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### YUGOSLAVIA:

Foreign relations

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### ON THE EVE OF THE TITO-CEAUSESCU MEETING

Summary: Tito and Ceausescu, Yugoslavia's and Rumania's party and state heads, will meet in Timisoara, Rumania on November 23 and 24 for "a short working session." The two leaders have previously met eight times, either in Rumania or in Yugoslavia. Even though their internal policies differ significantly, their joint efforts to resist Moscow's domination have brought them closer together. This has particularly been the case since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Yet in order not to provoke the Soviet Union, the two leaders have not attempted to create any entente. They have instead cultivated bilateral relations between the two countries.

On November 23 and 24 Yugoslavia's and Rumania's respective party leaders and heads of state, Josip Broz Tito and Nicolae Ceausescu, will meet in Timisoara for a two-day discussion. This will be the ninth meeting between Tito and Ceausescu since the Rumanian leader assumed power in April 1965. In addition to the official meetings, they met briefly in New York at the UN Assembly in October 1970, and in Persepolis, Iran, in October 1971. (1) Tito will be accompanied by Yugoslavia's Premier Dzemal Bijedic, Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac, Executive Bureau member Stane Dolanc, and president of the Serbian National Assembly, Dragoslav Markovic. Ceausescu will be accompanied by Rumania's Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Party Secretary Paul Niculescu Mizil, deputy premiers and Executive Committee members Ilie Verdet and Emil Draganescu, and head of a Party Central Committee section, Vasil Vlad.

Both Yugoslav and Rumanian papers call the Belgrade-Bucharest relations "as harmonious as ever before" (2) and "comradely and profoundly principled." (3) The Radio Zagreb commentator Milika Sundic said that "the confidence prevailing in our relations is such that intolerance and a lack of understanding of the specific conditions under which Yugoslavia and Rumania operate are impossible to think of." (4) Sundic added that "unfortunately this is not the case in Yugoslavia's relations with some other socialist countries."

President Tito met the Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev in the latter part of September this year, and at the end of October and beginning of November, the Yugoslav president visited Washington for talks with President Nixon. Tito also visited Canada, Great Britain and New Delhi this year. Thus he will have much to report to his friend Ceausescu with whom he shares a clearly defined interest in the defense of the sovereignty of both Yugoslavia and Rumania against possible threats from Moscow.

For his part, Ceausescu will surely have to provide information satisfying Tito's interest in the recent "mini cultural revolution" in Rumania. An article in Borba stated that the two party and state chiefs will also "exchange information on internal developments in each of the two countries." (5) Since Belgrade's normalization of relations with Peking, the Rumanians have ceased to be Tito's chief source of information on the conflict between the Soviet Union and China. Yet this conflict cannot but remain one of the main topics of discussion between the two Balkan statesmen. Soviet-Chinese relations are of particular interest to Belgrade and Bucharest for, as Chou En-lai said in an August interview with a Yugoslav daily, China is far from the Balkans and as a popular Chinese proverb says: "Distant water cannot quench fire." (6)

After becoming Rumania's leader in April 1965, Nicolae Ceausescu favored good Yugoslav-Rumanian relations. The peoples of both countries share a tradition of friendship which continued even in the era of Gheorghiu-Dej's anti-Yugoslav line during Stalin's lifetime. While it is true that Gheorghiu-Dej delivered the report in 1948 which expelled Tito from the communist family, Bucharest remained considerably more restrained than the other Balkan neighbors, more restrained even than any other East European country except Poland. This was, of course, not because of any special sympathies the Rumanian communist leaders held for the Yugoslav system, but rather because of Gheorghiu-Dej's disinclination to commit himself to one policy lest he be caught off balance when that policy changed.

For his part, Ceausescu has been able to establish closer ties with Tito without accepting any of Tito's internal policies. The Yugoslavs, in turn, have never tried to conceal the view that internally Rumania has been ruled in a Stalinist or at least semi-Stalinist manner. It is both countries' resistance to Moscow's monopoly within the international communist movement and the Soviet bloc that has caused them to join forces (at least regarding propaganda orientations) and to increase their cooperation in economic and other fields. Alarmed by the Warsaw Pact countries' invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Tito and Ceausescu have been doing their utmost to coordinate their policies without provoking Moscow. The Rumanian leader has been extremely cautious on the subject of an entente with Belgrade. But the Yugoslavs, too, have been reluctant to create the impression that they would enter any multilateral Balkan alliances as, for instance, the one envisaged by the Rumanian initiative of 13 June 1970 in which multilateral Balkan cooperation was proposed. The Yugoslavs answered that Belgrade would like to encourage "the process of bilateral understanding only because the current climate in the Balkans is not propitious for inter-Balkan cooperation on a multilateral basis." (7) The Yugoslavs have seen the successful development of bilateral relations as "an example of encouragement in this region for wider intra-European relations." (8)

The cultivation of bilateral relations is the policy which has been maintained until the present. In the wake of Leonid Brezhnev's recent visit to Belgrade the policy was once more deemed promising, for that visit provided hope that Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations might improve. The hope has, however, thus far not materialized. On the other hand, Yugoslav-Rumanian relations have become ever closer as illustrated by the recent statement by Yugoslav Foreign Ministry spokesman, Dragoljub Vujica, that bilateral relations have developed successfully. In the course of 1971 the progress on Yugoslav-Rumanian cooperation was evident in many areas, but especially in the economy. Trade between Yugoslavia and Rumania this year, according to Vujica, will reach the level of 100 million dollars for both partners, while in 1972 it is projected at the 150 million dollar mark. "In international politics the two countries have similar or identical views on the problems of the struggle for peace, of security, independence and equal cooperation among various states," Vujica said. (9)

One of the most important joint economic undertakings has been the construction of the Iron Gates hydroelectric-power and navigation system to harness the Danube's potential



for power generation and to improve navigation in the Iron Gates bottleneck. It is true that the Russians helped by supplying turbine generators, but the main problems were solved by Rumanian and Yugoslav engineers. The total power output will ultimately reach 10 billion kilowatt hours, which will take care of most Rumanian and Yugoslav requirements (particularly those in Serbia) with power to spare for export to neighboring countries, such as Bulgaria and Hungary. In a joint Yugoslav-Rumanian communique of 1967, the Iron Gates project was called "the bridge of friendship and cooperation between our socialist countries." (10) The strengthening of this friendship and cooperation will receive top priority in the Tito and Ceausescu discussions during the "working meeting" in Timisoara on November 23 and 24.

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- (1) The following is a breakdown of the nine meetings between Tito and Ceausescu: (1) Bucharest, 18-23 April 1966; (2) Timisoara, Rumania, 3 December 1966; (3) Osjek, Yugoslavia, 3-4 January 1968; (4) Belgrade, 27 May-1 June 1968; (5) Timisoara, 24 August 1968 (two days after the Warsaw Pact troops occupied Czechoslovakia); (6) Timisoara, 1-2 February 1969; (7) at the Iron Gates on the Yugoslav-Rumanian border, 20 September 1969; (8) Kranj, Yugoslavia, 3-4 November 1970; and (9) on 23 - 24 November 1971 in Timisoara.
- (2) Borba, Belgrade, 19 November 1971.
- (3) Scinteia, Bucharest, 20 November 1971.
- (4) Milika Sundic, Radio Zagreb, 18 November 1971, 1930 hours.
- (5) Borba, 19 November 1971.
- (6) Vjesnik, Zagreb, 28 August 1971.
- (7) Vjesnik, 15 July 1970.
- (8) Komunist, Belgrade, 5 November 1970.
- (9) Politika, Belgrade, 19 November 1971.
- (10) Jugoslovenski pregled, Belgrade, April 1967, p. 193.