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CPSU MAKES FRONTAL ATTACK ON COMMUNES

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Introduction

The most blatant and open criticism which has yet been made by the CPSU during this year of Mao Tse-tung's chief "contribution" to Marxism-Leninism, the communes, is contained in the latest issue of Kommunist (No. 12, 1961). The article, which breaks the uneasy truce in the Sino-Soviet dispute arrived at in Moscow last November, is written by Pavel Fedorovich Yudin, a former Soviet ambassador to Peking and one of the foremost theoreticians in the USSR. Yudin is a full member of the Central Committee, CPSU, and is also a former editor of the Cominform magazine, "For Lasting Peace, for People's Democracy". He can therefore be assumed to be speaking with the full backing of the Presidium.

His article deals with the transition from socialism to Communism, and after pointing out that in industrially developed countries the solution of the peasant problem is not as important as in the USSR or Chinese People's Republic, he gives a warning that direct transition from capitalism to communism is impossible without passing through the "cleansing fire" of socialism.

He then turns to a frontal assault on the communes which deserves to be translated in full:

"The natural process of transition from socialism to communism is determined by the fact that at a certain stage the gigantic development of science, technology, and labor productivity permits a sharp leap forward, the creation of an abundance of material goods and on this basis the transformation of socialist social relations into communist social relations.

"The desire of people alone, however great it may be, is obviously insufficient for transition to the highest phase. As has already been said, only the coincidence of the subjective aspirations of people with the objective trend of social development, a coincidence based on the knowledge and utilization of social laws, can accelerate the movement to communism. Therefore attempts at the premature introduction of the principles and elements of communism cannot be crowned with success. History is evidence of this.

"It is well known, for example, that during the period of collectivization in the USSR, attempts were made here and there to organize rural communes, that is to socialize not only the basic means of production but also minor implements, all the livestock, poultry, etc. However nothing came of this. The communes did not have a sufficient economic base, they were the result of an unfounded leap over certain stages of development, and therefore they died out almost as soon as they were born. Haste and the violation of the historic laws of development can only bring harm. The subsequent development of socialism in the countryside has shown that the transition from rural artels to the rural communes is in general not a necessary condition for building communism."

Yudin then explains, by quoting the draft program of the CPSU, that the transition to communist forms of relations is a consequence of the building of the material-technical base. This he defines as complete electrification, complex mechanization, increasingly full automation, an advanced chemicals industry, the rational use of natural resources, production based on scientific methods and a high level of cultural and technical ability among the workers. His readers in Peking will certainly note that all of these prerequisites were lacking when their communes program was originally forced through in 1958.

It seems, to judge by Yudin, as though "Not By Bread Alone" is still causing concern to the men in the Kremlin. At least this inference might well be drawn from a passage in which Yudin writes:

"The enemies of communism, attempting somehow to weaken the influence of the draft Program on men's minds, are descending to long-winded arguments to the effect that man is not satisfied with bread alone... But without bread there is neither freedom, nor justice, nor prosperity. The ideologists of the bourgeoisie are attempting to conceal this truth. But it is understood by the workers."

Thus Yudin does not answer either the question raised in Dudintsev's book or that asked by the critics of the draft Program. Instead he makes a platitudinous assertion with which no one is likely to take issue.

As Yudin must be well aware, the point of the book was not to ask whether freedom is possible without bread, but whether bread without freedom is enough. One wonders whether he cannot, or dare not, give an answer.



Towards the end of his article Yudin appears to be arguing against both domestic and Chinese critics of the slowness of the emergence of the promised land when he writes that:

"the gradualism of the transition from socialism to communism...must not be interpreted as some kind of retarded movement. On the contrary, it is a time of swift development of contemporary industry, large-scale mechanized agriculture, of the economy and culture with the active constructive participation of millions of builders of communism."

If this is supposed to soothe the feelings of the "speed-up" experts in the East, Yudin's open denunciation of the communes seems likely to have precisely the contrary effect.

r.r.g.

IS CLEAVAGE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA INEVITABLE?

By Lord Lindsay of Birker (Michael Lindsay)  
The Annals  
July 1961

Abstract: Although there are many issues about which China and the Soviet Union could quarrel and although there is strong evidence of some disagreements, the two regimes have an overwhelming common motive for maintaining solidarity against the outside world so long as both remain committed to Communist orthodoxy. Many of the predictions of future Sino-Soviet conflict erroneously assume that the Communist leaders, no matter what they say, play the traditional game of power politics. In fact, considerations of boundary, population, and so on are less important to the Communists than differences over the strategy which they should follow in their struggle against the non-Communist world. The Chinese position might be described as Marxist fundamentalism. There are two basic issues in the disagreement: the actual balance of power between Communist and non-Communist leaders, especially in the United States, to act in terms of rational self-interest. Since the controversy is entirely over strategy and timing, it does not necessarily involve any disruption of basic Communist solidarity. It may well become less heated if Chinese leaders come to realize that the balance of power in their favor is less decisive than they have claimed and if Soviet policy toward non-Communist powers becomes somewhat more intransigent to meet Chinese criticism. Soviet leadership by Khrushchev or in his spirit makes other developments less likely.--Ed.

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The answer to this question could be summed up in one sentence: Although there are many issues about which China and the Soviet Union could quarrel and although there is strong evidence of some disagreements, nevertheless, the two regimes have an overwhelming common motive for maintaining solidarity against the outside world so long as both remain committed to Communist orthodoxy.

This common motive was extremely clearly explained by Dr. George Modelski in his recent study of the Communist international system.<sup>1</sup> The Communist leaders can now see the possibility of a world in which first the preponderance and then the monopoly of power would be held by Communists. When Khrushchev says that in a few years' time one half of the world's industrial output will be produced in the Communist system, it is this future world which he sees as coming within his grasp through a shift in the world balance of power. Yet, it is just as plain that without China -- or, even less, in the face of opposition from China -- such a state of affairs would be complete-

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<sup>1</sup> George Modelski, The Communist International System (Research Monograph No. 9) (Princeton: Princeton Center of International Studies, 1960), pp. 54-55.



ly unattainable, no matter how powerful the Soviet Union herself might become. What more compelling image could there be for Communist leaders, what more powerful incentive to unity and solidarity, than this revolutionary prospect of a Communist world, now at last within reach?

This picture...is built into the essential structure of every Communist state and party. The parties -- above all the CPSU and the CCP -- are committed to a Communist world, and hence to Communist solidarity, not merely on the verbal level, but through the direct link between the extension of Communism and the domestic legitimacy of their own totalitarian regimes. The Communist Party's claim to total power, its justification of its monopoly of all key positions, is based on its claim of working for the "construction of communism" both at home and abroad. Communism will not have been constructed...unless it has become universal. Hence a struggle for the international expansion of communism is a justification of political monopoly at home and cannot be abandoned without giving up the essential justification of one-party rule.

#### Existing Traditional Motives

A great many of the predictions of future Sino-Soviet conflict ignore this basic ideological motive and assume that, whatever the Communist leaders may say, they must really be playing the traditional game of power politics with the same sort of concepts of national interest that have motivated other great powers in the past.

#### Territory

In terms of such motivations, there are a number of possible points of conflict. In terms of nationalist motives -- recovering China irridenta -- China could make strong claims for the major part of Eastern Siberia. The Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 fixed the boundary as the northern watershed of the Amur, and a nationalistic Chinese could plausibly argue that this was the last agreement voluntarily negotiated on the Chinese side, that later changes of boundary up to the cession of the Maritime Province in 1860 were made under duress. And nationalist, anti-Communist Chinese have reproached the Peking government for failing to press Chinese claims against the Soviet Union with the same vigor as Chinese claims in other directions.

Mongolia is another object of contention. It had been conquered by the Manchus in the late seventeenth century and officially remained part of China until 1946, but in the early 1920's it became the first Soviet satellite state. Recently there has been some evidence of attempts to restore Chinese influence, and, as Dr. Modelski points out, the Mongolian government has been able to get greater independence by playing off China against Russia.

Further west, there are more points at which China could claim Russian encroachments on a historical frontier, and, on the Russian side, there are disappointed aspirations for expansion. By 1940 the Soviet government had far more influence than the Chinese national government in Sinkiang, a province in which the great majority of the population came from the same racial groups as the native population of Soviet Central Asia. It seemed likely for a time that Sinkiang would follow Mongolia in becoming a Soviet satellite, but, in fact, Chinese control has been completely restored and Soviet influence eliminated.

Thus, right along the Sino-Soviet border, one can find historical claims or expansionist aspirations which could produce disputes between nationalistic governments. However, none of the possible issues would seem to be of the kind which either regime would regard as touching its vital national interests. They could touch off a conflict if the Chinese and Soviet governments thought of themselves as rivals in a struggle for power, but they would not be likely to override the powerful motives for maintaining Communist solidarity.

### Population

One argument which is quite often heard, but is almost certainly invalid, is that Chinese population pressure might produce an attempt to expand into Siberia and that the Soviet leaders are afraid of this. There are two fallacies in this argument. Firstly, the Chinese Communist leaders have repeatedly and strongly denied that there is a problem of overpopulation in China. There was some modification of this position during the more liberal period in 1956 and 1957, but, since then, it has again become heretical to suggest that an overpopulation problem is possible. If the Chinese leaders take their own doctrines seriously, it is not likely that they would make plans based on a view which they denounce as a heresy against Marx-Leninism. Secondly, even if the Chinese Communist leaders changed their views and started to maintain that the Chinese were Volk ohne Raum, expansion northwards would not be the most attractive possibility. There might be considerable gains in mineral resources, but, in terms of food supply, the possible gains from expanding southward would be far greater. Mongolia has large nomadic grazing areas but very little cultivation, and Eastern Siberia has only limited agricultural potentialities. On the other hand, the area from Burma to Viet-Nam has, even now, a large exportable surplus of rice, and production could be very greatly increased by bringing more land under cultivation and raising agricultural techniques to the Chinese level.

### Ideology

Visitors to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe do report expressions of suspicion and fear about the rising power of China. It is understandable that people in the Soviet Union should feel some resentment that the unquestioned supremacy of



the Soviet Union within the Communist bloc may be disappearing through the rise of China as another great power and that people in Eastern Europe should feel alarmed that the rather milder Soviet system of the post-Stalin era may be replaced by more doctrinaire influence from China. It is the Communist regimes with most to fear from a relaxation of the police state which have tended recently to side with China in doctrinal disputes. But even if such resentments and fears are widespread, they need not necessarily produce a cleavage so long as the Communist leaders in all countries continue to feel that they face a hostile capitalist world.

There is probably a valid analogy with the position in the non-Communist world. The shift in power and leadership from the United Kingdom to the United States has certainly produced some resentments and some anti-American feelings, and some Communists have drawn the conclusion that a cleavage in the non-Communist world is inevitable. In one of his last major pronouncements, Stalin argued that war between the capitalist powers was more likely than war between the capitalist and Communist parts of the world. In fact, the resentments between the major powers of the non-Communist world have never been strong enough to produce a serious cleavage in the alliance based on fear of Communist aggression. Similarly, people in the Soviet Union may resent the growing power of China, the two leaderships may compete for influence over local Communist parties in various parts of the world, the Chinese may feel resentful about the limited economic support they have been getting from the Soviet Union and so on. But there is no real reason to suppose that these feelings will lead to cleavage in the Communist bloc so long as it continues to face a non-Communist world presumed to be irreconcilably hostile.

#### A Hypothetical Cause

The situation would, of course, change completely if future Communist successes eliminated the non-Communist world or left any remaining non-Communist regimes obviously dependent on Communist tolerance for their continued existence. The main motive for maintaining Sino-Soviet solidarity would then have disappeared and domination of the Communist bloc would mean domination of the world. The only remaining threat to the power of the Communist party of the Soviet Union would then be the Chinese Communist party, and vice versa. It is extremely unlikely that such a situation would be stable, with the leaders on both sides brought up in a political tradition of eliminating any threats to Communist power. Even if each of the rival parties did not start with deliberate plans to eliminate the only remaining threat to its power, mutual suspicions that there might be such plans would be almost certain to produce them. Each side would come to feel that, in self-defense, it had to secure world dominance. Any of the possible points of dispute which have been mentioned above might then start off a conflict. This is, of course, a prediction about a hypothetical situation but, in so far as one can judge from historical analogies, this sort of power politics situation always ends with a single center of power.

Though a Sino-Soviet conflict might become extremely likely if the non-Communist powers had been defeated, this is not a contingency of much present interest to the non-Communist world. Its only important relevance is to Bertrand Russell's argument that surrender would be preferable to atomic warfare. If surrender of the non-Communist world led directly to a universal world empire, then surrender might have a good chance of buying at least several centuries of peace. Surrender to a Communist system with two centers of power would be very unlikely to buy more than a few years of peace. And there does not seem to be any reason for believing that the large-scale use of nuclear weapons would be less likely in a Sino-Soviet war than in a war between Communist and non-Communist powers. The logic of Bertrand Russell's argument would, therefore, imply that the only way to remove the danger of atomic war would be for the non-Communist world to surrender before China has developed a serious capacity for atomic warfare.

### The Existing Dispute

The actual dispute between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties has been about the strategy which the Communist camp should follow in its struggle against the non-Communist world. The Chinese position might be described as Marxist fundamentalism. One can find in Chinese publications a number of continually recurring themes which add up to a logically consistent position based on simple dogmatic Marxism.

There is the theme of the complete dependence of thought on class status. For example:<sup>2</sup>

Are there sentiments common to different classes? We differ from the revisionists fundamentally on this question. The Marxists think that in a class society, there is a class for everybody, and his thought and sentiments bear, without exception, his class brand. Therefore, there is fundamentally no possibility for people of different classes to share common sentiments. The revisionists think otherwise.....

There is the theme that the masses everywhere are already on the Communist side. For instance, "ninety percent of the people of the capitalist world population demand revolution, demand world peace, and demand the joint support of the socialist camp, particularly of the Soviet Union and China."<sup>3</sup>

A very important theme is that the capitalist powers, and, in particular, the United States, are bound to be aggressive from the very nature of their social system. Liu Shao-ch'i said:<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> From an article in Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien, No. 11 (June 1, 1960), translated in JPRS, No. 6018 (September 26, 1960).

<sup>3</sup> From an article in Hung Ch'i, No. 1 (January 1, 1961), translated in SCMP, No. 244 (January 16, 1961).

<sup>4</sup> Peking Review, June 7, 1960, pp. 6-7.



More and more people have now come to realize that although U.S. imperialism may make this or that change in its tactics at different times, and employ its two tactics -- the policy of war preparation and "peace" deceptions -- simultaneously or alternatively, its inherent nature and wild ambition to dominate the whole world and to enslave its peoples will never change.

An article in Hung Ch'i declares that it is "subjectivist logic divorced from reality" to hold that the mutually suicidal character of nuclear war may make imperialism unwilling to start one.<sup>5</sup>

The various contradictions inherent in the imperialist system cause it to adopt the policy of armaments expansion and war preparations and to engage in aggression and plunder.... It is in the course of development of these contradictions, which is independent of human will, that imperialism is daily approaching its doom.

A corollary of this is drawn in a statement by Mao Tse-tung which is quoted again and again. After describing the unchangeably aggressive nature of imperialism as "a Marxist law," he concludes, "The question of being provocative or not does not arise: provocation or no provocation, they will remain the same because they are reactionaries."

Other frequently recurring themes are that only force can induce the imperialists to negotiate or to observe agreements; that the forces of imperialism are a "paper tiger" which should not be despised tactically but is contemptible strategically; and that manpower, morale, and inspired Communist leadership are more important than weapons. These themes are often illustrated from the Korean war, always cited as a Communist victory, and from the Chinese civil war, the latter being cited in the flood of articles on the fourth volume of Mao's works.

A firm belief in these themes of Marxist fundamentalism leads logically to a position which the Chinese representatives seem to have taken both at the council meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Peking in June 1960 and at the Communist conference in Moscow in November and December.

According to Foa, a delegate with socialist credentials present in Peking:<sup>6</sup>

The position of the Chinese...was simple and clear. One should not talk of disarming, for disarming is impossible so long as imperialism exists and to talk about it demoralizes the masses of the workers and people, particularly in the countries still subjected to colonial domination.

5 "Refuting the Fallacy That the Nature of Imperialism Has Changed," an article from Hung Ch'i, translated in Peking Review, June 21, 1960.

6 From Corrispondenza Socialista, translated in JPRS, September 22, 1960.

It is an illusion to think that the funds for armaments can be allotted to the development of underdeveloped countries, for the capitalist countries will not in any case acquiesce in such a disposition of the economies from disarming. The trade unions should not deceive the workers about the possibility of improving their conditions so long as imperialism is with us. The sole objective of the trade unions should therefore be that of the all-out, total struggle against imperialism, so as to eradicate it by revolutionary action, creating socialism. The struggle for peace should not leave out of account the distinction to be made between just and unjust wars.

It follows from the Chinese position that negotiations with the imperialist powers cannot be expected to reach any genuine agreement which would reduce the risk of war. Their only value can be to demonstrate the bad faith of the imperialist claims to want peace and so to rally the masses to oppose imperialism. Since "the question of being provocative or not does not arise," it follows that the Communist powers should seize every possible opportunity of extending their influence. The imperialist powers, who can only be impressed by a show of force, will become more inclined to compromise. Under external pressure from the socialist camp and internal pressure from the peace-loving masses, the forces of imperialism can, perhaps, be defeated without a situation ever arising in which they have both the will and the power to resort to a major war in attempting to avoid their inevitable doom. And this strategy is the only one which offers any real hope of avoiding another world war.

This is the standpoint from which the Chinese and their supporters seem to have argued at the Moscow conference. And it is a standpoint which implies criticism of Soviet policy as coming dangerously near to revisionism. The Soviet government has shown signs of willingness to enter into serious negotiations with the non-Communist powers, as opposed to negotiations primarily designed to expose imperialist bad faith. The Soviet leaders appear to have been influenced by the argument that large-scale nuclear warfare would be mutually suicidal and have seemed to consider that the question of provocation did arise -- that, at least for the immediate future, it might be inexpedient to take action likely to provoke the imperialist powers into determined resistance.

### The Basic Success

The disagreement turns on two basic issues, the actual balance of power between the Communist and non-Communist sections of the world, and the ability of non-Communist leadership, particularly in the United States, to act in terms of rational self-interest. The Soviet position follows logically from an estimate that the Communist camp has not yet an overwhelming advantage in balance of power and that the anti-Communist leaders are sufficiently rational not to resort to full-scale nuclear



warfare in an attempt to prevent a further weakening of their position. The Chinese position follows logically from an estimate that the social forces making imperialism aggressive cannot be modified by rational self-interest and that the final over-throw of imperialism is possible in the very near future, because the imperialist forces are such very small minorities, even in the capitalist countries and because their apparent military power is largely a "paper tiger."

An interesting aspect of this disagreement concerns the non-Communist neutralist powers. The Chinese position was conveniently summarized in an article giving Mao Tse-tung's analysis of the countries attaining independence since 1945.<sup>7</sup> These are divided into three categories. First, there are those under proletarian leadership. Second, there are those ruled by the "upper bourgeois class" whose "independence exists in name only," such as the Philippines and Malaya. Third, there are those ruled by the "national bourgeois class" which, though anti-imperialist, are very weak and vacillating allies. An important passage seems to refer especially to India.

But people have seen that in the relations between the individual nationalist countries and the socialist states, there sometimes appeared dark clouds. In other words, an anti-Soviet tide has arisen in some countries. Beginning 1959 there appeared also an anti-Chinese tide. How do we account for this happening? The socialist states are not responsible for this situation. The class nature of our socialist states precludes us from taking an aggressive action against others.... There are two basic factors which are responsible for the present situation. First, the imperialists are taking advantage of the compromising and pendulous nature of the bourgeois class to divide unity and step up their pressure.... Second, the bourgeois rightists and other influential groups are using their opposition to Communism as a pretext to divert the attention of their own people from the current domestic problems which they cannot solve....

It is then argued that this is quite important.

We can say definitely that the workers and peasants of these countries and those who actually demand liberation from imperialism and colonialism show practically no interest in such anti-Chinese movement. Even the small minority of people who have taken part in the anti-Chinese movement will eventually change their views.... We have truth and righteousness on our side. Our struggle is one with reason, advantages and rhythm. Hence we are in complete control of the initiative of action....

<sup>7</sup> "Study Chairman Mao's Dialogue on Questions of Democracy in Colonial and Semi-colonial Countries." Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien, No. 9, May 1, 1960, translated in JPRS, No. 3904, September 13, 1960.

## NOT TO BE MICROFICED

From this Chinese analysis it follows that it is not particularly important to try to conciliate the leadership of the major neutralist countries. And since the "national bourgeoisie" are a weak and vacillating group destined to be overthrown by further social progress under proletarian -- Communist -- leadership, there is little to be gained by economic aid on a scale which might enable a national bourgeois regime to postpone its economic failure, though economic aid might be justified as a tactical measure to secure a neutralist national bourgeois regime rather than an imperialist controlled "upper bourgeois" one.

Soviet policy has obviously been based on a different analysis which concedes at least the medium term stability of some national bourgeois regimes and which recognizes that it may be important to conciliate present neutralist leaders and that rash Communist action could produce a serious anti-Communist movement in the neutralist countries. The large-scale Soviet assistance to India, the refusal to support the Chinese position in the border dispute, and the supply of equipment to be used in building strategic roads to the disputed border areas all suggest that the Soviet leadership has been determined to maintain a policy based on its analysis of the situation even when this is unwelcome to the Chinese.

### Conclusions

It seems clear that this Sino-Soviet controversy has been a bitter one. The Soviet delegates are said to have walked out of one session of the WFTU meeting in Peking and, apparently in retaliation, the Chinese cancelled the sending of representatives to the World Congress of Orientalists in Moscow. The proceedings at the Communist congress in Moscow seem to have been very heated, and the leaking to non-Communist commentators of reports of these heated discussions was an unusual breach of Communist secrecy. Even so, the forces for solidarity remained decisive and the Congress produced an agreed statement in which the main concessions seem to have come from the Chinese. The passage on national democracies seem to be nearer the Soviet than the Chinese analysis. Another important passage is the reference to Social Democratic parties. By conceding that a restoration of a working class "united front" is necessary for the effective exertion of mass pressure on imperialist governments, the document implicitly repudiates the Chinese claim that the great majority of the population, even in non-Communist countries, is already demanding support from the Communist powers against these rulers.

Though the declaration of December 1960 was claimed as a demonstration of Communist solidarity, it did not really settle the main issues in dispute, and it seems clear that there is still a divergence between the Chinese and Soviet positions. The Chinese position has an obvious power of attraction within the Communist movement through its promises of rapid and complete victory and through its appeal to a simple dogmatic Marxism.



Looking to the future, one can see two possible lines of development. The most likely is that the Sino-Soviet controversy will continue. Since it is a controversy entirely about timing and strategy, it does not necessarily involve any disruption of the basic Communist solidarity. It may well become less heated if Chinese leaders come to realize that the balance of power in favor of the Communist camp is not as decisive as they have claimed and if Soviet policy to the non-Communist powers becomes rather more intransigent in order to meet Chinese criticism.

A much less likely development is that Chinese accusations of revisionism and fear of the consequences of Chinese adventurism might eventually drive the Soviet leadership into actual revisionism. The signs of such a development would be a formal Soviet denunciation of the Chinese position as heretical and a new Soviet attempt to reach a reconciliation with Yugoslavia. It is only through such developments, which seem very unlikely so long as Khrushchev remains in power, that the Sino-Soviet controversy could lead to an actual Sino-Soviet cleavage.

THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM IN COMMUNIST CHINA

By Harold C. Hinton  
Current Scene  
July 19, 1961

The safest approach to the problem of the succession to power in a totalitarian state is the one recommended for the Soviet Union by Ambassador Bohlen. You should stand outside the Kremlin at a time of "intra-party struggle" and identify the bodies as they are carried out. These, to adapt a phrase of Lenin's, are the whom's; the survivors are, or at least include, the who's. But the game can also be played in other, if less satisfactory, ways, and it need not be confined to the Soviet Union; it can also be played with Communist China as its object.

Mao Tse-tung

Indeed, it needs to be so played. Contrary to the impression often conveyed by the Chinese Communist press, Mao Tse-tung, born December 25, 1893, and allegedly still going strong, is presumably mortal. The press again notwithstanding, his health has long been indifferent and may well be getting worse. He has had occasional bouts of serious illness, most notably at the beginning of 1954.<sup>1</sup> Ordinarily overweight, he appears in a photograph evidently taken in the late summer of 1958 or the early spring of 1959 about fifty pounds lighter than usual, his clothes and jowls hanging in empty folds.<sup>2</sup> For many years he has been a heavy smoker. For this or some other reason, he coughs frequently while speaking and tries to avoid long speeches.

<sup>1</sup> Mao was out of public view from approximately December 24, 1953, when he allegedly put forward a proposal for "strengthening party unity" at a Politburo meeting (see communique of Fourth Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee, New China News Agency, Peking, 18 Feb. 1954), until March 23, 1954, when he reappeared as chairman of the Committee for Drafting the Constitution. He was said to be "away on holiday" at the time of the Fourth Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee (February 6-10, 1954; see the communique). In the same month units of the "People's Liberation Army" were told by various delegations of a large "comfort mission" from Peking that Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh are both in very good health" (NCNA, Urumchi, 11 March 1954).

<sup>2</sup> This photograph shows Mao sitting as chairman of the National Defense Council and must therefore date from before April 1959, when Mao gave up that post along with the chairmanship of the Republic. The individual who showed it to the writer (in March 1960) had just received it from China and was under the impression that it had been taken recently. All individuals in the photograph are wearing summer uniforms, and there are leaves on the trees in the background.



On May Day, 1960, he appeared in public with his left arm at least partly paralyzed. Strokes, and perhaps cancer, would seem to be indicated. He appears currently to be considerably less active than he was during his post-1949 peak in 1956 and 1957 and to be making most of his public pronouncements through the pen of the pseudonymous "Yü Chao-li" whose first blast on the trumpet against the monstrous regiment of imperialism appeared in Red Flag on August 16, 1958, one week before the beginning of the Quemoy bombardment. Mao does not encourage the public celebration of his birthday, perhaps because he does not like to receive unnecessary intimations of approaching immortality. It will be interesting to see whether his body will be put on public display in a mausoleum when the time comes, in the manner of Sun Yat-sen, Lenin, and Stalin.

There is surely no need to stress the pre-eminent role that Mao has played in the Chinese Communist movement during the past quarter of a century. He has been the Chinese analogue of both Lenin and Stalin. The passing of this titan will inevitably tend to leave a vacuum partial rather than total, and almost equally obvious that Mao must desire the transition after his death or incapacitation to be as smooth as possible. The example of Stalin, who failed to pave the way for any intended successor, must be in Mao's mind. The downfall of Malenkov, whom Stalin appears to have envisaged as his successor,<sup>3</sup> occurred late in June 1957 -- at a time when the Chinese party was in the midst of a serious crisis occasioned among other things by the disastrous ending of the free speech or "blooming and contending" phase of the Party rectification movement which Mao had personally sponsored -- and probably helped to bring the Chinese succession problem to the top of their agenda.

### Preparations for the Succession

Thought had already been given to the problem. In September 1956, the First Session of the party's Eighth National Congress had created the post of honorary chairman of the Central Committee, still unfilled but obviously intended for the time when Mao might wish, or be forced by illness, to retire and designed as a vantage point from which he could supervise the transition.<sup>4</sup> In the original, though not in the published, version of his celebrated speech on contradictions of February 27, 1957, Mao had alluded in a rather cryptic way to the succession problem, implying that he might soon retire and that Chou-En-lai would then be in effective charge of affairs.<sup>5</sup> Later in the year the press sought to counteract the impression of a leader

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Wolfgang Leonhard, Kreml ohne Stalin, Cologne, 1959, p. 88.

<sup>4</sup> A comparable military rank, also unfilled as yet, that of Supreme Marshal, had been created in February 1955.

<sup>5</sup> The source of this information is a Chinese who held responsible positions on the Chinese mainland from 1950 to 1957 and listened to a tape recording of the original speech.

verging on senile/decreptitude by alleging that Mao had recently swum, or more accurately floated and paddled across, the Yangtze.

It seems possible to construct a reasonable facsimile of Mao's views on the succession question. He would claim that the future leadership of the party will be, allegedly like the present one, a "collective leadership," but he surely realizes that in the future as in the past one man will almost certainly become, sooner or later, more equal than the others. The question is: Who is the man most likely to succeed?

If one ignores Mao's somewhat cryptic remarks about Chou-En-lai in February 1957, the identity of his preferred candidate seems fairly clear. At the very highest level there have been almost no major changes in the order of precedence in the party since about 1945. This means that for more than half the duration of Mao's hegemony over the party the effective second position in the Politburo has been held by his fellow-Hunanese Liu Shao-ch'i. This fact alone creates a strong presumption that Liu is Mao's choice for the succession, and that if Mao should die or retire to the honorary chairmanship of the Central Committee the active chairmanship would pass automatically to Liu, in the absence of some reshuffling of the present order of the Politburo membership -- an unlikely although of course possible eventuality. Both Mao and Liu have essentially domestic, as contrasted with Moscow-directed, backgrounds and orientations although Liu, unlike Mao, visited Moscow prior to 1949.<sup>6</sup> Since then both men have confined their foreign travels to the Soviet Union and have never been out of China at the same time. They seem to have rather similar political outlooks, if only because Liu has modeled himself to a degree on Mao. If anything Mao has appeared, at least during the past few years, the more moderate and flexible of the two.

The downfall of Malenkov in 1957 probably helped to remind both men -- although Liu's personal stake is obviously the greater -- of the uncertainties attending the transmission of quasi-totalitarian power from one pair of hands to another. During the next several months, accordingly, Liu seems to have argued for the adoption of a drastic domestic and foreign program which he hoped would strengthen both his own position and that of his regime. Ultimately he was allowed by his colleagues, presumably including Mao but apparently over some objections, to preside over the launching of the "Great Leap Forward" in the spring and summer of 1958, to succeed Mao as head of state in April 1959, and to lead the Chinese delegation to the important conference of Communist Parties (not governments) in Moscow in November and December of 1960.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Liu was a student in Moscow in 1920-21.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Harold C. Hinton, "Intra-Party Politics and Economic Policy in Communist China," World Politics, July 1960, pp. 509-524.



The chairmanship of the People's Republic of China, which passed from Mao to Liu in April 1959, is more than a figurehead post. It has no real parallel in the Soviet Union, where Brezhnev as chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet finds his closest Chinese counterpart in the post of chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, which was held by Liu Shao-ch'i until April 1959 and is now held by Chu Teh. To date, Mao has of course stepped down only with one foot, since he retains the chairmanship of the Politburo and Central Committee of the party pending some more propitious time for its relinquishment. Nevertheless he paradoxically remains more prominent than Liu at those public or quasi-governmental functions at which he appears, whereas, as we have seen, it was Liu rather than Mao who went to Moscow late in 1960 to a purely party conference, whose earlier counterpart in November 1957 Mao had attended but Liu had not.

### The Candidates

Is Liu in fact the man most likely to succeed? In his favor are Mao's support -- to date and to outward appearances at any rate, his long experience in party organization and operations, his high and evidently strong position in the party, and presumably real ability. Against him are his apparently doctrinaire views, his unattractive public personality and image, his allegedly poor relations with at least a portion of the army command, potential or perhaps actual competition from other able and powerful figures in the party, and, it may reasonably be conjectured, a measure of Soviet disfavor. Worse still, perhaps, is his prominent association in 1958 with the "Great Leap Forward," floundering since 1959 in a morass of agricultural shortages. This setback might conceivably place in the hands of his rivals or opponents the crowbar needed to lever him from his position as the lion under the throne. For public confidence seems to be more nearly indispensable to a world-be quasi-dictator in China than to one in the Soviet Union, where in an analogous period Stalin was able to rule the entire country while scarcely traveling outside Moscow and seemed content to have his public image associated with virtually no emotion but that of fear. Mao has not ruled in this way, except to a limited degree, and it is doubtful that he could if he wanted to. Still another count against Liu is the fact that he seems too old to survive Mao by very long. If we take the date most commonly given for his birth, 1898, as correct, he is only five years younger than Mao. Stalin, to be sure, was only nine years younger than Lenin. But Khrushchev, who for all his energy is often rated as too old to have good keeping qualities, was born fifteen years after Stalin, and he has mentioned as his chosen successor Kozlov, who is fourteen years younger than he.

It is time to identify some of Liu's possible competitors for the succession. I think we may assume with reasonable confidence that if in fact one man ultimately gains a real pre-eminence over his colleagues, as seems very likely, he will be some one who is now, or at any rate will be at the time of Mao's death or retirement, a member of the highest party body, namely

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the Politburo -- or to be still more precise, the Standing Committee of the Politburo. For the time being, then, we may for lack of any better working hypothesis confine our search to the five men who, in addition to Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i, make up the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Of these individuals two, Chu Teh and Ch'en Yün, can be tentatively ruled out, Chu on the ground that while popular he is too old and has actually been something of a figurehead for more than twenty years, and Ch'en on the ground that he has been in comparative obscurity and poor health for the past few years; he seems to have busied himself largely with economic planning and administration, a field of activity which in spite of its obvious importance is not readily translatable into decisive political power. The same considerations that weigh against Chu and Ch'en, or some combination of them, would also count against the prospects of several of the regular Politburo members who do not belong to the Standing Committee. This rapid and convenient, if perhaps too easy, process of elimination leaves three men as the leading potential rivals to Liu Shao-ch'i for the succession. They are Chou En-lai, Lin Piao, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing.

Of these the senior, although not necessarily the most formidable in the long run, is Chou En-lai, who ranks third in the party and also holds the important governmental post of premier. Chou's visible assets are his great ability and charm, his political skill and durability -- indicated by the fact that he has the longest record of continuous service on the Politburo of any member of the party -- his strong bureaucratic position, his allegedly good connections with the army, his relatively favorable public image, and possibly a fairly high standing in Moscow. Against him are his comparative inactivity in the field of party organizational work, his possibly unjustified reputation as a man good at executing policy but not at originating it, and his probably justified reputation for comparative moderation at least toward the non-Communist world. Another handicap is the fact that he was born in 1898, the same year we have tentatively accepted for Liu Shao-ch'i, and may therefore be too old to be more than a transitional figure in the post-Maoist leadership of the party.

Another possible contender is Marshal Lin Piao, who succeeded P'eng Te-huai as Minister of Defense in September 1959. His main assets would appear to be his reputation as a brilliant field commander, his good connections with Mao Tse-tung going back to about 1930, his presumably high standing with the army, the fact that he appears to have been gaining in political influence since 1954, and his comparative youth (he was born in 1908, so that the age gap between him and Mao is the same as that between Khrushchev and Stalin). Against him must be set his relative although not total inexperience in party organization, his uncertain state of health, and the fact that no Communist Party has yet come under the domination of a man with a primarily military background. Lin joined the Politburo by March 1955 and in September 1956 was elected to the highest position on the Politburo below the Standing Committee, to which



he was subsequently elected in May 1958. It is interesting to speculate that he was elected to the Standing Committee in order to break a tie vote within the existing membership on some such important question as the "Great Leap Forward," the lineup possibly being Mao, Liu, and Teng against Chou, Chu, and Ch'en. In any event, Lin has been listed since then ahead of Teng Hsiao-p'ing on the Standing Committee.

Teng himself is the final obvious possibility. He has in his favor energy, at least some real ability, and a political star which has been rising rapidly since 1952. At the First Session of the Eighth National Congress of the party in September 1956, he gave the important report on the revised party constitution, a function which had been performed by Liu Shao-ch'i at the Seventh National Congress in 1945. Teng holds a position in the party which comes closer than does that of any one else to that which enabled Stalin to capture control of the Soviet party in the 1920's, although the resemblance is by no means complete. Teng sits on the Standing Committee of the Politburo, heads the Central Committee's Secretariat, and is a Vice Premier and a Vice Chairman of the National Defense Council. He is thus a tripod with a foot in each of the three power systems of the Chinese Communist regime -- the party, the bureaucracy, and the armed forces, the police apparently not being united or powerful enough to be ranked as a distinct system. This position gives him an exceptional opportunity and responsibility to observe and coordinate and, at least potentially, to control as well. He is the only member of the Chinese party known to have attended all of the three most important conferences in Moscow since Stalin's death, those of 1956, 1957, and 1960. His main handicaps seem to be the dislike which his arrogance and evident ambition have probably aroused in some quarters, his questionable health,<sup>8</sup> and his indifferent public image. As for his views, it might be noted that in 1958, while the "Great Leap Forward" was at its height, the tone of Teng's public pronouncements was one of the most strident militancy.<sup>9</sup>

#### The Unforeseeable Future

A major possible way of learning something more about the actual power situation would obviously be another party congress. The current party constitution provides that a new congress shall be elected every five years, so that elections ought to be held in the summer of 1961 and the Ninth National Congress ought to meet no later than September 1961. As yet (June 1961), however, no such announcement has been made. The constitution also provides that the congress delegates so elected shall meet

<sup>8</sup> An interesting photograph published in The China Quarterly, January-March 1961, before p. i, shows Teng leaning on a cane and standing in the center of a group whose other members (left to right) are Mikoyan, Liu Shao-ch'i, Khrushchev, Kozlov, Suslov, and P'eng Chen.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Teng's remarks on urban "people's communes" (NCNA, Peking, 30 September 1958).

once a year, but they did not meet in 1957, in 1959, in 1960, or in 1961 to date. Mao might choose the next congress as the occasion for announcing his retirement to the honorary chairmanship of the Central Committee. If, as seems likely, Liu still ranks immediately below Mao at that time, this step would presumably indicate a determination on Mao's part to maximize Liu's chances of succeeding him. Barring that, the congress should in any case provide some evidence, even if mainly of a negative kind, as to who is still who in Communist China.

The Communist Party of China has probably not settled the succession definitely yet, and there is no reason why we should attempt to relieve it of this responsibility. But if there must be speculation, let it be intelligent speculation based on the available evidence, rather than the mere consulting of the clouded crystal ball. There are clearly other factors beside the characteristics and current positions of the leading candidates that might have a bearing on the outcome.

It seems likely that Mao's death or incapacitation will be followed by a rather fluid power situation wearing the label of collective leadership. Respected figureheads may be useful, then even more than now, as devices for neutralizing certain positions while the tug-of-war goes on elsewhere, and for providing a facade of respectability for the entire situation. Possible examples, any of whom -- like the men already mentioned -- might of course predecease Mao, are Chu Teh, who was probably given the chairmanship of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in April 1959 because he was a sort of least common denominator acceptable to all groups concerned, including the army, and thus helped to counterbalance Liu's controversial elevation to the chairmanship of the Republic; Tung Pi-wu, the senior vice chairman of the Republic and the only founding member of the party beside Mao himself who is still active, in whose elderly hands it is evidently thought safe to leave the party's Control Committee; and the non-Communist Soong Ching-ling (Mme. Sun Yat-sen), now serving as junior vice chairman of the Republic.

As already indicated, the police do not seem strong enough to play the kind of role that Beria tried to play in the Soviet Union during the months following Stalin's death. The army is another matter. By no means a monolith where matters of military doctrine are concerned,<sup>10</sup> it can be said to have views on a number of questions of a political or semi-political character and to press them on its civilian colleagues with considerable vigor from time to time, although not always with success. It is hard to believe that it would remain indifferent if a power struggle should develop within the Forbidden City. Among its possible courses of action, its first choice would probably be to intervene, preferably behind the scenes, with a view to restoring at least the semblance of collective

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Alice L. Hsieh, "Communist China and Nuclear Warfare," The China Quarterly, April-June 1960, pp. 1-12.



leadership. Its next choice would probably be to support one contender against another; for example, it might well prefer Chou En-lai to Lin Piao to Liu Shao-ch'i or Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Finally, as a last resort it might seize power itself, but neither the Chinese nor the Communist tradition looks with favor on military dictatorship. It is of course quite conceivable that a split within the party would paralyze the army by producing a corresponding split within its ranks as well.

As Beria's behavior after Stalin's death<sup>11</sup> illustrates, control of the capital city means a great deal when power hangs in the balance. At present the highest party and governmental posts in the Peking municipality are held by P'eng Chen, a Politburo member of forceful personality who is apparently close to Liu Shao-ch'i. P'eng Chen attended the Moscow Conference in November and December of 1960 and, like Teng Hsiao-p'ing and three others (Li Fu-ch'un, T'ian Chen-lin, and Li Hsien-nien), sits on the Secretariat as well as on the Politburo.

Just as Stalin's heirs seem to have feared that their "imperialist" enemies or their own people might take advantage of their master's death to move against them and hence begged their party not to give way to "disorder and panic,"<sup>12</sup> so the Chinese Communist leadership may fear that Mao's death might be taken by their enemies as the signal for some sort of lunge. If a succession struggle should occur in a context of famine and popular unrest, it might in fact encourage the Nationalists to try their much-mooted "return to the mainland."<sup>13</sup> On the other hand, the fact that such possibilities, whose likelihood the Chinese Communists may well tend to exaggerate, exist is likely to make them anxious to present a sufficiently united front as not to give an opening to their enemies.

Isaac Deutscher makes the rather questionable statement that the Chinese Communists supported the "anti-party group" -- how is not clear -- in their unsuccessful test of strength with Khrushchev in June 1957.<sup>14</sup> The only evidence of which I am aware, tending to confirm this theory, is the air of less-than-

11 Beria's MVD troops surrounded Moscow on the night of March 6-7, 1953, although not necessarily in order to exert pressure on the party leadership; the aim may have been merely to ensure the latter's security (Leonhard, op. cit., p. 81.

12 Ibid., p. 58.

13 It should be noted, however, that the Dulles-Chiang statement of October 23, 1958, reads in part as follows: "The Government of the Republic of China considers that the restoration of freedom to its people on the mainland is its sacred mission. It believes that the foundation of this mission resides in the minds and hearts of the Chinese people and that the principal means of successfully achieving its mission is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles (nationalism, democracy, and social well-being) and not the use of force...." (The New York Times, 24 October 1958).

14 Isaac Deutscher, "Khrushchev, Mao, and Stalin's Ghost," The Reporter, 19 February 1959.

complete enthusiasm with which the news of Khrushchev's narrow triumph was reported in the Chinese press. In any case, relations between the two parties have deteriorated considerably since that time,<sup>15</sup> and it is not inconceivable that a hypothetical succession struggle in Peking might be complicated by Soviet intervention, whether in retaliation for a similar earlier act by the Chinese or not.

A final word of caution about the Soviet analogy. The convulsions in the Soviet party after Stalin's death, while serious, were less severe than some specialists had expected and were due to a large extent to the ruthlessness with which Stalin, through his personal secretariat and his police, had dominated his colleagues, his party, and his country, and to his failure to make effective preparations for the succession. Mao Tse-tung has generally kept a velvet glove pulled over his iron fist, at least in dealing with his fellow-party members, and it may therefore well be that there are fewer subsurface tensions, which might emerge later to wreck a "collective leadership," than was the case in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, as we have seen, Mao has made a greater effort to deal with the succession problem than Stalin made. Certainly the Chinese Communists have learned much from Soviet mistakes as well as from Soviet successes, and it may be that in the matter of the transfer of power they have succeeded in learning perhaps the most important lesson of all, to hang together rather than run the risk of hanging separately.

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15 Cf. Donald S. Zagoria, "Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance," Problems of Communism, May-June 1960, pp. 1-11; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Patterns and Limits of the Sino-Soviet Dispute," Problems of Communism, September-October 1960, pp. 1-7; Donald S. Zagoria, "Sino-Soviet Friction in Underdeveloped Areas," Problems of Communism, March-April 1961, pp. 1-13; Donald S. Zagoria, "The Future of Sino-Soviet Relations," Asian Survey, April 1961, pp. 3-14; Edward Crankshaw, "Sino-Soviet Rift Held Very Deep," The Washington Post and Times Herald, 12 February 1961; Edward Crankshaw, "Khrushchev and China," The Atlantic Monthly, May 1961, pp. 43-47; Richard Lowenthal, "Diplomacy and Revolution: The Dialectics of a Dispute," The China Quarterly, January-March 1961, pp. 1-24; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Challenge of Change in the Soviet Bloc," Foreign Affairs, April 1961, pp. 430-443.