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CHAPTER V

SECOND SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION

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CHAPTER V

SECOND SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION

1. A period of less than a week intervened between the end of hostilities in October and the second attack by Soviet armed forces on the morning of ^{Sunday,} 4 November. The Committee received authoritative evidence regarding the conditions in Budapest during this brief period. On the eve of the second attack, order was being rapidly restored in the damaged streets of the capital. People were already at work removing the rubble and glass. Despite innumerable broken shop and apartment windows, no looting took place. Good progress was being made in the direction of political consolidation, and the resumption of work could be confidently expected ^{Monday,} on 5 November in accordance with the declaration of the Executive Committee of the Greater Budapest Workers' Council. Negotiations had been completed for the formation of a National Guard under General Kiraly with a view to insuring internal security. A sense of confidence had developed among the citizens of Budapest.
2. Evidence has been given in the preceding chapter that Soviet troop movements into Hungary on a considerable scale and other military preparations had been going on for some days. In view of the difficulty involved in large-scale military planning, it would seem most probable that the design of the second intervention had been worked out during the last days of October, if not sooner. The purpose of this chapter is to assemble evidence as to the actual fighting which took place from early in the morning of 4 November until armed resistance ceased. It is thought appropriate, however, at this point to consider one aspect which

x has a considerable bearing on the way in which they developed,
x namely the attitude of the regular Hungarian^A army towards the
uprising and of the insurgents towards the^A army.

A. Relations between the Insurgents and the Hungarian Army

3. It is a significant fact that, throughout the uprising, no single unit of the Hungarian Army fought as such on the side of the Soviet troops. Not only at the Kilián Barracks, but also on the Citadel in Budapest and in the Mátra and Bükk mountains, Hungarian Army units fought together on the side of the uprising. Apart from these organized Army units, numerous Hungarian soldiers deserted to the insurgents or handed over weapons and ammunition. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Hungarian Army proved useless to the Soviet Command throughout Hungary as a means of quelling the insurrection. In fact, it started to disintegrate at the outset. Desertions took place in such numbers that the Minister of Defence, István Bata, was obliged to appeal over the radio in the following terms at 8.40 a.m. on 25 October - only some thirty-six hours after the beginning of the revolt: "I instruct those members of the Army who, for one reason or another, have been separated from their units to report to their commanding officers at their formations immediately, not later than 12.00, 25 October." Later appeals by radio called upon the troops to report to the nearest military post, since by then many soldiers had left their provincial garrisons to come to Budapest or to help in the uprising elsewhere.

4. Since the junior ranks came from peasant or working class homes, where the grievances complained of were well-known, their sympathies were quickly engaged on behalf of the insurgents, and there is evidence that similar grievances to those of the civilians had been voiced in the garrisons also. For example, there was bitterness over the introduction of a Russian-type uniform for Hungarian soldiers and over the subordinate position of the

X Hungarian Army. This inferior status was to be seen in the supervision by Soviet officers of the Hungarian General Staff, in the Soviet control over heavy tactical weapons, heavy communication materials and the strategic air force, and in the infiltration of the Hungarian Army by State security organs under Soviet supervision. A sense of inferiority had thus been bred in the Hungarian rank and file which, for some time past, had led to complaints.

5. The resistance of the Hungarian people was considerably strengthened by the attitude of the soldiers, at first by their refusal to fight against the insurgents and soon by their active help. This attitude, however, did not extend to most of the senior officers. Under Soviet inspiration, special cadres of Communist officers had been developed to handle all key operations and commanding officers were chosen for their party affiliation rather than their military training. Senior Hungarian officers with military experience had, in most cases, been retired or assigned to teaching posts in one of the Military Academies. On the other hand, a number of younger officers had undergone training in the Soviet Union and were presumed to be not only Communists, but also pro-Soviet. The remainder of the Officer corps had at one time or another during the past ten years received a special Communist indoctrination, and many were believed to have pro-Soviet sympathies. However, in the Budapest Military Academies, contrary to expectations, the cadets reacted differently to developments. Being of peasant or working-class origin, they examined conditions in Hungary from a more critical point of view. They knew, by their own experience, the grievances of the workers and took part eagerly

X in such discussions as those at the Petöfi Club. According to
Budapest radio reports, when the demonstrations were organized on
X 23 October, about 800 Cadets from the Military Academy in Buda
X were among the demonstrators at the Bem statue.

Great encourage-
ment was given to the demonstrators by the presence in their midst
X of Cadets marching in their uniforms.

6. All these factors had created sympathy and confidence between
the insurgents and the rank and file of the Hungarian Army. Most
of the insurgents, however, remained distrustful of the Army
X command and of the senior officers in general. During the days
of freedom, the Military Council of the Army / and the Command of
the National Guard established a working relationship with the
insurgents of Greater Budapest. In the provinces, the situation
was still confused. Much depended on the attitude of the officer
commanding the local garrison and on that of his staff. Often
the senior officers had been against the October uprising or had
declared themselves neutral. In some cases, where the garrison
had actually sided with the insurgents, it had been unable to act
as an organized unit for lack of ammunition or through action by
the AVH or by the Soviet NKVD.

7. The freedom fighters / welcomed deserting soldiers and
officers into their ranks and made extensive use of weapons and
X equipment given them by the Army, but they preferred to keep the
command of the insurgent groups in civilian hands. During the
X "days of freedom", it was proposed to re-organize the Army on
non-political lines and to remove some of the officers known for
their pro-Soviet views. This, however, would take time and,

meanwhile, the revolutionary committees had little faith in the Ministry of Defence or in the Hungarian military command. They often insisted on personal confirmation of instructions by a leader they trusted, such as General Maléter or General Király.

8. At the first meeting of the Revolutionary National Defence Committee on 31 October, and General Generals Maléter/ Király and Nader of the Air Force, had been of the opinion that the re-organization of the Hungarian Army should be speeded up. They felt, however, that the attitude of the Army and of the insurgents towards the Russians should be above reproach during the negotiations for withdrawal of the Soviet troops. The possibility of a renewed Soviet attack was already borne in mind. While Generals Maléter and István Kovács were concerned exclusively with the technical negotiations for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, General András Marton was called from the Military Academy to prepare a defence plan, for use in the event of a second Soviet attack. General Marton, however, was released from the Academy only on 2 November. By that time, Soviet troop movements were going on in various parts of the country and communications were becoming extremely difficult. It was obvious that the Soviet command, if it wished to strike, had more than sufficient troops in Hungary to make any organized resistance impossible.

9. On 2 and 3 November various revolutionary groups in such positions as the Corvin Block and the Kilián Barracks and in the industrial suburbs of Budapest replenished their stocks of ammunition with the help of the National Guard. They appear to have received little, however, but rifle bullets. Some officers and NCO's attached to the various groups undertook a little hasty

artillery training. Defensive positions were improved or alternative sites chosen which provided better vantage points for anti-tank guns. It would appear, however, that no overall plan was drawn up to protect Budapest in the event of an attack. The resistance organizers worked on the local level and with improvised means.

10. Reports by witnesses clearly brought out the lack of confidence shown by revolutionary groups in the Hungarian military command, as distinct from the rank and file, on the night of 3-4 November, immediately preceding the Soviet attack. Leaders of Revolutionary Committees seemed to derive special satisfaction from being in direct telephone communication with Mr. Nagy, Mr. Tildy or General Király. From 9 o'clock in the evening, reports came in from the Committees by telephone and special messenger both to Mr. Nagy and to General Király. At that stage, the Revolutionary Committees would clearly have had no confidence in any hierarchy of officers transmitting their messages from the field to the highest echelons. This circumstance throws some light on the individualist nature of Hungarian military operations. Resistance followed no general plan, but was limited to local, although often fiercely fought, engagements. It is important to see these engagements against the background of a Hungarian Army which had virtually ceased to exist as such, with the resulting impossibility for Army units to fight in formation, but with the corollary that the participation of soldiers and sections of the Army in the resistance became a common feature of the fighting. It was in such circumstances that the citizens of Budapest found themselves again under Soviet fire.

X ← B. The Fighting in Budapest

11. From 9 p.m. on 3 November the capital had been completely surrounded. Information that hundreds of tanks were advancing slowly towards the capital was received from observation posts on the major highways. Reports came in that, at some places such as Pestszerterzsébet, small units had entered the district, possibly trying to make the insurgents open fire. Since, according to the withdrawal agreement of 31 October, Russian troops were to evacuate Greater Budapest, local Commanders were ordered ^{not to open fire.} on instructions from Mr. Nagy. The Ministry of Defence also gave the same instruction on repeated occasions. Witnesses have testified that in no case was a shot fired by the insurgents. By 3 o'clock in the morning tanks were moving along Soroksár Avenue up to Boráros Square on the Pest side of the river, cutting off Csepel island from the inner capital. Similar advances were made from the Váci ^{AVENUE} Way on the north, down the East ^e Bank of the river, cutting off Újpest from the Buda side. No precise information exists from the other sectors, but it is known that Soviet troops opened fire at 4.25 a.m. at Budaörsi ^{AVENUE} Barracks, to the south of the old city of Buda. Shortly afterwards cannon fire was heard from all quarters of the city and from out-lying districts.

12. Fighting broke out at numerous points of resistance. Soviet tanks advanced along the main boulevards radiating from the Danube. The insurgents set up barricades at important intersections on the Outer Ring of Pest and fierce fighting took place at Üllői Street, Marx Square, Kálvin Square, at the Kilián Barracks, and at the Corvin Cinema. On the Buda side, there was fighting on Gellert

Hill, at the Citadel and on the Royal Palace Hill, at the Southern Railway Station, in Széna Square and in Móricz Zsigmond Square. Resistance varied according to the available strength in men, weapons and ammunition. In some cases Russian troops were able, within a matter of hours, to fight through to such important points of the city as Parliament Square, the banks of the Danube, the bridgeheads, the radio station, and the police headquarters. Whatever organized resistance may have been planned for the city as a whole had ceased by 8 o'clock in the morning, that is, shortly after the radio station ^{had been} / taken over by Soviet troops. Thereafter the groups continued fighting until their ammunition was exhausted or until the defending positions had been destroyed by the heavy tank barrage. The Kilián Barracks were subjected to a three-hour assault and to aerial bombardment, but the building was not seized for three days. The Citadel military units, reinforced by freedom fighters, held out until 7 November. The Soviet losses were severe, as these defence positions were well organized. Fierce fighting also took place at Móricz Zsigmond Square and in other parts of the city. From the evidence received, it would seem that for the first two days the Soviet attack was directed principally against those fortified positions which, by their continued resistance, prevented the Soviet Command from claiming that it was in full control of Budapest. The impression is gained that the Soviet troops avoided a systematic hunting down of secondary targets, such as snipers, in the belief that complete order would shortly be restored. When that proved not to be the case, Soviet tanks began to move again along the main boulevards,

firing indiscriminately into houses to strike fear into the people and to force their surrender. This shooting caused severe damage to buildings on the boulevards and along the side streets, even where there had been no recent resistance by the freedom fighters. By 8 November much of Budapest bore severe traces of the fighting. Hundreds of buildings were completely destroyed and thousands more had been severely damaged. The destruction was especially marked in certain districts but, in a city as large as Budapest, many areas were fortunate enough to have escaped to escape. By nightfall on the 7th the fighting had become intermittent and was mostly confined to the outlying industrial districts.

← 3. The Fighting in the Industrial Districts of Budapest

13. Resistance in the industrial districts of Budapest differed from that in the city because most of the fighters were workers and the fighting became a struggle between the Hungarian factory workers and the Army of the Soviet Union. This was the case more particularly in those districts on the Pest side of the Danube where most of the heavy industries of Hungary are concentrated. As in the capital, leadership of the resistance forces emerged at the local level. Each district or group of districts, under the command of the Revolutionary Councils, was reinforced with army equipment and by army personnel who volunteered to join the freedom fighters. The Revolutionary Council of Csepel received some 85 pieces of artillery from the barracks on the island when many officers and men joined them against the orders of their commanding officer.

14. The factory districts from Ujpest in the North, through Kobánya and southward to Pestszenterzsébet, Soroksár and Csepel Island, put up the strongest resistance. This continued until 11 November. With the exception of a few clashes in the hills of Nógrád and Baranya counties which occurred after this date, it can be said that these districts were the scene of the most tenacious Hungarian armed resistance during the second intervention. A detailed account of the fighting in all districts cannot be given, but considerable material has been received on the overall situation. The primary objective of the Soviet forces would appear to have been the capture and control of the capital. They did not enter the outlying industrial districts except to the extent that they had to go through them when following the main highways. In the morning of 4 November, the centres of fighting were on the highway to Vác and on the other highways radiating southwards to Csepel Island. The Soviet troops, equipped with armoured cars, light and heavy tanks, and self-propelled artillery, were faced, as in the capital, with fighting on

street corners against anti-tank guns, odd pieces of artillery, machine guns and incendiary hand grenades. The freedom fighters were always outnumbered, but, according to the evidence, when the situation became desperate they would withdraw and reappear from another street to hit the tail end of an advancing armoured column. In some cases the Soviet troops had to leave their tanks to clear road obstructions, giving the freedom fighters an opportunity to attack them with side arms. It appears that the situation on 4 and 5 November was one of constant harassment of the Soviet columns. The Soviet armoured units opened fire on all buildings along avenues and streets and inflicted heavy casualties among non-combatants. Several tenements and workers' apartment buildings collapsed as a result of cannon fire, with 20 to 50 people trapped in the cellars.

15. In many districts the factories, such as the Kőbánya Beer Factory, the Ganz Works, the Electric Bulb Factory and the Csépel Steel Plant, were arsenals for the Hungarians. The fighting, however, varied in the different districts, according to the heavy weapons and ammunition available. Witnesses testified that action would continue until all artillery shells were exhausted. Then the freedom fighters would either join up with another group, carrying their side arms, or go into hiding. The Soviet forces, on the other hand, had a superabundance of fire power, and it was not necessary for the Soviet Army to employ all the armoured units which they had at their disposal.

16. The fighting in the 20th district - Pestszenterzsebét and Soroksár - was organized under one command and lasted from the morning of the 4th until the evening of the 8th. Sporadic fighting then continued until the morning of the 11th. Radio Station "Róka", which was heard outside Hungary up to 8 November, was located in this district and did much to maintain the

morale of the freedom fighters. Soroksár Avenue joins Csepel and the Tököl military airport with the capital. Soviet troops soon gained control of this Avenue, but they were subjected to harassment and their losses of men and materials were reported to be high. The Soviet troops undertook a number of punitive sorties in the side streets, killing many non-combatants and destroying many buildings. During these attacks, the Committee was told, the Soviet troops would shoot indiscriminately at anything, even if it were not a legitimate target. Examples described to the Committee included a bread line of women and children, standing outside a bakery, which was shot at on 4 November. On 7 November a Red Cross ambulance was destroyed by machine gun fire; the wounded and the nurses in it were killed.

17. The Revolutionary Council of Csepel constituted another centre of resistance. It is noteworthy that certain witnesses, former members of the Revolutionary Council of Csepel, testified before the Committee that they and other members of the Council had advocated on the eve of the second intervention that, in case of a Soviet attack, the Csepel workers should not resist. The Soviet forces, it was thought, were bound to win, and any resistance would be a futile sacrifice of life. The workers, however, made it clear that such a suggestion was unacceptable to them. In the outcome, the battle of Csepel was the hardest-fought of all, for the workers were united in their determination to fight and were well provided with weapons. Since Tököl airport would be isolated from Budapest unless the Csepel workers were subdued, the Soviet Command was forced to break their resistance. Between 4 and 9 November, fighting went on incessantly in the area as a whole, although at various points only intermittently. The freedom fighters maintained an effective organised

armed resistance in most of the area throughout these five days. On the 7th there was a concentrated artillery barrage against the whole area, supplemented by aerial bombardment. The next day an emissary from the Soviet Commander asked the freedom fighters to surrender. They refused, and the fighting continued. The following day, the 9th, another emissary stated that unless the insurgents surrendered no one would be spared. This was also turned down. The shelling was intensified by artillery units converging from the north and by the heavy guns now stationed on the Gellert Hill. At 2 p.m. the Soviet forces used anti-personnel rocket mortars causing great destruction to the factories, installations and surrounding buildings. At 6 p.m. the Revolutionary Council decided to end the fighting. Their ammunition was practically exhausted. With the cessation of hostilities in Budapest, it was possible for the Soviet forces to concentrate on ~~the~~ Csepel. There was some shooting the next day - the 10th - but the armed resistance was, to all intents and purposes, over, as the Soviet tanks had by then occupied all the plants and warehouses which were formerly the bases of resistance.

D. Fighting in the Provinces

18. While the objectives of Soviet strategy were the suppression on the Hungarian national movement and the overthrow of the Nagy Government, which had been called upon to implement the demands of the insurgents, it was the apparent aim of the Soviet High Command to avoid clashes wherever possible. Thus, throughout the whole of Southern Hungary, from Békéscsaba in the East to Kőrmend in the West - with the notable exception of Pécs - there was no actual fighting during the revolution. The absence of resistance was due to a variety of reasons:

(a) In the towns and villages where no Soviet or Hungarian troops were stationed, the Revolutionary Councils which came into being between 25 and 30 October could not secure any weapons. In most cases there was no immediate need for them, as the local members of the AVH ^{had} complied with the request that they turn over their offices and remain in their homes. At the time of the second intervention, these Revolutionary Councils had no weapons in store with which to effect armed resistance;

(b) In such towns as Szeged, where troops were usually garrisoned, special steps had been taken by Soviet Intelligence to neutralize the senior officers of the Hungarian Army. It was thus possible for the Soviet troops to insure from the outset that no weapons reached the insurgents. This was also the case in Kecskemét, where the commander of the ^{Hungarian} garrison, who was a Soviet trained officer, had taken the necessary measures to keep his unit

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inactive throughout the uprising.

19. A full account of events throughout the country would run to great length, nor would it add to the conclusion that, irrespective of the degree of duration of military resistance by the Hungarian people, the overwhelming majority of them were determined to see their demands put into effect. The description here given will therefore be limited to the events in a few provincial centres which are broadly representative of what happened in the provinces during the second intervention.

20. At Pécs, the chief city of Baranya county, and an important centre due to its proximity to the uranium mines, nothing of any military significance occurred between 23 October and 1 November. The AVH did open fire on the first demonstrators, but during a second demonstration on 1 November, it was forced to surrender and the Revolutionary Council took over all the functions previously handled by Communist Party officials. A declaration of policy drawn up by the Council demanded as its first point the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. It also called for the exploitation of the uranium mines by the Hungarian State. On the evening of 1 November, the Soviet officials of the uranium mines were asked to leave with their families; they were sent by truck to Szekszárd, where some Soviet units were stationed. During the next two days, everything was quiet at Pécs and the Revolutionary Council went to work to reorganize the various public services. After 1 November, however, reports regarding the systematic increase of Soviet troops at Dombóvár, some 25 kms. north of Pécs, created an atmosphere of anxiety.

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21. By the evening of 3 November, it was obvious that the Soviet troops intended to take military action against the insurgents.

X X The Commander of the Hungarian Forces in Pécs, who had originally agreed to fight in case of a Soviet attack, decided during the night to disarm his troops. The Revolutionary Council, in order to avoid the destruction of the city, resolved to resist in the hilly regions surrounding Pécs. On the morning of 4 November, the Soviet troops took over the city. In the meantime, some 5,000 volunteers - mostly miners and students carrying arms and ammunition - joined the insurgents in the Mecsek mountains. The Soviet troops made numerous sorties against the positions of the insurgents but, owing to the mobility of the latter and their lightning guerrilla tactics, the Soviet troops suffered many casualties and, for some three weeks, were unable to subdue the insurgents. On the 8th, the insurgents attacked a convoy and killed the Commander of the Soviet forces. Day by day, they harassed the Soviet troops by commando raids and, though the insurgents had lost many men, it was mainly lack of ammunition that forced them to give up the fight and escape across the border to Yugoslavia. The Committee was informed that many of the Hungarian wounded, who were to be sent down from the mountain hospital by Red Cross ambulances, never reached their destination alive. One witness stated that two wounded freedom fighters were taken out of a truck by Soviet troops, made to kneel in a public square with their hands tied behind their back and ^{were} then shot with a

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x submachine gun.

22. The events during the uprising at the important industrial centre of Dunapentele are particularly noteworthy because of the representative character of its population. After the war, it rapidly developed from a small village into an industrial city under the name of Sztálinváros. Steel foundries, iron works and chemical industries caused its industrial population to grow to 28,000 by 1956. It was the most important experiment undertaken by the Party in its industrialization programme and was considered to be one of the main strongholds of Communism. On 24 October the workers decided to follow the example of Budapest. They organized a Revolutionary Council to represent them and established Workers' Councils in the various factories. The next day, during a demonstration, the AVH opened fire on the crowd, killing 8 people and wounding 28. During the next two days, there was more fighting with the AVH, who were now barricaded in the Army barracks. On the 29th, a helicopter landed on the barrack-ground and a Soviet official with his family, the senior officers of the AVH and two senior Hungarian officers were flown away. Shortly afterwards, a deputation from the barracks declared that the Army was on the side of the revolution.

23. The following days were spent in organizing the activities of the Revolutionary Council and in the military training of some 800 workers. Radio "Rákóczi", which was transmitting from Dunapentele after 4 November, was repeatedly heard asking for assistance in weapons and equipment. It called on

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Radio Free Europe to pass on these appeals for outside assistance against the Soviet intervention and also retransmitted the appeals of other "free" Hungarian stations. On the 5th, Radio "Rákóczi" appealed to the International Red Cross for medical supplies. On the 6th, a Russian armoured unit stopped on the outskirts of the town and asked for the surrender of the insurgents. The Commanding officer, with an AVH interpreter, was escorted into the town and met the leaders of the Revolutionary Committee. It was pointed out to him that the insurgents were not "fascists" or "capitalist agents" but principally workers, many of whom had been staunch supporters of the Communist Party. To convince him of this he was asked to hear two card-bearing members of the Party from the crowd which was assembled outside. These men explained that they had been taught to believe that the Soviet Union defended human rights and were the liberators of the people. They declared they wanted now to be free of Soviet intervention and had demanded the abolition of the AVH. When the Soviet officer stated that he had to carry out his orders, the two Communist freedom fighters tore up their party cards and threw them at his feet. The Soviet Commander withdrew, stating that he would take no action against Dunapentele until he received new orders. Nevertheless, the next day - 7 November - the Soviet forces attacked the town from three directions using a large armoured force, self-propelled guns and a tactical air force. The battle lasted all day, but the freedom fighters held strongly organized positions and were able to withstand the onslaught. By

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the evening of 8 November, the ammunition had been exhausted and most of the fighters were ordered to go into hiding. Some 300 men with side arms managed to escape during the night. They continued armed resistance in the countryside until 11 November when it was decided to disperse, as any further resistance appeared to be futile.

24. It was reported that during the fighting in Dunapentele the factories did not suffer as much as the living quarters of the population, where considerable damage was done by bombing. The freedom fighters lost 240 men during the fighting; 12 tanks and 8 armoured cars of the Soviet forces were destroyed. Witnesses stated before the Committee that the purpose of the workers' resistance in Dunapentele was to demonstrate that all Hungarians wanted to see their country freed from external domination. Witnesses were emphatic in pointing out that, irrespective of religion, creed or party affiliation, the factory workers, with the officers and men of the garrison, were entirely united in their objectives and that throughout the period 25 October to 8 November no one, except the members of the AVH, dissented from the policies of the Revolutionary Council.

X 25. In the country of Veszprém, northwest of Lake Balaton, the Revolutionary Council, having consolidated its position by 26 October, concerned itself principally with political and administrative matters, as the military questions appeared to be less pressing. There had been no fighting in the country with Soviet troops during the first intervention, except at Várpalota,

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where the miners, in attacking the AVH, had also killed three Soviet political advisers. However, the Veszprém Revolutionary Council assisted in the ^{formulation} of a coordinated policy with the other Transdanubian provincial councils, for the purpose of creating a military command to protect Transdanubia in case of a second military intervention. Its first act was to purge from its membership four of the five officers who had been originally elected, on suspicion of maintaining contacts with the Soviet forces; it elected instead a soldier and the head of the Provincial Police, thus effecting, according to the testimony received, a Council which was truly representative of all sections of the population of the Province. The next three days were devoted to the political negotiations for the resumption of work and for the organization of the National Guard. By Saturday, 3 November, however, the systematic build-up of the Soviet forces within the Province had become so apparent that the National Guard, consisting of students, workers and soldiers, made hasty preparations in the city of Veszprém in anticipation of a Soviet attack. This attack came at 5 a.m. the next morning. For two and a half days the National Guard, besieged in the old city of Veszprém, fought against greatly superior Soviet forces which had launched the attack from three directions. By midday of 6 November, the ammunition of the insurgents was exhausted. About 40 Hungarians and possibly an equal number of Russians had lost their lives. The battle

caused considerable destruction to the city, including buildings of historical and artistic significance. Most of the insurgents were able to escape and attempted to hide their side arms. However, by the evening Soviet trucks were being loaded with students seized from their homes and taken to unknown destinations.

According to the evidence, by 1 December none of these students had been returned. At the end of the battle, some Soviet troops, in a spirit of revenge, entered the University buildings and destroyed the chemical equipment in the laboratory.

X 26. At Miskolc, the University and industrial city of north-east Hungary, military action during the second Soviet intervention differed in some respects from those in western Hungary. This no doubt can be attributed to the presence of Soviet troops in the area who were moving constantly in and out of the city, since Miskolc is on one of the arterial roads between Budapest and the northeastern frontiers. The presence of the Soviet troops tended to make it impossible for the insurgents to organize a resistance plan based on the city itself. This same problem confronted the insurgents of other cities in eastern Hungary, and as there was no time for an organized resistance in the countryside, armed resistance in eastern Hungary did not endure as long as in Pécs, Dunapentele and Veszprém. In the early morning of Sunday, 4 November, the passage of troops through the city was not unusual, and the attack against the University buildings, one of the principal centres of resistance in the city, was to

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some extent a surprise. The students fought with whatever weapons had been given them for about one hour. Many students were killed and the Soviet troops also suffered a number of casualties. The Committee was told that, when the fighting was over, many students were seized by the Soviet troops and taken to an unknown destination. On the other hand, troops of the National Guard, who were fighting through the day in Miskolc and the Hejőcsaba district, retreated towards the Bükk mountains. In the city itself fighting went on until the afternoon when the Revolutionary Council of Borsod County was obliged to capitulate.

27. From various sources of information, including radio reports emanating both from the "free" stations within Hungary and from those coming under the control of the Soviet forces, it is possible to conclude that the Soviet troops, during the night of 3 to 4 November advanced in a forced march from Dunaföldvár and possibly Baja towards Kaposvár and Nagykanizsa which were captured with little or no resistance. From Szombathely northwards there was fighting throughout the day of 4 November. Battles took place in the north at Győr, on the Győr-Sopron road and on the Győr-Hegyeshalom road against parachute troops and forces crossing possibly from Rajka. At Komárom on the Danube, Hungarian military units with freedom fighters fought throughout the day against the powerful Soviet units attacking from Hungarian territory and from Czechoslovakia across the Danube bridge. At Tatabánya, the miners fought with weapons which they had

received from the Army. At Székesfehérvár, the Hungarian military garrison, after breaking through the Soviet encirclement, moved to positions in the Vértes mountains, while others proceeded southwest towards the Bakony mountains. There they established bases for guerrilla operations against Soviet troop movements along the highways connecting Budapest with western Hungary. The Budapest Military Staff College and the Budapest armoured brigade fought valiantly in the Mátra mountains against an armoured division. The information regarding the crossing of the Danube by Soviet troops at other points east of Komárom is considered unreliable in view of the fact that for a period of more than ten days various Hungarian units were able to move from the northeast between the Bükk and Mátra mountains across the Danube to the southwestern chain of the Vértes mountains.

28. The fighting round the Danubian military centres of Szolnok, Kecskemét and Kalocsa is illustrative of the Soviet control exercised over the Hungarian Army. These three garrisons were, throughout the period of the Revolution, under the command of pro-Soviet officers. As the strength of the Soviet troops was increasing from 1 November, they were unable to assist the local National Guard as other garrisons had been able to do. At the outbreak of hostilities on 4 November, the barracks at Szolnok were surrounded and the Soviet tanks inflicted many casualties on the Hungarian troops who were taken by surprise. At Kecskemét and Kalocsa there was no fighting in the town, but a number of

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officers and men were able to break through the encirclement, and for many days fought with the freedom fighters in the Danubian plain, inflicting damage on the Soviet forces and supplies moving on the highways.

29. A survey of the movement of Soviet forces in Hungary during the period ^{from} 29 October to 4 November shows that, irrespective of the assurances given to Premier Nagy by Soviet political personalities, there existed a definite plan for the reconquest and military subjugation of Hungary. This plan in fact was carried through fully. Contrary to the contentions of the Soviet Government that the Hungarian revolution was capitalist inspired, by elements residing outside Hungary, the Committee cannot but conclude that the Hungarian resistance to the second Soviet intervention was a heroic demonstration of the will of the Hungarian people to fight for their national independence.^{1/}

^{1/} The Committee is not in possession of what it would regard as reliable figures for the casualties that occurred during the Hungarian uprising. From an official Hungarian source (The ^{SS.} X Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Statistikai Szemle, issue XX number 11-12; ⁹ Volume XXXIV, of November-December 1956, p. 929), it is stated that the number of all registered deaths from October through December 1956 was 27,400, i.e. 10% higher than in the same months of 1955. The number of people who died in the fighting, according to this source, can be estimated at some 1,800-2,000 in Budapest and 2,500-3,000 in the whole country.

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~~9/30~~ Among those who died in the fighting between 23 October and 30 November and whose deaths had been registered up to 1 January 1957, 84% were men and 16% women. More than one-fifth of these people were under twenty years of age, 28% were between twenty and twenty-nine years old, 15% between thirty and thirty-nine years old and 15% between forty and forty-nine. In the provinces, the greatest number of deaths in the fighting occurred ~~XXXX~~ in the counties of Pest, Győr-Sopron, Fejér and Bács-Kiskun.

~~31~~ The same official Hungarian source has stated that about 13,000 wounded (11,500 in Budapest) were treated in hospitals and clinics up to the end of November. In addition, doctors, ambulances and first-aid stations are said to have rendered first-aid to a large number of slightly wounded people. It is possible that the above figures do not present a complete picture. Some sources have placed the number of dead and wounded far above that suggested by the Hungarian Government. Speaking in the Indian Parliament on 13 December, Mr. Nehru said that, from such information as he had received, "it would appear that about 25,000 Hungarians and about 7,000 Russians died in the fighting". The Committee, however, received the impression that this figure may well be too high. On many occasions, efforts were made by the Committee to obtain precise knowledge of the casualties occasioned by the uprising. This did not prove to be possible, and it may well be some time before accurate figures are available.