

NYC 117 20 MAR 63  
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HEREWITH COMMENTS ON CONTENTS OF MUN 61 OF 11 MARCH.

A. ROMANIA.

1. DESTALINIZATION. FIRST PARAGRAPH MAY REQUIRE SOME REVISION AS RESULT OF RECENT SOVIET MOVES DESIGNED TO CONTROL INTELLECTUALS AND DAMPEN THE DESTALINIZATION PROCESS. SOME OTHER MENTIONS OF THE MEANING OF DESTALINIZATION WHICH APPEAR IN THE VARIOUS COUNTRY GUIDANCES MAY BE USEFULLY ALTERED TO A DEGREE AS A RESULT OF RECENT SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS.

2. DESTALINIZATION. PARAGRAPH FIVE, SECOND SENTENCE. ASSUME THAT INTERVIEWS WITH ROMANIAN STUDENTS IN WESTERN UNIVERSITIES REFER TO EXILE STUDENTS BUT THIS NOT QUITE CLEAR AS WRITTEN.

3. RESTRICTIONS. IN PENULTIMATE SENTENCE, SUGGEST DROPPING "...IN ORDER TO LEAVE THE GATE OF POLITICAL DESTALINIZATION OPEN." IT IS OUR GENERAL POLICY TO AVOID PERSONAL ATTACKS AND I BELIEVE THE ABOVE WORDS ARE UNNECESSARY AND COULD APPEAR RATHER INGENUOUS.

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B. BULGARIA.

1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. SECOND PARAGRAPH, FINAL SENTENCE. DOES THIS REFER TO PERSONAL ATTACKS OR TO CRITICISM OF POLICIES? BELIEVE THIS CAN USE SOME CLERIFICATION. I ASSUME WE WOULDNOT BE PROHIBITED FROM ATTACKING OBVIOUSLY ERRONEOUS POLICIES WHETHER OF ZHIVKOV OR OTHERS.

2. DIFFUSION OF POWER. SECOND SENTENCE. SUGGEST REWORDING TO READ "...FOR THE SABRANIE WHICH FORMALLY MAKE IT POSSIBLE ETC."

3. YUGOSLAVIA. THIRD SENTENCE. IT IS NOT CLEAR TO ME THAT IT IS UP TO US TO "ARGUE FOR A PLEBESCITE AND A FEDERATION" AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION FOR THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM WHICH DOES NOT, OF COURSE, INVOLVE ONLY BULGARIA AND YUGOSLAVIA. THIS IS CLEARLY A POLICY QUESTION OF IMPORTANCE AND DELICACY. PERHAPS WE ARE ON FIRM GROUND HERE, BUT I HAVE NEVER SEEN THE PLEBISCITE PRINCIPLE SPELLED OUT.

C. POLAND.

PRINCIPLE SPELLED OUT.

C. POLAND.

1. TRUCE FOR THE CHURCH. THIRD SENTENCE. AM IN BASIC DISAGREEMENT THAT "THE WHOLE THRUST OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE WEST - AND THIS INCLUDES THE PAPACY - IS ONE OF COMPROMISE AND DISENGAGEMENT." OVERFLIGHTS, DISARMAMENT IMPASSE, RETENTION OF TROOPS IN CUBA, SEEM TO POINT IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION. STATEMENT COULD BE MODIFIED, BUT IT SEEMS TOO CATEGORIC AS IT STANDS.

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D. CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

THE GERMAN PROBLEM, SECOND SENTENCE. THE SECOND PART OF THIS SENTENCE PRESENTS A JUDGMENT ON GERMAN POLICY WHICH HARDLY SEEMS WARRANTED BY GERMANY'S OFFICIAL POSITION. IT SEEMS, AT BEST, A MATTER OF SUCH SENSITIVITY AS TO BE BEST LEFT ALONE BY RFE. REALLY DOUBT THAT THIS IS PART OF OUR TASK.

E. THE REVOLUTIONARY UPRISING OF 1956.

FIFTH AND SIXTH SENTENCES. IT LOOKS AS IF WE ARE GOING PRETTY FAR IN FLATLY STATING THAT MOSCOW DECIDED THE REVOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO BE SURPRESSED ONLY RPT ONLY AFTER THE REVOLUTIONARIES CALLED FOR NEUTRALITY AND FREE ELECTIONS. THE SAME APPLIES TO THE STATEMENT THAT KHRUSHCHEV FOUND THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM ACCEPTABLE UP TO THAT POINT. IT IS CERTAINLY USEFUL TO PUT FORWARD AND STRESS THE THESIS THAT CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM WERE PROBABLY ACCEPTABLE, BUT WE HAVE TO BE SOMEWHAT CAREFUL LEST WE STRETCH THE LINE OF CREDIBILITY TOO FAR.

GENERAL:

THE TACTICAL GUIDANCES CONTAINED IN THIS MESSAGE SERVE AN URGENT NEED AND IT IS EXCELLENT THAT YOU WERE ABLE TO GET TO THESE ON TOP OF THE OTHER BASIC GUIDANCES AND OTHER MATERIALS YOU HAVE PREPARED. THINK THESE WILL BE WELCOME AND MOST USEFUL FOR US AND RESPONSIBLE BD AND DESK PERSONNEL WHEN DISTRIBUTED.

END MSG.

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