

RADIO FREE EUROPE  
MUNICH

OUTGOING CIPHER MESSAGE

TO: 5

MIN 44 10 SEPTEMBER 64

TO WALTER INFO: STERNER  
FM BURKS (SCHNEIDER ACTING) INFO SMITH, COLLINS, COOK,  
MILLER

10/1732 S T R I C T L Y C O N F I D E N T I A L

THE FOLLOWING DRAFT SPECIAL GUIDANCE ON THE SINO-SOVIET  
SCHISM HAS BEEN REVIEWED BY THE POLICY BOARD AND BD DIRECTORS  
HERE. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONSULTING DESK CHIEFS AND LETTING US  
HAVE YOUR COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS BY 16 SEPTEMBER.

(TEXT ATTACHED)

PAGE 1

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT SPECIAL GUIDANCE  
THE SINO-SOVIET SCHISM

INTRODUCTION

SINCE THE SUMMER OF 1963 SOVIET AND CHINESE ACTIONS AND STATE-  
MENTS HAVE INDICATED REALIZATION BY BOTH SIDES THAT THE ESSENTIAL  
RUPTURE BETWEEN THEM HAD ALREADY TAKEN PLACE. THE CHINESE OPEN  
LETTER OF 14 JUNE 1963, AND THE SOVIET REPLY OF 14 JULY WERE IN  
EFFECT LETTERS OF EXCOMMUNICATION; WHAT FOLLOWED SUBSEQUENTLY  
WERE ONLY MANEUVERS IN WHICH EACH SIDE SOUGHT TO PLACE THE FORMAL  
RESPONSIBILITY ON THE OTHER.

THIS TACTICAL MANEUVERING IS GOING ON AND MAY CONTINUE TO  
GO ON FOR SOME TIME. BUT, IN THE STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL SENSE,  
THE BREAK IS A REALITY NOW; THE SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE NO LONGER  
EXISTS; CHINA DECLARES HERSELF "UNALIGNED" WITH REGARD TO THE  
USSR (1), AND USES EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE THE EXTENT OF  
SOVIET INFLUENCE WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.

IN THIS SITUATION RFE HAS A NEW OPPORTUNITY. IT NEED NO  
LONGER CONVINCE ITS AUDIENCES THAT SINO-SOVIET DIFFERENCES EXIST,  
THAT THEY ARE BOUND TO GROW, AND THAT THE COMMUNIST WORLD IS  
GOING TO SPLIT UP AS A RESULT. IT MUST RATHER MAKE CLEAR THAT  
THE SCHISM HAS NOW TAKEN PLACE; THAT IT IS PROBABLY PERMANENT,

(1) CHEN YE IN AN INTERVIEW ON MAY 3, 1964. SOVIET COMMENT



(1) CHEN YI IN AN INTERVIEW ON MAY 3, 1964. SOVIET COMMENT ON THIS STATEMENT (IZVESTIA, JUNE 4, 1964): "IN POLITICAL LANGUAGE THIS MEANS IN FACT THAT CHEN YI DOES NOT CONSIDER CHINA PART OF THE WORLD SOCIALIST CAMP."

PAGE 2

AND CHAOS ALTERS PROFOUNDLY THE FRAMEWORK OF COMMUNIST REFERENCE WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES AND THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION. RFE MUST MAKE CLEAR TO ITS TARGET ELITES THAT THE COLLAPSE OF UNITY MEANS ABOVE ALL THAT INDIVIDUAL PARTIES ARE NOW FREE TO EXERCISE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE INDEPENDENCE. REVISIONISM PER SE IS NO LONGER HERESY.

THE DISINTEGRATIVE TENDENCIES WHICH HAVE EMERGED AND ARE OPERATIVE IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT FACTOR POINTING IN THE DIRECTION OF RFE'S ULTIMATE GOAL: THE RESTORATION OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM TO THE PEOPLES OF EASTERN EUROPE.

#### RFE OBJECTIVES

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT PERMITS RFE TO SET FORTH THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES:

1. TO EDUCATE THE TARGET AUDIENCES ON THE FULL SIGNIFICANCE FOR THEMSELVES, THEIR RULERS, AND WORLD COMMUNISM AS A WHOLE OF THE SINO-SOVIET SCHISM AND THE CENTRIFUGAL FORCES WHICH IT HAS SET IN MOTION; AND PARTICULARLY TO CONVINCE THEM THAT IN THE SPLIT MOVEMENT THEY ARE NOW IN A POSITION TO DEMAND GREATER CONCESSIONS FROM THEIR REGIMES;

2. TO PERSUADE TARGET ELITES THAT AS A RESULT OF THE SCHISM IT IS IN THEIR OWN VITAL INTEREST TO SEEK GREATER POPULAR SUPPORT AND TO DEVELOP CLOSER TIES WITH THE WEST;

3. TO SECURE FULLEST APPRECIATION BY TARGET ELITES OF THE LIMITATIONS NOW CIRCUMSCRIBING SOVIET ACTION TO PREVENT DISSIDENCE, AND TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO AVAIL THEMSELVES OF ALL OPPORTUNITIES WHICH NOW EXIST FOR THE EXERCISE OF INDEPENDENT POLICY OPTIONS;

4. TO EXPLOIT THE DECLINE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ELAN OF THE TARGET REGIMES SO AS TO REDUCE THEIR COMMITMENT TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AND SOVIET GOALS ABROAD;

MCRF

PAGE

5. TO REDUCE AND BALANCE OUT THE CREDIT INEVITABLY ACCRUING TO MOSCOW IN EASTERN EUROPE AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE EXTREMISM OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS.

TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES RFE WILL DEVELOP IN ITS BROADCASTS THEMES AND TRAINS OF THOUGHT AS OUTLINED BELOW.

"WORLD COMMUNISM" IS RUINED- THE PHRASE ITSELF IS NOW A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS. THE GENERAL IMPACT OF RFE BROADCASTS WILL BE THAT



"WORLD COMMUNISM" IS RUINED- THE PHRASE ITSELF IS NOW A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS. THE GENERAL IMPACT OF RFE BROADCASTS WILL BE THAT THE WORLD COMMUNIST TIDE HAS PASSED ITS HIGH POINT. THE DREAM OF A GLOBAL COMMUNIST EMPIRE DIRECTED FROM MOSCOW WAS JUST A DREAM. IT REQUIRED A SINGLE GREAT COMMUNIST POWER RECOGNIZED AS THE LEADER BY ALL, CAPABLE OF ENFORCING COMPLETE UNITY OF ACTION, UNCHALLENGED IN ITS RIGHT TO SHAPE THE DOCTRINE TO FIT ITS OWN POWER AIMS. NOW A SECOND GREAT POWER CLAIMS THE SAME RIGHT, IS ABLE AND WILLING TO DEFEND ITS INTEREST AGAINST THE USSR, AND COMMANDS ENOUGH SUPPORT IN THE WORLD MOVEMENT THAT THE WEAPON OF EXCOMMUNICATION IN THE SOVIET HANDS HAS BECOME NOT ONLY MEANINGLESS BUT COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. THE CHINESE CHALLENGE INVOLVES NOT A HERESY BUT SCHISM; THEREFORE IT IS HISTORICALLY UNPRECEDENTED AND FAR MORE DANGEROUS TO THE MOVEMENT. SCHISM IS ORGANIZATIONAL IN CHARACTER. IT SIGNIFIES THAT THERE NO LONGER EXISTS A SINGLE CENTER OF DECISION AND CONTROL, A SINGLE ORGANIZATION TO ENFORCE UNITY OF ACTION, A SINGLE ORTHODOXY.

THE ESSENTIAL QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN COMMUNIST RELATIONS WAS THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SINGLE, MONOLITHIC MODEL. THERE IS NO SUCH QUALITATIVE CHANGE INVOLVED IN THE EMERGENCE OF A THIRD FOURTH, AND N-TH MODEL. IN FACT, THAT'S WHERE THE INNER LOGIC OF THE SCHISM IS LIKELY TO LEAD. FOR DOGMA IN THE ABSENCE OF AUTHORITY IS NOT A /MORE/

PAGE 1

ORCE FOR UNITY BUT FOR FURTHER DISCORD AND FRAGMENTATION. ONCE A SCHISM HAS TAKEN PLACE, EVERYONE CAN CLAIM ORTHODOXY. NO HERETICS CAN BE EXPELLED. THEY CAN JUSTIFIABLY ESTABLISH NEW ORTHODOXIES. IN OTHER WORDS, THE MARXIST-LENINIST LABELS NO LONGER MAKE SENSE, AND AS LONG AS COMMUNISTS INSIST ON THINKING IN IDEOLOGICAL CATEGORIES, THEY WILL ALWAYS FIND NEW REASONS TO QUARREL. THE COMMUNIST DOCTRINE, WHICH ONCE NOURISHED THE GROWTH OF THE BLOC AND CEMENTED IT TOGETHER, HAS BECOME AN AGENT OF ITS DISINTEGRATION.

NATIONAL INTEREST. THE COMMON DENOMINATOR OF ALL COMMUNIST DEVIATIONS IS THE NATIONAL INTEREST. IN THIS RESPECT, YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, CHINA, ROMANIA ARE FOLLOWING THE SAME PATH. SO IS THE SOVIET UNION. COMMUNISM NOW IS A CLUSTER OF INCREASINGLY NATIONALISTIC MOVEMENTS. IT WAS INTERNATIONALIST ONLY AS LONG AS MOSCOW WAS ABLE TO SUBORDINATE ALL OTHER NATIONALISMS TO SOVIET POWER INTERESTS. IN THE CONDITIONS OF AN OPENLY SPLIT MOVEMENT, IT HAS BECOME DIFFICULT FOR THE MEMBER OF ANY COMMUNIST PARTY TO DEFINE REASONABLY WHAT THE INTERESTS OF "WORLD COMMUNISM" ARE. HE CAN, HOWEVER, RATHER CLEARLY DEFINE THE INTERESTS OF HIS OWN PARTY, AND THE NATIONAL AMBITIONS OF HIS OWN COUNTRY. WHAT IS MORE, HE CAN NOW ACT ACCORDINGLY.

SINCE NEITHER MOSCOW NOR PEIPING IS TODAY IN A POSITION TO ENFORCE THE UNCONDITIONAL ALLEGIANCE OF ANY PARTY, COMMUNIST-RULED COUNTRIES ARE NOW ABLE TO DIFFER INCREASINGLY IN THEIR REAL /MORE/



POLICIES. THE POSITION WHICH THEY TAKE ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES SHOULD IN THE FUTURE DEPEND INCREASINGLY UPON THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS. WHAT FORM THE "SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH" WILL TAKE DEPENDS ULTIMATELY ON THE VIEW EACH PARTY TAKES OF ITS OWN INTERESTS. ITS POSITION IS NO LONGER DEFINED IN ADVANCE BY ADHERENCE TO A COMMON IDEOLOGY (WHICH IS NO LONGER COMMON TO ALL), OR BY ALLEGIANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION (WHICH CAN NO LONGER BE ENFORCED EXCEPT PERHAPS BY EXTREME MEASURES AT PROHIBITIVE COST).

RULING PARTIES ARE NOW ABLE TO CONCENTRATE INCREASINGLY ON THEIR DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, AND REDUCE THE ENGAGEMENT OF THEIR RESOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY PURSUITS. FROM NOW ON THEY MUST BE INCREASINGLY ANSWERABLE TO THEIR PEOPLE FOR THE COSTS, TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE, OF LOYALTY TO THE USSR; FOR ANY PARTY TO CLAIM INABILITY TO RESIST SOVIET WISHES IF NATIONAL INTEREST REQUIRES A DIFFERENT COURSE OF ACTION, WOULD BE TO ADMIT ITS INCOMPETENCE AS A NATIONAL LEADERSHIP.

THE CASE OF RUMANIA IS INSTRUCTIVE AS THE FIRST NATIONAL DEVIATION WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE WITHIN THE NEW CONTEXT CREATED BY THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONOLITH. IT SHOWS THE LIMITS WHICH ARE NOW PLACED ON SOVIET ACTION IN CENSURING A DISSIDENT ALLY. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE LIMITS BEYOND WHICH THE RUMANIAN LEADERSHIP SHOULD NOT PRESS THE SOVIETS AT THE PRESENT TIME, IT IS HIGHLY INSTRUCTIVE TO SEE HOW MUCH MOSCOW ALREADY HAS CONCEDED TO THE RUMANIAN REGIME. ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT YET /MORE/

PAGE 6

REACHED THE STAGE OF ORGANIZATIONAL INDEPENDENCE ACHIEVED BY CHINA AND YUGOSLAVIA, THE ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTES OF DOMESTIC POWER IN RUMANIA (SUCH AS CONTROL OVER THE SECURITY APPARATUS) ARE NO LONGER IN SOVIET HANDS. AS THE HISTORY OF EARLIER NATIONAL DEVIATIONS INDICATES, THIS IS OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE. ORGANIZATIONAL DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIETS IS A SURVIVAL OF BLOC RELATIONS DURING THE STALINIST ERA, WHEN IT SERVED PRECISELY THE PURPOSE OF ENFORCING UNCONDITIONAL SATELLITISM.<sup>5</sup> SUCH SUBSERVIENCE TO A FOREIGN POWER IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH NATIONAL DIGNITY, AND THE ASSERTION OF NATIONAL INTEREST.

ROLE OF THE CPSU. IN RESPONDING TO THE NEW REALITIES OF BLOC RELATIONS, MOSCOW HAS VACILLATED BETWEEN PRAGMATIC TOLERATION OF DIFFERENCES AND EFFORTS TO RE-ESTABLISH A LEADING ROLE FOR THE CPSU. DESPITE THE MANY STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE CPSU IS NOT AND DOES NOT WISH TO BE "AT THE HEAD" OF THE MOVEMENT, THE FACT REMAINS THAT IT STILL WISHES TO LEAD AN IDEOLOGICAL BLOC. IT STILL INSISTS ON BANNING FACTIONS (2), REJECTS IDEOLOGICAL COEXISTENCE, AND RETAINS ABSOLUTIST IDEOLOGICAL PRETENSIONS. IT STILL EXPECTS OTHER RULING PARTIES TO BECOME ENGAGED

-----  
(2) AND ACCUSES THE CHINESE OF "SUPPORTING A KIND OF COMMUNIST MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM" BY THEIR INSISTENCE ON ADMITTING THAT THERE ARE FACTIONS  
-----  
WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.  
/MORE/

PAGE 7

IN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND CRISES CREATED BY SOVIET POLICY, TO



IN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND CRISES CREATED BY SOVIET POLICY, TO SUBMIT TO AN "INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOR" EVEN WHERE DISADVANTAGEOUS FROM THE NON-SOVIET POINT OF VIEW, AND TO ACCEPT DECISIONS OF THE SOVIET-CONTROLLED SEGMENT OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AS BINDING. THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN QUICK TO DISCERN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOVIET PREACHMENT AND PRACTICE:

"THE LEADERS OF THE CPSU SAY THEY HAVE NO DESIRE FOR THE POSITION OF 'HEAD,' BUT IN PRACTICE THEY DEMAND THE PRIVILEGE OF LORDING IT OVER ALL FRATERNAL PARTIES." (3)

THEY DEMAND THIS PRIVILEGE BY INSISTING THAT SOVIET PARTY DECISIONS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE BE SUBSEQUENTLY RATIFIED BY AN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CONFERENCE AND BECOME BINDING ON ALL PARTIES. IN EFFECT, THE CPSU WANTS TO FUNCTION AS THE INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE OF THE MOVEMENT, DETERMINING NOT ONLY THE ISSUES WHICH WOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR RATIFICATION BUT ALSO CONTROLLING THE COMPOSITION OF THE "MAJORITY" SO THAT IT REMAINS PRO-SETEHEHENCE THE INS

RPTG

BE SUBMITTED FOR RATIFICATION BUT ALSO CONTROLLING THE COMPOSITION OF THE "MAJORITY" SO THAT IT REMAINS PRO-SOVIET (HENCE THE INSISTENCE ON BANNING FACTIONS). THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE CPSU ROLE AND OTHER PARTIES' DUTY IN THE MOVEMENT HAS BEEN SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

THE ABSENCE OF A CENTRALIZED GUIDING AGENCY DOES NOT MEAN BUT ON THE CONTRARY RAISES STILL HIGHER THE RESPONSIBILITY OF EACH PARTY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNITY OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. TO BE CONSTANTLY ATTENTIVE TO THE PULSE OF THE OTHER FRATERNAL PARTIES, TO "SYNCHRONIZE WATCHES" WITH THEM, TO HEED THE OPINION OF THE MAJORITY OF THE PARTIES IS THE INTERNATIONAL DUTY OF EACH DETACHMENT OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. AND IF A PARTY FINDS ITSELF IN ISOLATION OR IN THE MINORITY ON ANY QUESTION, THE AUTHORITATIVE OPINION OF THE MAJORITY MUST PROMPT IT TO SELF-CRITICISM, TO A CAREFUL RE-CHECKING OF ITS POSITIONS. (4)

(3) THE LEADERS OF THE CPSU ARE THE GREATEST SPLITTERS OF OUR TIMES: PEKING, FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS, 1964, P. 37.

(4) PARTIINAYA ZHIZN, MOSCOW, NBR 11, JUNE 1964. IN PRAVDA'S VERSION (MAY 7, 1964): "THE PRINCIPLE OF INDEPENDENCE DOES NOT RELEASE A SINGLE COMMUNIST PARTY FROM RESPONSIBILITY TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, FROM THE FULFILLMENT OF ITS INTERNATIONAL DUTY...THE ABSENCE OF A SINGLE GUIDING CENTER IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT DOES NOT AT ALL MEAN THAT ANY PART IS PERMITTED TO VIOLATE THE DECISIONS AND FAIL TO OBSERVE THE EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS WORKED OUT BY THE FRATERNAL PARTIES, OR TO DISREGARD THE OPINION OF THE MAJORITY."

MORE/

PAGE 8

THE JUNE 15TH, 1964 CPSU LETTER TO THE CHINESE EXPRESSLY CLAIMED THE RIGHT FOR THE SOVIET PARTY TO TAKE INITIATIVE IN CALLING INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS, WHILE DENYING TO ALL OTHER PARTIES THE RIGHT "TO HINDER, WITHOUT BREAKING WITH INTERNATIONALISM, THE CONVOCAION OF THE MEETING OR UNILATERALLY DICTATE TERMS UNDER WHICH SUCH A MEETING MUST BE HELD!"

TWO THINGS ARE CLEAR IN THIS CONNECTION. FIRST, THE CPSU IS NOT QUITE SINCERE IN CLAIMING THAT IT HAS REPUDIATED THE STALINIST MODEL OF INTERPARTY RELATIONS TO THE EXTENT THAT IT NO LONGER EXPECTS EACH FOREIGN COMMUNIST TO TOE THE SOVIET LINE. SECONDLY, IN THE NEW POST-SCHISM STAGE OF THE



DICTATE TERMS UNDER WHICH SUCH A MEETING MUST BE HELD!"

TWO THINGS ARE CLEAR IN THIS CONNECTION. FIRST, THE CPSU IS NOT QUITE SINCERE IN CLAIMING THAT IT HAS REPUDIATED THE STALINIST MODEL OF INTERPARTY RELATIONS TO THE EXTENT THAT IT NO LONGER EXPECTS EACH FOREIGN COMMUNIST TO TOE THE SOVIET LINE. SECONDLY, IN THE NEW POST-SCHISM STAGE OF THE MOVEMENT THIS SOVIET CONCEPT OF EACH FOREIGN COMMUNISTS' DUTY IS LITTLE MORE THAN THE STATEMENT OF AN ASPIRATION, WHICH CAN NO LONGER BE ENFORCED. SOVIET INSISTENCE ON BANNING FACTIONS FROM THE MOVEMENT HAS NOT HALTED THE EMERGENCE OF MORE FACTIONS. SOVIET EFFORTS TO ENFORCE UNITY AGAINST THE CHINESE, EVEN THE ALBANIANS, AND INDEED DEVIATIONS OF ANY KIND, HAVE BEEN SINGULARLY UNSUCCESSFUL. THE TIME KHRUSHCHEV HAS SPENT "CONSULTING" WITH OTHER PARTIES ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE HE HAS LONG WANTED TO /MORE/

PAGE 9

CONVENE; THE FACT THAT INSTEAD OF THE DESIRED SUPPORT HE OFTEN RECEIVED PLENTY OF ADVICE FROM OTHER PARTIES ON WHAT THE SOVIET PARTY SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT DO; THE RESTRAINT WITH WHICH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS TREATED THE REPEATED RUMANIAN REFUSAL TO "SYNCHRONIZE WATCHES" WITH MOSCOW- ALL THIS INDICATES THE EXTENT TO WHICH SOVIET AUTHORITY IN THE POST-SCHISM MOVEMENT HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED. HOW MUCH AUTHORITY THE SOVIETS MAY ULTIMATELY PRESERVE OVER EACH INDIVIDUAL PARTY NOW DEPENDS ON THAT PARTY, ITS POLICIES, AND TO A SIGNIFICANT EXTENT ON ITS WILL FOR INDEPENDENCE, RATHER THAN ON MOSCOW. THE MOVEMENT HAS STOPPED EXPECTING ALLEGIANCE FROM FOREIGN COMMUNISTS

RPTG

EXTENT ON ITS WILL FOR INDEPENDENCE, RATHER THAN ON MOSCOW. THE SOVIET INSTINCT FOR EXPECTING ALLEGIANCE FROM FOREIGN COMMUNISTS MAY NOT HAVE CHANGED, BUT CONDITIONS IN THE MOVEMENT HAVE.

MOREOVER, THE CPSU IS NOW STUCK WITH THE ROLE OF DEFENDING A STATUS QUO IN THE MOVEMENT. IT CANNOT HOPE TO GAIN MUCH, BUT IT STANDS TO LOSE A GREAT DEAL. ITS EFFORTS TO PRESERVE A MORE THAN EQUAL ROLE IN THE MOVEMENT HAVE

RPTG

MOREOVER, THE CPSU IS NOW STUCK WITH THE ROLE OF DEFENDING A STATUS QUO IN THE MOVEMENT. IT CANNOT HOPE TO GAIN MUCH, BUT IT STANDS TO LOSE A GREAT DEAL. ITS EFFORTS TO PRESERVE A MORE THAN EQUAL ROLE IN THE MOVEMENT HAVE LED TO THE GROWTH OF FOREIGN PARTY INFLUENCE ON MOSCOW'S POLICY DECISIONS, WHICH IN TURN IS LIKELY TO IMPOSE FURTHER RESTRAINTS ON ITS EXERCISE OF A "LEADING ROLE". THUS IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT IN THE SOVIET UNION "SOME PEOPLE ARE READY TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE VICTORY OF NATIONALISM OVER COMMUNISM" (IZVESTIA, JUNE 6, 1964) IT REMAINS FOR THE CPSU TO ADMIT THAT COMMUNISM MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT, RATHER THAN LESS, TO DEAL WITH DIVERGENCES OF NATIONAL INTEREST, MUCH LESS DEVELOP A SUCCESSFUL COMITY OF COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS. /MORE/



THE DISINTEGRATIVE PROCESS. IN THE POST-SCHISM ERA, COMMUNISM HAS FINALLY MET THE "HISTORICALLY INEVITABLE" FATE OF ALL ABSOLUTE DOCTRINES: THE BREAK-UP INTO SECTS UNABLE TO IMPOSE THEIR ORTHODOXIES ON EACH OTHER AND CONSEQUENTLY FORCED TO COEXIST ON RELATIVE TERMS. PARTICULARLY IN BROADCASTING TO ELITES, RFE STRESSES THE THEME THAT THIS IS COMMUNISM'S INEVITABLE "WORLD-HISTORICAL" FATE.

RFE WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO SPOTLIGHT MANIFESTATIONS OF THE DISINTEGRATIVE PROCESS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. TO THIS END, RFE WILL EXPLOIT ALL AVAILABLE FACTIONAL LITERATURE PUBLISHED ON ALL CONTINENTS, AND TRACE IN DETAIL FACTIONAL CONFLICT IN ALL PARTIES WHERE IT OCCURS. SPECIAL EMPHASIS WILL BE PLACED ON THE EMERGENCE AND ACTIVITIES OF PRO-CHINESE SPLINTER PARTIES, WITH AN EYE ON EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THEIR RISE AND INFLUENCE HAS BEEN AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SOVIET-CONTROLLED SEGMENT OF THE MOVEMENT. GREAT ATTENTION WILL BE PAID TO THE ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECT, ABOVE ALL TO CHINESE EFFORTS AND SUCCESS IN SETTING UP WORLD-WIDE RIVAL GROUPINGS COMPLETE WITH CHINESE-CONTROLLED PARTIES

MOVEMENT. GREAT ATTENTION WILL BE PAID TO THE ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECT, ABOVE ALL TO CHINESE EFFORTS AND SUCCESS IN SETTING UP WORLD-WIDE RIVAL GROUPINGS COMPLETE WITH CHINESE-CONTROLLED PARTIES, A SPECIAL DOCTRINE, AND FRONT ORGANIZATIONS. WHETHER DEALING WITH FACTIONS, PARTIES, OR CENTERS, RFE WILL SEEK TO DISCOVER AND TO PROJECT THE LOCAL REASONS FOR THEIR DEVELOPMENT.

COMMUNIST FAILURE TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS OF DIVERGENT NATIONAL INTERESTS INCLUDING TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, AND THE ROLE OF THESE INTERESTS IN THE DISINTEGRATIVE PROCESS WILL RECEIVE MAJOR ATTENTION IN BROADCASTS DEALING WITH THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE MOVEMENT. DEVELOPMENTS ALONG THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER WILL BE REFERRED TO IN /MORE/

PAGE 11

THIS CONTEXT, INSOFAR AS KNOWLEDGE OF THEM BECOMES AVAILABLE, BOTH AS TO THE CHINESE ACTIVITIES SEEKING TO RE-ESTABLISH INFLUENCE OVER TERRITORIES LOST TO TSARIST RUSSIA BY IMPOSITION OF UNEQUAL TREATIES IN THE PAST, AND SOVIET ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS IN SINKIANG, SEEKING TO ESTABLISH INFLUENCE OVER CHINA'S MINORITIES. MAO TSE-TUNG'S STATEMENT OF 10 JULY 1964 AND THE PRAVDA REPLY OF 2 SEPTEMBER 1964 HAVE PUBLICLY DEMONSTRATED THAT TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND BORDER CONFLICTS HAVE NOT BEEN EXCLUDED BY COMMUNISM.

SOVIET AND CHINESE POLICIES. WHILE ADMITTING THAT, AS PRACTITIONERS OF MARXISM-LENINISM, THE CHINESE CLEARLY HAVE THE BETTER SIDE OF THE ARGUMENT, RFE WILL AT THE SAME TIME DRAW AND EMPHASIZE THE CONCLUSION THAT THIS REFLECTS ABOVE ALL ON THE ABSURDITY OF THE DOCTRINE ITSELF IN THE MODERN NUCLEAR WORLD. RFE WILL OF COURSE OPPOSE CHINESE POLICIES WHICH WOULD PROMOTE REVOLUTIONARY CONFLICT IN AREAS OF STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OR WOULD REQUIRE THE USE OF FORCE. THIS CHINESE POSTURE UNDERLINES THE DANGER TO MANKIND STEMMING FROM A MAJOR POWER TRYING TO CLOTHE ITS AMBITIONS IN MARXIST-LENINIST GARB. THUS THE CHINESE ULTIMATELY DISCREDIT MARXISM-LENINISM AS SUCH. IT FOLLOWS THAT MARXISM-LENINISM IS OBSOLETE AS A GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT IN THE NUCLEAR AGE.

ON APPROPRIATE OCCASIONS, RFE WILL BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF ITS AUDIENCES THE SPECIFIC CHINESE CONDITIONS (SUCH AS OVER-POPULATION AND INDUSTRIAL BACKWARDNESS) WHICH MAY ACCOUNT FOR THE COMMUNIST LEADERS' RELATIVE INDIFFERENCE TO THE RISKS OF WAR, AS WELL AS THE FACTORS WHICH PROMPT THE USE OF RACIST THEMES IN CHINESE PROPAGANDA IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. CONSIDERING, HOWEVER, THE VOLUME OF ANTI-PEIPING MATERIAL EMANATING FROM SOVIET AND REGIME SOURCES, RFE WILL SEE ITS ROLE NOT SO MUCH IN ADDING TO THIS OUTPUT BUT IN UTILIZING IT AS A PRIME SOURCE

(MORE)

PAGE 12

MENTS AGAINST ANY KIND OF RECKLESSNESS IN  
ALL MANIFESTATIONS OF STALINISM  
BY ANY COMMUNIST



(MORE)

PAGE 12

OF COMMUNIST ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANY KIND OF RECKLESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AGAINST ALL MANIFESTATIONS OF STALINISM IN THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN FIELD, AGAINST EFFORTS BY ANY COMMUNIST COUNTRY TO EXERCISE HEGEMONY OVER OTHER PARTIES AND STATES. SPECIFIC POLICIES WILL BE JUDGED ON THEIR MERITS FROM THE RFE POINT OF VIEW AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH RFE OBJECTIVES, REGARDLESS WHETHER THEY CAN BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE SOVIET OR CHINESE POSITION ON THE SAME MATTER.

THIS APPROACH WILL PERMIT RFE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF ITS AUDIENCES THOSE ASPECTS OF THE CHINESE POSITIONS WHICH HAVE SOME POSITIVE IMPACT IN THE EAST EUROPEAN CONTEXT (SUCH AS EXPOSURE OF SOVIET MOTIVATIONS WITH RESPECT TO COMECON, FOREIGN AID, AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF SOVIET POLICY). AT THE SAME TIME IT WILL PERMIT A BALANCED TREATMENT OF SOVIET POLICIES WHICH DESERVE CREDIT FROM THE EAST EUROPEAN POINT OF VIEW. THIS MEANS FIRST OF ALL SYSTEMATIC CROSS-REPORTING OF FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR SUCH AS THE PROGRESS OF LIBERMANISM, THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF SOVIET WRITERS AND ARTISTS IN THEIR STRUGGLE FOR GREATER FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, AND INCREASED INVESTMENT ALLOCATIONS FOR AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER INDUSTRIES.

RPTG

FIRST OF ALL SYSTEMATIC CROSS-REPORTING OF FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR SUCH AS THE PROGRESS OF LIBERMANISM, THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF SOVIET WRITERS AND ARTISTS IN THEIR STRUGGLE FOR GREATER FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, AND INCREASED INVESTMENT ALLOCATIONS FOR AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER INDUSTRIES.

KEEPING THE SINO-SOVIET QUARREL, WITH ITS CHARGES AND COUNTER-CHARGES, AT THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION, ALSO HAS THE EFFECT OF REINFORCING THE GENERAL TREND TOWARD MORE "REVISIONIST" POLICIES. FOR INSTANCE, BY SPOTLIGHTING THE ANGRY CHINESE ACCUSATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ABANDONED WORLD REVOLUTION. RFE DOES NOT ASSUME, HOWEVER, THAT IN OPPOSING THE AGGRESSIVE PEIPING POLICIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD THERE IS AN AUTOMATIC COMMUNITY OF INTEREST BETWEEN EAST

(MORE)

PAGE 13

EUROPE AND THE USSR. RFE WILL GIVE CREDIT TO THE MORE MODERATE AND ENLIGHTENED SOVIET POLICIES WHERE SUCH CREDIT IS DUE. HOWEVER, AS IN THE CASE OF DOMESTIC RELAXATION BY THE TARGET REGIMES, RFE WILL PROCEED FROM THE IMPLIED ASSUMPTION THAT THIS MODERATION SPRINGS FROM RECOGNITION OF WHAT IS NECESSARY, RATHER THAN FROM A CHANGE OF HEART.

IT IS NEVERTHELESS INEVITABLE THAT RFE BROADCASTING ON THE SINO-SOVIET SCHISM ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED ABOVE, MAY OCCASIONALLY HAVE THE EFFECT OF BUILDING UP THE SOVIET UNION AS AN OBJECT OF APPROVAL. IN PROPAGANDA TERMS, RFE CANNOT EXPECT TO CALL BOTH THE POT AND THE KETTLE BLACK AND STILL HOPE TO PRESERVE INTACT ITS CREDIBILITY, WHICH IS ITS GREATEST SINGLE ASSET. WHERE THE CHINESE POSITIONS ARE UNREASONABLE AND EVEN RECKLESS, WHERE THEY DEMONSTRATE THE ABSURDITY OF MARXIST-LENINIST ORTHODOXY IN A NUCLEAR WORLD, THE SOVIET POSITIONS IN COMPARISON ARE MORE REASONABLE AND MORE

RPTG

THE ABSURDITY OF MARXIST-LENINIST ORTHODOXY IN A NUCLEAR WORLD, THE SOVIET POSITIONS IN COMPARISON ARE MORE REASONABLE AND MORE MODERATE, DEMONSTRATING THE RELATIVELY GREATER SOVIET WISDOM IN ABANDONING ORTHODOX POSITIONS. AGAIN, THERE ARE SPECIFIC SOVIET REASONS FOR THIS ATTITUDE: AS A "HAVE" NATION THEY ARE LESS INCLINED TO GAMBLE THAN THE CHINESE "HAVE-NOTS". BUT IN THE EYES OF RFE AUDIENCES, SUCH MOTIVATIONS CANNOT BE HELD AGAINST THE SOVIETS. RFE CANNOT EXPECT COMMUNIST AUDIENCES, AND INDEED NOT EVEN ANTI-COMMUNISTS IN THE TARGET COUNTRIES, TO CONCLUDE THAT SOVIET POLICIES ARE AS UNDESIRABLE AS PEIPING'S; THE PARTIAL NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY AND THE SINO-INDIAN WAR ARE CASES IN POINT. TO CALL FOR A PLACQUING OF DEPRIVATIONS UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD

RPTG

THE SINO-INDIAN WAR ARE CASES IN POINT. TO CALL FOR A PLACQUING OF BOTH HOUSES UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD DEPRIVE RFE OF OPPORTUNITIES INHERENT IN BROADCASTING ON THE SCHISM; IT WOULD

(MORE)



(MORE)

PAGE 14

CONFUSE LISTENERS BY PRESENTING A WORLD IN WHICH MEANINGFUL ALTERNATIVES DO NOT EXIST. SUCH BROADCASTING WOULD NOT ONLY PRODUCE FRUSTRATION, BUT WOULD ALSO COMMIT THE ERROR OF POLITICAL SHORTSIGHTEDNESS IN DENYING CREDIT TO COMMUNISTS, SOVIET OR OTHERS, FOR MOVING AWAY FROM POSITIONS WE WANT THEM TO ABANDON.

WHILE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF EXPLOITING THE SINO-SOVIET SCHISM RFE WILL THUS FIND ITSELF ON OCCASION SPEAKING OF SOVIET POLICIES WITH A DEGREE OF APPROVAL, IN MANY OTHER PROGRAMS WILL FIND SUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITY TO SUBJECT THEM TO HIGHLY CRITICAL TREATMENT. RFE WILL CONTINUE TO CRITICIZE SOVIET POLICIES AND KHRUSHCHEV'S ACTIONS AS TWO-FACED, INADEQUATE, AND INCONSISTENT. IT WILL MAINTAIN ITS OPPOSITION TO ALL ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET SOCIETY AND ITS EAST EUROPEAN IMITATIONS, WHICH ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH PERSONAL AND POLITICAL FREEDOM, RATIONAL ECONOMY, AND NATIONAL DIGNITY. IN THIS WAY, THE APPARENT DANGER OF SEEMING TO GIVE APPROVAL TO CERTAIN SOVIET POSITIONS WILL BE MINIMIZED AND BALANCED OUT.

RECONCILIATION WITH THE MASSES. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF BROADCASTING ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED ABOVE WILL BE TO HELP REDUCE COMMUNIST ELAN AND SPREAD REALIZATION OF THE DECLINE IN SOVIET PRESTIGE AND AUTHORITY. OTHER TYPES OF BROADCASTING, DEALT WITH IN OTHER POLICY PAPERS, WILL REINFORCE THIS EFFECT. IN THIS CONNECTION ONE MAY CITE CONTINUOUS RFE TREATMENT OF WESTERN MILITARY STRENGTH AND REFERENCES TO THE SOVIET RECOGNITION, IN THE CUBA CRISIS, OF THE UNMATCHABLE SUPERIORITY OF THE UNITED STATES IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE SOVIET UNION HAS THUS BEEN FORCED TO ACCEPT, FOR AN

(MORE)

PAGE 15

INDEFINITE PERIOD, A POSITION OF MILITARY INFERIORITY- TO WHICH IS NOW ADDED THE DEFECTION OF HER MOST IMPORTANT ALLY. RFE COVERAGE AND COMMENTARY ON SUCH MATTERS AS THE SHARP DROP IN THE RATE OF GROWTH OF SOVIET GNP, THE CURRENT INABILITY OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE TO PROVIDE THE POPULATION WITH SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES OF BREAD GRAINS, AND OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED ANTI-SEMITISM FURTHER ILLUSTRATE THIS POINT.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE SINO-SOVIET SCHISM, HOWEVER, THE BASIC RFE THESIS IS THAT SOVIET LOSS OF CONTROL OVER THE WORLD REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT, COUPLED WITH THE DISINTEGRATIVE IMPACT OF THE SCHISM, PUTS THE FUTURE OF THE MOVEMENT IN VERY CONSIDERABLE DOUBT AND RAISES LARGE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE POLICIES OF THE SOVIET STATE. THEREFORE, IT BEHOOVES EACH REGIME TO CAST AN ANCHOR TO WINDWARD AND DEVELOP INDEPENDENT STRENGTH NOT ONLY ABROAD BUT ESPECIALLY AT HOME. SUCH STRENGTH, AND CAPACITY TO WITHSTAND WHATEVER THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE ONE-TIME "BLOC" MAY BRING, CAN BE ACQUIRED ONLY THROUGH A GENUINE RECONCILIATION WITH THE PEOPLE AT HOME. THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED BY MEANS OF CONCEDING TO THE PEOPLE THE FULFILLMENT OF THEIR MOST IMPORTANT ASPIRATIONS. THIS LINE OF REASONING SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE ENCOURAGED BY INDIRECTION ONLY. IF THE COMMUNISTS THEMSELVES SAY THAT OURS IS AN ERA OF "COEXISTENCE", THIS IS WHAT IT MEANS. FOR THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS TO COEXIST NOT ONLY WITH THE WEST, BUT ALSO AMONG THEMSELVES, WITH THE OPPOSITION WITHIN THEIR OWN RANKS, IN IDEOLOGY AS IN ANY OTHER FIELD, AND FIRST OF ALL WITH THEIR PEOPLE. AFTER THE GREAT SCHISM HAS BECOME REALITY AND REDUCED THE ABSOLUTIST PRETENSIONS OF COMMUNISM TO SPOOLS, THIS IS THE ONLY FUTURE THE MOVEMENT CAN ASPIRE TO.

END MSG



THE DISINTEGRATIVE PROCESS. IN THE POST-SCHISM ERA, COMMUNISM HAS FINALLY MET THE "HISTORICALLY INEVITABLE" FATE OF ALL ABSOLUTE DOCTRINE: THE BREAK-UP INTO SECTS UNABLE TO IMPOSE THEIR ORTHODOXIES ON EACH OTHER AND CONSEQUENTLY FORCED TO COEXIST ON RELATIVE TERMS. PARTICULARLY IN BROADCASTING TO ELITES, RFE STRESSES THE THEME THAT THIS IS COMMUNISM'S INEVITABLE "WORLD-HISTORICAL" FATE.

RFE WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO SPOTLIGHT MANIFESTATIONS OF THE DISINTEGRATIVE PROCESS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. TO THIS END, RFE WILL EXPLOIT ALL AVAILABLE FACTIONAL LITERATURE PUBLISHED ON ALL CONTINENTS, AND TRACE IN DETAIL FACTIONAL CONFLICT IN ALL PARTIES WHERE IT OCCURS. SPECIAL EMPHASIS WILL BE PLACED ON THE EMERGENCE AND ACTIVITIES OF PRO-CHINESE SPLINTER PARTIES, WITH AN EYE ON EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THEIR RISE AND INFLUENCE HAS BEEN AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SOVIET-CONTROLLED SEGMENT OF THE MOVEMENT. GREAT ATTENTION WILL BE PAID TO THE ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECT, ABOVE ALL TO CHINESE EFFORTS AND SUCCESS IN SETTING UP WORLD-WIDE RIVAL GROUPINGS COMPLETE WITH CHINESE-CONTROLLED PARTIES

RPTG

MOVEMENT. GREAT ATTENTION WILL BE PAID TO THE ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECT, ABOVE ALL TO CHINESE EFFORTS AND SUCCESS IN SETTING UP WORLD-WIDE RIVAL GROUPINGS COMPLETE WITH CHINESE-CONTROLLED PARTIES, A SPECIAL DOCTRINE, AND FRONT ORGANIZATIONS. WHETHER DEALING WITH FACTIONS, PARTIES, OR CENTERS, RFE WILL SEEK TO DISCOVER AND TO PROJECT THE LOCAL REASONS FOR THEIR DEVELOPMENT.

COMMUNIST FAILURE TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS OF DIVERGENT NATIONAL INTERESTS INCLUDING TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, AND THE ROLE OF THESE INTERESTS IN THE DISINTEGRATIVE PROCESS WILL RECEIVE MAJOR ATTENTION IN BROADCASTS DEALING WITH THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE MOVEMENT. DEVELOPMENTS ALONG THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER WILL BE REFERRED TO IN /MORE/

PAGE

THIS CONTEXT, INSOFAR AS KNOWLEDGE OF THEM BECOMES AVAILABLE, BOTH AS TO THE CHINESE ACTIVITIES SEEKING TO RE-ESTABLISH INFLUENCE OVER TERRITORIES LOST TO TSARIST RUSSIA BY IMPOSITION OF UNEQUAL TREATIES IN THE PAST, AND SOVIET ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS IN SINKIANG, SEEKING TO ESTABLISH INFLUENCE OVER CHINA'S MINORITIES. MAO TSE-TUNG'S STATEMENT OF 10 JULY 1964 AND THE PRAVDA REPLY OF 2 SEPTEMBER 1964 HAVE PUBLICLY DEMONSTRATED THAT TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND BORDER CONFLICTS HAVE NOT BEEN EXCLUDED BY COMMUNISM.

SOVIET AND CHINESE POLICIES. WHILE ADMITTING THAT, AS PRACTITIONERS OF MARXISM-LENINISM, THE CHINESE CLEARLY HAVE THE BETTER SIDE OF THE ARGUMENT, RFE WILL AT THE SAME TIME DRAW AND EMPHASIZE THE CONCLUSION THAT THIS REFLECTS ABOVE ALL ON THE ABSURDITY OF THE DOCTRINE ITSELF IN THE MODERN NUCLEAR WORLD. RFE WILL OF COURSE OPPOSE CHINESE POLICIES WHICH WOULD PROMOTE REVOLUTIONARY CONFLICT IN AREAS OF STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OR WOULD REQUIRE THE USE OF FORCE. THIS CHINESE POSTURE UNDERLINES THE DANGER TO MANKIND STEMMING FROM A MAJOR POWER TRYING TO CLOTHE ITS AMBITIONS IN MARXIST-LENINIST GARB. THUS THE CHINESE ULTIMATELY DISCREDIT MARXISM-LENINISM AS SUCH. IT FOLLOWS THAT MARXISM-LENINISM IS OBSOLETE AS A GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT IN THE NUCLEAR AGE.

ON APPROPRIATE OCCASIONS, RFE WILL BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF ITS AUDIENCES THE SPECIFIC CHINESE CONDITIONS (SUCH AS OVER-POPULATION AND INDUSTRIAL BACKWARDNESS) WHICH MAY ACCOUNT FOR THE COMMUNIST LEADERS' RELATIVE INDIFFERENCE TO THE RISKS OF WAR, AS WELL AS THE FACTORS WHICH PROMPT THE USE OF RACIST THEMES IN CHINESE PROPAGANDA IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. CONSIDERING, HOWEVER, THE VOLUME OF ANTI-PEIPING MATERIAL EMANATING FROM SOVIET AND REGIME SOURCES, RFE WILL SEE ITS ROLE NOT SO MUCH IN ADDING TO THIS OUTPUT BUT IN UTILIZING IT AS A PRIME SOURCE

(MORE)

PAGE 12

OF COMMUNIST ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANY KIND OF RECKLESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AGAINST ALL MANIFESTATIONS OF STALINISM IN THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN FIELD, AGAINST EFFORTS BY ANY COMMUNIST



INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AGAINST ALL MANIFESTATIONS OF STALINISM IN THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN FIELD, AGAINST EFFORTS BY ANY COMMUNIST COUNTRY TO EXERCISE HEGEMONY OVER OTHER PARTIES AND STATES. SPECIFIC POLICIES WILL BE JUDGED ON THEIR MERITS FROM THE RFE POINT OF VIEW AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH RFE OBJECTIVES, REGARDLESS WHETHER THEY CAN BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE SOVIET OR CHINESE POSITION ON THE SAME MATTER.

THIS APPROACH WILL PERMIT RFE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF ITS AUDIENCES THOSE ASPECTS OF THE CHINESE POSITIONS WHICH HAVE SOME POSITIVE IMPACT IN THE EAST EUROPEAN CONTEXT (SUCH AS EXPOSURE OF SOVIET MOTIVATIONS WITH RESPECT TO COMECON, FOREIGN AID, AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF SOVIET POLICY). AT THE SAME TIME IT WILL PERMIT A BALANCED TREATMENT OF SOVIET POLICIES WHICH DESERVE CREDIT FROM THE EAST EUROPEAN POINT OF VIEW. THIS MEANS FIRST OF ALL SYSTEMATIC CROSS-REPORTING OF FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR SUCH AS THE PROGRESS OF

RFE

FIRST OF ALL SYSTEMATIC CROSS-REPORTING OF FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR SUCH AS THE PROGRESS OF LIBERMANISM, THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF SOVIET WRITERS AND ARTISTS IN THEIR STRUGGLE FOR GREATER FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, AND INCREASED INVESTMENT ALLOCATIONS FOR AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER INDUSTRIES.

KEEPING THE SINO-SOVIET QUARREL, WITH ITS CHARGES AND COUNTER-CHARGES, AT THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION, ALSO HAS THE EFFECT OF REINFORCING THE GENERAL TREND TOWARD MORE "REVISIONIST" POLICIES. FOR INSTANCE, BY SPOTLIGHTING THE ANGRY CHINESE ACCUSATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ABANDONED WORLD REVOLUTION. RFE DOES NOT ASSUME, HOWEVER, THAT IN OPPOSING THE AGGRESSIVE PEIPING POLICIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD THERE IS AN AUTOMATIC COMMUNITY OF INTEREST BETWEEN EAST

(MORE)

Page 13

EUROPE AND THE USSR. RFE WILL GIVE CREDIT TO THE MORE MODERATE AND ENLIGHTENED SOVIET POLICIES WHERE SUCH CREDIT IS DUE. HOWEVER, AS IN THE CASE OF DOMESTIC RELAXATION BY THE TARGET REGIMES, RFE WILL PROCEED FROM THE IMPLIED ASSUMPTION THAT THIS MODERATION SPRINGS FROM RECOGNITION OF WHAT IS NECESSARY, RATHER THAN FROM A CHANGE OF HEART.

IT IS NEVERTHELESS INEVITABLE THAT RFE BROADCASTING ON THE SINO-SOVIET SCHISM ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED ABOVE, MAY OCCASIONALLY HAVE THE EFFECT OF BUILDING UP THE SOVIET UNION AS AN OBJECT OF APPROVAL. IN PROPAGANDA TERMS, RFE CANNOT EXPECT TO CALL BOTH THE POT AND THE KETTLE BLACK AND STILL HOPE TO PRESERVE INTACT ITS CREDIBILITY, WHICH IS ITS GREATEST SINGLE ASSET. WHERE THE CHINESE POSITIONS ARE UNREASONABLE AND EVEN RECYLESS, WHERE THEY DEMONSTRATE THE ABSURDITY OF MARXIST-LENINIST ORTHODOXY IN A NUCLEAR WORLD, THE SOVIET POSITIONS IN COMPARISON ARE MORE REASONABLE AND MORE

2216

THE ABSURDITY OF MARXIST-LENINIST ORTHODOXY IN A NUCLEAR WORLD, THE SOVIET POSITIONS IN COMPARISON ARE MORE REASONABLE AND MORE MODERATE, DEMONSTRATING THE RELATIVELY GREATER SOVIET WISDOM IN ABANDONING ORTHODOX POSITIONS. AGAIN, THERE ARE SPECIFIC SOVIET REASONS FOR THIS ATTITUDE: AS A "HAVE" NATION THEY ARE LESS INCLINED TO GAMBLE THAN THE CHINESE "HAVE-NOTS". BUT IN THE EYES OF RFE AUDIENCES, SUCH MOTIVATIONS CANNOT BE HELD AGAINST THE SOVIETS. RFE CANNOT EXPECT COMMUNIST AUDIENCES, AND INDEED NOT EVEN ANTI-COMMUNISTS IN THE TARGET COUNTRIES, TO CONCLUDE THAT SOVIET POLICIES ARE AS UNDESIRABLE AS PEIPING'S. THE PARTIAL NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY AND THE SINO-INDIAN WAR ARE CASES IN POINT. TO CALL FOR A PLAGUE ON LEPHINGURES UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD

RFE

THE SINO-INDIAN WAR ARE CASES IN POINT. TO CALL FOR A PLAGUE ON BOTH HOUSES UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD DEPRIVE RFE OF OPPORTUNITIES INHERENT IN BROADCASTING ON THE SCHISM; IT WOULD

(MORE)



PAGE 1

CONFUSE LISTENERS BY PRESENTING A WORLD IN WHICH MEANINGFUL ALTERNATIVES DO NOT EXIST. SUCH BROADCASTING WOULD NOT ONLY PRODUCE FRUSTRATION, BUT WOULD ALSO COMMIT THE ERROR OF POLITICAL SHORTSIGHTEDNESS IN DENYING CREDIT TO COMMUNISTS, SOVIET OR OTHERS, FOR MOVING AWAY FROM POSITIONS WE WANT THEM TO ABANDON.

WHILE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF EXPLOITING THE SINO-SOVIET SCHISM RFE WILL THUS FIND ITSELF ON OCCASION SPEAKING OF SOVIET POLICIES WITH A DEGREE OF APPROVAL, IN MANY OTHER PROGRAMS IT WILL FIND SUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITY TO SUBJECT THEM TO HIGHLY CRITICAL TREATMENT. RFE WILL CONTINUE TO CRITICIZE SOVIET POLICIES AND KHRUSHCHEV'S ACTIONS AS TWO-FACED, INADEQUATE, AND INCONSISTENT. IT WILL MAINTAIN ITS OPPOSITION TO ALL ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET SOCIETY AND ITS EAST EUROPEAN IMITATIONS, WHICH ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH PERSONAL AND POLITICAL FREEDOM, RATIONAL ECONOMY, AND NATIONAL DIGNITY. IN THIS WAY, THE APPARENT DANGER OF SEEMING TO GIVE APPROVAL TO CERTAIN SOVIET POSITIONS WILL BE MINIMIZED AND BALANCED OUT.

RECONCILIATION WITH THE MASSES. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF BROADCASTING ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED ABOVE WILL BE TO HELP REDUCE COMMUNIST ELAN AND SPREAD REALIZATION OF THE DECLINE IN SOVIET PRESTIGE AND AUTHORITY. OTHER TYPES OF BROADCASTING, DEALT WITH IN OTHER POLICY PAPERS, WILL REINFORCE THIS EFFECT. IN THIS CONNECTION ONE MAY CITE CONTINUOUS RFE TREATMENT OF WESTERN MILITARY STRENGTH AND REFERENCES TO THE SOVIET RECOGNITION, IN THE CUBA CRISIS, OF THE UNMATCHABLE SUPERIORITY OF THE UNITED STATES IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE SOVIET UNION HAS THUS BEEN FORCED TO ACCEPT, FOR AN

(MCP)

PAGE 2

INDEFINITE PERIOD, A POSITION OF MILITARY INFERIORITY- TO WHICH IS NOW ADDED THE DEFECTION OF HER MOST IMPORTANT ALLY. RFE COVERAGE AND COMMENTARY ON SUCH MATTERS AS THE SHARP DROP IN THE RATE OF GROWTH OF SOVIET GNP, THE CURRENT INABILITY OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE TO PROVIDE THE POPULATION WITH SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES OF BREAD GRAINS, AND OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED ANTI-SEMITISM FURTHER ILLUSTRATE THIS POINT.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE SINO-SOVIET SCHISM, HOWEVER, THE BASIC RFE THESIS IS THAT SOVIET LOSS OF CONTROL OVER THE WORLD REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT, COUPLED WITH THE DISINTEGRATIVE IMPACT OF THE SCHISM, PUTS THE FUTURE OF THE MOVEMENT IN VERY CONSIDERABLE DOUBT AND RAISES LARGE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE POLICIES OF THE SOVIET STATE. THEREFORE, IT BEHOOVES EACH REGIME TO CAST AN ANCHOR TO WINDWARD AND DEVELOP INDEPENDENT STRENGTH NOT ONLY ABROAD BUT ESPECIALLY AT HOME. SUCH STRENGTH, AND CAPACITY TO WITHSTAND WHATEVER THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE ONE-TIME "BLOC" MAY BRING, CAN BE ACQUIRED ONLY THROUGH A GENUINE RECONCILIATION WITH THE PEOPLE AT HOME. THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED BY MEANS OF CONCEDING TO THE PEOPLE THE FULFILLMENT OF THEIR MOST IMPORTANT ASPIRATIONS. THIS LINE OF REASONING SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE ENCOURAGED BY INDIRECTION ONLY. IF THE COMMUNISTS THEMSELVES SAY THAT OURS IS AN ERA OF "COEXISTENCE", THIS IS WHAT IT MEANS: FOR THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS TO COEXIST NOT ONLY WITH THE WEST, BUT ALSO AMONG THEMSELVES, WITH THE OPPOSITION WITHIN THEIR OWN RANKS, IN IDEOLOGY AS IN ANY OTHER FIELD, AND FIRST OF ALL WITH THEIR PEOPLE. AFTER THE GREAT SCHISM HAS BECOME REALITY AND REDUCED THE ABSOLUTIST PRETENSIONS OF COMMUNISM TO SHAMBLES, THIS IS THE ONLY FUTURE THE MOVEMENT CAN ASPIRE TO.

END MSG