high command, who condemn the Army cuts as a blow to the country's military potential, and who are closely allied to those of Khrushchev's opponents inside the Party who have from the very first disagreed with his foreign policy.

We have no detailed information on this second group's activities, but there have been unverified rumors of a delegation to Khrushchev from them in which even several marshals are said to have taken part. The conflict with this group led to shifts in the high command which became known only at the May Day celebrations in Moscow. The most important of these were the removal of Marshal Ivan Konev as commander of the Warsaw Pact armed forces and of Marshal Vasily Sokolovsky as chief of staff.

These shifts were attributed to the fact that Sokolovsky ostensibly belonged to the moderate camp of opponents of an aggressive policy. Although Sokolovsky has not been known for particular aggressiveness, this explanation is not convincing. He has always assumed the role of a military technician, which helped him survive under Stalin when his former chief, Marshal Georgi Zhukov, was in disfavor. In addition, Sokolovsky's removal does not seem to be a serious fall from grace. He appeared on the Government reviewing stand on May Day, though the parade was received by his successor, Marshal Zakharov. Under the circumstances, it is advisable to wait before drawing conclusions about the meaning of his removal.

Marshal Konev's case is quite different. He was absent from the stand on May Day, though he did appear at the victory celebration, where the composition of the group attending was quite broad. Konev has been the most definite and militant political and Party figure in the high command, both under Stalin and since. His role in creating the Warsaw Pact, his article against Zhukov, etc., indicate that the high command shifts were in the nature of removals of men opposed to Khrushchev's foreign policy, critics of "peaceful coexistence." Such opposition is entirely possible and if any individual marshal was at the head of it, all Konev's past would suggest he was the man. Thus, insofar as the shifts in the high command were of a political nature, they were aimed at eliminating opposition to Khrushchev's policy of reducing the armed forces.

The shifts in the Presidium and the secretariat of the Party's Central Committee after the U-2 incident also point to a struggle in the top Party hierarchy. These changes were made at a special Central Committee plenum meeting on May 4,

and were of great scope and significance. Basically what took place was a de facto unification of the top apparatus of the Council of Ministers with the Central Committee Presidium, concentrating all the main lines of control in Khrushchev's hands, and resulting in the shift of a number of Presidium members to Government work. This greatly increases the importance of the Government apparatus. Plainly, the Council of Ministers was put in charge of all economic matters, both industrial and agricultural, and no one on the Central Committee secretariat is left to direct affairs on the economic sector.

The role of Alexei Kosygin has grown tremendously. He has become Khrushchev's First Deputy in the Council of Ministers and will obviously be the principal director of all Soviet economic activity, with Nikolai Ignatov as his aide in agriculture. The importance of the Ministry of Culture has also been increased with Yekaterina Furtseva as its head.

The Central Committee secretariat was greatly reduced. Only five men remain on it in addition to Khrushchev: Leonid Brezhnev, Frol Koslov, Otto Kuusinen, Nuritdin Mukhitdinov and Mikhail Suslov. Brezhnev's position is especially striking, even unprecedented, in Soviet history. He has been given Marshal Kliment Voroshilov's position as formal President of the USSR, while remaining a secretary in the Central Committee secretariat. Thus, by his intra-party position, the formal head of state of the Soviet Union becomes a direct subordinate of Khrushchev, the head of Government! For the moment it is difficult to explain why this extraordinary situation has arisen, but an explanation may be sought in only one direction: Khrushchev is concentrating both formal and factual power in his hands in a manner not yet seen in the Soviet dictatorship.

It is worth noting, too, that Brezhnev addressed the conference of secretaries of the basic Party cells in the Army, so that the scope of his activities apparently includes Party surveillance of Army matters. Obviously, this is directly connected to the emergence of opposition in the military command and stresses further Brezhnev's exceptional role as Khrushchev's right-hand man.

The role of Frol Kozlov, who was transferred from the Government to the Central Committee secretariat, is not quite clear. The Western press sees him as Khrushchev's principal assistant but this is at odds with Brezhnev's rapid advancement. The functions of the other secretaries are, however, entirely clear. Kuusinen, editor of the latest Foundations of Marxism-Leninism (the book which now supersedes Stalin's Foundations of Leninism) and chairman of the commission to draft a new CPSU program, is in charge of ideological work. Suslov heads the Central Committee foreign sector and is "in charge" of all foreign Communist parties. Mukhitdinov's basic role

is contact with Eastern nations. His job is mostly decorative, though the work in the East is, obviously, far from being that.

Though many highly interesting particulars have been omitted, the basic meaning and objectives of Khrushchev's reorganization seem clear. He has reconstructed the central apparatus in such a way as to concentrate control in his own hands. His objective is in many ways similar to that pursued by Stalin in May 1941, when he assumed the chairmanship of the Council of People's Commissars. As Stalin did then, so Khrushchev today foresees major complications in the near future, although whether he expects these inside the Party or on the international scene, or both, is not yet clear.

What choices he will make and what policies he will pursue are not yet certain, but it is clear that he is preparing the governmental machine for all eventualities, and leaving only men he trusts completely in the central and most important positions.