

OUTGOING CIPHER

TO: C

1971 AUG 20

18:20

MUN 47 20 AUG 71

TO: DURKEE INFO YARROW HOVEY DUNNING KAUFMANN REYMAN
FM: WALTER INFO COOK BEDE BERNARD BROWN KOHAK LYON
NOWAK PECHACEK/BELLUS ZAHARIEFF

201651:

RFE DAILY REPORT NO. 189

1. BULGARIA: NOTHING.

2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: NOTHING.

3. HUNGARY: NOTHING.

4. POLAND: NOTHING.

5. RUMANIA: MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS ARE THE RECEIPT OF A FULLER TEXT OF THE 17 AUGUST SMENA (DS) WHICH IS THE STRONGEST THREAT TO DATE AGAINST RUMANIA AND OF A FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT BY AN UNPRECEDENTED JOINT SESSION YESTERDAY OF THE RUMANIAN CC, STATE COUNCIL AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS THAT THERE WILL BE NO RETREAT OR CONCESSIONS IN RUMANIA'S CHINA POLICY. SMENA CRITICIZES THE RUMANIAN DELEGATIONS TRIP TO CHINA AS SUITING THE PLANS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY. "THE SHIFT OF THE RUMANIAN LEADERSHIP TO THE CHINESE PLATFORM ON SEVERAL QUESTIONS--AS CAN BE JUDGED FROM THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED... (AT THE END OF THE VISIT)--WOULD MEAN A DEVIATION FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM...." SMENA THEN GOES ON TO QUESTION THE REALISM OF RUMANIAN POLICY AND OMINOUSLY QUOTES THE BRITISH ECONOMIST TO THE EFFECT THAT NEITHER THE US NOR CHINA COULD DO MUCH TO HELP RUMANIA WERE IT TO GET INTO ANY "GRAVE DIFFICULTY." "SYMPATHY," SMENA POINTS OUT, "IS AN INSUFFICIENT BASIS FOR A REALISTIC FOREIGN POLICY" AS SHOWN BY "SEVERAL EXAMPLES IN MODERN HISTORY." (THIS SEEMS A HINT AT CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1968.) THE SMENA ARTICLE THUS GOES CONSIDERABLY FURTHER THAN THE MAGYAR HIRLAP (SMENA CONSIDERS PEKING'S PLAN FOR A TIRANA-BELGRADE-BUCHAREST "AXIS" AS A FACT WHEREAS MAGYAR HIRLAP TREATED IT AS AN "IF."), THE EARLIER SMENA, THE NEUES DEUTSCHLAND OF

(MORE)

14 AUGUST AND OTHERS. THE AMBIGUITIES OF THE ARTICLE BY NO MEANS CONCEAL THE THREAT.

TWO DAYS AFTER THE SMENA ARTICLE, ON AUGUST 19, THERE WAS AN UNPRECEDENTED JOINT MEETING IN BUCHAREST OF THE CC, THE STATE COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. CEAUSESCU AND MAURER SPEECHES TO THE MEETING ARE NOT AVAILABLE. RADIO BUCHAREST'S SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS (DS), HOWEVER, MAY BE TAKEN AS OFFICIAL AND PROOF ENOUGH THAT THE RUMANIANS ARE NOT BUDGING ON FOREIGN POLICY. THE JOINT SESSION APPROVED THE LEADERSHIP'S POSITION AT THE COMECON MEETING--WHICH IS OF TERTIARY IMPORTANCE OR LESS AT THIS POINT--AND "APPROVED AND HIGHLY APPRECIATED" THE CEAUSESCU DELEGATION'S TRIP TO CHINA. IT POINTED OUT THAT THE VISIT WAS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 10TH PARTY CONGRESS, IMPLYING NOT ONLY THAT THE TRIP WAS CORRECT BUT THAT THE POLICY ON WHICH IT WAS BASED WILL CONTINUE. THE JOINT SESSION CALLED ON ALL MINISTRIES, STATE BODIES AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS "TO IMPLEMENT THE TASKS RESULTING FROM ACCORDS AND TALKS DURING THE VISITS." ASSUMING THAT A FALL VISIT BY CHOU EN-LAI TO RUMANIA WAS AGREED ON DURING THE VISIT TO CHINA, THIS STATEMENT MAY BE AN ESOTERIC INDICATION THAT CHOU'S VISIT WILL TAKE PLACE IN SPITE OF THE THREATS.

THE COUNTRY MEETING TODAY DISCUSSED THE GENERAL SITUATION AND, WHILE COMING TO NO NEW CONCLUSIONS, GENERALLY RECOGNIZED THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF INVASION MUST BE CONSIDERED TO EXIST. THE RUMANIAN REGIME HAS GIVEN NO SIGN OR ENCOURAGEMENT THAT ANYTHING LESS WOULD BRING RUMANIA INTO LINE WITH MOSCOW. CLEARLY THE SOVIETS RETAIN VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES FOR ESCALATING THE PRESSURE SHORT OF INVASION AND MOSCOW WOULD PREFER CEAUSESCU'S RETREAT TO THE ALTERNATIVE OF MILITARY ACTION. NEVERTHELESS, IT COULD COME TO USE OF FORCE. FROM MOSCOW'S POINT OF VIEW IT MAY SEEM THAT WHEREAS IN THE PAST THEY ALWAYS HELD A LONG RANGE OPTION TO INVADE RUMANIA AS A LAST RESORT, AS A RESULT OF RUMANIAN-CHINESE, CHINESE-US, AND US-RUMANIAN CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS, WHAT WAS EARLIER LONG RANGE MAY NOW APPEAR MUCH MORE IMMEDIATE.

IN VIEW OF THE SMENA OPEN THREAT, AND FOLLOWING LENGTHY DISCUSSION HERE, WE HAVE DECIDED NO LONGER TO BIO IPSO FACTO EVERY WESTERN PRESS DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION. RESPONSIBLE, SOBER AND BALANCED WESTERN PRESS DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION MAY NOW BE BROADCAST WITH CLEAR ATTRIBUTION. SEE ALSO TODAY'S DGS.

P.S. EXCERPTS FROM A CEAUSESCU SPEECH TODAY TO A MEETING COMMEMORATING THE 150TH ANNIVERSARY OF A RUMANIAN UPRISING AGAINST THE TURKS HAVE JUST COME IN (DS). CEAUSESCU'S LINE CONFIRMS AND REINFORCES OUR COMMENTS ABOVE.

(MORE)

6. OTHER: GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE JAPANESE CP, KENJI MIYAMOTO HAS ARRIVED IN MOSCOW ON HIS WAY TO RUMANIA. ALTHOUGH MIYAMOTO AND OTHER UNIDENTIFIED MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION WERE MET AT THE AIRPORT BY SUSLOV AND KATUSHEV, THERE HAS BEEN NO WORD OF "TALKS" BETWEEN THE CPSU AND THE JCP AS OF LAST NIGHT. THE JCP'S VISIT TO RUMANIA RECONFIRMS THE TWO PARTIES' SIMILARITY OF VIEWS ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES, MAINLY ON THE NEED OF MAINTAINING INTERPARTY RELATIONS ON THE BASIS OF INDEPENDENCE AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S AFFAIRS. FOR THE RUMANIANS, THE JCP DELEGATION'S VISIT IS A DEMONSTRATION OF MORAL SUPPORT BY AN IMPORTANT, LIKE-MINDED NON-RULING PARTY. IT COMES ON THE HEELS OF VISITS BY OTHER PARTY LEADERS ALSO SYMPATHETIC TO THE RUMANIAN STAND, SUCH AS CARILLO OF THE SPANISH CP AND HERMANNSON OF THE SWEDISH CP. (THE LATTER LEFT BUCHAREST YESTERDAY AFTER HAVING BEEN GIVEN VIP TREATMENT BY CEAUSESCU AND OTHER RUMANIAN PARTY LEADERS.) FOLLOWING THEIR VISIT TO RUMANIA, THE JCP DELEGATION IS SUPPOSED TO PROCEED TO ROME WHERE THEY ARE TO HOLD TALKS WITH ITALIAN CP OFFICIALS.

THE LJUBLIANA DELO ARTICLE (DS) SERVES TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO RUMORS THAT BREZHNEV WILL VISIT YUGOSLAVIA, THOUGH THE ARTICLE DEMURELY STATES THAT ITS INFORMATION HAS BEEN GLEANED UNOFFICIALLY. THE ARTICLE ASSERTS THAT THE TALKS WILL BE ALMOST ENTIRELY POLITICAL AND THE IMPRESSION IS GAINED THAT THE TOPICS DISCUSSED WILL NOT CONCERN LONG-TERM DIFFERENCES BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE USSR BUT WILL PERTAIN TO "CURRENT PROBLEMS." AMONG THESE, THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY "THE RATHER SPECTACULAR ENTRY OF CHINA AMONG THE RANKS OF THE OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED BIG POWERS" IS HIGHLIGHTED BY THE ARTICLE WHICH, MORE SPECIFICALLY CITES THE NIXON VISIT TO CHINA AND THE CHOU EN-LAI VISIT TO EUROPE AS CONCRETE EXPRESSIONS OF THIS "SPECTACULAR ENTRY." THE ARTICLE DECLARES THAT ANY STABLE MODUS VIVENDI BETWEEN THE USSR AND YUGOSLAVIA MUST BE WORKED OUT ON THE BASIS OF THE BELGRADE DECLARATION OF 1955 AND THE MOSCOW DECLARATION OF 1956.

END MSG