

April 23, 1958

IDEOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY - MUTED AND FORTISSIMO

Moscow Radio's announcement of the fissile article from Kommunist which brands Marshal Tito's Party program as unscientific, non-Marxist, non-Leninist, etc. was broadcast on 18th April, 1958. It is therefore unlikely to be a coincidence that on 17 April, Literary Gazette, the leading intellectual publication of the USSR, carried a review by P. Karelin of a newly-issued anthology of Lenin's article "Against Revisionism".

In the main, Karelin's article appears to be just another in the spate which has been flooding all media of Soviet propaganda for months past. But the sinister aspect of it, which will scarcely escape many readers, is that it opens with an attack on Bukharin. A letter written by Lenin in 1916 is quoted as saying:

"There it is, that is my fate. One battle after another - against political stupidities, banalities, opportunism, etc...."

This outburst, according to Karelin, was evoked by an article written under a pseudonym, the author of which Lenin recognized as Bukharin. Karelin claims that the "particular stupidities" which incurred Lenin's wrath consisted of Bukharin's idea, supported by Radek, that the workers are, in principle, hostile to the State. Lenin's reply evasively claimed that "socialists advocate the use of the state for the transition from capitalism to socialism." Yet Bukharin's thesis has now been proven correct in East Berlin, Poznan and in Hungary.

On the following day the Kommunist article made the importance of this seemingly irrelevant denunciation of Bukharin clear when it took issue with Tito's Party program over the withering away of the State. The Yugoslavs profess to believe that withering away begins when socialist forces have come to power, which is surely what the second quotation from Lenin above implies. But Kommunist postpones withering away to the Ides of March, again invoking Lenin to suit its book, and arguing that the existence of capitalist states, and the internal differences between workers and peasants under socialism make it necessary for the state to remain until at last it can disappear simultaneously with democracy. Clearly if the State is to be as semi-permanent as Kommunist suggests, any idea of hostility to it on the part of the workers, such as the Yugoslavs imply in their draft program by suggesting that it should now begin to wither, is inconvenient to the Kremlin, and needs to be denounced. This is probably the true reason for the attack on Bukharin.

Karelin then turns to a discussion of the origins of revisionism, which leads him to the present day, and thus enables him to link Bukharin with Benedict Kautsky, Giolitti, Clark and Fast in the

in the USA, and Salzberg in Canada. He admits that contemporary revisionists are now denouncing the Soviet constitution because of its failure to provide for an opposition, which, they say, constitutes a retreat from "pure democracy" and arbitrary rule. This passage suggests that the question of a two- or multi-party state is still being raised in Moscow, since otherwise there would be little point in drawing attention to such a delicate problem.

Karelin also castigates the British Labor Party and "socialist reformers" for their belief that the "new socialism" can be erected on the basis of capitalism, without the preliminary destruction of the latter by violence. Finally he turns his attention to those who "attack the principles of proletarian internationalism and preach national communism," thereby suggesting obliquely that Marshal Tito for example, is a revisionist, only fit to be denounced together with such names as Bukharin and Radek. It seems likely that readers in Warsaw will note this with concern in view of the strong Bukharinist tendencies in Poland today.

The appendix below, which was written in March, 1958, examines the present state of Kremlin-style Communism and lists the "seven sins of revisionism" (p. 7). It will be seen that the Kommunist article on the Yugoslav draft program pins at least six of these seven sins on to Marshal Tito - the exception being the crime of demanding liberty for factions and factional struggle. This fact gives a clear indication of how deep is the ideological abyss which now yawns between the two parties. In view of the fact that Moscow, in belaboring the revisionists in Communist and socialist parties in many parts of the world, never attempts to unmask a heresy in the huge Chinese Party, it will be exceptionally interesting to see how soon Peking joins in the anti-Tito chorus.

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THE NATURE OF COMMUNISM TODAY

During the years since the death of Stalin, changes have appeared on the face that Communism presents to the free world. This has led many to believe that there has also been a change of heart.

But recent statements, in print and on the public platform, have made it clear that Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders have not moved an inch from the arguments on which Communism is based.

The present leaders of the Soviet Union came to power and hold their positions by their allegiance to the ethical and political codes of Marxism-Leninism. They will therefore negotiate and bargain with other countries in accordance with the rules developed by Communism over the years. These are here examined.

Basic Theory

Communism is founded on Marx's dialectical materialism. The essence of Marxism is:

- (a) That history advances inexorably by conflict (or dialectic) with particular reference to the class struggle, towards a predestined end: first to Socialism, the elimination of capitalism, and ultimately to Communism, the elimination of the state;
- (b) That though this process is inevitable, it can be speeded up by applying the "objective laws of reality" disclosed by Marx.

These basic beliefs account for all that is worst in Communism: its arrogance, intolerance, brutality and stupidity. Belief in the inevitability of Communism explains the arrogance. But belief in Communism presupposes that human nature can be made perfect, which explains the stupidity. Since the advent of Communism can be hastened, it becomes the duty of all Communists to hasten it. Since dialectical materialism recognizes no moral standards and no ethical code beyond the duty to further Communism, intolerance and brutality are the logical result.

The Party

Lenin developed and perfected the technique of seizing power. After seizure, power would be in the hands of the proletariat (the urban workers) who would retain it by establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Communist Party is by definition the "vanguard of the proletariat." Within the Party, decision must, according to the principle of democratic centralism, be unanimous and binding, even if a debate were permitted before the decision was taken. In fact the only place where any discussion can take place is the Central Committee and, more particularly, the Presidium.

So by exalting the proletariat as the only class that counts under Communism, and by claiming to be the only possible representative of the proletariat, the Communist Party justifies its absolute monopoly of power, which resides in practice in the hands of a small body of men, or even of one man, at the top.

The ordinary citizen under this system is completely powerless. He cannot act against the Party, vote against the Party, speak against the Party or even think against the Party without automatically becoming an "enemy of the people," the most serious crime under the Communist code. If he does not accept Communism, his only resource, if he is honest, is to confine himself to some humble or technical capacity where political belief is inessential; but if he is cynical, he will get what he can out of the system either by outpacing his rivals in making himself useful or by the graft and corruption to which free enterprise degenerates in Communist countries.

International Communism.

The proclaimed aim of international Communism, and hence of the Soviet Government, is to dominate the world. This was announced 40 years ago, has been constantly repeated since, and remains valid today. Lenin wrote: "...but as soon as we are strong enough to strike down capitalism as a whole we shall immediately seize it by the throat." (Works, 3rd Russian edition, Vol. 25, p. 500.)

In this plan for global domination the Soviet Union fills a special role as the "Motherland of Communism." It is the base from which the operation can be carried out, the "fulcrum of power." All Communists, wherever they live, ~~must have~~ their first allegiance to the Kremlin. "In present circumstances one cannot call oneself a Marxist unless one openly and devotedly supports the first proletarian dictatorship in the world." (Stalin, Problems of Leninism, 11th Edition, Moscow, 1945, p. 204).

How is domination to be achieved? In Problems of Leninism, (p. 69), Stalin wrote: "Objective: to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, using it as a base for the overthrow of imperialism in all countries." Communists believe that there can be no security for Communism until world-wide revolution has been accomplished; for the whole theory of Marxism-Leninism is based upon hostility between Communism and capitalism. In 1920 Lenin proclaimed: "As long as capitalism and Socialism exist, we cannot live in peace; in the end one or the other will triumph - a funeral dirge will be sung either over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism." (Works, 3d Russian edition, Vol. 25, p. 512).

Method

In its early years Communism predicted that capitalism would be overthrown by inevitable revolution from within. When this did not come about Lenin began to speak of "a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois States." Stalin evolved a number of methods for profiting from every major or minor conflict in the non-Communist world. His successors, led now by Khrushchev have evolved further techniques, which, on the whole, are more subtle.

The following are examples of Communist techniques since 1945, illustrating their variety and flexibility:

- Armed force (Greece, Korea, Tibet, Malaya, Indo China and Hungary);
- Physical pressure short of war (the Berlin blockade);

Threats and intimidation (Stalin's tanks created NATO);
Coups d'état and "revolution from above" with Red Army backing (Czechoslovakia);

Economic pressure (by sanctions, as against Yugoslavia in 1948, or by the now more fashionable loans);

The "United Front" (to divide democratic parties in the West);
Arms deals (Egypt, Syria)

Ruthless, opportunist suppression of opponents by minority Communist parties (Eastern Europe from 1945 to the present day);

Penetration and disruption by Communist minorities in countries where the Party is in opposition, but protected by the democratic rights it seeks ultimately to destroy;

Communist-dominated front organizations;

Opportunist exploitation of nationalism, anti-Colonialism, co-existence, "peace," neutralism, or any other creed or cause that can be harnessed and exploited.

Unceasing world-wide propaganda regardless of expense (the Moscow Youth Festival alone was estimated to have cost £50 million).

It is true that the most blatant instances of aggression took place under the leadership of Stalin; but although Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders have denounced Stalin for cruelty, stupidity, despotism and the personality cult, they have never repudiated his methods of spreading Communist domination. Indeed, Khrushchev heralded the New Year of 1957 with the remark, "When it comes to fighting imperialism, we are all Stalinists." Maxim Gorky in Days with Lenin (New York, 1932, p. 44) recorded Lenin's reply to a question about the cruelty of revolutionary tactics and life: "Is it possible to act humanely in a struggle of such unprecedented ferocity? Where is there any place for soft-heartedness and generosity?" Communism has never shown any scruples about the use of force internally or externally. It is simply a matter of judging expediency and calculating risk, which has considerably increased since the advent of nuclear weapons. Its materialist philosophy does not recognize any moral inhibitions. The end justifies the means.

Strategy and Foreign Policy

Soviet military strategy and foreign policy are the servants of International Communism; their aims are identical and their direction no less single-minded. The Soviet Government, uninhibited by public opinion or parliament, does not negotiate on the basis of goodwill, justice, morality or equitable compromise for its own sake. There is only one basic criterion for successful Communist diplomacy: the spread of International Communism.

Appeals to Soviet good will are, as pointed out earlier, a waste of time; agreements based only or largely on good will are illusory, as shown by the disparity between the agreements and understandings reached at Yalta and Potsdam and the actual fate of Eastern Europe after 1945. Nor will any moral pressure force the Soviet Government to do what it does not want to do unless it thinks it expedient. It was ready to hold up the Austrian

Treaty for nearly ten years on the flimsiest pretexts; it has declared that it will not consider further negotiations or a German Peace Treaty with the Powers concerned; and it has ignored resolutions by the overwhelming majority of the United Nations calling for the removal of its troops from Hungary.

Since Hitler attacked the USSR in 1941, the West has done everything possible, sometimes at the risk of its own security, to develop trust and friendship between the Soviet Union and the West. At the end of the Second World War, Stalin took advantage of this to spread his empire across Europe by means of revolution from above, mock elections and the establishment of police States. In the name of its own security, the Soviet Union not only created the satellite bloc, but annexed the Baltic States and territory from Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Finland, Germany and Japan. Soviet expansion paused only when it encountered resolute resistance, as it did in Iran, Greece, Berlin and Korea.

Conflict and Contradiction

Conflict between the Communist and non-Communist worlds is a basic assumption of Marxist analysis. Lenin said: "So long as we have not won over the whole world, so long as we remain weaker, both economically and militarily, than the capitalist world, we must hold on to the following law: 'To make the best use of the contradictions and the antithesis among imperialists.'" (Works, 3rd Russian edition, Vol. 25, p. 489). Stalin defined the aim in more detail: "Of these contradictions there are three which must be regarded as the most important:

"The first contradiction is the contradiction between labor and capital...

"The second contradiction is the contradiction among the various groups and imperialist Powers in their struggle for sources of raw materials, for foreign territory...

"The third contradiction is the contradiction between the handful of ruling 'civilized' nations and the hundreds of millions of the colonial and dependent peoples of the world...

"Such, in general, are the principal contradictions of imperialism which have converted the old, 'flourishing' capitalism into moribund capitalism." (Problems of Leninism, 11th edition, Moscow, 1945, p. 15).

International Tension

As the Soviet Government does not negotiate compromises for their own sake, there is no reason to suppose that it considers a reduction of international tension desirable. It may at a given time, in shaping its tactics, decide that tension cannot safely be permitted to grow or that it must even be relaxed. World war has at no time since 1945 been in the Soviet interest and is certainly not so now. But a careful calculation of risk is common prudence. It does not imply good will or humanitarian scruples. Tension is an instrument of political warfare, and variations of its intensity can have a crumbling effect on world

opinion. Threats of hydrogen rockets are thus interspersed with peace propaganda and invitations to talks.

Nationalism and Self-Determination

There are few forces that can be more profitably harnessed to the aims of International Communism than nationalism. The following passage from Stalin's Problems of Leninism (p. 62) cynically explains:

"This does not mean of course that the proletariat (i.e. the Communists) must support every national movement, everywhere and always in every single concrete case. It means that support must be given to such national movements as tend to weaken, to overthrow, imperialism, and not to strengthen and preserve it. Cases occur where the national movements in certain oppressed countries come into conflict with the interests of the development of the proletarian movement (i.e., Communism). In such cases support is, of course, entirely out of the question. The question of the rights of nations is not an isolated, self-sufficient question; it is part of the general problem of the proletarian revolution, subordinate to the whole, and must be considered from the point of view of the whole."

Inside the Soviet orbit nationalism is a serious heresy, or "poison", as it was recently called in Hungary.

Co-existence and Neutralism.

Coexistence goes back to the days of Lenin. It has been brought to the fore whenever the Soviet government has decided that expansion by force was temporarily impossible and more subtle methods were consequently needed. Khrushchev recently reassured the West that co-existence does not imply ideological truce; on the contrary, coexistence in his conception is highly competitive. Competitive co-existence is conducted according to Soviet rules. There is nothing to prevent a non-Communist country trying the Communist experiment. But if it does not like it, it has no second choice. Co-existence does not apply inside the Soviet orbit, where Moscow decides on the course and no opposition is tolerated. (Yugoslavia secured complete, and Poland restricted, independence, but only by bold strokes that the Kremlin accepted with ill grace as the alternative to full-scale military intervention involving risk of major war). Co-existence is designed for export only. The same is true of neutrality. It is a virtue when practised by countries that might otherwise belong to Western alliances but a crime when attempted by a country such as Hungary..

Negotiation from Strength

Soviet propaganda never tires of its jibes against the Western doctrine of negotiation from strength. But no country is more conscious of the realities of the balance of power than the Soviet Union. Lenin's remark about seizing capitalism by the throat as soon as the Communists were strong enough to strike it down as a whole has already been quoted. A recent example of what happens when the West is, or appears to be, negotiating from weakness was the abrupt manner in which the Soviet Government broke off disarmament negotiations as soon as they had successfully tested an inter-continental ballistic missile. For years

they have been appealing to the world at large with the ingenuous slogan: "Ban all atomic weapons." But in discussing recent suggestions for international control of the use of outer space, Khrushchev accused the Americans of attempting to neutralize the Soviet advantage in long-range rockets.

Secrecy

Communism, almost since its origins, has existed in an atmosphere of conspiracy. In Russia this has resulted in a system of secrecy whose only historical parallels are offered by countries such as Japan and Tibet during periods of estrangement from the world. Lack of reliable information about what is going on inside the Soviet Union is a major source of world tension. Soviet unwillingness to lift the veil of secrecy is the biggest obstacle to a workable disarmament agreement. Secrecy also gives the Soviet Union advantages in the propaganda war. With the lack of reliable information about Soviet intentions, almost everything the Soviet leaders say is headline news in the West. Nothing is easier for them than to play on world public opinion. By contrast, the Soviet people are, by radio jamming, censorship, restrictions on travel and on the import of books and newspapers, and by many other regulations, insulated as far as possible from anything that might cast doubt upon the Government's monopolistic propaganda.

No Revisionism Allowed

It may be argued that many of the quotations in the foregoing are taken from the works of Lenin and Stalin and are therefore out of date. Such an argument is quite wrong. As has been pointed out, Stalin's tyrannies were the direct, logical outcome of Marxist and Leninist principals. Stalin was no deviationist, but an uncompromising Marxist. Furthermore, although Khrushchev criticized some of Stalin's internal policies as mistaken, and reversed his policy towards Yugoslavia, he has never questioned and indeed has by implication approved - Stalin's efforts towards Communist domination of the world.

"Revisionism" - that is, any movement towards liberalism or more genuine co-existence - is one of the gravest sins a Communist can commit. It is at present the main target of special measures to enforce orthodoxy, throughout the Marxist world, including the recent decision to publish a successor to the Cominform journal, which was wound up in 1956.

A recent article in the Moscow magazine Aid to Political Self-Education listed the "seven sins of revisionism". The author, Ponomarev, is head of the international department of the Communist Party, and therefore an authority. These are the seven sins of the revisionists:

- (1) They have been guilty of "glossing over and minimizing the aggressive nature of imperialism and the danger of a new war". In other words, Soviet propaganda will continue to vilify the West and keep its own people in unwarranted fear.
- (2) They have "denied the directing and guiding role of the Communist Parties" - i.e., they have rebelled against the rigid discipline imposed by Party leaders.
- (3) They have "denied the fundamental laws of the class struggle" and preached "collaboration between the classes and the possibility of gradually transforming capitalism into Socialism." They have rejected all means of acquiring power except through parliamentary or trade-union action.
- (4) They have attempted to bring the programme and principles of Communism nearer to those of Social Democracy.
- (5) They have denied the universal importance of "Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat."
- (6) They have demanded "liberty of factions and factional struggles" - thus enabling minority groups within the Party to make themselves heard and even to criticize the leadership.
- (7) They have rejected "proletarian internationalism" and denied "the importance of the experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." Or, in plain language, they have become reluctant to love and obey the Kremlin.

This seven-point doctrine shows what the Communist Party is fighting against. It also indirectly proves what it is fighting for. Soviet leaders are, in fact, determined to ensure the following points:

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union must be the unquestioned leading force in international communism.

International Communism must be a militant movement; there can be no genuine co-existence with the non-Communist world.

Communism can make no alliance with democratic movements - except temporary and cynical ones for the purpose of advancing the Communist cause.

Above all, Marxist-Leninist dogma must remain unchallenged. The Soviet totalitarian State must be the pattern for all future Communist development.

Conclusions

Such is the nature of Communism. Marx's basic theory, Lenin's practical application, Stalin's land-grabbing, treachery and

murder - these are not things which can be forgotten. They are the heritage of the present leaders, the rules by which they must live and govern.

Before Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues can enjoy trust, they must, at the very least, abandon the part of their creed that condones treachery and lying; they must renounce the precept that "the end justifies the means." Until this happens (and it seems no nearer now than it has ever been) the most that can be hoped for is a hard, overt and enforceable bargain.

THE ANTI-REVISIONIST CAMPAIGN

General News Talk , April 11, 1958
by Walter Kolarz

NOT TO BE MICROFICED

During the past few weeks Moscow has stepped up its campaign against revisionism. Within less than a week Pravda has published as many as three comprehensive articles warning its readers against the revisionist danger throughout the world. The first denounced revisionism in France, where the unstable elements of the Communist Party are said to be under the influence of a petty-bourgeois, reformist ideology. The second was a polemic against revisionist views in economics, and included attacks on Milovan Djilas, the British Labor Party and the late Karl Kautsky. The third of the three articles took up the cudgels against the Italian revisionist "renegades" in the first place, against Gioletti and Reale.

The Soviet Communist Party Secretariat, which is ultimately responsible for the contents of Pravda, is obviously worried by the lack of ideological cohesion in the international Communist camp. On no account, therefore, must the campaign against revisionism be allowed to die down. Pravda must continue to set the example to the Communist Parties the world over in unmasking the revisionist heresy.

It will be remembered that the campaign started on 22nd November last year, when the Declaration of the twelve Communist Parties of the Sino-Soviet bloc was published. This Declaration contained attacks both on revisionism and dogmatism, but it was emphasized beyond any doubt that revisionism was to be considered as the main danger. Soon after the publication of the resolution the big guns of the Soviet propaganda apparatus went into action. Fedoseyev, director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences, Konstantinov, head of the Central Committee Department for Education and Propaganda, and Shevlyagin, another high official of the Central Committee, all contributed elaborate treatises on the revisionist problem to the Central Party organs. Lesser theoreticians were mobilized for similar exegeses in the provincial newspapers. The other ideological danger mentioned in the Declaration of the twelve Parties, namely, dogmatism, or to speak more bluntly, Stalinism, was all but forgotten.

Of course, this propaganda blast was not only intended for Russian home consumption, it was also broadcast to other countries. Since the 22 November, Moscow Radio has put several dozen anti-revisionist commentaries out on the air. One particular commentary called, "Revisionism, the main Danger", was broadcast in February as many as twenty-one times within five days. The strategy of this Soviet anti-revisionist Radio propaganda clearly shows where the weakest points lie from the Kremlin's point of view. The largest volume of anti-revisionist attacks were beamed on Yugoslavia, and the next largest on Hungary. Poland, Rumania, and China ranked next in importance as anti-revisionist targets.

So there is no doubt that the Soviet Communist Party has faithfully carried out the injunction of the twelve-Power Declaration to wage an all-out struggle against the revisionist heresy. But to what extent did the other Communist Parties follow the Soviet lead? Those who proved to be the most docile were the

Czechoslovak and Bulgarian Communists. Moscow Radio can almost completely dispense with broadcasting anti-revisionist statements to Czechoslovakia since that job is done in Prague and Bratislava to the full satisfaction of the Kremlin. Indeed, the Czechoslovak propaganda offensive against revisionism has been the most voluminous and the most militant throughout Eastern Europe. Czech Communist propagandists have particularly excelled in denouncing revisionism in Poland, and this has also been a preoccupation of the Bulgarian communists.

The Communist Party of the Soviet zone of Germany, on the other hand, has lagged somewhat behind in the first part of the campaign. It gained greater momentum only after the purge in East German politburo at the beginning of February. Those expelled, especially Schirdewan, were accused of having put a brake on the anti-revisionist effort. The Rumanian communists appear to have been particularly hesitant in joining the new propaganda drive, no doubt out of regard for the Yugoslavs. This is not the first time that they have taken this attitude. Last year, too, they tried as much as possible to keep out of the polemics between the Communist bloc and the Yugoslavs. However, it looks as if the Rumanian Communist Headquarters were finally persuaded to be more active on the anti-revisionist front, and more anti-revisionist material has appeared in print in Bucharest since the end of February. When signing a joint statement with a Hungarian Communist delegation at the beginning of March, the Rumanian Communists pledged themselves to both the fight against revisionism and to the liquidation of dogmatism and sectarianism. It seems that the Hungarian Communists of the Kadar persuasion are particularly anxious to denounce sectarianism and dogmatism along with revisionism since they are still worried about the strong Stalinist wing in the Party.

Those who have been least inclined to accept Moscow's guidance on the problem of revisionism are the Poles. The Polish Communist leadership, it is true, did silence the revisionist press organs last autumn, but this was before the publication of the Moscow Declaration. During the last few months, the official Polish Communist propagandists have paid little attention to the revisionist problem, and Gomulka told a correspondent of the London Times in February that revisionism in Poland was never strong and is now disappearing. Moreover, the Polish Communist weekly, Polityka, which is believed to be close to Gomulka, has at least on two occasions urged for moderation in the anti-revisionist campaign. This was done especially in an article, last January, which compared the well-known Hungarian revisionist Professor Lukacs with Galileo, thus suggesting that the attacks on Lukacs may be invalidated one day, in the same way as was criticism of Galileo.

These discrepancies in the anti-revisionist campaign in Eastern Europe, ranging from the violence of Prague, the caution of Budapest, to the scepticism of Warsaw, would in themselves be sufficient reasons for Moscow to continue with its anti-revisionist battle cries and to make them even louder and more offensive. However, there are other reasons, too - particularly the inroads revisionism has made into the Western Communist Parties, which is the subject of the latest Pravda articles.