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PARTY AND STATE (XII)

Moscow and the Moslems

One of the most meaningful indicators of the manner in which centralized leadership by the CPSU was maintained over the Republic Parties in the final phase of the Stalin era was the assignment of Russians to the posts of second secretary in nearly all Central Committee secretariats in which the leading post had been allotted to a representative of the local nationality. At the time of the XIX Party Congress (October 1952) the only exceptions to this rule were Armenia and Georgia, where the first secretaries apparently enjoyed special favors from their most famous Caucasian compatriot; in the Baltic regions, as well as in Central Asia, the rule was rigidly observed; in the Western Republics, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Moldavia, (and Karelo-Finland) non-Russians had not yet been permitted to aspire to either the post of first or second secretary. Since Stalin's death, however, there has been a marked change of cadre policy in the European regions and the secretariats of all the Central Committees - except Moldavia¹ - are now composed almost entirely of native Communists. In the Caucasus, after the purge of Beria's cohorts, however, the special privilege held by Georgia was withdrawn and the politruk V.P. Mzhavanadze, despite his war time association with Khrushchev in the Ukraine, was assigned a Russian second secretary in August 1956.² In Azerbaidzhan where, even under Bagirov, the second secretary had been Russian, this policy has continued, leaving Armenia the sole Transcaucasian Republic in which an all-national secretariat remains.³ In the Central Asiatic Republics, a predominantly Moslem area, the adherence to the Stalinist principle of maintaining a watchdog in the secretariat has been continued and even extended to the replacement of the native Kazakh first secretary by 4 successive Russians.

¹Headed by Z. Serdyuk, a member of Khrushchev's Ukrainian apparat.

²P.V. Kovanov, previously a deputy Chief of the CC Department for Agit-Prop. It is interesting to note that Mzhavanadze has not been mentioned in the Georgian press for more than a month, being absent at the meeting of the Tbilisi Party Aktiv and not listed at the ceremonies in connection with Voroshilov's visit to the Caucasus in July.

³The first secretary, S. Tovmasyan, although in attendance at the Lenin Award celebrations for Armenia, on July 18, was not listed as present at the 30 July plenum which discussed selection and distribution of cadres.

The replacements of these first secretaries in the Central Asian⁴ Parties since 1952 have tended to obscure the fact that the second secretaries have generally been unaffected by the charges of inefficiency levelled against their nominal superiors. In tabular form the shifts can be summarized as follows:

	Year	1st secretary	2nd. secretary
Kazakhstan	1952	<u>Shayakhmetov, Zh.</u>	Afonov, I.I.
	1954	<u>Ponomarenko, P.N.</u>	Brezhnev, L.D.
	1955	Brezhnev, L.D.	Yakovlev, I.D.
	1956	Yakovlev, I.D.	Zhurin, N.I.
	1957	Belyaev, N.I.	<u>Karibzhanov, F.K.</u>
Kirghizia	1952	<u>Razzakov, I.R.</u>	Churkin, V.N. ⁺
	1958		Stepkin, V.F. ⁺⁺
Tadzhikistan	1952	<u>Gafurov, B.G.</u>	Obnosov, B.N.
	1956	<u>Uldzhabayev, T.</u>	
Turkmenistan	1952	Babayev, S.	Sennikov, A.
	1954		Grishayenkov, F.A.
	1958	<u>Karayev, D.D.</u>	
Uzbekistan	1952	<u>Nyazov, A.I.</u>	Melnikov, R.Ye.
	1955	<u>Mukhitdinov, N.</u>	
	1957	<u>Kamalov, S.</u>	
	1959	<u>Rashidov, S.</u>	

Underlined are representatives of the Moslem nationality groups.

⁺Appointed Chairman Kirghiz Sovnarkhoz.

⁺⁺Formerly First Deputy Chairman, Kirghiz Council of Ministers.

Most striking is the frequency of replacement in Kazakhstan where a series of Moscow procounsuls, running from P. Ponomarenko (1954) to N. Belyaev (1957), have kept the highest Party post beyond the reach of the native Kazakh communists who, except for Zh. Shayakhmetov from 1945-54, have never been permitted to "rule" their own territory. As a concession to the predominant nationality group, since December 1957, the post of second secretary has now been allotted to a Kazakh functionary, F.K. Karibzhanov. Just the opposite phenomena can be observed in Uzbekistan where a succession of natives has maintained the tradition of holding the top post while a single Russian, R.Ye. Melnikov, has continued to serve as second secretary. Since the removal of S. Babaev, as first secretary of the Turkmen CC, there has been no attempt to conceal the fact that one of the major sins committed even by the apparatchiki of the Stalin era was their inability to resist or suppress "the tendency which counterposed the cadres of native nationality to those of other nationalities."⁵ From the discredited secretary's article in Partinaya Zhizn (December 1957) the exact measure of his deviation can be derived: in 1952 native Turkmenians occupied 50% of the leading cadre positions in the Republic; in

⁴The sole holdover is I.R. Razzakov in Kirghizia; see Background Information, "Party and State (X)", 14 July 1959.

⁵Kommunist Turkmenistana, February 1959; see also Background Information, "The Purge in Turkmenia" April 29, 1959.

1957, this proportion had risen to 70%. No doubt, this veteran functionary, from 1945-52 Chairman of the Turkmen Council of Ministers and from 1952-1958 first secretary of the Turkmen CC, was one of the "certain comrades (who)...wrongly interpreted" the expansion of the rights of republics by taking this to mean a genuine transfer of authority and the implementation of a personnel policy in which "in some places there appeared a tendency of opposing the cadres of the native nationality to the cadres of other nationalities."⁶

The use of exactly the same formulation by B. Gafurov, a contemporary of Babaev, who is now training Moslem cadres in Moscow,⁷ in the Turkmen journal is not a mere coincidence, but the expression of the current Leninist nationality policy, as interpreted by N.S. Khrushchev. Its most recent formulation can be found in a long theoretical article on the nationality problem:

"In Soviet socialist society the social base of nationalism and chauvinism has been liquidated. But certain nationality vestiges are still maintained in the consciousness of certain backward people. The forms of the appearance of these manifestations are varied. In the economic field they are expressed in localist tendencies which inflict harm on all national interests...In the selection and placement of cadres they are expressed in the counterposing of cadres of one nationality to another. Such acts, for example, took place in the Turkmen SSR where the former secretaries, comrades Babayev and Durdyeva grossly ignored the Bolshevik principles of selection and promotion of cadres and treated with disdain cadres of other nationalities. The Party organization has sharply condemned these and other violations of the Leninist principles by the above persons and severely punished them."⁸

These statements concerning cadre difficulties in the Central Asian republics are proof that the development of new Communist national cadres by Stalin has not solved the dilemma of colonial rule now faced by the Soviets under Khrushchev.⁹ Nor is it likely, that periodic purges, even as extensive as that recently conducted in the Turkmen Republic will permanently suppress the aspirations for genuine autonomy in Soviet Asia. The new leader of the Soviet Party State has already found some of the Stalinist stalwarts wanting in their allegiance to Moscow; subsequent changes will demonstrate whether Khrushchev's own selections have been more successful in reconciling Moscow's needs and native desires.

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⁶B. Gafurov, The Construction of Socialism and the Nationality Question, in "Questions of the Construction of Socialism in the USSR, USSR Academy of Science, Moscow, 1959, p. 94, quoted from Radio Liberation Daily Information Bulletin, 31 July 1959.

⁷Director of the Institute for Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences since his transfer from the post of 1st secretary of the Tadzhik CC in 1956.

⁸I.P. Tsameryan, The Development of National Relationships in the Period of Expanded Construction of Communism, Voprosy Filosofii, No. 17, 1959, p. 45.

⁹See discussion below, pp. 3-13.

THE SECOND SECRETARIES

CHURKIN, Vasili Nesterovich. Party and government official; second secretary and Bureau member, CC, Kirgiz CP; member CP, since 1931.

In March 1950 as first secretary, North Ossetian Oblast Party Committee, elected deputy, USSR Supreme Soviet; elected member, CC, Kirgiz CP, at Seventh Congress, Feb. 1954 (re-elected Eighth Congress, Jan. 1956); elected second secretary and Bureau member, CC, Kirgiz CP, at CC plenum after Seventh Congress (re-elected at CC plenum after Eighth Congress); re-elected deputy, USSR Supreme Soviet, 1954; elected deputy; Kirgiz Supreme Soviet, March 1956, and thereupon Presidium member, Kirgiz Supreme Soviet; voting delegate, 20th Congress of CPSU, Feb. 1956; appointed member, Economic Commission, Council of Nationalities, USSR Supreme Soviet, Feb. 1957; Order of Lenin.

(Source: Biographic Directory of the USSR, Scarecrow Press, New York, 1958).

GRISHAENKOV, Fedor Arkhipovich. Party official; second secretary and Bureau member, CC, Turkmen CP; member CP since 1941.

Born in 1914. In 1952 second secretary and Bureau member, CC, Turkmen CP; reelected member, CC, Turkmen CP, at 12th and 13th Congresses, Feb. 1954 and Jan. 1956; reelected second secretary and Bureau member, CC, Turkmen CP, at CC plenums after 12th and 13th Congresses; elected deputy, USSR Supreme Soviet, 1954; elected deputy, Turkmen Supreme Soviet, 1955; voting delegate, 20th Congress of CPSU, Feb. 1956; 1958, member of the Commission for Legislative Proposals of the Council of Nationalities, USSR Supreme Soviet.

(Source: Biographic Directory of the USSR, Scarecrow Press, New Yor, 1958)

MELNIKOV, Roman Yefimovich. Party official; second secretary and Bureau member, CC, Uzbek CP; candidate member, CC, CPSU; member, CP, since 1928.

As secretary and Bureau member, CC, Uzbek CP, elected deputy, USSR Supreme Soviet, March 1950; from 1952 second secretary, CC, Uzbek CP; elected candidate member, CC, CPSU, at 19th Congress, Oct. 1952 (reelected 20th Congress, Feb. 1956); reelected member, CC, Uzbek CP, at 12th and 13th Congresses, Feb. 1954 and Jan. 1956; reelected second secretary and Bureau member, CC, Uzbek CP, at CC plenums after 12th and 13th Congresses; reelected deputy USSR Supreme Soviet, March 1954, and thereupon member, Budget Commission, Council of the Union; elected deputy, Uzbek Supreme Soviet, Feb. 1955, and thereupon its Presidium member; voting delegate, 20th Congress of CPSU; 1958 member of the Commission for Legislative Proposals Council of the Union, Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

OBNO SOV, Petr Stepanovich. Party official; second secretary and Bureau member, CC, Tadzhik CP; member, CP, since 1932.

In 1949 first secretary, Leninabad Oblast Party Committee (in Tadzhikistan); elected deputy, USSR Supreme Soviet, 1950 and 1954; elected member, CC, Tadzhik CP, at Eighth Congress, 1952 (reelected Ninth and Tenth Congresses, Jan. Feb. 1954 and Jan. 1956); elected second secretary and Bureau member, CC, Tadzhik CP, at CC plenum after Eighth Congress (reelected after Ninth and Tenth Congresses); voting delegate, 20th Congress of CPSU, Feb. 1956; criticized selection of Party personnel at plenum of CC, Tadzhik CP, fall 1957; Order of Red Banner of labor; 1958 member of the Economic Commission of the Council of Nationalities, Supreme Soviet USSR.

(Source: Biographic Directory of the USSR, Scarecrow Press, New York, 1958)

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THE MOSLEM INTELLIGENTSIA IN THE USSR

Central Asia Comes of Age

By A. Bennigsen
Soviet Survey
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For nearly forty years the Soviet purpose in the Moslem territories of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle Volga has been to integrate the national élites into the socialist system. What the communists desire is a total integration - political, intellectual, and spiritual; and this involves destroying the old pre-revolutionary Moslem élite and creating in its place a new intelligentsia of Marxist formation, detached from Islam and exclusively devoted to the Soviet regime.

The relation between Russians and the non-Russian peoples is one of the key problems of the Soviet Union, and its solution undoubtedly depends upon the success or failure of the Moslem experiment. Although reliable documentation is scarce, we have collected in this article some information which throws light on the experiment, about which too little is known in the West.

The traditional Moslem intelligentsia

In the Moslem lands of Russia before 1917 there was a large and often brilliant national intelligentsia, whether of the old traditional type (in Turkestan and Daghestan) or Westernised (the modernist djadids of Kazan, Baku, and the Crimea); and this intelligentsia played a most important role both culturally and in the Moslem national movements at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. Today there remain only a few scattered remnants of this generation, which was destroyed in the terrible period from 1928 to 1938.

The old religious élite is now represented by a very small group, which is not, however, negligible, because it is the sole repository within the Soviet borders of the traditional Islamic culture. It includes the officiating personnel of the Moslem cult, organised from the four religious centres of Tashkent, Baku, Ufa, and Buynaksk. Their precise number is unknown, but it must certainly be small. A Soviet estimate of 1942-3 gave the number of 'mullahs' as 8,000, but there is reason to believe that this figure is too high.

Most of them belong to the older generation and only a very few of them are young, because there is only one madrasseh in the whole USSR from which they can be recruited. The Mir-i-Arab at Bukhara was opened in 1949, to be closed in 1957 and replaced by the Barak Khan at Tashkent. The Bukhara madrasseh in 1956 had 105 students taking the seven-year course of medium-grade classical Moslem studies. Only a small proportion of them (five in 1955) go on to higher studies at the university of Al-Azhar.

This tiny nucleus of mullahs is, therefore, the sole group of traditional Moslem intellectuals in the service of a population of some thirty million.¹ They appear to be recruited solely from the dispossessed classes - clergy, aristocracy, or bourgeoisie - and they play no part at all in the country's social, cultural, and political life, since Soviet society allows only a marginal existence to religious personnel. Their activity is strictly confined to their religious function and their flocks consist, with few exceptions, of the old. There are no Moslem 'religious' publications in the USSR;² but the Mufti of Tashkent, Ziautdinov Babo-Khanov, however, is exceptional in enjoying a certain political influence.

The Sovietised intelligentsia

The word 'intelligentsia' is understood in the Soviet Union in a very wide sense. It includes almost everyone who is not a manual worker or peasant. Thus the 'kolkhoz intelligentsia' includes not only chairmen and book-keepers but also foremen and sometimes even 'tractor operatives.' But in this study we shall use the word only for the higher-educated class. This Moslem Soviet intelligentsia has several characteristics in common with the Russian intelligentsia and in distinction from those of other Moslem countries. The three most important are:

1. Its quantitative and qualitative importance in the life of the Moslem populations of the USSR. Whereas the intelligentsias of other Middle Eastern countries, except Turkey, are only a thin social stratum, the intellectual élite of the Moslem Republics in Russia is a numerically large social class. It has a very wide field of recruitment provided by the higher and secondary technical schools which are the product of the Soviet regime's titanic effort in the sphere of public education. In Uzbekistan, for example, with a total population in 1956 of 7,300,000, there were in 1958 no less than 31 institutes, of higher education with 78,300 students and 99 technical schools with 57,900.³

2. And yet the communist authorities consider it too large and are scandalised by the continued attendance at Koran schools. S. Babaev, first secretary of the CC of the Turkmen CP, declared at its 4th Plenum (25-26 February 1957): 'Only the low level of our anti-religious propaganda can account for the attendance at Moslem religious establishments of certain young graduates from Soviet schools.'
3. The only Moslem religious works published since 1925 have been: the Koran, issued for the first time since 1917 at Tashkent in 1955-6 by the Central Asian Religious Board; a religious calendar, Dini Kalindary, issued in Uzbek language in an edition of 10,000 by the same board at Tashkent; and a catechism, Islam and the Moslem rite, a little manual of 69 pages printed in Arabic, in the Tartar language, at Ufa.
4. R. Gulamov, Under the Leninist Flag of Friendship between Peoples (Kommunist, No. 15, 1958).

Of course these figures include a large number of Russians. In 1940 the proportion of Moslems in the University of Central Asia in Tashkent was only 32.5%.⁴ But the percentage of Russians is continually falling while that of the young national cadres increases.

2. Its 'youthfulness.' The overwhelming majority of the Moslem intellectuals belong to the post-revolutionary generation, and graduated from the universities in the thirties, after the substitution of Latin alphabets for the Arabic.⁵ They have therefore grown up without contact with the external Moslem world and are cut off from the Moslem cultural past. With rare exceptions, therefore, they are a 'Soviet' intelligentsia, to whose formation the traditional culture of Islam has contributed nothing.

3. Its 'monolithic' character, due to the uniformity of public education. Although each Moslem Republic in the Union possesses its own ministry of education, the organisation and the educational programme is exactly the same in all of them. The young Moslem intelligentsia is fashioned in a uniform mould and racial differences tend to disappear in a 'Soviet Moslem' intellectual type whose reactions and whose psychological, social, and political attitude are almost everywhere the same.⁶

On the other hand, there is a certain difference between the Moslem and the general Soviet intelligentsia, due to its social origin.

The Soviet intelligentsia, that latest product of the 'classless society,' is supposed to combine the élites from all strata of the population; and in the Russian intelligentsia this does seem to be more or less the case. But it is less so in the Moslem regions. Although higher education is now generally open to all strata of society (including children of the old dispossessed classes), the social basis of the Moslem intelligentsia presents certain special features. Because there was no industrial working class before 1917 in the Moslem lands, except for Azerbaijan, the majority of the young Moslem intellectuals are the children of peasants, less detached than the children of industrial workers from the family background and traditions of the past; and, further, a comparatively large number of them come from the former 'privileged' class (the landed nobility).

4. 20 let Sredne-Aziatskogo Universiteta (Tashkent, 1940), pp. 20-21.

5. The Latin alphabet everywhere replaced the Arabic between 1926 (in Azerbaijan) and 1929 (in Tatarstan); between 1938 and 1940 it was in turn replaced by the Cyrillic alphabet, suitably modified.

6. The projected extension of the boarding-school system, to remove children from parental influence, will have the effect of assimilating the next generation still more closely to the 'Soviet' type.

7. One of the chief reproaches addressed by Soviet writers to the young Moslem intellectuals is the persistence of 'aksakalism' (from the Turkish ak: white and sakal: beard) - that is to say, of 'exaggerated respect' for parents.

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And there is another factor, peculiar to the former nomad territories (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Karakalpakistan): namely, the strong survival of the 'clan' spirit which would link the creation of new intellectual cadres with the status of the family or clan.⁸

Thus the Moslem intelligentsia, in spite of its 'youthfulness,' seems more closely linked to the older generation, more 'conservative,' and also less fluid than the Russian. And, finally, thanks to the persistence of Islamic customs, the Moslem intelligentsia differs from the Russian by the modest position it accords to women. We learn from the Soviet press that very few Moslem girls go beyond the ten-year school: in Kirgizia not more than 20%,⁹ and in Uzbekistan¹⁰ between 1947 and 1952 the six higher schools of Samarkand awarded only 172 diplomas, or an average of 29 a year, to Uzbek girls. The Tajikistan newspaper, Kommunist Tajikistana (25 November 1955) discloses that in 1955 there were only five Tajik girls at the Institute of Agronomy at Stalinabad, and not one in any of the Republic's veterinary or hydraulic establishments. And this phenomenon does not seem to be a mere survival of old customs, because the local Soviet press reveals that, since the end of the war, there has been a decrease in the number of women in responsible positions. For example, in the Osh district of Kirgizia in 1955¹¹ there were:

In 193 kolkhozes only 3 women presidents (as against 7 in 1945); 30 women kolkhoz foremen (as against 70 in 1945); 25 women farm overseers (as against 89 in 1945).

Education

The education of the new Moslem intelligentsia is not 'free.' It is 'planned' and 'oriented' by the regime, and its objective in the minds of the Soviet leaders is twofold:

The intelligentsia must be trained to active participation in the building of a communist society, and must therefore be 'technical' rather than 'literary,' it must therefore be politically oriented and detached from Islamic influences.

It must be an auxiliary and mediator of the Soviet power to the Moslem masses; in other words, it must be 'Russified.'

8. The frequent attacks in the Soviet press of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on the persistence of the clan spirit in these former nomads confirms the survival of the ancient 'feudal' structure in the midst of fully established Sovietism.
9. Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, 21 May 1952. On ten Kirgiz girls who passed out from the ten-year school in the town of Osh, only two went on to higher schools.
10. Pravda Vostoka, 6 October 1955.
11. Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, 6 October 1955.

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The intellectual and moral education imparted in the universities and Komsomol organisations is directed to this twofold objective and leaves little or no place to the traditional Moslem culture. It differs scarcely at all from the education of Russian students. The young Moslem is indoctrinated with materialist atheism and communist morality, but the chief emphasis is laid upon two points: technical and scientific training, and cultural Russification.

Technology

In all Moslem countries the major weakness of the intellectual classes is their almost exclusive devotion to literary and clerical activities. There is a plethora of lawyers, journalists, and politicians, and a dearth of engineers and technicians. Before the revolution the Moslems of Russia shared this weakness. The Soviet authorities have tried to correct the disproportion and have succeeded up to a point, though the available statistics show that up to now the Moslems in technical colleges are still outnumbered by the Russians. Thus, at Alma-Ata in 1952, only 16 out of 98 science lecturers at the Kazakh Academy were Kazakhs;¹² and in the same year there were only 38 Turkmens among the 67 graduates at the Ashkabad Academy of Sciences.¹³

But the proportion of Moslems pursuing scientific studies is constantly increasing. In Uzbekistan, for example, in 1936 it was very small:¹⁴

Institute of Irrigation (Tashkent):	10% of 'national' students
Institute of Agronomy (Tashkent):	21% of 'national' students
Institute of Agronomy (Samarkand):	44% of 'national' students
Institute of Textiles (Tashkent):	21% of 'national' students
Institute of Finance (Tashkent):	36% of 'national' students

and the percentage of diplomaed 'nationals' was lamentable:

Institute of Transport (Tashkent):	7%
Institute of Irrigation (Tashkent):	10%
Institute of Agronomy (Samarkand):	0% (out of 362)
Institute of Education (Fergana):	0% (out of 93)

By 1940 the proportion of 'nationals' in the universities had somewhat increased, but it was still small, for in the University of Central Asia at Tashkent, only 32.5% of the students and 12% of the teachers were 'Turkmens'.¹⁵

12. Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 11 April 1952.

13. Turkmenkaya Iskra, 20 September 1952.

14. Bogdanov and Agishev, 'The Creation of Cadres in Uzbekistan' (Revoliutsiya i Natsionalnosti, No. 7, 1936, pp. 54-57).

15. Twenty Years of the University of Central Asia (Tashkent, 1940), pp. 20-21.

By 1958, however, if a recent survey may be trusted, 80% of the 2,500 students in the Faculty of Science at Samarkand University were Uzbeks. So the Soviet authorities can be said to have obtained already spectacular results in this domain, and to have given the Soviet Moslems a unique place in the general picture of Dar-ul-Islam. For they alone possess a national élite of scientists and technicians which, although small as yet, will before long be able to dispense with 'foreign' (meaning Russian) assistance and make itself solely responsible for the future of an industrialised country.¹⁶

Russification

In the Moslem Republics, secondary and higher education is a powerful instrument for the linguistic and cultural russification of the young national intelligentsia. Russian is a compulsory subject, from the fifth class upward, in primary and secondary schools, and it is necessary to pass an examination in Russian before entering the university. And although the teaching in higher institutes is, theoretically, in the majority-language of the students, in practice Russian predominates everywhere. The national languages are, in fact, only used in the study of certain literary and juridical subjects, whereas Russian is used in the scientific courses, both from habit and for reasons of convenience (its more suitable vocabulary, the availability of textbooks in Russian but not in Turkish, and so on). Further, wherever there is a mixture of students of different nationalities, the national languages are supplanted by Russian.

In this way, Russian is becoming more and more the language of the universities, and an administrative or scientific career is open only to those who know it perfectly. As Mukhitdinov, first secretary of the Uzbek Central Committee, has put it:

'Russian is the second tongue of all the peoples of the Soviet Union; to know it is the best way for the Moslem peoples to raise their cultural level and the only way to achieve a true scientific culture.'¹⁷

Not only is the Moslem intelligentsia unquestionably russified in language, but its way of thinking is often russified also. And this puts it in the peculiar condition of being neither entirely 'national' nor yet really 'denationalised.' It is a sort of isolated group between the Russians and the mass of non-Russian-speaking Moslems.

16. Ubai Arifov, director, and Sadyk Azimov, assistant-director, of the Uzbekistan Institute of Nuclear Physics (founded in 1956) are both of them Uzbeks (vide Pravda Vostoka, 25 August 1956). In October 1956 the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences had nine active members, including seven 'nationals,' and 13 corresponding members, including five 'nationals'; its President, Abdullaev, is an Uzbek (Pravda Vostoka, 7 October 1956).

17. Kizil Uzbekistan, 22 August 1956.

The place of the intelligentsia in the life of the Moslem Republics

Strong in numbers, and with a technical competence comparable to that of their Russian colleagues and a Marxist political education, the national intelligentsias should be capable, in theory, of occupying the principal positions and exercising political and economic leadership in the Moslem Republics. But is it so in fact? To answer this question, we must briefly examine the position of the Russian and the national cadres in the various political and economic sectors.

I. Moslems in the governmental system of the National Republics

In the Moslem Republics there is an almost invariable tacit rule which allots to the 'nationals' those ministries which confer the appearance of authority and the posts which involve direct contact with the population (Health, Justice, Social Security, etc.), while the key positions, which confer real power, are reserved for Russians. The President of the Council of Ministers is always a 'national,' while the first Vice-President is compulsorily a Russian.

Except in Kazakhstan, where the nationals are no longer the majority, there is always a big majority of nationals in the Council of Ministers. In 1955 the proportions were as follows:

Uzbekistan	21 ministers, 5 of them Russian
Kazakhstan	24 " 14 "
Kirgizia	20 " 6 "
Turkmenistan	19 " 6 "

But the distribution of portfolios is such as to leave the key sectors in Russian hands. These are:

1. The political police: The director of State Security (formerly MGB and possessing also, since the fall of Beria, the principal attributes of the MVD) is always and everywhere a Russian.
2. Planning: In three out of the five Central Asian Republics the director of the Planning Commission, which is a sort of Super-Ministry of Economic Affairs, is a Russian.
3. Communications: This is a political as well as an economic portfolio. All the ministers of communications in the Central Asian Republics are Russian.
4. Local Industry: This is a republican ministry, with a certain degree of independence from Moscow. Four of the five Central Asian ministers of industry are Russian.

In addition, Russians are heavily preponderant in the army and the police of the Moslem Republics.

II. Moslems in the Communist Party

In the Soviet diarchy, as is well known, the real power belongs to the Communist Party and the appearance of power to the apparatus of Soviets and Government. It is therefore not surprising that the proportion of Russians and other non-Moslems is particularly high in the apparatus of the communist parties of the Republics. These parties are in any case not autonomous but are simply regional organs of the CPSU, and they are therefore very strictly controlled from Moscow.

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Before the war, Russians and other 'Europeans' were in the majority in the communist parties of the Republics. In 1930 in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan the percentage of 'national' communists was 45 and 28, respectively;¹⁸ in 1933 in Tatarstan, Azerbaijan, and the Crimea, the percentages were 42, 46.3 and 14.6.¹⁹ Has the situation changed? It is difficult to be sure because, since the war, statistics of racial composition are no longer issued. In the Kazakhstan CP, however, the Russian element must have increased through the influx of new Russian colonists who were settled in the unoccupied lands of Kazakhstan in 1955-58. But in the other parts of Central Asia it would seem that the relative proportion of Russians and nationals in the CPSU is stable, though with a slight preponderance of Russians.

I have more information about the racial composition of the party congresses of the Republics which, since the war, assemble every two years. In Uzbekistan, at the XXIst congress (15-18 February 1954) there were 614 delegates, of whom 189, or 31% were non-Moslems.²⁰ The number of Europeans is in this case less than at the preceding congress (September 1952), which was attended by 612 delegates of whom 40% were non-Moslems. At the VIII Kirgiz congress (January 1956) there were 465 delegates, of whom 236, or 50.7%, were non-Moslem, and here the non-Moslem percentage has increased by 3% over the percentage at the VIth congress (August 1952).²¹ In the central committees and secretariats, which are the controlling bodies of the Communist Party, the proportion of non-Moslems is even higher. In the central committees of the five Central Asian Republics in 1956 it ranged from 58.4% in Kazakhstan to 25.3% in Tajikistan.²²

18. P. Rysako, 'On the XIVth Anniversary', Revoliutsiya i Natsionalnosti, 10 November 1931, pp. 1-18.
19. Aronshtam, 'The Purge of the Party's national organisations', ibid. 6 May 1933, pp. 7-18.
20. Pravda Vostoka, 17 February 1954.
21. Pravda Vostoka, 24 September 1952; 29 January 1956.
22. Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 27 January 1956; Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, 27 August 1956; Turkmenskaya Iskra, 22 January 1956; Kommunist Tajikistana, 31 January 1956. The detailed figures of central committee membership at the congresses held in January 1956 were:

	Total		Non-Moslem		Percentage of non- Moslems
	Members	Candidates	Members	Candidates	
Uzbekistan	199	55	62	21	31.0
Kazakhstan	178	55	104	34	58.4
Kirgizia	116	37	40	11	34.4
Turkmenistan	135	40	55	20	38.5
Tajikistan	154	57	39	13	25.3

The structure of the central committee secretariats, which are the controlling party bodies, has followed an unvarying rule since the war. The first secretary, who is the prominent figure, is always and everywhere a 'national' (again with the exception of Kazakhstan, where the Moslems are now a minority in their own Republic), while the second secretary, who is also secretary of the cadres and thus in control of the entire Party hierarchy, and therefore the real head of the Republic's Party, is always and everywhere a Russian. The same rule applies on the regional level. In Kazakhstan in December 1955 there were 10 Russian first secretaries and 16 Russian second secretaries in the regional committees of the 16 regions of the Republic.

III. Moslems in the Economic Sphere

Soviet sources are almost completely uninformative about the distribution of professional work in the different spheres of economic activity in the Moslem Republics. Nevertheless the observations of foreigners who have succeeded in visiting Central Asia and the rare occasional information in the local press make it clear that there is a quite definite division between the Russian and the Moslem spheres of activity. Thus the sovkhoses, irrigation, communications, transport, building, finance and banking, as well as certain industrial sectors, are, in most of the Republics, dominated by Russians. This can be explained both by the Russian authorities' desire to keep control of the key sectors of regional economy and also by the dearth of indigenous technical cadres.

When Russian and Moslems are employed together on a large-scale undertaking it is noticeable that the former tend to monopolise the organising and technical posts while leaving the subordinate jobs to 'nationals.' As an example, when 100 workers at the 'Friendship between Peoples' hydro-electric station of Kairak-Kum were decorated, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan issued in a decree of 28 December 1956²³ a table showing the distribution of jobs among them. It was as follows (57 Russians, 30 Moslems, and 13 Germans):²⁴

Political and administrative posts: 19 Russians, 1 German
 Engineers: 9 Russians, 3 Germans
 Foremen: 5 Russians, 4 Moslems
 Skilled workers: 17 Russians, 7 Germans, 5 Moslems
 Labourers: 6 Russians, 2 Germans, 17 Moslems
 Cocks and Chauffeurs: 1 Russian, 4 Moslems

Our brief survey has shown that, while there are a great many openings for the Moslem intelligentsia, and there will be still more as new technical cadres are created, their scope is nevertheless restricted by the political exigencies which withhold from Moslems, in every case, the leading positions in politics and in the key sectors of the economy.

The rise of the Moslem intelligentsia is carefully controlled by the communist authorities, lest the independence of the Moslem Republics should reach the point where separatist ideas might begin to awaken. This control is still

23. Kommunist Tajikistana, 4 January 1957.

24. Either volunteers from the GDR or, more probably, Volga Germans deported to Central Asia.

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too obvious in the sphere of what the Soviet authorities call 'national culture' which is turned into something lifeless and rootless and slavishly modelled on the lines of Russian culture. Only its innocuous 'folklore' and picturesque historical aspects are encouraged and it is purged of all living content and relevance.

Attitude of the Moslem intellectual

The Soviet authorities have certainly succeeded in turning the Moslem intellectual into a 'socialist' who regards himself as a 'European,' with a contempt for his country's recent past and for foreign 'Asiatics,' and decisively opposes any return of the pre-1917 capitalist or religious regime. This looks like a fundamental break with the past and seems to justify all the hopes of the Russian authorities. But the situation is more complex. Before deciding whether the Moslem intellectual is a true russified and de-Islamised homo sovieticus, for whom proletarian class interests are supreme over those of his national group, we need to examine his behaviour in two important matters: his relations with Russians, and his attitude towards Islam and the national culture.

Is the Moslem intellectual russified? To all appearance, he is; and the evidence of all superficial observers agrees on this. He is a 20th century technician, very proud of the regime's successes. He also appears grateful to the Russian people, 'elder brother' of all the Soviet peoples, for the education which has brought him, in an external and intellectual sense, closer to Russians and Westerners than to his Asiatic brothers.

Yet, in spite of his more or less perfect knowledge of Russian, the Moslem intellectual has not forgotten his mother tongue, but on the contrary is deeply attached to it. He is bilingual and he never uses Russian apart from his work. There is, therefore, no linguistic assimilation, any more than there is cultural assimilation.²⁵

But there is a more reliable test for judging the degree of russification of the Moslem intelligentsia: namely, the racial intermixture between Russians and nationals. In spite of the wholesale influx of Russians into the Moslem Republics, the perennial dream of the Russian authorities that the two communities will melt into one has not been realised. Russians and Moslems live side by side but do not mix. They retain their own separate characteristics. At the bottom of the social scale, segregation is total; and even in university and administrative circles Russians and Moslems keep as far apart as they can.

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25. The slightest relaxation of ideological pressure by the authorities is followed in the Moslem Republics by measures whose real significance can only be the desire to escape from the Russian tutelage. For example, the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR issued a decree on 21 August 1956 making the Azer language the only official language of the Republic, to the exclusion of Russian. This measure was hailed, according to the local paper Bakinski Rabochi (28-29 August 1956) with 'waves of enthusiasm' whose meaning can only have been 'nationalist' if not overtly anti-Russian.

The Soviet press does not conceal the fact that mixed marriages are extremely rare. Before the Revolution, marriage between a Russian girl and a Moslem was unusual, but possible, because not forbidden by the Shariat law; today it is still an exceptional event, even among the intellectuals, however 'de-Islamised.' We may instance the reply of a D.P. - a typical Moslem intellectual, former Komsomol and Party member, completely de-Islamised and apparently russified - to the question whether nationals in the USSR married Russian girls: 'We would never consent to marry a Kafire (infidel).' And marriage between a Moslem girl and a Russian man, which was formerly forbidden by Moslem law, is still impossible, as it was before the Revolution.

Is the Moslem intellectual de-Islamised? Although the sovietised intellectual resists inter-racial mixture he is not strictly a 'Moslem' either, because he is not a practising one; yet neither is he a real atheist. Rather, he is indifferent; he ignores Islam, or has forgotten it. This is confirmed from such different sources as the Soviet press, which complains that the intelligentsia is only indifferent to religion and not definitely hostile to it, and the unanimous testimony of visitors to Central Asia, who report crowded mosques, though the crowds are composed only of the old and of the poorest sections of the population.²⁶

We shall, however, misunderstand the intellectuals if we fail to see their attitude towards the faith of their ancestors in its true perspective. What they are indifferent to is the dogma, the faith in the strict sense. But on the other hand they are attached to the nexus of customs and traditions which constitute the specific Moslem way of life. How can we doubt this when we see that intellectuals who are completely de-Islamised nevertheless retain the ancestral attitude towards women (the Soviet press is explicit about this) and that they still practise polygamy and enforce seclusion and the wearing of the veil upon women, in spite of all the official prohibitions. Moreover, the consciousness of belonging to the Umma - the community of believers as opposed to the 'world of infidels' - is deeply rooted in all of them. And their feeling is not merely platonic; it is expressed in the rite of circumcision, which is practised by almost the entire Moslem population including the communist intellectuals.

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26. The Moslem cult is no longer observed in the USSR. Of the five basic elements of the faith, the zakat is prohibited; pilgrimage to Mecca has been permitted since the war but there are not more than about 20 pilgrims a year; the five-fold prayer is observed only by the old; but fasts seem to be observed fairly faithfully in the rural districts. (The fifth element, the shahada or confession of faith is a mental act.) The number of mosques open for services is derisory; according to the Mufti of Tashkent there are not more than 60 in Uzbekistan and 27 in Kazakhstan.

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If, then, there is no obvious attachment to Islam as a faith, it is nevertheless true that the attachment to a traditional culture deeply tinged with religious feeling is very powerful. The most striking proof of this is the quarrel between Russian and national communists which broke out in 1952 over the national heritage of the Central Asian Turks. It will be remembered that the Russian authorities, with the aim of purging the national heritage of the Moslem peoples of its 'reactionary' elements (religious and feudal), made a wholesale attack upon the national epics of the Turkish people. The national intellectuals perceived the significance of this attack and detected in it a grave peril: the practical liquidation of the whole national culture and its replacement by what the authorities euphemistically call Soviet, though they really mean Russian, culture. The resistance of the nationals was embittered, especially in Kirgizia, where the crisis provoked by the condemnation of the national epic, Manas, caused a profound schism not only in university circles but also in the local Communist Party. The result was a spectacle unique in the history of the USSR: Kirgiz communists accusing their Russian comrades of 'chauvinist imperialism,' while the latter retorted with accusations of 'bourgeois nationalism.'²⁷

The paradox is curious. It is the new communist national cadres in the Moslem Republics who, in the name of Marxism-Leninism, rise to defend the national heritage of their peoples with its deep and perdurable tinge of 'nationalism' and, above all, of Islam. Beautiful as they may be, it cannot be said of epics like Dédé-Korkut (Azeri), which hymns the victories of Turkish warriors over Georgian or Armenian Christians, or Alpamysh (Uzbek) and Manas (Kirgiz), whose heroes are ghazis, champions of the Moslem faith against the 'infidel,' that they are calculated to consolidate 'proletarian friendship among socialist peoples.' From the Marxist angle these epics are undeniably 'feudal' and 'religious' productions, and yet they were defended, often heroically, and to a victorious conclusion, by Moslem intellectuals of authentic Marxist formation. Evidently their national sentiment and loyalty to the national culture is infinitely stronger and deeper than their allegiance to Marxism. And there is more to it than this. The Marxist Moslem intellectual has not forgotten that he belongs to the native population, to which he is bound by culture, speech, and customs. He naturally regards himself as its representative and champion against the growing Russian pretensions. Faithful to his compatriots, the Moslem intellectual is not seen by them as a renegade, even though he has become a communist, but rather as a defender.

What conclusions may be drawn from this brief survey? First, that the 'nationalism' of the Moslem peoples has not disappeared, as the Soviet leaders hoped it would, with the arrival of the socialist society. So far from that, it has even become more conscious and more deeply felt, because its mouthpiece is now the young intelligentsia instead of the pre-revolution church and feudal nobility. The Moslem intellectual, even when apparently 'de-Islamised,' cannot be assimilated to the Russians and the efforts of authority to create a super-national Soviet patriotism have had no success. On the contrary, by a process familiar in all 'colonial' countries, the Central Asian or Caucasian intellectual emerges as the representative of his people, and his national consciousness is at once more acute and more rational, and in the last resort more hostile to the Russian influence, than that of any other social class.

27. See, in this connection, our study in L'Afrique et l'Asie, 2ème trimestre, 1952.

Nevertheless, the Moslem intellectual is aware that the independence of the Moslem lands before the Russian conquest, or of the Emirate of Bukhara before 1917, was a sham because there was no élite capable of really leading the country. But today there is such an élite, and with every year that passes the Moslems of the USSR draw nearer to a real independence, when their countries will be in the sole control of their own 'nationals.'

The Moslem intellectuals are perfectly aware of this, but they also know that the Russians will never voluntarily abdicate from the role of 'elder brother of the Soviet peoples.' In the meantime, they walk hand in hand with the Russians on the road that will lead to their independence - and the road is still probably a long one. For the moment, friction with the Russians is limited to a few matters essential for the defence of their national integrity, and the storm that will break out when the young Moslem intellectuals demand political and cultural autonomy is still beyond the horizon.