

14 November 1957

Background Information (USSR)

THE PARTY AND THE POLICE

The resolution of the problem of Party influence in the Soviet Army must inevitably raise the issue of Party control of the secret police. On the basis of his published statements there is no reason to doubt that Marshal Zhukov personally—and the overwhelming majority of the professional officer corps as well—opposed further penetration of the Party functionaries and increased Agit-Prop activities in the Army. As a factor in the controversy between the First Secretary and the Marshal, the Main Political Administration of the Ministry of Defense, which enjoys the status of a Department of the Central Committee (Sovetsky Flot, 12 May 1957 quoting "Instructions of the Central Committee to Organizations of the CPSU in the Soviet Army and Navy") was essentially the extension of the Central Committee Agit-Prop apparatus into the armed forces, supplementary to the omnipresent Party organizations within the Army and Navy units. In the police apparatus, the punitive instrument of the Party, only the latter exist, and there the principle of direct Party control has certainly not been challenged since the liquidation of Beria. Nor can any evidence be produced to document the widely-held belief that the security and counter-intelligence functions of the KGB, particularly in the armed forces, have been significantly reduced in the post-Stalin period. (See "The Soviet Secret Police," edited by S. Wolin and R. Slusser, New York, 1957, p. 58; also Background Information, 2 August 1957.) Today, as Stalin informed the Yugoslavs a decade earlier, the fundamental premise of maintaining power in a mono-Party state still maintains its validity:

"According to the theory of Marxism, the Party should control all the State organs in the country, including the Ministry of State Security." (Letter from the CC CPSU to the CC CPY, 28 March 1948, from "The Soviet Yugoslav Dispute," Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs, London, 1948, p. 15.)

In institutional terms, the unexpected ouster of Marshal G. K. Zhukov as Minister of Defense on the eve of the fortieth anniversary was the exact counterpart of the unexplained removal of Col. General S. N. Kruglov as Minister of Internal Affairs two weeks before the XX Party Congress (see Background Information, 1 February 1956); only the change in the Party status of the Marshal made necessary subsequent action by the Central Committee, as in the case of the anti-Party group four months, and in the case of Marshal L. P. Beria four years, ago. To execute personnel shifts in the command of the secret police, headed since April 1954 by Army General (then Col. General) I. A. Serov, however, only the appointive and removal powers of the Party machine need be exercised. Since these, as was so demonstratively stressed in the CC resolution on Marshal Zhukov, have been "entrusted" to the Secretariat, i.e. N. S. Khrushchev, there is no discernible obstacle to whatever shake-ups the First Secretary may now deem essential. At the XX Party Congress, in accordance with the precept quoted above, Khrushchev claimed that "proper control by the Party and government over the work of the State Security agencies has been established by putting in tested cadres." (Pravda, 15 February, 1956.) Still largely anonymous, these select members of the Khrushchev machine may now move to the front in order to consolidate by coercion the position which their leader has won by persuasion.

Almost nothing is known of the present police leadership at the center. In addition to Army General Serov (full member CC), only K. F. Lunev, Deputy Chairman (candidate member of the CC; awarded Red Banner of Labor, Pravda, 31 October 1957) has been identified as an official of the Committee for State Security

(Radio Moscow, 25 January 1956); in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a single deputy minister, Lt. General S. N. Perevertkin has been listed in published sources (Izvestia, 26 February 1957). In the republics there have been several changes during the past three years, but no evidence of systematic replacement (see below, p. 1); some of these—Strokach (Ukraine), Mordovets (Moldavia), Vaskin (Turkmen), for example—may be actually occupying posts in Moscow. In only one instance has a specific charge been revealed: at the V Plenum of the CC of the Turkmen Communist Party where

"the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and above all of the Minister, Comrade Berdyev, was subjected to sharp criticism for the serious violations of socialist legality permitted by him." (Turkmenskaya Iskra, 3 August 1957.)

The two most recent appointees to head a Ministry of Internal Affairs in peripheral republics provide interesting examples of the Party's cadre policies. In Armenia, G. O. Melkonyan, formerly chief of the CC Department of Administrative and Finance Organs was assigned to police work (15 September 1957) in the Turkmen SSR, the Chairman of the Supreme Court, Kh. N. Baynaev, exchanged judicial robes for a police uniform of Minister of Internal Affairs on orders of the Party (Radio Yerevan, 12 September 1957).\*

In the introductory section to his composite articles on literature Khrushchev associated "Comrade Malenkov" with the "sworn enemy of the Party and the people, the provocateur Beria" (Pravda, 28 August 1957). From sources available here, this was the first revival of the fatal Stalinist epithet which Khrushchev himself had so vigorously criticised in his "secret speech." It has now reappeared in the official journal of the Institute of Law of the Academy of Science, again linked with Beria directly and counterposed to the concept of Party control of the police:

"...the Party itself boldly and frankly raised the question...of the grave violations of legality which had been permitted by J. V. Stalin in the final period of his activity and which became known mainly after the unmasking of the enemy of the people, Beria, and the placing of appropriate Party control over the activity of the organs of State security... The proper control of the Party over the work of all the State organs, including the organs of State security, has been established." (N. G. Alexandrov: "The Socialist Principles of Soviet Law, Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo," No. 11, November 1957, p. 27.)

The "proper control of the Party" is, of course, merely a euphemism for the still unidentified organizational mechanism within the Party Presidium and/or Secretariat which is responsible for police affairs. Under Stalin in the early postwar years A. A. Kuznetsov, formerly Secretary of the Leningrad Committee, and later a member of the Orgburo CC CPSU was the CC Secretary "entrusted with supervision of the State security organs." (Secret speech by N. S. Khrushchev at the XX Party Congress.) This promotion, according to Khrushchev in February 1956, so "alarmed Beria," generally considered the Politburo member charged with directing the police organizations, that he and Abakumov, the Minister of State Security, fabricated the "Leningrad Affair." Eighteen months later (Pravda, 7 July 1957), after the expulsion of Malenkov from the Central Committee and its Presidium, Khrushchev publicly identified Malenkov as one of the main organizers of the same "Leningrad Affair;" at the end of August 1957 the First Secretary closed the circle of charges against Malenkov by labelling him a tool of Beria (Pravda, 28 August 1957). This association, in the context of the now stereotyped "defense" of Stalin, remains the most far-reaching accusation against any

\*In the general reorganization of the Soviet judiciary A. N. Gorkin, a member of the Cheka in 1919-21, a Party functionary for sixteen years, 1921-37, and Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet from 1939-53 was named Chairman of the USSR Supreme Court. (Pravda, 13 February 1957.)



of the ousted leaders. To complete the metamorphosis of Stalin from the leading actor to practically a passive spectator during the final decades of terror from 1936-1953 is not merely another tactical propagandistic maneuver by Khrushchev. It has now become an absolute necessity as the First Secretary increasingly assumes the powers and prerogatives of his predecessor, the General Secretary of the Central Committee. At the last Party Congress Khrushchev warned the delegates that it was "incorrect and harmful" to reveal "a certain distrust of workers of the state security agencies" and assured the Party members that

"the overwhelming majority of our Chekists are honest officials, devoted to our common cause and we trust them." (Pravda, 16 February 1956.)

The relative stability of the police organization—as shown by the absence of striking changes since the Beria purge—is concrete evidence of the trust the police apparatus acquired during a period when the fiction of collective leadership could still be maintained; at the next Party Congress when the rewards for assistance in the consolidation of one-man rule are distributed, a single police official might conceivably return to the Presidium. Whatever his name, he will owe his place to services performed on behalf of the First Secretary. Whether he remains 84 months, as in the case of Comrade Marshal Beria, or 100 days, as in the case of Comrade Marshal Zhukov, will depend on his continued subservience to the man who commands the Party apparatus.

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MVD-KGB 1954-1957\*

	Summer 1954	October 1956	October 1957
USSR	MVD S.N. Kruglov	M.P. Dudorov	No change
	KGB I.A. Serov	No change	" " "
RSFSR	MVD held by USSR	M.P. Stakhanov	" " "
	MGB ministers	(?)	" " "
Ukraine	MVD T.A. Strokach	A.M. Brovkin	" " "
	KGB V.F. Nikichenko	No change	" " "
Belorussia	MVD M.I. Baskakov	" "	" " "
	KGB A.I. Perepelitsin	" "	" " "
Moldavia	MVD P.F. Kulik	M.P. Romanov	" " "
	KGB J.L. Mordovets	A.V. Propenko	" " "
Estonia	MVD J. Lombak	No Change	" " "
	KGB I.P. Karpov	" "	" " "
Latvia	MVD I.D. Zujans	" "	" " "
	KGB J. Veveris	" "	" " "
Lithuania	MVD A.A. Gailevicius	" "	" " "
	KGB K.F. Lyandis	" "	" " "
Armenia	MVD P.V. Piskunov	" "	G.O. Melkorian <sup>+</sup>
	KGB G.A. Badalyants	" "	No change
Azerbaidzhan	MVD A.Y. Bulyga	A.G. Kerimov <sup>+</sup>	" " "
	KGB A.M. Guskov	F.I. Kopylov <sup>++</sup>	" " "
Georgia	MVD A.I. Inauri	No change	" " "
	KGB V.N. Dzhanzhgava	" "	" " "
Kazakh	MVD S. Kabulbaev	" "	" " "
	KGB V. Gubin	" "	" " "
Kirghiz	MVD N. Moskov	" "	" " "
	KGB A. Tereshchenko	" "	" " "
Tadzhik	MVD B. Makhamov	" "	" " "
	KGB D. Vishnevsky	P.I. Zakharov <sup>+++</sup>	K.N. Baynayev <sup>++</sup>
Turkmen	MVD S. Berdyev	No change	No change
	KGB V. Vaskin	S. Bannikov	" " "
Uzbek	MVD Y. Babadzhanov	No change	" " "
	KGB A. Byzov	" "	" " "

\* See also Table, Background Information, 11 October 1956

<sup>+</sup> 14 Aug. 1956      <sup>+</sup> 15 Sept. 1957  
<sup>++</sup> 28 Oct. 1956      <sup>++</sup> 12 Sept. 1957  
<sup>+++</sup> ? Oct. 1956