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SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEM OF HUNGARY

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FIFTY-FOURTH MEETING (CLOSED)

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 4 April 1957, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Alsing ANDERSEN

(Denmark)

Repeal of Kadar with Rev. Comm. up to 11 Nov. due to weakness  
imposition of old party members in local Admin  
Soviet troops and AVH enforce Kadar policy  
Kadar fled at noon of 3 Nov, Betrayal. -



The CHAIRMAN: On behalf of the Committee I once more bid you welcome. We are grateful that you were able and willing to appear before the Committee again in Geneva to answer our questions. The delegate of Australia would like to put some questions to you.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): I would like to start by asking a few questions about the Workers' Councils and the Revolutionary Councils. I notice from a paper we have before us that you were president of the Revolutionary Workers' Council of south Budapest. There seems to have been quite a clear distinction in many parts of the country between Revolutionary Councils, which often were responsible, or made themselves responsible, for the administration of entire cities, and the Workers' Councils which normally confined themselves to dealing with a factory or a group of factories. In your case the words used are: "Revolutionary Workers' Council", that is a mixture of both. Would you please clarify for me exactly what the Revolutionary Council of south Budapest was?

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): I should first of all like to call the attention of the delegate of Australia to the fact that a basic misunderstanding exists. I was the chairman of the Revolutionary Council of south Budapest and not of any Workers' Council. That Revolutionary Council, of which I was chairman, handled the political administration of the major part of the city. South Budapest was, in fact, the best example of how the Revolutionary Council was built up gradually from the Workers' Councils. It was responsible for the administration of a whole section of the city and not only for the administration of one factory. The situation was as follows: During the night of 23 October when the revolution broke out the individual fighting groups of revolutionaries were spontaneously formed. Those fighting units, in most places, elected from their own members temporary Revolutionary Councils, the task of which was to coordinate and unify all the fighting activities and to represent that unit in political affairs. Furthermore, it was assigned the task of establishing contact with the Hungarian Government to which it presented the demands and the wishes of the revolutionaries. It also demanded that Workers' Councils be formed in all the individual industries and plants. Those Councils were elected by the workers.



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Thus, I was elected a member of the Workers' Council in the cable factory of Budafok. It is true that I was only able to speak to them on the telephone because I was, at that time, engaged in other activities in south Budapest which I considered were more important. Nevertheless I was a member of the Council. The leaders of the Revolutionary Council that had been temporarily formed in south Budapest held meetings with the leaders of the Workers' Councils which had been formed in the individual factories, and with the leaders of the political parties. During those meetings it was suggested that a unified Revolutionary Council should be formed in which representatives of the political parties, the fighters and the Workers' Councils should take part thus enabling a co-ordinated plan of action to be worked out. Such a Council could also further the wishes and demands of the Hungarian people. Therefore representatives of all the political parties (which had been reorganized) and of all the individual plants and factories, and the fighters, were able to take part in the elections which were to be held in south Budapest. Candidates from all those groups stood for election to the Central Revolutionary Council. For example, the twenty-four member group of the south Budapest Revolutionary Council was as follows: twelve were nominated by each political party, the Smallholders', the Social Democrats and the Peasants, and the other twelve were nominated by the Workers' Councils of the factories and the representatives of the armed fighters. Therefore it will be seen that the Central Revolutionary Council was representative of all sections of the population, including the Workers' Councils and the armed fighters (I was myself a representative of the fighters and became the chairman of the steering committee). My deputies were the president of the Workers' Council, Pal Bodor and another man who was a young fighter. The final list of nominations was as follows: Varfalvi, representative of the fighters and chairman of the steering committee; Istvan Cigany, a nominee of the leaders of the Revolutionary youth movements, deputy chairman of the steering committee; Laszlo Dragos, another deputy chairman a leading representative of the Workers' Council of Csepel and a member of the south Budapest Revolutionary Council.



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Gyorgy Prada, a member of the Workers' Council of an arms factory. Istvan Rakosa, a gymnastics teacher. Imre Molnar, a skilled worker. Janos Kiss, the president of a factory Workers' Council. Ferenc Jancsik, a police lieutenant. He was also a police lieutenant during the Rakosi regime. He was elected to the Central Revolutionary Council.

From this list of names it can be seen that there were policemen, workers, members of Workers' Councils, political party secretaries and so on, equally, represented and in their turn they represented the 180,000 inhabitants of South Budapest from every social and political class.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): You have effectively answered the next six questions I intended to ask! Could you tell me if this pattern which was followed in South Budapest is the pattern which was followed throughout Hungary at this time, by that I mean the formation of a Revolutionary Council which itself suggested the formation of Workers' Councils where these did not exist and which assumed powers of direction over the administration of a certain area, including, I suppose, certain powers of direction over the Workers' Councils themselves?

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): This was a universally accepted pattern and it was accepted at the meeting held in the trade union building on 2 November. The workers, the students and army delegates accepted this because it was not organized before and in several districts this is how it came about.

Firstly, the leaders of the Revolutionary Councils felt that they needed to have an exchange of views with the Workers' Councils and also with the university students and that is how it happened. In practice, for example, in the eighth district of Budapest, this was the exact pattern and it was also the pattern in Csepel, Ujpest and several other districts.

As far as I know it was only the temporary Revolutionary Councils that were able to work in full co-operation with the Home Guard of the army, because, as you know, our victory lasted only a very few days and there was no time in every district to finalize the situation, to hold a mass meeting and have an election. In those districts where this did not happen it was due to the fact that the second Russian intervention came within a few days.



(Mr. Varfalvi)

I know about all these territories, for example, in Győr, in Trans-Danubia, the pattern was similar and the Committee there was at first composed of the leaders of the Workers' Councils. Later on it represented not only all the classes of Győr but also of Trans-Danubia, and it was on the same basis as the Revolutionary Council of South Budapest but, of course, it represented a much bigger territory than that Council.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): We have heard of some variations in this general description of Revolutionary Councils. For instance, we have been told of the existence of a students' Revolutionary Council. Could you tell me how this fitted into this pattern?

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): The students' Revolutionary Council was created quite spontaneously in the first few days of the revolution. As you know, they were the first group to take action on 23 October and during the first few days it was absolutely necessary that the students of different universities and high schools should create their own Revolutionary Councils which in turn co-operated fully with the district Revolutionary Councils. Eventually it became part of the Revolutionary Council that represented all classes of people.

In south Budapest, for instance, we had a students' Revolutionary Council which was led by Cigany. It was called the Revolutionary Youth Organization but it was really a students' council and later on this was merged into the central Revolutionary Council and the members took part in the proceedings of the central Revolutionary Council. The reason for the formation of this students' Revolutionary Council was to make it apparent that there was no connection with the council for the youth which had existed under Rakosi. This council was called the "Democratic Society of Youth" or "D.I.SZ." and had been formed with the intention of indoctrinating the youth of Hungary with communist ideology so that out of this group of young men would come those who would participate in the Communist Government. The students wanted to disassociate themselves from this Rakosi organization and they wanted to emphasize the fact with their new organization and make it clear that they had nothing in common with the Rakosi organization.



Mr. SHANN (Australia): Presiding over this organization of Revolutionary Councils was there a national central revolutionary organization either in existence or planned and, therefore, not established before the revolution came to an end?

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes, there were plans to form a central Revolutionary Council the elements of which were already in existence in the Trans-Danubia Council as that was a unified Revolutionary Council. This would have been followed by a Revolutionary Council for the region between the Danube and Tisza Rivers and thus a national central revolutionary organization would have been formed had time allowed it. Its task would have been to co-operate with the newly-formed coalition government and prepare for the holding of free elections. However, because of the lack of time it was impossible to form this national Revolutionary Council.

The basic idea was that the structure must be built not from the top and going down but from the bottom going to the top and the industries and factories would have elected their representatives and also the army and the students. That is how the Budapest Council was formed. These councils built up in this way from below would in turn have formed the national central revolutionary organization. Time did not permit it because the days of peace between 31 October and 4 November were not sufficient to allow it to be formed democratically in this way. It was purely because of the lack of time that it was not formed.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): I imagine that the Revolutionary Councils had considerable influence on the Government and that the Government in turn may have been dependent on the Revolutionary Councils for carrying out its ordinary work; what were the means whereby the Revolutionary Councils maintained their relations with the central government of Mr. Nagy?

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): The individual Revolutionary Councils immediately tried to find a possibility of establishing contact with Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister, and to inform him of the wishes of the electors in their districts. On 26, 27 and 29 October and 2 November there were discussions in Parliament where the several district and industrial Workers' Councils



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had, through their delegations, negotiations with Imre Nagy. The cease-fire order which contained the main demands of the revolution and which I gave to you as the seven points when I was last here was not born on the basis of Imre Nagy's ideas but on the basis of representatives of several Workers' Councils and several district Revolutionary Councils. During that final meeting where these points were summarized it so happened that the seven points were identical with those that were demanded by all the individual councils, and, therefore, Imre Nagy recognized the necessity of accepting this point of view and on the basis of his agreement we agreed to the cease fire.



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The Workers' Councils as well as the Revolutionary Councils made it quite clear to Imre Nagy that unless the Hungarian Government fulfilled the demands of the Hungarian revolution the latter would not accept Imre Nagy as Prime Minister. As Imre Nagy became Prime Minister on the basis of constitutional continuity but the revolution had replaced that continuity by the will of the whole country, the Government of Imre Nagy could be recognized only so far as and so long as Imre Nagy represented that will and tried to carry it out. The people had already thought for themselves much earlier. It was for these reasons that we made it clear to Imre Nagy that we could accept his Government as only an interim measure, its sole task being to make it possible for free elections to be held, free elections which in practice would be arranged by the Revolutionary Councils together with the Government over the whole of the country.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): When were the Revolutionary Councils abolished by the Kadar Government; and do you know whether, when they were ordered to be abolished, the order was obeyed at once?

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): When Prime Minister Nagy fled from Parliament to the Yugoslav Legation and the Soviet armed forces, relying solely on their armed might and regardless of the will of the Hungarian people, put in power the puppet government of Kadar, the first act of this puppet government was to try, in a tricky Communist way, to put into the Revolutionary Councils, at least temporarily until they could abolish the councils, men who were on their side. The Revolutionary Councils were no longer leaning on armed force because the Russians had destroyed the Home Guard, and were obliged to carry out partially the will of Kadar and to admit the former Communist Council members. They were compelled to do this because of the Russian armed might and the new police formed by Kadar. The Kadar group did not come to the territory of Budapest until 11 November. As I told you previously, the Russians were able to penetrate our ranks, but we were able to hold out until 11 November. The Kadar Government tried to negotiate with us. Thus a man who said he was a deputy of Kadar telephoned me saying that "The Kadar Government is very glad that things are working so well in Budapest, but as the unified workers and peasants have taken over the Government of Imre Nagy it is absolutely necessary that the former Council chairman, Putaki, and another should return and occupy their former positions." He also said that we should lay down



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our arms to the mixed Hungarian-Russian group and that he hoped we would, after purifying ourselves of the counter-revolutionaries, continue to work in co-operation and support with them. I then informed him by telephone that the presidency of Imre Nagy in the Council had been accepted by the south Budapest Council, who wanted this. However, the fact that Kadar became Prime Minister was not wanted by anybody and was due solely to the armed might of the Soviets, and therefore we would not recognize this situation as lawful and would defend ourselves until the last drop of our blood. All attempts to send government-appointed people would be resisted by us, and we were not ready to negotiate with a government which had no lawful constitutional basis. After this statement the Kadar Government did not try to make any other approach to us except in an armed way. Then we were able to resist until the 11th. Four days before I left Hungary Istvan Cigany was found. He stayed until the end of December at Pesterzsébet and was able to say what the situation was after the Soviets had occupied southern Budapest. For example, when the Soviet troops occupied that territory the Soviet military commander and three Hungarian members of the AVH appeared at the Town Hall looking for the Revolutionary Council. An engineer, Pal Bodor, the deputy of the President of the Revolutionary Council and Istvan Cigany, the second deputy President, were there; they received the Russian commander and reported as members of the Executive Committee of the Revolutionary Council. The Russian commander shook hands, congratulated them, and asked them to continue their work. Next day Futaki arrived in an AVH truck. He was the former chairman of the Council. He arrived with his officials and went to the Town Hall; he left those two members of the Revolutionary Council at their places and started giving his own orders without addressing a single word to the two Council members sitting there. On the third day the Russians took Pal Bodor from his home during the night, and the next day at the Town Hall Futaki expressed his sorrow at this event and said that he would see to it that Bodor was brought back; but two or three days later, after search was made for Cigany at his own home, he was not found because he had hidden with four or five other members of the Revolutionary Council, namely Istvan Rakosa, Imre Molnar, a skilled worker, Jozsef Kiss, the leader of the arms factory, and Ferenc Jancsik, the police lieutenant. At this time he was living in a crypt in Pesterzsébet, and it was only during the night that he communicated with others; when everybody was arrested he himself fled and reached Italy through Austria.

That is how it worked in practice; the Revolutionary Council was always greeted by the Russian commander, next day the former Communist leaders arrived, and then the



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members of the Revolutionary Council were taken by night from their homes. Even weeks later Kadar spoke about Revolutionary Councils, but by that time none of the people of the revolution was left in them, it was his people who were there again. It was thus that he wanted to deceive the world.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): I would like to ask some questions of detail about the statement which you gave us in Rome. I think most of these questions can be answered quite briefly; it is just a matter of clearing up a few points about which I am a little puzzled. When describing the events you said several times that you handed your demands to Parliament. By that I take it you mean that you handed in your demands at the Parliament building, not that you handed your demands actually to Parliament itself.

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): These demands were at all times given into the hands of Imre Nagy personally in writing, in most cases in the small council chamber near the office of Imre Nagy, and once even in his own office.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): You referred in your evidence to having seen Kadar -- I presume in the Parliament building -- in the late hours of 3 November. Are you quite certain of that date, 3 November?



Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): On the night of 2nd/3rd there was a meeting at the headquarters of one of the trade unions. It began on the afternoon of the 2nd and lasted practically through the night until the small hours. I discussed things with Kadar in a corner of Imre Nagy's office in the Hungarian Parliament building so there is no doubt that he was there at that time. At the later meetings, however, when the question of forming a coalition government was discussed Kadar did not participate. In fact, Nagy's son-in-law, Janosi, called attention to this and told us not to forget that Kadar was not present during our discussion and decision to form a coalition government. He said that nevertheless Kadar had been included in the Cabinet as Minister of State. I asked why he emphasized that Kadar was not present and he replied "I have my reasons." The next day — that is, 3 November because we left Parliament early that morning — Janosi called us up at our homes and said that Kadar had fled from Parliament at noon on the 3rd. I then asked him why he was telling us that now and if he would explain why he had emphasized during the night meetings that Kadar was not present. He said this was because from 1 November Kadar barely appeared in Parliament and was carrying on an exchange of views, as far as he, Janosi, knew, with the Russian military leaders. When I asked him why he was only now telling me this he gave a very strange answer. He said that as Kadar was a member of the Hungarian Government he had the right to carry on discussions with the Russians. Janosi felt that Kadar was holding this exchange of views not in the name of the Hungarian Government but more or less in his own name since Kadar never reported to the Government on these conversations although he was still Minister of State. Instead of discussing what had to be done with Imre Nagy he left Parliament without even letting Nagy know about it.

May I just add that there may have been a mistake because I referred to the meeting on the night of 2nd/3rd as taking place in the late hours whereas according to the calendar that would be the early hours of the 3rd.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): You appear to have seen the Prime Minister at Parliament House for the first time on the 26th. Do you know — I should tell you that we have some evidence to the contrary — whether Mr. Nagy was in Parliament House between the 23rd and the 26th and in a position to carry out the functions of Government.



Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): I personally saw Prime Minister Nagy in Parliament for the first time on the 26th. Whether he was in Parliament between 23 and 26 October I cannot say. From his own admission, however, I do know that not only from the 23rd to the 26th but also on the 29th, namely at the cease-fire negotiations, Imre Nagy could not act independently because at the negotiations with him in Parliament on 26 and 28 October two men in civilian clothes were continuously present, and Imre Nagy did not present us to these men as he did to all the other people present. On 29 October he stated clearly that this was the first opportunity for us to talk freely and without guards. I can therefore prove as an eye-witness that even on the 28th there were AVH men in civilian clothes at the back of Imre Nagy and on one occasion he even told me that he was forced under arms to make the first speech he made from the balcony of Tildy's office in the Parliament building. I can say quite definitely therefore that from 23 to 26 October I know nothing of the whereabouts of Imre Nagy because I did not get to Parliament until the 26th. On the 26th and the 28th one could negotiate with Imre Nagy only in the presence of two guards, and the Committee will recall that it was only on the 29th that Imre Nagy made a statement as to who was responsible for the entry of the Russians into Hungary. It is significant that he only dared to say that on the 29th when the guards were no longer at his elbow.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): Towards the end of your statement in Rome you described what happened while Maleter was negotiating with the Russians and I would like to ask three or four questions on this. Perhaps I can ask them all at once and then you can answer them in turn.

You said that at seven o'clock the order was received from the Ministry of Defence that observations should be organized. I want to know from whom this order was received, from which person, and to whom it was given. You then said, and this is my second question, that you were told that you should continually inform Maleter as to what was going on, and I want to know how it was proposed that you should inform Maleter. Thirdly, you referred to the commander of the home guard and I want to know whether that was General Kiraly. You said that Kiraly, I presume, received direct information from advanced guards sent into the Russian camps. Can you tell me what you mean by that?



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Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): At seven o'clock in the evening the order came direct from Parliament over the secret line K 22 to organize observation of the Russians. I myself answered the telephone but unfortunately I did not ask the name of the person at the other end. As this was the secret telephone and they called us on our secret number I considered it a genuine call, particularly as I had to call them back at the Parliament building, which I did on Imre Nagy's secret telephone.



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At nine o'clock I reported on the 1,000 K line, and I knew his voice because I had spoken personally to Imre Nagy and knew it was he. He told me we must give our information to him directly because only he had direct communication with Maleter who was negotiating at Toekoel. The military data received by the commander of the home guard for southern Budapest from each part of the territory was, for technical reasons, forwarded to me through a camp line and I sent it on direct to Imre Nagy, because the police had no direct line to the Ministry. Therefore I was simply a go-between. Each individual piece of data was reported by the observers to the commander of the home guard, who is going to be your next witness today. When I received the information from him over the military camp telephone I made a note of it and gave it directly to Imre Nagy in Parliament and he kept Parliament continuously informed. I think that answers your first two questions.

The third question concerned Bela Kiraly; he did not receive the information because the commander of the home guard gave it to me, but he gave it to Maleter before he was cut off from him. The commander of the home guard had a direct line of communication with the Ministry of Defence. Therefore Laszlo Oltvanyi who will be the other witness will be able to tell you exactly to whom he gave the information, but it was Imre Nagy who sent it on to Maleter. On one occasion when the situation was most critical, after three o'clock when the Russian armoured cars had started an attack as I mentioned in my statement, our radio equipment was able to intercept information from the Russian command that they must proceed. That was the only case when it happened that Imre Nagy had me relayed directly to Maleter. I was able to inform Imre Nagy that it was not only the movement of the Russians but that the aim of the Russians was the Kilian barracks in the Bararos Place, that we had learned by intercepting the 'phone message. They used pseudonyms for these two places but we knew from information provided by our prisoners the meaning of these pseudonyms.

As I say, it was only once that Imre Nagy was able to put me in direct communication with Maleter — I do not understand how this was done — when he was negotiating in Toekoel. I cannot say definitely that the man I was speaking to was Maleter and not someone else, because I only spoke once to Maleter in my life and was not able to recognize his voice. He said he was Maleter and when



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I began to tell him about the situation we were interrupted. This is all I can say in reply to your third question.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): There was a fourth question: who were the agents or spies that you had in the Soviet camps? You mentioned in your previous statement "advance guards sent into the Russian camps".

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): The names of the people who were in the Russian camps will be given to you by the commander of the home guard whom you will see.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): There is one other question I should like to ask and this is a matter of opinion. I am afraid it must remain so, as there seems to be no method of reaching any direct evidence on this point. Have you any explanation for the remarkable change in the attitude of Mr. Kadar towards the revolution? In his public statements about the revolution he said on one occasion it was a national revolution and he was supporting it, yet within a few hours he was classifying the whole business as a counter-revolution and was going over to the Russians.

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): What I shall say on this subject is naturally my own opinion, but I believe many people think the same. Kadar had been imprisoned during the Rakosi regime for holding similar political views to those professed by Imre Nagy and step by step he identified himself with the revolutionary aims. Prime Minister Imre Nagy himself did not always declare Hungary to be neutral. He too proceeded step by step and accepted point by point the revolutionary demands, and until 31 October Kadar did the same thing. This seems to be proved by Janosi's statement that until 1 November he had only looked into Parliament now and then. It is also proved by the fact that as a member of the coalition government and as its Minister of State he had left Parliament on 3 November and had made separate agreements with the Russians.



(Mr. Varfalvi)

In my opinion, Kadar based himself on a national communism, and as Imre Nagy had given up national communism by saying Hungary would become neutral that was the first reason for Kadar's differing from him as he could not agree to that. Secondly, the Russians used Kadar — a former Muscovite — for their own purposes. This was demonstrated when Kadar said to a small delegation who went to see him in Parliament "I myself do not do what I want to do" and he swore. He changed his mind when he saw that the Hungarian people could not be pushed around or directed from the top. The Hungarian people were fighting from the bottom up in order to ensure their human rights, and Kadar could not identify himself with this. This was the reason for his first step towards the Russians, who simply used him as a tool. Kadar has nothing to do with Hungarian national aspirations and the fact that he is servile to the Russians, in my opinion, does not absolve him of his responsibility to history, and he lies when he says he is the Prime Minister of the whole country.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): What would you say if I told you we have substantial evidence that Mr. Kadar did in fact agree to the neutrality declaration?



Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): In my opinion, and as far as I know, Kadar did agree with the Declaration of Neutrality because he was a member of the Government and when this was proclaimed in the Council of Ministers he was in agreement because there was a majority in favour of the Declaration. At that time one minister alone could not oppose the will of the Revolutionary Councils because we had continually said that we were willing to support the Hungarian Governments only insofar as they represented the will of the people. He was forced to agree but did not really personally agree with the Declaration. For that reason his visits to Parliament became far less frequent and finally he went over to the Russians. At that time even he did not know that he would have to perform such a servile task as that which the Russians demanded of him as Prime Minister. But it is a fact that he accepted the Declaration of Neutrality. I myself was present at several meetings in Parliament including the meeting at which the cease-fire agreement was reached. I accepted it even although, personally, I did not agree with that or with some other opinions which were expressed. However, in the face of a majority vote, I felt it was my duty to represent the will of the majority independently of my own convictions. I should like to give you a concrete example of what I mean: I did not agree at all with the statement made by Imre Nagy that the matter of elections should be discussed by Parliament, because I did not consider that the composition of Parliament was an appropriate one. But, as I say, at the time of the cease-fire I was forced to accept it and to sign it. Later on even Imre Nagy himself felt that it should be the Revolutionary Councils' duty to administer that and not Parliament. I feel that Kadar must have been in much the same position. He agreed because of the force of circumstances but he was low enough to pursue a separate path and to reach a separate agreement with the Russians because of his beliefs -- the end of which was national treachery.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): I have no further questions to ask but I should like to thank the witness and to say that it is a pleasure to ask questions of a witness of his calibre.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to ask you some questions pursuant to those which have been put to you by the representative of Australia. Could you give me some clarification with regard to your statement as to who called in Russian assistance



(The Chairman)

and in this respect I refer you to page 104-110 of the verbatim record of Monday, 18 March, which pertains to your conversation with Imre Nagy. He asked you when you had first seen the first Russian tank in Budapest. Your answer was that it had been on the 24th but you did not say at what time of the day you had seen it. Later on Mr. Nagy said that he was named Prime Minister on the night of the 23rd and that it was quite clear therefore that it would not have been possible for him to call in the Russian troops between 4 and 6 o'clock in the morning. However, he was speaking about calling Russian troops into the country — not into Budapest. It seems to me that there might be a contradiction there. On the other hand there may be no contradiction and perhaps the matter could be clarified if you could tell me when you saw the first tank in Budapest. However you did know that there were Russian tanks in Hungary but they needed to go farther than the frontier in order to come into Budapest. It seems to me that it could be of very great significance if you could give us precise details as to the time in order that we can ascertain who could have called in the Russians and who could not have called them in. I refer again to the verbatim record: Mr. Nagy said to you: "If you care to consider at what time Hegedues and Geroe called upon the Russian commander in Cegled then you will see that the Russian troops had the time to come in". In other words he pointed out to you that the Russian troops had time to come in at the request of Hegedues and Geroe but, in his own opinion, not at his own request. Do you know at what time Hegedues and Geroe called on the Russian commander in Cegled? If you knew that the whole position might become clear and it would be of very great significance to our report if you could give us this clarification.

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): I myself saw the first Russian armoured vehicle at dawn on 24 October, approximately at 5 o'clock. It was going from Calvin Place to the Ferenc Jozsef Bridge and was standing near the bridge. Nobody was shooting from it but there were soldiers lying around near it and the Russian soldier who was standing in the opening of the armoured car did not even seem to care that there were armed men there. I saw this when, having run out of ammunition, I had been told to go in that direction to find more ammunition. This I was unable to find and it was then that I went towards the barracks where I hoped to ask the soldiers for ammunition. Exactly at 6 o'clock at Uelloei Street



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on the corner of Nepliget, at the big cross-roads --- opposite the Nepliget were the ex-Ferenc Jozsef Barracks, I do not know what they are called now under "democracy" --- I saw the first column of Russian vehicles which were then commencing to fire on people in the streets; there was absolutely no armed fighting there at the time. When we questioned Imre Nagy as to who could possibly be responsible for this, and when he asked me when I had first seen the first armoured car, I did not mention the one that I had seen standing near the Ferenc Jozsef Bridge; it had not engaged in any shooting and it did not seem important. What was important was the column of vehicles that had started to fire at the corner of Nepliget in the early morning of the 24th, about 6 o'clock. As I have said, there was a large cross-roads at Uelloei Street and Nepliget. That was the first shooting I saw; I did not know if there had been any other vehicles previous to those I had seen. I am telling you what I saw with my own eyes. Until 6 o'clock on the morning of 24 October the battles which had taken place in Pest were directed against the AVH and not against the Russians, at least in that sector in which I was fighting, but I believe that was also the case in other places. The enemy to be attacked first by armed units was the AVH. In the early hours of the 24th when the Russians intervened on the side of the AVH the population started to fight against the Russians.



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Imre Nagy was referring to this question of responsibility because in view of the Warsaw Pact Russian units had the right to be stationed in Hungary and most of these units were at Cegled. He wanted to know what time this occurred because as he was made Prime Minister between 3 and 4 o'clock he said that I who knew Hungary would understand that nobody who had been in his position for such a short time would have time to call in the Russians and give them time to organize their columns within one and a half hours -- I do not mean to call in Russian troops from outside the country but from where they were stationed within Hungary, and there would not even have been time for this. Imre Nagy therefore wanted to prove that even if we suspected he had done it, it would have been an impossibility, as Cegled is sixty kilometres from Budapest. Even if Imre Nagy had telephoned the commander at Cegled it would have been absolutely impossible within the time limit for the Russian troops to have been organized, arrive in Budapest and start a battle. An armoured car could leave Cegled at 4 o'clock, arrive in Budapest at 6 o'clock and start shooting only if it was already standing by and loaded with ammunition.

The CHAIRMAN: Were there no Russian tanks nearer to Budapest than Cegled?

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): According to my information there were Russians at Szekesfehervar in Trans-Danubia but the Commander who follows me as a witness will be able to give you more information about this. These units in Trans-Danubia were presumably the ones that came in and I saw one of them on the Pest side of the Ferencz Jozsef Bridge as they were coming from Buda. When I saw the tank I immediately lay down on the floor as I was frightened that they would shoot. It was at that point that the people next to me said "Do not worry, they are not shooting, they have been here an hour and a half." When we take into account the fact that this episode happened at 5 o'clock -- when I saw the armoured car by the bridge -- that particular vehicle must have been there since 3.30. This is additional proof that Nagy could not have called them because even if the vehicles were prepared and standing by it would have been impossible for them to get to Budapest from Szekesfehervar in one hour.

Istvan Piros, who was the Minister of the Interior, knew beforehand that the university students wanted to organize a demonstration in front of the Bem Statue on 23 October and it was only after discussing it with Geroe and Hegedues that it was authorized. Therefore, it is only they who could have taken these measures. It



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is absolutely certain that Geroe and Hegedues at the time they were authorizing the demonstration had already made the necessary security arrangements and had had discussions with the Russian command at Cegled. According to the refugees that were coming from the direction of Cegled and Pesterzsebet by the afternoon of the 23rd the Russian troops in Cegled were fully mobilized and ready to move. Therefore, after the first sound of gunfire was heard and after receiving a telephone message they came to Budapest. This could only have been done by Geroe and Hegedues who were legally at the head of the Hungarian Government at that time and not Imre Nagy.

As to the second part of the question, namely, the calling of Russian troops into the territory of Hungary, I am sure the Committee have already heard that by 28 October Russian prisoners had been arrested who were found to have Romanian money on them. They even operated on such prisoners in the Verebely Clinic and we questioned such prisoners. Therefore, we came to the conclusion that these units came from Romania and must have started to leave there on the 22nd or the 23rd and this also proves that preparations were made before the start of the revolution. By the 22nd and the 23rd, during the first demonstrations by the youth, the Russians were already preparing to intervene with armed forces and this is what I have tried to prove by telling you about the Russian prisoners who had Romanian money in their possession.

As to the question that Hegedues and Geroe went to Cegled, I cannot answer about that. Perhaps there might be a misunderstanding here because what I said was that it was only Hegedues and Geroe who could give information as to how the Russian troops could reach Budapest from Cegled so quickly and commence fighting. Geroe could not have been in Cegled because he made his famous speech in Budapest, but he must have been dealing with the Russians by telephone or by some other means of communication.

The CHAIRMAN: In my opinion your explanation is satisfactory but I have another question. In your statement you mentioned a memorandum which Mr. Imre Nagy had asked you and some of your colleagues to write down and deliver in Vienna to the representatives of the "great Powers" -- I think that was your expression. It is not clear to me what kind of memorandum that is. Has that been published or sent to the United Nations?



Mr. VAREFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): One or two minutes before going to the Yugoslav Legation Imre Nagy was in touch with us by telephone. He trusted us as we were one of his main points of defence -- the south Budapest area was the last to give in. He said to us that the will of the Hungarian people and all those circumstances which were the reasons for the Government's actions, and which were described by him in his radio speech, should all be put in one memorandum and that this, the last will of the legitimate Government of Hungary, should be forwarded to the free nations.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not know what that memorandum is about. I have asked the Rapporteur and he does not know either. We would like to know what kind of memorandum it is, whether it has been published and sent to the United Nations, or where we can find a copy of it so we can see the contents for ourselves.

Mr. VAREFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): This memorandum was written by us when we were still in Budapest and when we were surrounded.

The CHAIRMAN: We appreciate that but would you answer my question?

Mr. VAREFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): On 26 November we gave it to a Mr. Steven Z. Zagorski, an attache, at the American Embassy in Vienna. On 22 November we gave it to Mr. Tennison of the United Kingdom Embassy. On the same date to Mr. Fucher, a counsellor at the French Embassy. On the 28th to the Ambassador of Cuba in Vienna, personally. A few days later to the Minister of Italy in Vienna. We also handed it over to the West German Government through their legation in Vienna. All the three great Powers, as well as all the other legations, answered that this memorandum would be immediately forwarded to their governments, which we understand did happen.

At the beginning of December this memorandum was taken personally by Anna Kethly who said that she would bring it to the attention of the United Nations and this according to my information was done. The memorandum itself has not been given officially to the United Nations Organization because it was addressed to Member States. The memorandum was published in the Italian press and an original copy of this was given by me to the Committee -- I believe, to the Secretariat.



The CHAIRMAN: That memorandum, as far as I understand now, does not contain anything but what Anna Kethly and you have stated already in your explanations.

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): The memorandum could not contain anything else because it represented really the will of the Hungarian people and our testimony conformed to the truth. We wanted to bring this to the attention of the great Powers, asking that they request the United Nations to intervene effectively in this question.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): Did you know Mr. Nagy before the events of 23 October?

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): I personally did not know Prime Minister Imre Nagy before the events of 23 October, before his first Premiership. After that I was in prison the whole time so that I knew his face only from newspapers, and my immediate contact with him was when I spoke to him on 26 October.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): Did you know Miss Anna Kethly before the events of 23 October?

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): I knew her by sight. I had no immediate personal contact with her.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): When referring to the last hours of 24 October you spoke of Mr. Nagy's declaration. Was that statement made by telephone? Did he address himself directly to you, or was that statement something which you heard from others who in turn had heard it directly? The statement to which I am referring is the one made by Mr. Nagy just before he fled to the Yugoslav Legation. You have told us about a message by Mr. Nagy from the Yugoslav Legation as being his last communication with you.



Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): That statement of Imre Nagy was made at about 6 a.m. on 4 November, and it came about in this way. Prime Minister Imre Nagy, with whom we were in continuous contact all night, called us up on the telephone. I myself lifted the receiver but there was also another instrument switched in so that at least two of us could hear what was going on. This last political will of Imre Nagy I myself heard with my own ears, Imre Nagy spoke to me directly; Istvan Cigany was at the other receiver and he too heard it with his own ears. A freedom fighter from Pesterzsebet, Tibor Legat, was also there. They were there to ask for instructions about what to do because the Russians were there. Tibor Legat heard the statement also when I hung up the receiver. In the first moments we thought it was an important question, so that two people heard the statement directly with their own ears and a third person heard it immediately after the receiver had been hung up. Also, according to my knowledge, Imre Nagy had this political will sent to other people.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): I notice, in the statement as reported to us, the following sentence which is attributed to Imre Nagy, "They have abducted the Prime Minister of a country which is a member of the United Nations." As far as I know, when Imre Nagy was speaking he had not yet been abducted by the Russians, it was a few minutes later that he took refuge in the Yugoslav Legation; and it was only much later, when he left the Yugoslav Legation, that he was taken by we still do not know whom. I therefore do not understand this sentence, "They have abducted the Prime Minister of a country which is a member of the United Nations." How could he know at the time that he would be abducted?

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): There may be some misunderstanding. He was speaking of abduction, not of resignation. I will quote three sentences from what he said, because I wrote them down at the time as I thought them so important. He spoke the following sentences, and I read this during my last testimony, but there may have been perhaps a misunderstanding somewhere — "This battle is the freedom fight of the Hungarian people against Russian intervention. It is possible that I can stay in my place for only one or two more hours, and the whole world will have to see how armed might is crushing the resistance of a people who desire only freedom — and this is where there may have been a mistake — and how they are abducting the legal Government of a member State of the United Nations from the capital of the country. In the last moments I ask you, the chief leaders



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of the revolution, to leave the country. What I said in my radio broadcast on what we agreed during the various parliamentary discussions with the representatives of the national revolution -- all this put into a memorandum and with it turn for help to all the peoples of the world. Explain that today it is Hungary; tomorrow or the day after tomorrow it will be the turn of the other countries because the imperialism of Moscow knows no bounds, it is only trying to gain time. Anna Kethly, Hungary's only Minister in security, should continue to represent our country. Help her in her work. To her personally I wish to send a separate message, namely that the positions of 31 October have been passed. Tell her what led us to declare our neutrality at the most hopeless time, and that in the present circumstances that is the only road that we can tread," those were Imre Nagy's last words. A few moments afterwards he fled to the Yugoslav Legation.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): You said that, during the last night of 3-4 November when you received information about the movements of Soviet troops and communicated it to Imre Nagy, you yourself received the information from the Home Guard who got it from their observers and communicated it also to the Ministry of Defence. Can you tell us why the Home Guard were giving you these messages when they were already forwarding them to the Ministry of Defence? Why were the messages given to you? Was it in order that you should transmit them to Imre Nagy?



Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): The commander told me immediately about reports coming into the Home Guard from the military observers because at seven o'clock in the evening instructions came from Parliament to report Soviet movements at once to Imre Nagy in the Parliament building. Since the commander-in-chief of the Home Guard could not speak directly with the Parliament building, the instructions from Parliament were received by me and I forwarded them to him and the report was made in the same way. At the same time they continued to submit ordinary military reports.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): On what date did you leave Hungary?

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): I left south Budapest on 11 November and on 12 November I crossed the Austro-Hungarian border. I fled with other members of the south Budapest Revolutionary Council.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): When we interrupted our discussion with you in Rome I told you that I would like to put a few questions as to the intervention of a foreign force in the battles in the streets of Budapest and Hungary in general. This afternoon you have clarified a great many of the points I wish to raise consequently I will not spend time on questions to which you have already replied in a very satisfactory manner. I would however like to ask you if you can tell us very concisely at what moment, in what circumstances and exactly how you obtained proof of the intervention of foreign troops — that is to say Soviet troops — for the purpose of crushing the Hungarian revolution.

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): Through the shameful Warsaw Pact the Soviet Union tried to bind to itself the satellite States. One of the basic demands of the Hungarian revolution which the Hungarian Government did in fact wish to carry into effect was the renunciation of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union, through its observers, could see that the nation was united in demanding the renunciation of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. It was obvious



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that this was not the demand of one group, one plant or one industry but of the whole population. They realized immediately that renunciation of the Warsaw Pact and withdrawal of the Russian troops from Hungary would mean that never again would Hungary be prepared to serve the ends of Russian policy and Russian might. It was also clear that Rakosi and his comrades had lied about the strength of the Hungarian Communist Party and told them that this was much stronger than in fact it was, because the Soviet observers could see for themselves that in Hungary communism had so few supporters that in the event of free elections any government that might be formed would not maintain close contact with the Soviet Union. They also saw that Hungary wished to be neutral and to live on a basis of friendship with all countries and it was this wish for neutrality that was the greatest setback to Russian ambition because if we look at the map we can see that if Hungary became a neutral State it would form with Austria a finger pointing deep into the Communist countries and would divide Yugoslavia from the Soviet route from the north, which would have a great deal of influence on future Yugoslav policy.

The principal reason however for the Soviet Union's unwillingness to agree to a neutral Hungary was that Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, seeing that it was possible to win freedom, would without doubt sooner or later, as evidenced by the movement in Poland, seek their freedom in the same way. If Russia made concessions at one point it would automatically lose all the satellite countries including Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, which would mean the defeat of the Soviet ambition to rule the world. I have spoken to some of the more intelligent Russian soldiers who said when they were questioned that they had come to Hungary because the Fascists there wanted to get power for themselves in order to join the West in annihilating the Soviet Union.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): You say you spoke to Russian soldiers and I would like to ask you when these conversations took place -- was it before or during the revolution? Could you tell us briefly at what moment and because of what facts you gained the conviction that Russians were fighting against the Hungarian workers and the Hungarian peasants in the streets.



Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): I spoke to Russian soldiers even before I was in prison, and unfortunately there were many of them in Hungary. Later, when I came out of prison, I also spoke to Russian soldiers and in the days immediately after the revolution I noticed a material difference in the kind of Russian I spoke to. I spoke to Russians who had been captured and to Russian soldiers who had voluntarily joined the side of the freedom fighters. Those who had been captured and whom I questioned officially could have been motivated in their answers by a certain fear and I took this into account. Among these there were only one or two who knew they were in Hungary; many thought they were at the Suez Canal or elsewhere. Those who joined the Hungarian side voluntarily provide evidence that is more reliable because they spoke without fear. Their own position was hopeless and they joined the Hungarian people whose position was equally hopeless as against Bolshevik might. They came in with the Russian troops and when I asked one of them why as a soldier he had deserted, thus laying himself open to immediate execution, why he had joined us Fascists, us counter-revolutionaries, to fight with us against the Russians he said it was because he had seen that the whole Hungarian nation including the peasants, the youth, the old men and the women, was united against the Russians and the AVH. I asked how he had realized this and he said that the Russian soldiers at Soroksar were not even given a glass of water or a piece of bread or potato by the Hungarian people, who regarded them with hatred. He said that he too had a wife, children and a family and he had realized that the Hungarian people were completely united against them, the Russians.



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At the same time, he said, "When we captured prisoners I could see that many of them were workers and students, and there were no Fascists." He said he liked the way that we spoke freely, saying what we thought, and talking of things they could not speak about in Russia. This one was a teacher and a very intelligent man. There was another Russian who was a simple man and his remarks were the more striking for that. He said that at home in Russia everything was done on orders but here we did as we wished. He said he would like to do as he wished, and not only what he was ordered to do. The answers and the remarks of these Russian soldiers are perhaps the most striking example to illustrate why the Russians are calling the Hungarian revolution a counter-revolution, and why the Russian individual comes to his senses when he sees freedom in action. That is why the Soviet Union was so much afraid Hungary might be liberated. It was not the uranium mines, nor the liberty of the nine million people of Hungary that was the cause for concern, but that the Russian people in chains should see the Hungarian people liberate themselves; this would spread inside the Soviet Union and must lead sooner or later to the crumbling of the Soviet empire.

According to my humble opinion, if I may express it here, the events from 20 October to the first days of November, that is, the events of the revolution in Hungary will be remembered by the world for thousands of years as the time of the first crack in Soviet prestige, in their collection of nations into a machinery which casts a shadow ahead of it. It carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction, as did Hitler's Germany, and as soon as people have the opportunity for self-determination, the Soviet empire will crumble of its own accord.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): On what day did you see Soviet troops fighting against the people of Hungary in the streets of Budapest?

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): The first occasion was 24 October at six o'clock in the morning, at Uelloei Street where the bridge crosses and Nepliget is on one side and the barracks on the other. Here I saw armoured cars and Russian troops actually firing and fighting against the Hungarians. It was all the more serious because there were no battles going on at the time, and the Soviet armoured cars opened fire without any previous warning.



Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): In the last part of your statement before us in Rome you asked the Committee to request the United Nations to take action to arrest the trials and accelerated police trials in Hungary. Have you gained any further information since you last spoke to the Committee in Rome about these trials or any other executions? Would you repeat the same request as to the action we should take to try to retard these trials?

Mr. VARWALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): As soon as the Committee left Rome I went to Trieste for a few days, since new refugees are arriving there from Yugoslavia and I felt it my duty to gather new information about the base acts of Kadar's Government and the Soviet Union. I heard of three more death sentences that had been carried out, but since I was not prepared for this question today, I do not know the names. I can give you tomorrow the names of those who were executed. I should like the Committee to hear Istvan Cigany as a witness because he can tell the Committee much about these accelerated trials and executions. One of the main reasons for these events is to make living witnesses disappear, and to get them out of the way. A second reason is to frighten the people, and when the witnesses disappear and the people are frightened into passivity, this passivity can be used to throw dust again into the eyes of the world. It is the most earnest desire of every Hungarian emigrant -- and my own most fervent desire which I repeat in my own name and in the name of all my comrades, with great respect -- that this Committee should make some proposal in defence of basic human rights to the Secretary-General of the United Nations so that the United Nations should try to stop these accelerated trials and executions in Hungary until the justice of the Hungarian revolution is determined before the world.

I should like to call the attention of the delegate of Uruguay -- since he is, perhaps, the one who has had most to do with human rights among the Committee members and has written about that subject -- to the tremendous danger it means for the whole world if the world stands by doing nothing while the most fundamental laws and constitutions and human rights are crushed in this manner. What security can any nation have? If this is possible here today, it is possible there tomorrow, and the consequence is anarchy. With respect, I should like to repeat my request



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that this Committee should do whatever it can to stop the accelerated trials and executions in Hungary.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to ask you to give us all the information you have at your disposal, and the names of the people who have been executed since this Committee met in Rome. I am sure this Committee will do whatever it can. I should like to thank you also for the words you addressed to me as the representative of my country in regard to what I have done in defence of the rights of man.

In your answer to certain questions put by the representatives of Australia and Tunisia, you said the Russians were using Kadar "who is an old Muscovite" for their own ends. What does the expression "old Muscovite" mean, in your opinion? Please try to give us an objective answer. Why do you speak of Kadar as "an old Muscovite"? For my part I can guess why but I should like to have you tell us as objectively as possible.



Mr. VARTALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): In Hungary the name "Muscovite" came into being at the time of the death of Stalin. Many of the old Communists who were preaching and practising Communism illegally during the time of Horthy were in, or had come from Moscow and knew Communism merely as an idea on paper, yet they fought for it according to their convictions. These men called the situation existing in Hungary a "Muscovite situation" and by doing so they wished to emphasize that the Communism of which they considered themselves members was not that order of terror and dictatorship which ruled in and from Moscow. When I talked with old Communists they declared that never in their lives would they have lifted a finger for the type of Communism which exists today. I should like to remind the Committee of Pal Kelemen who was the Party secretary of the chain and cable factory, and who was the leader of the factory council, on the night of the 23rd when the fighting started shouted: "Come on, everybody!" I said to him very sarcastically: "You are supposed to be a Communist" to which he replied: "Yes, I am a Communist but I am not a Muscovite". The same expression was used by Imre Nagy on 26 October when he said: "Gentlemen, I am a Communist but not a Muscovite". He went on to say that the social achievements which he held to be most important, namely the nationalization of the large industries and the distribution of land were what he stood for but that he was against the monolithic dictatorial policy which was issued from above and which characterized the Rakosi regime. Imre Nagy and the other old Communists held to the principle that Communism should be supported from below by all classes of society and that its aims and policies should be supported by the people. However a contrary state of affairs existed whereby orders were imposed from above. In Hungary there were two kinds of Communists: those who held to the Marxist ideology by conviction and those who acted purely as the servants of Moscow. For instance on one day Rajk was a traitor and on the next he was a national hero. Kadar was also a "Muscovite" but did not appear to be one at first and that was why, under the Rakosi regime, he was thrown into prison. Thus, during the first days of the revolution the leading revolutionaries were willing to talk to Kadar; he had been present at the time of the Declaration of Neutrality and despite the fact that he had approved of it he started to negotiate with the Soviet Union. From then onwards any relationship between him and the Hungarian people ceased. It is for that reason that Kadar is hated bitterly by the Hungarian people in the same way in which they hated Rakosi because the people, and the Communists, could see that it was not a question of adherence to Communist ideology but accepting orders from Moscow which had to be obeyed. Those who did not obey them were put out of the way, imprisoned or executed.



Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): I recall that in your last statement you quoted some poetry by the poet Lajos Kossuth in which he said that the faith God gave him was capable of bringing the dead back to life. You then quoted some other poetry which was to the effect that people should act without fear. Could you repeat those words for us now for the cause of Hungary. I hope you have the same feeling for them as I do. They are words which are close to my heart as someone who is interested in human rights.

Mr. FARVALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): I finished my last statement with the words of Lajos Kossuth who represents the ideal of freedom for Hungary. Kossuth in one of his speeches said the following: "I feel that God gave into my hands a musical instrument with which I might awaken the dead." Allow me to give some explanation of those words, which were so important to the Hungarian people. Lehel, who was one of the seven original leaders of Hungary, used an instrument called a tarogato, which was something akin to the trumpet of Gabriel, the sound of which could awaken the dead. With those words Kossuth aroused the people of my country. I myself am indeed a small figure in the world, but the conscience of the world is so deeply asleep that it cannot be awoken now and it is just for that reason that I quote the words of another poet, Laszlo Mecs, who is also a priest. He said: "You carefree people, you who sleep without fear, our fate will be your fate!" Laszlo Mecs was imprisoned and it was through the bars of his prison that he felt that an unconquerable force can triumph in the cause of human rights.

I should like to ask the representative of Uruguay if he would allow me to present him with the original text of this poem by Mecs.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): I would like to thank you very much for the kind attention you have paid to my questions. I am very grateful to you.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to add the gratitude of the Committee to that of the representative of Uruguay and to thank you for your excellent statement.

Mr. VARFALVI (interpretation from Hungarian): May I be permitted to thank the Chairman and each and every member of the Committee for the warm words of appreciation which they have spoken. I also thank the representative of Australia who said that it was a pleasure to question me, and the representatives of Tunisia



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and Uruguay for the deep and sincere interest they have shown in the fate of my poor country. It is my belief and my hope that the work of the Committee will prove to be a more decisive step in the right direction than many people think today. May I be allowed to hand to you an official book which pertains to the facts of the Rajk and other political trials in which the defence **lawyers** supposedly acted in the interests of their clients; this should be of interest to those who concern themselves with human rights. May I please make a proposal to the Committee that when the report on the Hungarian question is made to the General Assembly it should be published for the whole world to see. It might also be of interest if in the report a simple Hungarian worker, a simple Hungarian peasant and a simple Hungarian student should be quoted so that the whole world could see and hear from two or three witnesses what has been happening in Hungary. Thus the tarogato of which Kossuth spoke might succeed in arousing people's interest in the fate of my country. I would like to thank you very much for having heard me.

Mr. Varfalvi withdrew.



The CHAIRMAN: I now call upon the Rapporteur.

Mr. SHANN (Rapporteur): I would just like to say a few words about the report. I had the opportunity this morning of a profitable discussion with Mr. Jordan and the Legal Officer and what I am suggesting to the Committee, if they regard this as appropriate, is that on Monday next we should have a general discussion about the report on the basis of document 12 which I hope the Secretariat before then will be able to give to the representatives of Tunisia and Uruguay in French and in Spanish. As a result of that discussion I am suggesting that document 12 should then be expanded considerably to take into account the views that are expressed on Monday by the delegations here and to show in greater detail what may come under the seventeen chapter headings in document 12.

That work would take a day or two after Monday and then, on Wednesday or Thursday, a larger edition of document 12 would be circulated to members of the Committee so that we can proceed to a more precise and detailed discussion of the outlines of the report. Armed with the views of the members of the Committee after they have had the opportunity of discussing this expanded and larger document I would then go away with the Secretariat to New York and prepare a bigger document which would be the draft of the final report of the Committee.

In addition to that there will be some other documents circulated including an index of documentation, and so on, which it is hoped will be of assistance to the delegations on the Committee in their consideration of the report.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to thank the Rapporteur for this information. Are there any remarks to be addressed to the Rapporteur?

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): I would like to join the Chairman in the thanks he has expressed to the Rapporteur. I would like to thank him personally and say that I have appreciated his words. I always have a very great feeling for the Rapporteur.

As to the more concrete formation of our views in connexion with the report I think that it is very suitable that the Rapporteur should go to New York to continue to examine the work on the report in more detail. I would like to say that I am in complete accord with the Rapporteur and I join in the expression of thanks by the Chairman.



Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I am also in complete accord with this proposal and I thank the Rapporteur.

The CHAIRMAN: We have now agreed on our procedure. The meeting stands adjourned until tomorrow at 3 p.m.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.