

EYES ONLY AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MUN 182 29 OCT 62
TO RICHARDSON
FM SMITH

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REF NYC 182 (WRITTEN SUNDAY, 28 OCTOBER, BUT NOT TRANSMITTED UNTIL MONDAY, 29 OCTOBER.)

I DO NOT THINK YOUR FORM OF COMMUNICATING GUIDANCE IDEAS TO ME HAS ADDED TO MY PROBLEMS. I HAVE NOT ASSUMED ANY AUTOMATIC REQUIREMENT THAT ANY MESSAGE FROM YOU TO ME, OR ANY PAPER FROM YOU, MUST BE SHOWN TO ANY PARTICULAR PERSONS IN RFE. ~~8-548-76-78-85~~ *Strictly limit* CIRCULATION AS I SEE FIT, AND NO ONE SEES ANY FEC MESSAGES EXCEPT AS I WANT THEM TO SEE THEM.

HOWEVER, IT IS MY HABITUAL AND CONSIDERED PRACTICE NOT TO OPERATE AS A ONE-MAN SHOW ON BROADCASTING POLICY MATTERS, AND I CAREFULLY AVOID SPRINGING DECISIONS ON MY KEY PEOPLE WITHOUT MY HAVING HAD THE BENEFIT OF THEIR COUNSEL AND ADVICE, AND THEY HAVING HAD THE BENEFIT OF BEING IN THE KNOW DURING THE FORMULATIVE STAGE, AND HAVING THE FEELING THAT THEIR IDEAS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AND THAT THEY ARE THEN CARRYING OUT SOMETHING THEY HELPED FORMULATE AND BELIEVE IN.

IT WOULD BE THE HEIGHT OF FOLLY FOR ME TO BY-PASS OR NOT MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF MY STAFF: FIRST BECAUSE I NEED THEM, THEY HAVE A LOT OF COMPETENCE AND CAN GIVE ME GOOD ADVICE; AND SECOND BECAUSE A SURE WAY OF BREAKING UP THIS LOYAL AND VERY HARD WORKING TEAM WOULD BE TO TRY TO RUN THEM BY FIAT, OR BY YOU AND ME KEEPING OUR OWN COUNSEL, MAKING OUR OWN DECISIONS, AND THEN PUTTING THEM INTO EFFECT ARBITRARILY OR OUT OF THE BLUE. THESE TOP STAFF PEOPLE ARE NOT JUST CARRYING OUT ANOTHER JOB, AS YOU WELL KNOW; THEY ARE DOING THIS BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE IN IT AND BELIEVE THEY CAN CONTRIBUTE SOMETHING WORTHWHILE TO IT. THEY RESPECT YOU AND ME, BUT THE NATURE OF THIS KIND OF OPERATION IS NOT SUCH THAT IT CAN BE RUN LIKE A MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, WITH PLANS MADE IN SECRET BY JUST A FEW TOP COMMANDERS, THEN ISSUED COLD TO THE DIVISIONS AND REGIMENTS AND BATTLE GROUPS TO CARRY OUT UNQUESTIONINGLY.
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ALL OF WHICH IS TO SAY THAT I THINK OUR SYSTEM OF USING THE POLICY BOARD AS AN ADVISORY STAFF, AND THEN IN APPROPRIATE CASES AND AT THE RIGHT TIMING TO BRING IN THE BROADCASTING DIRECTORS FOR DISCUSSIONS BEFORE ISSUING A NEW POLICY DIRECTIVE, IS ON THE RIGHT TRACK. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES DO I THINK THAT A DIRECTIVE SUCH AS THE GUIDANCE ON THE CUBAN SITUATION SHOULD EVER BE ISSUED WITHOUT PRIOR DISCUSSION WITH THE BROADCASTING DIRECTORS. THEREFORE I DO NOT SEE THAT THERE HAS BEEN ANY ADDITION TO OUR PROBLEMS BY FAULTY FORM OF COMMUNICATIONS.

LET ME ILLUSTRATE THE TYPE OF APPROACH I USE. THE FIRST DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED CUBAN GUIDANCE AS ADDRESSED TO ME AND BURKS. I FELT THAT IT NEEDED SO MUCH IMPROVEMENT THAT I DID NOT MAKE ANY DISTRIBUTION OR PLAN ANY MEETING ON IT WITH BROADCASTING DIRECTORS. 8,53-8 I ASKED BURKS TO WORK THAT NIGHT ON REVISING AND TIGHTENING UP

UTION OR PLAN ANY MEETING ON IT WITH BROADCASTING DIRECTORS. INSTEAD I ASKED BURKS TO WORK THAT NIGHT ON REVISING AND TIGHTENING UP ALONG LINES WE DISCUSSED, THEN TO HOLD A SESSION WITH POLICY BOARD TO GO OVER REVISED DRAFT WITH A VIEW TO THEN SENDING IT BACK TO YOU TO GET YOUR ACCEPTANCE (AND FURTHER REVISIONS) OF WHAT WE CONSIDERED WOULD BE A MAJOR RE-WRITE, BEFORE WE EVEN MENTIONED IT OR TOOK IT UP AT ALL WITH THE BROADCASTING DIRECTORS. MEANWHILE, WHEN WE RECEIVED YOUR COMPLETELY REWORKED REDRAFT, WHICH WAS SUCH A GREAT IMPROVEMENT AND SO CLOSE TO OUR IDEAS, WE DECIDED TO SHORT CIRCUIT THE STEPS TO GAIN TIME, AND TO TAKE UP YOUR REDRAFT DIRECTLY AND JOINTLY WITH THE POLICY BOARD AND BROADCASTING DIRECTORS. OUT OF THIS QUICKLY CAME OUR RELATIVELY FEW RECOMMENDED CHANGES WHICH YOU ACCEPTED (WITH REINSTATEMENT OF ONE PARAGRAPH) WHICH OF COURSE WE ACCEPTED AND ISSUED IMMEDIATELY WITHOUT ANY FURTHER CONSULTATION WITH BD'S.

WHEN I WAS CALLED IN LAST NIGHT ON YOUR CIVIL DEFENSE MESSAGE, I CONSULTED WITH ADAMS (IN BURKS ABSENCE) AND WITH MATER. MY TELECON COMMENTS WERE ENTIRELY MY OWN. NO BD'S OR OTHER STAFF WERE CONSULTED AT THIS STAGE.

I THINK THE SYSTEM IS ALL RIGHT. I WILL DECIDE IN EACH CASE HOW DEEP TO GO IN CONSULTING WITH MY STAFF, AND THE DEPTH I HAVE GONE WILL USUALLY BE INDICATED BY THOSE I NAME FOR INFO COPIES ON MY RETURN MESSAGES TO YOU, TO CLUE YOU AND OUR IMMEDIATE STAFFS IN ON WHO CAN RECEIVE COPIES OF FURTHER ROUTINE COMMUNICATIONS ON SUBJECT.

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SO MUCH FOR THIS ASPECT. NOW AS TO YOUR EXPLANATION OF WHAT YOU ARE TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH BY YOUR VARIOUS SUGGESTIONS. THIS ALSO I BELIEVE ALL OF US HERE CLEARLY UNDERSTAND AND ARE DRIVING TOWARD THE SAME OBJECTIVES. OUR PEOPLE HAVE BEEN WORKING LITERALLY NIGHT AND DAY TO ACHIEVE JUST THE OBJECTIVE YOU STATE, AND WORKING AT A PACE WHICH CAN NOT BE CONTINUED TOO LONG WITHOUT A BADLY ADVERSE EFFECT UPON THE QUALITY OF RESULTS. I BELIEVE OUR DAILY GUIDANCE (AS WELL AS THE SPECIAL GUIDANCE WHICH HAS EQUALLY BE EMPHASIZED) HAS WITH SUFFICIENT DETAIL PRETTY WELL REFLECTED WHAT WE HAVE CONSTANTLY AND FULLY STRESSED IN OUR MEETINGS REGARDING FULLEST USE OF OUR ABILITIES TO EXERT INFLUENCES TOWARD REDUCING USSR RISK TAKING. TO ILLUSTRATE THE EMPHASIS PUT ON THIS, I PERSONALLY HAVE MADE THE POINT, MOST VIGOROUSLY, AT A 10:00 AM MEETING. EVERYONE KNOWS THAT ONLY RARELY DO I PERSONALLY MAKE A POLICY POINT AT THESE MEETINGS, AND WHEN I DO EVERYONE REALIZES THAT WE ATTACH HIGHEST

IMPORTANCE TO THE POINT BEING MADE. ALSO, I HAVE INTERJECTED ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS ON THIS LINE IN THE 9:45 MEETINGS. NO ONE HERE FAILS TO GRASP THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS POINT, NOR HAS THERE BEEN ANY SHORTCOMING IN THE POINT BEING PUT ACROSS EFFECTIVELY ALL DOWN THE LINE.

WHERE WE PROBABLY DIVERGE SOMEWHAT FROM YOUR THOUGHTS IS THE EXTENT OR NATURE OF THE EFFORTS RFE SHOULD MAKE "TO STIMULATE REACTIONS AMOUNTING TO A PARTIAL BREAKDOWN IN THE NORMAL ROUTINES OF DAILY LIFE IN THE TARGET COUNTRIES...(PROMOTING)...INDISCIPLINE...PERCENTAGE OF LABOR FORCE STAYING HOME...FOOD HOARDING", ETC. IN THIS UWE HAVE FELT THAT STRONG PLAY OF THE FACTS OF THE BIG ISSUES, PRIMARILY THE MANY MAJOR ACTIONS BY KENNEDY AND OTHER AUTHORITIES, AS WELL AS THE MANY USEFUL STATEMENTS OF IMPORTANT NAME PEOPLE, WHICH DEMONSTRATE THE FIRMNESS OF THE U.S. POSITION, THE DETERMINATION TO FIGHT IF NECESSARY IN CUBA OR IN BERLIN OR ANYWHERE, IF RECKLESS SOVIET MOVES OR LACK OF SOVIET PRUDENCE SHOULD PREVAIL; THE VERY IMPACT OF THESE SERIOUS AND BIG EVENTS, PLUS VIGOROUSLY SETTING STRAIGHT THE REGIME MEDIA DISTORTIONS OF THE TRUE SITUATION,

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ARE THE BEST WAY TO GET OUR AUDIENCES TO ARRIVE AT SOUND CONCLUSIONS AND THEREBY STIMULATE THEIR REACTIONS. WE HAVE NOT BELIEVED THAT RESORT TO SPECIAL PROGRAMMING FORMATS OR ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT BE REGARDED AS A GIMMICK WOULD BE AS CREDIBLE TO OUR LISTENERS AS WOULD BE THE USE OF THE HARDEST HITTING PROGRAMS WE CAN DEVISE, ON OUR USUAL SCHEDULES, WHEN AND WHERE OUR AUDIENCES ARE ACCUSTOMED TO HEARING OUR NEWS, OUR COMMENTARY, ETC.

MY REACTION AGAINST OVERPLAYING CIVIL DEFENSE (FEELING THAT DETAILED PRESENTATION OF A BROAD SWEEP OF INFORMATION PROGRAMS WOULD BE OVERPLAYING) WAS NOT BECAUSE OF ANY THOUGHT THAT THE SATELLITE "REGIMES OR USSR MIGHT BELIEVE THE US WAS CONTEMPLATING SOME RISKY ACTION APART FROM CUBA", BUT RATHER A COMBINATION OF THREE OTHER REASONS.

FIRST, I AM CONCERNED THAT RFE NOT LOSE CREDIBILITY BY GIVING THIS ISSUE A PREDOMINATELY BIGGER PLAY THAN THE ACTUAL FACTS WARRANT AND AS IS REASONABLY WELL SUPPORTED BY THE WORLD PRESS, WORLD RADIO OR WORLD OPINION (FOR EXAMPE, VOA HASN'T BEEN SAYING ANYTHING ABOUT US CIVIL DEFENSE ACTIONS IN THE SATURDAY OR SUNDAY BROADCASTS I'VE LISTENED TO, NOR HAVE OTHER RADIO OR WIRE SERVICES GIVEN THIS MUCH PLAY). IN OTHER WORDS, WHILE I'M IN FAVOR OF PLAYING SUCH NEWS FOR ALL IT IS WORTH, I WOULD RECOMMEND AGAINST STRETCHING THIS INTO MORE THAN TRULY CREDIBLE DOSES JUST AS A DEVICE TO STIMULATE EAST EUROPEAN REACTIONS. THE NEXT TWO OF MY REASONS EXPLAIN WHI I THINK THIS WOULD BE A BAD DEVICE FOR THIS PURPOSE.

STRESSING THE DANGERS OF FALL-OUT, NUCLEAR WAR, ETC., IS A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD, RISKY FOR RFE TO SWING ABOUT EXCEPT WITH GREAT CARE, SINCE IT IS SO EASILY DEFLECTED AND TURNED INTO REACTIONS AGAINST THE U.S. (AND RFE). NUCLEAR WAR DANGERS ARE ALMOST AUTOMATICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE U.S. IN THE MINDS OF EUROPEAN INFORMATIVE TALKS OF MEASURES PEOPLE SHOULD TAKE I.E., NOT ACTUAL NEWS ABOUT CURRENT U.S. ACTIVITIES, BUT PROGRAMS ON ADVICE AS TO MEASURES TO BE TAKEN, COMMENTARY ON HORRIBLE DANGER, ETC.) WHEN HEARD THROUGH JAMMING, OR PEICEMEAL, OR REPEATED BY WORD OF MOUTH, CAN SO EASILY BE CONSTRUED AS IMPLYING THREATS BY THE U.S., OR AS EFFORTS TO STIR UP OUR AUDIENCES BY INVOKING FRIGHT OR TERROR, WHICH MIGHT TAKE /MORE/

PLACE TEMPORARILY AMONG SOME SEGMENTS BUT SOON TURN INTO A REACTION AGAINST RFE AND/OR THE U.S. ON THE PART OF LARGER SEGMENTS, RATHER THAN CREATE THE DESIRED RESULT OF CAUSING PRESSURES ON THEIR OWN REGIMESS. WE ARE NOT YET AT THIS STAGE IN A POSITION TO WANT TO GAMBLE ON OUR FUTURE USEFULNESS AND CREDIBILITY ON THE SLENDER REED OF THE UNCERTAIN VALUE TO OUR OBJECTIVES WHICH EXCESSIVELY HEAVY CIVIL DEFENSE AND NUCLEAR DANGERS PLAY AT THIS TIME MIGHT GAIN. THIS SEEMS ESPECIALLY VALID TO ME IN VIEW OF MY THIRD REASON.

THIS IS SIMPLY THAT WE HAVE SUCH AN ABUNDANCE OF EXCELLENT PEGS FOR GETTING ACROSS OUR BASIC OBJECTIVE, INCLUDING APPROPRIATE NEWS PLAY ON U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE ACTIONS (AND IF IT DEVELOPS, PRESS REVIEW, PANORAMA, ETC.), THAT WE DO NOT NEED TO CROWD OUT THESE EVEN BETTER OPPORTUNITIES, IN FACT SHOULD NOT CROWD THEM OUT, AT LEAST NOT AT THIS STAGE, BY ESPECIALLY HEAVY PLAY ON CIVIL DEFENSE INFORMATION AND ADVICE. NOT ONLY ARE THE BIG EVENTS WHICH ARE HAPPENING HOURLY THE MOST VALUABLE GRIST FOR OUR MILL, BUT THEY DO NOT ENTAIL THE RISKS OF BEING TURNED AGAINST US. ALSO THERE IS A LIMIT TO HOW MUCH WE CAN GIVE TOP EMPHASIS TO WITHOUT LOSING EMPHASIS ALTOGETHER.

I GUESS WHAT ALL THIS BILLS DOWN TO IS THAT I JUST DON'T WANT TO STRAIN OR EXAGGERATE OUR PLAY OF ANYTHING SO AS TO GIVE IT AN APPEARANCE OF STRETCHING FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES, ESPECIALLY ON THE NUCLEAR DANGERS QUESTION WHERE HYSTERIA OR EMOTIONAL REACTIONS AGAINST THE U.S. CAN SO EASILY BE RAISED, OR WHERE SOME INDIVIDUALS MAY MOMENTARILY BECOME FRIGHTENED ONLY TO BE FOLLOWED BY A LATER WAVE OF REACTION AGAINST US FOR HAVING INDUCED SUCH FEELINGS.

I HAVE MADE THIS LONG IN AN EFFORT TO EXPRESS MYSELF FULLY AND HONESTLY. I HOPE I HAVE NOT CREATED A FEELING OF OVERSTATEMENT OR NARROW OBSTINANCY.

RELATED TO ALL THIS IS THE MATTER OF GEARING TO A LONG TERM EMERGENCY SITUATION. WE MUST ALL EXERCISE CONTROL AND RESTRAINT ON THE BARRAGE OF EXTRA REQUIREMENTS BEING THROWN AT EVERYONE. WE CAN NOT CONTINUE TO EXPEND OUR ENERGIES AND MANPOWER TOO MUCH OUT OF PROPORTION AT NIGHT. I THEREFORE WANT TO DISCUSS FRANKLY THE NEED TO MINIMIZE CALLING PEOPLE OUT OF BED AND REQUIRING NIGHT SHIFTS, ETC. IT MUST SEEM VERY SIMPLE TO SEND A MESSAGE FROM NEW YORK AT SIX, EIGHT OR TEN O'CLOCK IN THE EVENING, BUT THIS IS MIDNIGHT, TWO A.M., OR 4:00 AM IN MUNICH. WE ARE FAST RUNNING INTO SERIOUS INROADS ON NEEDED REST, AND ON CAPABILITY FOR THE HEAVY DEMAND OF THE REGULAR WORKDAY OF KEY PERSONNEL, AS WELL AS INCURRING THE DANGER OF CREATING A FRAME OF MIND OF "IS EVERYTHING A FLAP"? ALSO EXTRA DOLLAR COSTS ARE BUILDING UP WHICH EVENTUALLY WILL CREATE BUDGET DEFICITS OR WHICH COULD BE BETTER SPENT ON SOMETHING ELSE.

JUST TO ILLUSTRATE: WE HAVE ONLY EIGHT TELETYPE OPERATOR SPACE, WITH TWO VACANCIES AT PRESENT AND ONE MAN ON HOME LEAVE, THUS ONLY FIVE OPERATORS TO COVER NIGHT AND DAY. WE ARE TRYING HARD TO FILL THE VACANCIES, OF COURSE, BUT QUALIFIED PEOPLE WHO CAN BE CLEARED AND WHO WANT TO WORK FOR US ARE HARD TO COME BY. A CODED EYES MESSAGE TO ME IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT MEANS THAT BOTH MY TELETYPE SUPERVISOR AND MY SECRETARY ARE CALLED IN. THEY BOTH HAVE TO WORK VERY LONG HARD DAYS - 8:30 AM TO 8:30 PM IS NOT AN UNUSUAL REGULAR DAY.

OUR TELETYPE ROOM IS REGULARLY OPEN FROM 8:30 AM UNTIL MIDNIGHT OUR TIME. TELEX IS AVAILABLE THROUGHOUT THAT PERIOD, AND TELETYPE LINES ARE OPEN FROM 2:00 PM TO 7:00 PM AND FROM 10:00 PM TO 11:00 PM (8:00 AM TO 1:00 PM AND 4:00 PM TO 5:00 PM YOUR TIME). THESE LINES CAN EASILY AND IMMEDIATELY BE EXTENDED WHENEVER NECESSARY. IN ADDITION, OUR CENTRAL NEWS ROOM CAN BE REACHED BY TELEX 24 HOURS A DAY.

I WOULD LIKE TO ASK THAT TO THE FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE, AND EXCEPT FOR REAL EMERGENCIES, MESSAGES TO US BE SENT DURING OUR NORMAL 3:30 AM TO MIDNIGHT TELETYPE ROOM SHIFT (2:30 AM TO 6:00 PM YOUR TIME), OR VIA CNR TELEX AT OTHER HOURS. THIS MAY MEAN THAT ON SOME OCCASIONS IF YOU WISH TO SEND ME AN EYES MESSAGE AFTER 6:00 PM (MIDNIGHT IN MUNICH) THAT A NEW YORK OPERATOR WILL BE REQUIRED TO STAY UP OR COME BACK IN TO SEND THE MESSAGE AT 2:30 AM YOUR TIME WHEN OUR TELETYPE ROOM OPENS, RATHER THAN CALLING ON MUNICH OPERATORS TO COME BACK IN AND CAUSING OUR "EYES" SUPERVISOR AND MY SECRETARY TO GET UP AND COME IN UNEXPECTEDLY IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT WHEN NO ACTION CAN BE TAKEN ON THE MESSAGE ANYWAY UNTIL MORNING (GRANTING POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS). BY CAREFULLY CUTTING THE MESSAGE TAPE IN ADVANCE TRANSMISSION SAVINGS WILL ACCRUE. TELEX COSTS US \$180 AND HOUR, WHEREAS WE GET OUR TELETYPE LINES FOR \$8. BECAUSE OF TYPING MISTAKES OR PERFORATED TAPE TROUBLES OR TRANSMISSION GAMBLES, SEVERAL RE-RUNS WERE REQUIRED ON THE MODDLE OF THE NIGHT GUIDANCE MESSAGE, AND ON YOUR SATURDAY NIGHT MESSAGE, WHICH RAN THE TOTAL COST OF THESE INDIVIDUAL MESSAGES PROBABLY ABOVE \$100 EACH, COUNTING TELEX TIME OF 20 TO 30 MINUTES AND OVERTIME. WE DON'T HAVE THE MONEY TO KEPP THAT UP, BUT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, WE DON'T HAVE THE MANPOER.

WE ARE REQUIRING SO MUCH NIGHT WORK OF OUR KEY PEOPLE, THAT WHEN AT A RECENT 10:00 AM MEETING WE ANNOUNCED A SPECIAL MEETING FOR 11:00 O'CLOCK, MICHAEL GARMANIKOW (AN ARDENT WORKER AND NO GRIPER) ASKED "A.M. OR P.M.?" NIGHT AND DAY IS ALL RIGHT FOR A SHORT STRETCH, BUT WE CAN'T KEEP IT UP FOR A LONG PULL, AND WE ARE INEVITABLY IN FOR A LONG PULL; THAT IS, IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL IN WHAT WE ARE ALL-OUT SHOOTING FOR.

END MSG