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27 March 1958

STATEMENTS AND VIEWS ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF EASTERN EUROPE  
AND, IN PARTICULAR, OF HUNGARY

(Texts and References)

No. 1 (Revised)

CONTENTS

	<u>I.</u>	<u>Page</u>
A. <u>The American-Soviet Exchange</u> .....		1
1. Letter of President Eisenhower to Marshal Bulganin, 12 January 1958.....		1
2. Question put to and answer made by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles after his address to the National Press Club, 16 January 1958.....		1
3. Address prepared for delivery by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge at the University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky, 17 January 1958.....		2
4. "On Certain Questions of the International Situation" - Speech by Mr. N.S. Khrushchev at a Conference of Foremost Byelorussian Republic Agricultural Personnel, Minsk, 22 January 1958.....		3
5. Letter of Marshal Bulganin to President Eisenhower, 2 February 1958.....		4
6. Letter of President Eisenhower to Marshal Bulganin, 16 February 1958.....		5
7. Soviet Aide-Memoire delivered to Llewellyn Thompson, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 28 February 1958..		6
8. United States reply, 6 March 1958, to the Soviet Union..		6
9. Letter of Marshal Bulganin to President Eisenhower, 6 March 1958.....		7
10. Mr. N. S. Khrushchev's replies to questions of the editorial board of <u>Trybuna Ludu</u> (Poland), 10 March 1958.		7
11. Mr. N. S. Khrushchev's speech at the Kalinin electoral meeting, Moscow, 14 March 1958.....		8
12. Aide-mémoire of the Soviet Government to the Government of the United States, 24 March 1958 .....		10
13. News Conference of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 25 March 1958.....		11
B. <u>The British-Soviet Exchange</u> .....		12
1. Letter of Prime Minister Macmillan to Marshal Bulganin, 8 March 1958.....		12
2. Letter of Marshal Bulganin to Prime Minister Macmillan, 19 March 1958.....		12



	<u>Page</u>
C. <u>Unofficial American Views</u> .....	13
1. A private view [Mr. George F. Kennan].....	13
2. Congressional views [Rep. Henry S. Reuss and other members of Congress].....	14
D. <u>Unofficial British Views</u> .....	16
1. Views of Mr. Dennis Healy, M.P.....	16
2. Views of Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, M.P. ....	16
E. <u>An Official Japanese Statement</u> .....	20
Note Verbale of 24 February 1958 of the Government of Japan in reply to the letter of the Government of the USSR dated 10 December 1957.....	20
II.	
<u>The Polish Plan for the Creation of a Denuclearised Zone in Central Europe</u> .....	20
1. Statement by Mr. Adam Rapacki, Foreign Minister of Poland, on 2 October 1957 at the twelfth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.....	20
2. The Polish memorandum of 14 February 1958 on the creation of a denuclearised zone.....	21
ANNEX - Text of the memorandum of 14 February 1958.....	22



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I.

A. THE AMERICAN-SOVIET EXCHANGE

1. Letter of President Eisenhower to Marshal Bulganin, 12 January 1958

"The second situation to which I refer is that of the countries of Eastern Europe. The heads of our two Governments, together with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, agreed in 1945 that the peoples of these countries should have the right to choose the form of government under which they would live, and that our three countries had a responsibility in this respect. The three of us agreed to foster the conditions under which these peoples could exercise their right of free choice.

"That agreement has not as yet been fulfilled.

"I know that your Government is reluctant to discuss these matters or to treat them as a matter of international concern. But the heads of governments did agree at Yalta in 1945 that these matters were of international concern and we specifically agreed that there could appropriately be international consultation with reference to them.

"This was another matter taken up at our meeting in Geneva in 1955. You then took the position that there were no grounds for discussing this question at our conference and that it would involve interference in the internal affairs of the Eastern European states.

"But have not subsequent developments shown that I was justified in my appeal to you for consideration of these matters? Surely the Hungarian developments and the virtually unanimous action of the United Nations General Assembly in relation thereto show that conditions in Eastern Europe are regarded throughout the world as much more than a matter of purely domestic scope.

"I propose that we should now discuss this matter. There is an intrinsic need of this in the interest of peace and justice, which seems to be compelling."

For complete text see The New York Times,  
13 January 1958.

2. Question put to and answer made by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles after his address to the National Press Club, 16 January 1958

Question: "At the time of the Hungarian Revolution one year ago, you expressed the opinion that this statement meant the beginning of the end for Soviet Russia and world Communism. With the advent of Sputnik, and so on, is this still your opinion?"

Answer: "That is my opinion, But I don't think at the time I made the remark that you referred to I put a date on when the end would be. But the most significant development I think that has occurred in recent times has been the proof given by the Hungarian people that even though they had been under Soviet Communist rule, and, above all, indoctrination,



subjected through their schools, their radio and their press to all of the influences that Communism could exert, yet in the face of having been subjected to that for well over a decade, what was the end result? The end result was thousands upon thousands of people who were ready to die rather than continue subject to that kind of a system.

"Well, as I say, when that has been demonstrated, that demonstrates that there is a fatal defect. The Communists had the opportunity-- how long was it? From '45 to '56, eleven years--to teach the young people, to have their ear exclusively from that period, say from the time when they were in their early teens until the time when they were in their middle twenties. The fact was that the revolt came primarily out of the young people who never had known anything in the way of education during that decade except what they got from the Communists. If Communism can't win the hearts and the minds of the people under those conditions, then I say that that is proof that it is never going to go on indefinitely ruling the people of their world.

"Now they can, as they have, gain successes. And as they continue to be ruthless, they can continue this suppression. But the significant fact was that it brought to light that there is, in my opinion, a fatal defect in that system, a defect which in the end is going to lead to their undoing. Now, how quickly does that happen?

"I think I have always avoided trying to put a date on it. I have sometimes said a decade, or generation -- phrases to indicate an indefinite time. But it is silly to try to put dates on these things. It could happen quickly or it could be prolonged, depending on circumstances that nobody can foresee, that nobody can estimate. But that the event in Hungary demonstrated something which in the end is going to be their undoing, about that I have no doubt whatsoever." (Applause)

(Department of State, for the Press, No. 19 -  
16 January 1958)

3. Address prepared for delivery by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge at the University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky, 17 January 1958

"In the case of Hungary, neither the United Nations nor, for that matter, the United States, succeeded in freeing the Hungarians from Soviet oppression. But the United Nations did apply - and is still applying - every available effective pressure short of war. A special five-nation United Nations Committee made a report on the situation which was the most devastating report in United Nations history. Twice the General Assembly, by overwhelming majorities, has condemned Soviet crushing of Hungary's independence and of the rights of the Hungarian people, and has demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The second vote, on September 14, showed an even larger majority than the first. By that vote the Assembly also appointed Prince Wan of Thailand, a statesman of world



reputation, to pursue the matter further with the authorities in Moscow and Budapest. In spite of callous indifference in both places Prince Wan's efforts have not been abandoned. Meanwhile the United Nations has twice refused to confirm the credentials of the Kadar delegates. As I announced on December 14, the United States will not hesitate to ask for a special session of the United Nations General Assembly on the Hungarian question if the circumstances warrant it.

"That constant hammering on the Hungarian situation has been a real blow to communism is proved by the torrent of propaganda which has come out of Moscow and its satellite capitals, trying to discredit the United Nations Special Committee and everybody else who took a hand in the matter. What hurts them most is that through this experience so many people in the free world, even though thousands of miles from Hungary, have understood as never before the realities of life under communism. That, in turn, has given the lie to Moscow's efforts to persuade people that in the recent words of Mr. Khrushchev, 'the communist ideology is the most humane ideology in the world.'"

"It is tragically true that neither the United Nations nor the United States were able to liberate Hungary by peaceful means. But this does not mean, as is sometimes said, that there is a double standard of morality at the United Nations. The United Nations has a single moral standard, embodied in the Charter. What varies is its ability to enforce that standard.

"The United Nations cannot ignore the realities of power in the world if it is to make progress, any more than a mariner can ignore the direction of the wind, however adverse that direction may be. Among those realities is the fact that the Soviet Union is one of the world's two greatest military powers and that, although it is often sensitive to the pressures of world opinion, it is totally callous to moral values. With or without the United Nations, we can no more change that fact in the short run than a mountain climber can change the height of Mount Everest."

For complete text see U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Press Release No. 2859,  
14 January 1958

4. "On Certain Questions of the International Situation"- Speech by Mr. N.S. Khrushchev at a Conference of Foremost Byelorussian Republic Agricultural Personnel, Minsk, 22 January 1958

"In his message Mr. Eisenhower makes the following 'solemn and categorical declarations':

"1. The United States will never support any kind of aggressive action by an collective defense organization or by any member-state of such an organization;

"2. The United States will always be ready to facilitate the development of a system of effective measures on collective security in the United Nations in place of regional measures on collective security."



"Mr. Eisenhower's statements can only be welcomed. But how can they be reconciled with the President's demand that the question of the East European countries, meaning the people's democracies, be discussed at this conference as well as the question of reuniting Germany in order to liquidate the German Democratic Republic?

"The Soviet Union has repeatedly outlined its position on both the matter of the European people's democracies, whose people are free to choose their own path of development, and on the German question.

"The Soviet government's viewpoint on this question is known to the U.S. President. Nevertheless in his reply Mr. Eisenhower wrote:

"I know that your government is reluctant to discuss these questions and reluctant to regard them as questions which have international import\*\*\*\*

"This was another of the questions raised at our conference in Geneva in 1955. At that time you took the position that there were no grounds for discussing this question at our conference and that such a discussion would lead to interference in the internal affairs of the states of Eastern Europe.

"But haven't subsequent events confirmed that I was correct when I proposed to you that these questions be discussed? Undoubtedly the Hungarian events and the U.N. General Assembly's virtually unanimous action on this question have indicated that conditions in Eastern Europe are universally considered to be of considerably broader scope than a purely domestic issue. I propose that we now discuss this question. There is a real need for such a discussion in the interests of peace and justice which seems to me compelling."

"What do Eisenhower and Dulles want? Apparently they want to meet with us and talk over liquidating the socialist system in the Soviet Union and liquidating the people's democratic system in the people's democracies. They evidently want us to repudiate socialist construction and restore the capitalist regime. Some people even suggest that the peoples of the socialist countries be polled as to whether they favor socialism or capitalism." ...

For complete text see The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 5 March 1958, Vol. X, No. 4, pp. 15 through 22. (Translation from Pravda and Izvestia, 26 January 1958)

##### 5. Letter of Marshal Bulganin to President Eisenhower, 2 February 1958

"As to the situation in East European countries, the Soviet Government's position requires no explanation and it is my opinion that any polemics on this question would be useless. It is permissible, however, to ask how is it possible while maintaining normal diplomatic relations with the People's Democracies or with some of them and consequently recognizing the sovereignty and independence of these countries, how is it possible to suggest to other countries to discuss the question of the internal situation in these countries? The Soviet Union cannot be a party to such a proposition which we can regard only as intolerable interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. I would also ask another question: are there any grounds for any country to assume the role of arbiter and take it upon itself to decide what social and economic system must be established in this or that state?



"It was just for this reason that at the Geneva conference of heads of government in 1955 my colleagues and myself declared quite definitely that problems of such kind could not be the subject of international negotiations.

"In your argumentation in favor of your proposal for the discussion of this question you refer to the events in Hungary. But is it not a fact that the events in Hungary have demonstrated in the first place that the Hungarian people were able to give due rebuff to the elements which, acting on the instructions and with the support of definite foreign circles, have raised their hands against the social system chosen by the people of Hungary? For our part, we are firmly convinced that in the interests of consolidating universal peace it is imperative for all of us to concentrate our energies on those questions the solution of which would create conditions for the development of peaceful cooperation of peoples and not to allow relations between states to be poisoned by bringing up such questions which could sidetrack us from problems which are really important for the preservation of peace. In this connection, I think you would agree that if we are to be guided by a sincere desire to engage in fruitful negotiations, the persistent bringing up, the imposing, in fact, of such questions which do not meet the approval of other negotiators would be of little use."

For complete text see The New York Times,  
4 February 1958. Original text in Prayda,  
4 February 1958.

6. Letter of President Eisenhower to Marshal Bulganin, 16 February 1958.

". . . You have proposed, and insisted on, about ten topics which you want to have discussed at such a meeting. I, in turn, suggested some eight topics which I thought should be discussed - strengthening the United Nations, dedicating outer space to peaceful purposes, the reunification of Germany, the right of the peoples of Eastern Europe to choose the form of government under which they would live, and a number of specific proposals in the disarmament field.

"I wrote that, if there were to be a top-level meeting, I would be willing to discuss your proposals in good faith if you would so discuss mine. Your answer is that I must be prepared to discuss your proposals but that as regards mine there must, you said, 'be unanimous agreement of all participants as to the necessity for considering such proposals'. In other words, you demand the right to veto discussion of the matters I believe to be vital to peace.

"I noted that Mr. Khrushchev devoted a considerable part of his Minsk speech to a discussion of conditions in Hungary, Poland and East Germany. Does the Soviet Union claim such a proprietary interest in these lands and people that to discuss them is solely a matter of Soviet domestic concern? If not, and if these lands and people can be discussed by Soviet leaders as an international problem, why cannot we both discuss them?"

For complete text see The New York Times,  
18 February 1958.



7. Soviet Aide-Memoire delivered to Havellyn Thompson, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 28 February 1958.

"The question brought up by the Government of the United States of America concerning the situation in the countries of East Europe relates to just this category. The discussion of this type of question would mean the impermissible interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, a path on which the Soviet Union will not tread in any circumstance.

"The Soviet Government in general cannot understand why it is addressed with proposals to discuss internal affairs of third countries that are sovereign states and with which both the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the United States of America maintain normal diplomatic relations. In the opinion of the Soviet Government to bring up questions of this type means deliberately to lead matters to a sharpening of relations between states, deliberately to subject to threat the achievement of understanding on urgent questions of liquidating the "cold war" and lessening international tensions.

"The Soviet Government thinks that, for guaranteeing the success of a conference at the highest level, it is essential that the attention of the participants of the conference be concentrated on such questions, the resolution of which will actually help to ease international tension, strengthen confidence between states, and consolidate the peace."

For complete text see The New York Times,  
7 March 1958.

8. United States reply, 6 March 1958, to the Soviet Union.

"The Soviet memorandum indicates that the 'summit' meeting should mark a 'sharp break' in the direction of improving the whole international situation, of 'creation of conditions for the peaceful collaboration of all states.' This greatly-to-be-desired result cannot, however, in the opinion of the United States, be achieved if there are excluded from consideration the principal causes of international tension.

"A basic cause, perhaps the basic cause, of tension is the support by the Soviet state of the world-wide ambitions of international communism. Other major causes of tension, which are perhaps manifestations of the above-mentioned basic cause, are the enforced partition of Germany and external interference in countries of Eastern Europe which result in a denial to the peoples of their right freely to choose their own Government. The United States does not, as the Soviet Government suggests, seek interference in the internal affairs of other nations but rather the elimination of such interference."

For complete text see The New York Times,  
7 March, 1958.



9. Letter of Marshal Bulganin to President Eisenhower, 6 March 1958.

"We do not believe and have never stated that a summit conference should discuss only those questions which have been suggested by the Soviet Union. I must recall that in our proposals of Jan. 8 the Soviet Government made it clear that it was prepared to discuss, by general agreement, other constructive proposals, conducing to the termination of the cold war, which may be advanced by other participants in the conference.

"This does not mean, however, that we can agree to discuss issues which fall within the province of the internal affairs of other states and the examination of which could have no other results than further aggravation of relations between the states. The situation in the countries of Eastern Europe and the uniting of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany into a single state fall precisely within that category. You, Mr. President, are aware of the Soviet Government's point of view in this respect and there is scarcely any need to elaborate on this again. A discussion of such issues would signify inadmissible interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, a course the Soviet Union will take under no circumstances.

"The question naturally arises why the Soviet Government is approached with a proposal to discuss the internal affairs of third countries which are sovereign states and with which both the United States of America and the Soviet Union maintain normal diplomatic relations. Indeed, if anything in the internal structure of any East European country is not clear to the United States Government then, as you are well aware, there is the age-long practice of clearing up such issues through the usual diplomatic channels and not by interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. We do not consider it possible to assume the role of a judge and solve problems pertaining to the internal structure of other countries. Nor can we recognize such a right for any other state and consider inadmissible not only the discussion but also the posing of such problems."

For complete text see The New York Times,  
8 March 1958.

10. Mr. N.S. Khrushchev's replies to questions of the editorial board of Trybuna Ludu /Poland/, 10 March 1958

"... Now we can say with satisfaction that the inviolable unity of the international communist movement, which has been strengthened particularly in the past few years, is the supreme expression of this fraternal union of the workers of all countries. The communist and workers parties have forced it in the struggle against the attempts of imperialist reaction and revisionists to split the world communist movement.

"The enemies of the working class calculated to cause complications in relations between the fraternal parties in particular between the parties of the socialist states. With this purpose in view they tried to exaggerate



difficulties encountered in socialist construction to speculate on some individual misunderstandings and irregularities in relations between the socialist states. These misunderstandings can, of course, happen inasmuch as an absolutely new type of relations is taking shape, relations which have no precedent in history. As experience shown, however, all the questions of relations between the socialist states are resolved and can be resolved through friendly discussion on the basis of the strict observance of the principles of proletarian internationalism.

"This, of course, does not please our enemies. They would like to see the people of the socialist countries at loggerheads. This would facilitate the realization of their cherished dream of restoring capitalism in the people's democracies. It is common knowledge, for instance, that the imperialist reactionary forces wanted to cash in on the events in Hungary and also on the difficulties encountered by socialist construction in Poland. Moreover, they actively interfered in Hungarian events.

"Counterrevolutionary forces rushed there to crush socialist Hungary and restore fascism. But the sound forces of the Hungarian people united to rebuff the fascist reaction and, helped by the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, defeated the counterrevolutionary insurgents.

"If there were some people who doubted the Hungarian events were provoked by the imperialist forces, now everyone sees who inspired and encouraged the fascist hoodlums in Hungary." ...

For complete text see Pravda,  
12 March 1958.

11. Mr. N.S. Khrushchev's speech at the Kalinin electoral meeting, Moscow,  
14 March 1958.

"...In the aide-memoire sent in reply by the U.S. State Department, just as in the message from the U.S. President, the whole question of the summit meeting is being pushed back to the starting point. These documents say nothing of substance about our proposals, but instead the German question and the question of the situation in East European countries is again being raised. We cannot conceal our disappointment at the position taken by the U.S. Government.

"Besides, it was not only a disappointment for us, but also for peace-loving forces of all countries. This was very well and convincingly expressed by President of the Czechoslovak Republic Novotny in an interview given recently to CTK correspondents and "Rude Pravo". I cannot imagine any East European country giving its consent to the discussion of such a question, Comrade Novotny emphasized, at least Czechoslovakia is rejecting it absolutely, categorically. About us and without us discussions were conducted in Munich with Hitler. The year 1958 however is not 1938. (Applause)

"The very fact indeed that the message of the U.S. President contained the so-called issue of the position in the countries of East Europe is unheard of in relations among states. Think of it, how can a state entertaining normal diplomatic relations with other countries, having in them its diplomatic



representatives---and these countries have their embassies in Washington and are members of the United Nations---how can such a state advance the question of the political system of these countries to a third party? Has anyone empowered this state to act in this way? If such a full power does exist, may it present it. This is really a gross violation of elementary norms in relations among states.

"We have repeatedly and resolutely stated that we are not going to discuss this issue---not because we are so intractable as Western countries wish to present us, not because we allegedly reject categorically the proposals of the United States. No, the very raising of this question is insulting to those countries whom the U.S. President has in view and runs counter to commonsense. (Applause)

"If you want to discuss the question of the social system of some socialist states, why do you not name such a country as the Soviet Union? Why do you exclude the socialist countries, of Asia, such as the Chinese People's Republic? ...

"Why then should such questions be raised again? We refute, and not only refute but declare that in the case of new attempts from the outside to forcibly alter the order in socialist countries, we will not remain just spectators and will not abandon our friends in need. (Prolonged applause) We are true to our obligations and to our international duty, and we would not like anyone to try our patience again. (Applause) After all, we too can raise similar questions on our part; namely, how long will capitalism exist in West European countries? Is it not time for this regime to give way to the more progressive socialist regime?

"Has not enough blood been shed in wars started by capitalist countries? This is a reasonable question not only from our point of view but also from that of all mankind. But we are realists, comrades. How can we ask this question of the representatives of capitalist countries whom we intend to meet and discuss how the state of cold war can be liquidated, how after this meeting may peaceful coexistence be insured? It does not take much imagination to make it clear that such a question cannot be discussed at either the highest or the lowest level. We consider it absurd to raise such questions, and we do not raise them.

"We say to our Western partners: If you do indeed wish to liquidate the cold war of which the nations are sickened to death and insure peaceful coexistence of states, you must not increase the difficulties to solution of controversial questions. If two social systems exist, there can be no other policy than the policy of reasonable compromise which does not touch upon the internal regime, does not give advantage to any one country, and does not infringe the interests of safety of the states concerned." ...

For complete text see Pravda, 15 March 1958



12. Aide-mémoire of the Soviet Government to the Government of the United States, 24 March 1958.

"In its aide-mémoire the United States Government declares that it is guided by serious intentions in considering questions pertaining to preparation of a summit meeting.

"It goes without saying that such an intention is only commendable. It is surprising, however, that the United States Government admits the possibility of the summit meeting becoming turned into a kind of a theatrical show, a spectacle. It should be noted that such pronouncements about a summit conference, on which the peoples pin so much hope, seem strange, to say the least.

"Even if some Western circles do have an intention to smear the idea of a meeting at the highest level, it is to be hoped that this does not reflect the position of the United States Government.

"As to the Soviet Government, it has stated more than once that it attaches exceptionally great importance to the salutary effect of the entire international climate and to the important contribution to the cause of peace which a meeting with the participation of the heads of government should have.

"And more, what constructive approach to a summit meeting on the part of the United States Government can we talk about if it continues insisting on the discussion of the so-called problem of the situation in East European countries. It is difficult to believe that the United States Government does not know that such a proposal cannot but be resolutely condemned by the Soviet Union and those countries, the situation in which it would like to make the subject of discussion at an international conference.

"The very fact that this question is being posed is insulting to these states and impermissible in international relations.

"No one has given the United States, or any other country, the powers to appear in the role of judges who decide whether a given country should or should not have the social and state system chosen by her people. He who today, guided by his hostility to socialism, poses the question of changing the social system in East European countries, pushes the world onto the road of kindling enmity among peoples, the road of war. But then it is pertinent to ask: what do international negotiations and a summit meeting for reducing international tension have to do with that?

"The Soviet Government has already more than once pointed out how dangerous to the cause of peace it would be to carry ideological differences into the sphere of international relations. This viewpoint finds ever wider international recognition and was reflected in particular in the unanimous decision of the twelfth session of the United National General Assembly on the problem of peaceful coexistence of states.



"Nevertheless, the aide-mémoire of the United States Government lays stress on differences of an ideological nature and at the same time alleges that international communism is the main cause of tension.

"Were we to discuss the irreconcilable fundamental differences existing between social systems, the differences between capitalism and socialism, whither would this lead us, and what would be the chances of rapprochement between the states?

"Unquestionably, in that case the gap between the states of East and West would have become even deeper and the winners would be those who are sowing enmity and discord in international relations." ...

(The New York Times, 25 March 1958)

13. News Conference of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 25 March 1958

"Now, as you know, President Eisenhower has made perfectly clear that he wants to have a summit meeting if there is any reasonable chance of reaching substantial agreements which will ease the international situation and make peace more likely. But it's more and more apparent, and has been revealed I think by this exchange of correspondence, that the Soviets are demanding a very high political price as a condition to having such a meeting, and the question is whether there is enough hope out of such a meeting to justify paying the political price which the Soviets seem to be exacting.

"I have jotted down here, quite hurriedly, some of the price tags that they seem to be putting on it, and I would like to read those to you, if I may, to illustrate my points:

"1. The equating of certain Eastern European governments, such as Czechoslovakia and Rumania, with such Western Governments as the United Kingdom, France and Italy;

"2. Acceptance of the legitimacy of the East German puppet regime and acquiescence in the continued division of Germany;

"3. Ending the agreed joint responsibility of the four former occupying powers of Germany for the reunification of Germany, a responsibility that was reaffirmed at Geneva in 1955." ...

Question: "Mr. Secretary, in the note from the Soviet Government of yesterday, they referred to the possibility of discussing a German peace treaty, and also a pact between the Warsaw powers and the NATO powers. Now as agenda items, do those two points not open the whole question of the reunification of Germany and, also, the position of Eastern Europe, which you want to discuss?



Answer: "I would feel rather that they tend pretty much to close the door to the kind of thing that we want to discuss.

"The Soviet, at least, would interpret such an agenda item as limiting the discussion to the particular matters; namely, a peace treaty involving both Germanies and equating of the Warsaw Pact with the NATO group. I would be extremely concerned to see the agenda accepted in that form without at least making clear that we interpret the agenda as opening up the possibility of discussing these other items.

"You will recall that at the last summit conference at Geneva, there was a very prolonged and rather sharp exchange of views at the restricted meeting with respect to the label and title to be given to these topics. And finally we compromised upon a title that was called 'European Security and Germany' and that, we felt, was broad enough to open up the kind of subjects that you refer to.

"If we now accepted a narrowing of that agenda item, as the Soviets propose, certainly they would argue that we had agreed to forego at this time any discussion of the reunification of Germany. Indeed, they are quite categorical, and have been in the whole series of notes that they have put out, that they do not consider that the reunification of Germany is discussable.

"If we accept such an agenda item with their interpretation of it, I would think that--while, of course, nobody is there physically to prevent the heads of Western governments from uttering words, and we could probably use those words, "Reunification of Germany"--I am quite sure it would be contended on the other side that the terms of the conference have implicitly, or, indeed explicitly, excluded that." ...

(The New York Times, 26 March 1958)



B. THE BRITISH-SOVIET EXCHANGE

1. Letter of Prime Minister Macmillan to Marshal Bulganin, 8 March 1958

..."In drawing up the agenda it would, of course, be necessary to consider not only the proposals in your letter but any other proposal which might be put forward by other Governments concerned. There are, for example, the suggestions in the letter addressed to you on January 12 by President Eisenhower which I fully endorse. Despite the comments which you have made on them, these suggestions must clearly be considered further in the preparation of any agenda for a meeting of Heads of Government."

For complete text see The Times,  
London, 10 March 1958.

2. Letter of Marshal Bulganin to Prime Minister Macmillan, 19 March 1958

..."Nor can we agree to a discussion of questions which belong to the sphere of the domestic affairs of other states and whose discussion cannot result in anything but further aggravation of the relations between powers. I mean such questions as the situation in East European countries or the union of the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany into a single country ... Discussion of such questions would constitute intolerable interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, to which the Soviet Union will in no case agree. The legitimate question arises why the Soviet Government is approached with the proposal to discuss the home affairs of other countries which are sovereign states and with which both Great Britain and the USSR have normal diplomatic relations. Indeed, if the Government of Great Britain is uncertain about the internal structure of one or another East European country, then, as you know, there is the age-old practice of clarifying these questions through the usual diplomatic channels and not by meddling in the home affairs of other countries. Neither can we agree that some other countries have the right to do so, and hold that it is inadmissible not only to discuss, but even to raise such questions. We do not doubt that if someone proposed to discuss at an international conference the internal political situation, say, in France, Italy, Turkey, Canada, or Great Britain itself, this suggestion would naturally meet objections on your part. To include this kind of question on the agenda of a summit meeting would mean dooming it to failure in advance, and we by no means want this to happen." ...

For complete text see Pravda,  
20 March 1958.



C. UNOFFICIAL AMERICAN VIEWS

1. A Private View:

Extracts from the third of six Reith Lectures delivered on the BBC by George F. Kennan, 27 November 1957: The Problem of Eastern and Central Europe.

"I am sure there is no need for me to go into details about the situation in the satellite area. You all know what has happened in these past three or four years. The Moscow leaders made an attempt to undo some of the harm that Stalin had done with his policies of ruthless political oppression and economic exploitation. The first effects of this relaxation - as shown in the disorders in Eastern Germany and Poland and later in Hungary - was not to reconcile people to the fact of Soviet rule but rather to reveal the real depths of their restlessness and the extent to which the post-war arrangements had outworn whatever usefulness they might once have had. The Soviet leaders, startled and alarmed by these revelations, have now seen no alternative, in the interests of their own political and military security, but to reimpose sharp limits to the movement for greater independence in these countries, and to rely for the enforcement of these restrictions on the naked use or presence of their own troops.

The result has been, as we all know, the creation of an extremely precarious situation, dangerous and unsatisfactory from everyone's standpoint. The state of the satellite area today, and particularly of Poland, is neither fish nor fowl, neither complete Stalinist domination nor real independence. These things cannot be expected to remain this way for long. There must either be further violent efforts by people in that area to take things into their own hands and to achieve independence by their own means, or there must be the beginning of some process of real adjustment to the fact of Soviet domination. In the first of these contingencies, we in the West could easily be placed once more before the dilemma which faced us last year at the time of the Hungarian uprising; and anyone who has the faintest concern for the stability of the world situation must fervently pray that this will not happen.

Will the Hope for Independence Die?

As for the second alternative, which at this moment appears to be the more likely of the two, it seems no less appalling. If things go on as they are today, there will simply have to be some sort of adjustment on the part of the peoples of Eastern Europe, even if it is one that takes the form of general despair, apathy, demoralisation, and the deepest sort of disillusionment with the West. The failure of the recent popular uprisings to shake the Soviet military domination has now produced a state of bitter despondency throughout large parts of Eastern Europe. If the taste or even the hope for independence once really dies out in the hearts of these peoples, there will be no recovering it; then Moscow's victory will be complete. Eastern Europe will then be permanently lost to Europe proper and to the possibility of any normal participation in international life.



I can conceive of no escape from this dilemma that would not involve the early departure of Soviet troops from the satellite countries. Recent events have made it perfectly clear that it is the presence of these troops, coupled with the general military and political situation in Europe, which lies at the heart of the difficulty. Only when the troops are gone will there be possibilities for the evolution of these nations toward the institutions and social systems most suited to their needs; and what these institutions and systems might then be, is something about which I think we in the West can afford to be very relaxed. If socialism is what these people want and need, so be it; but let it by all means be their own choice.

It is plain that there can be no Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe unless this entire area can in some ways be removed as an object in the military rivalry of the Great Powers. But this at once involves the German problem. It involves the German problem not only because it implies the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Germany, but because so long as American and other Western forces remain in Western Germany it will be impossible for the Russians to view their problem in Eastern Europe otherwise than in direct relation to the overall military equation between Russia and the West. Any solution of the problem of the satellite area is thus dependent on a solution of the German problem itself. This is one of the reasons why I am inclined to feel that the German question still stands at the centre of world tensions; that no greater contribution can be made to world peace than the removal of the present deadlock over Germany; and that if, in fact, it is not removed, the chances for peace are slender indeed."

(The Listener, Vol. LVIII, No. 1496, 28 November 1957)

## 2. Congressional Views:

Statement by Henry S. Reuss, member of the House of Representatives  
(Democrat-Wisconsin) 27 January 1958.

In his statement to the House Mr. Reuss recalled (a) the statement he and 16 other democratic members of the House made on 16 March 1955; (b) and the letter he and 12 democratic members of the House sent in December 1956 to President Eisenhower. Both statements related to the future of Central and Eastern Europe and the following are relevant extracts from them:

- (a) "West German rearmament is underway, because Russia leaves the West no alternative. But if you agree, and if Russia will carry out her part of the bargain by withdrawing to her historic borders, we will welcome a unified and independent Germany; a free Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Rumania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic States, each independent but part of a larger central European community based upon a respect for human rights; and all without the capacity to make aggressive war."  
(16 March 1955)

"Again, in December 1956, shortly after the Hungarian revolt had shown how shaky was the Soviet hold on the enslaved nations of Eastern Europe, 12 Democratic members of this body-- Hugh J. Addonizio, Thomas L. Ashley, Charles A. Boyle, John D. Dingell, Torbert H. Macdonald, Eugene J. McCarthy, Henry S. Reuss, George H. Rhodes, Peter W. Rodino, Jr., James Roosevelt, B.F. Sisk, Frank Thompson, Jr. -- wrote the President suggesting some concrete goals for United States policy in revolution-



torn middle Europe based on our own revolutionary ideals of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

- (b)-1. Life: To bring an end to the threat of war in central and eastern Europe. A road toward that goal: creation of a demilitarized area, without the capacity to make aggressive war, for 1,000 miles from the Rhine to Russia's historic boundaries, with the demilitarization and the security of the area guaranteed by the East and West.
2. Liberty: To free the peoples of central and eastern Europe from foreign occupation or domination; to confirm their right to free elections, free speech, free worship, the civil liberties, protection for minorities; and at the same time to guard against the rebirth of totalitarianism from any quarter. A road toward that goal; embedding these human rights in the constitutions of the liberated states, with an international guaranty of their preservation.
3. The pursuit of happiness: To hasten the economic and social progress of the liberated areas, and to provide an alternative to the old nationalistic rivalries for territory and resources. A road toward that goal: encouraging (by such steps as economic aid under international auspices) regional federation and economic integration in central and eastern Europe. (December 1956)

Mr. Reuss added on 27 January:

"If accepted by the Russians, an offer to withdraw troops and create a demilitarized zone between the Rhine and Russia would greatly increase the chances of peace by widening the area where a mistake could be made without the catastrophe of all-out nuclear war. To those who say that Russia would reject such a proposal, I would answer that the scientific and administrative minds which sent Sputnik into orbit should also be able to grasp that such a proposal could be Russia's best assurance against the military threat of a rearmed Central Europe . . .

"Moreover, making some such disengagement proposal, even though the Russians reject it, is, I believe, necessary if the NATO Alliance is to go forward toward rearmament with any kind of unity."

(Congressional Record - Proceedings and Debates of the 85th Congress, Second Session, Vol. 104, No. 12, 27 January 1958, pp. 939-945.)

See also comments of Joseph P. Lash and William V. Shannon in New York Post, 9 February 1958.



D. UNOFFICIAL BRITISH VIEWS

1. Views of Mr. Dennis Healy, M.P. (Leeds, East-Labour.)

- (a) Mr. Healy in a pamphlet written in 1957 suggested the creation of a "neutral belt" composed of the Federal Republic of Germany on the one hand, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary on the other. Other countries might be added as part of "bargaining" between East and West. "The West would offer for example Denmark, if the Soviet Union would agree to include Romania". There would be an agreement to withdraw foreign forces from the countries belonging to such a neutral zone.

(Fabian Tract, No. \_\_\_\_\_ 1957;  
France Observateur, No. 400,  
9 January 1958, p. 8.)

- (b) Mr. Healey, speaking in the foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons on 19 February 1958, reiterated his views on "disengagement", and said that "Central Europe was the right place geographically to start". He added that there was an "impressive gathering of support" for it on the Western side, and "at least one Communist Government - Poland - was committed to it".

(The Times, London, 20 February 1958)

2. Views of Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, M.P. (Leeds, South-Labor)

- (a) In a television interview on 26 January <sup>Mr. Gaitskell</sup> suggested that a central zone with controlled national armaments, a kind of "experiment in controlled disarmament", be set up in West and East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. After the establishment of the neutral zone, Germany should be reunited on the basis of free elections and excluded from NATO, while the three Eastern countries should withdraw from the Warsaw Pact.

(Associated Press dispatch from  
London, 26 January 1958.)

- (b) Speaking in the foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons on 19 February, Mr. Gaitskell suggested that the Western Powers should withdraw armed forces progressively from West Germany, and the USSR from Eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In addition he proposed (1) that stock-piling of nuclear arms in those countries should be forbidden; (2) that Germany should be re-united; (3) that a European Security Pact be signed; (4) that the frontiers of de-nuclearized countries should be guaranteed and (5) that West Germany should withdraw from NATO and that Eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary should withdraw from the Warsaw Pact.



The following are relevant parts of The Times' report of Mr. Gaitskell's intervention:

"Finally, the third and most important subject--disengagement in Europe. Here he thought it was just as likely progress could be made.

"On both sides of the frontier there was substantial pressure for German reunification, and the possibility could not be ruled out at some future time of the German people infuriated by the Communist Government -- now becoming much tougher than ever before--doing as they did in 1953, staging a riot or a minor revolution against the existing régime. If this were to happen to-day or next year the danger of the situation must surely be apparent. It would be very difficult for the West German Government to restrain her forces from going to the help of their comrades on the other side of the frontier.

"There was also the possibility of further movement within the satellites. Nobody could see stability in that part of the world. Yet if there were to be another uprising, did we wish to go through again the appalling dilemma we faced in the autumn of 1956, when we had to choose between an inevitable third world war or leave the Hungarians to their fate?

"If trouble were to break out in central or eastern Europe, Britain would be faced with troops on the other side armed not only with conventional but nuclear weapons. The White Paper implied that we were to rely on massive retaliation for almost anything that happened. There was no indication of what we should do in the case of these minor incidents.

"The key to disengagement, the most important thing of all, was withdrawal of foreign forces from western and eastern Germany, and from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. (Opposition cheers.)

"The Rapacki plan involved some advance. For the first time Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as East Germany, were equated with West Germany.

"The major argument against it was that it did not involve real disengagement and did involve the West giving away the threat of Germany being armed with nuclear weapons, which was a thing none of them wished to see. It was a threat to the Russians and involved the West giving away this valuable bargaining counter for far too little in exchange.

"He regretted the exclusion of Hungary, but the Rapacki plan should be regarded as the start, and the basis for discussion. It was not good enough to say there were difficulties. What Britain should have done long ago was to put forward her own proposals for disengagement.

"What the Opposition would like to see done was: First, the gradual withdrawal of foreign forces from East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Secondly, an agreement to limit and control conventional forces, and no nuclear weapons permitted to the nations covered by this agreement. Thirdly, German reunification. Fourthly a security pact underwritten by the great Powers guaranteeing the frontiers of this neutral zone; finally, if everything else was agreed, an agreement for Germany to withdraw from NATO and for Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. "



- (c) Mr. Gaitskell made the following remarks on 12 March 1958 on CBS radio's "Radio Beat" programme:

"I wonder, if we could go back to disengagement -- which, in fact, we never got on to. I find a lot of people who take the view that if you are putting forward proposals for relaxing tension-- whether through disarmament or through what we call disengagement, some new ideas for trying to get a settlement with the Russians -- there are lot of people who think that that means you're soft on defense, that you're no longer keen about NATO, that you no longer care about the unity of the West. I want to say emphatically that I think that is absolute nonsense. And I want to declare my own point of view, which is that I've always been a strong supporter of NATO, the Atlantic Alliance, and I fully agree with what Mr. Stevenson said earlier-- that we have got to keep up our guard.

"But I'm equally clear that to stand in a position of sort of frozen immobility -- what I describe, to mix the metaphors a bit, as a Maginot Line mentality--without any attempt to reach settlements with the Russians, or indeed cope with the propaganda war, if that's what it is which they're conducting--I believe that to do that is in fact fatal to the West; because it undermines the confidence and feeling of unity in the West, since so many people are desperately anxious to get some settlement.

"Now, then, what sort of settlement? Well, if we take Europe, I think it would be generally agreed that there are two major problems. One is the position of Germany today, and the second is the position of the satellite states. And it is no exaggeration to say that as far as Germany goes, if there were to be, say, next year a rising in East Germany like the one in 1953, a very dangerous situation indeed would develop. Because you will now have a West German army-- with a year's time it will be considerably stronger--and there will be an enormous temptation, to put it no higher, for the West Germans to go to the help of their East German comrades the other side of the Iron Curtain. If that were to happen, obviously the danger of World War III is immediately apparent. That's one reason why I think we've got to forestall it.

"And equally I don't mind saying that I don't want to get into the position again that we all found ourselves in the autumn of 1956 when the Hungarian uprising took place, and we had to stand by shamed and angry and helpless--because if we had moved in any military sense to help the Hungarian rebels, that might have precipitated World War III, too. If we can't do anything to help them directly--and I would take that for granted--in a military sense, then for heaven's sake let's see if we can do anything diplomatically. That's the background to the disengagement proposals which I would like to put forward...

"We have put forward a plan for the past 18 months, and I'd like to begin with that if I may. It's a quite straight-forward five-point plan involving the following changes:



"First of all, the withdrawal of foreign forces from East and West Germany, from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

"Second, an international control over the conventional national forces--or indeed, if you like, nuclear as well--but an international control over the national forces allowed to that area, and of course agreed with the countries in that area. So that in itself, the second point is really a pilot scheme in locally-controlled disarmament.

"Third, the reunification of Germany.

"And fourth, the signing of a security pact under which the frontiers of these countries would be guaranteed mutually by the countries themselves and by the great powers.

And finally, provided all the rest is agreed, then I would say: "Right! West Germany and East Germany say, 'We withdraw from NATO'; Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary withdraw from the Warsaw Pact."

"That is the full plan for what we call a neutral zone or a neutral belt. Now, I believe that if that could be agreed, it would be an enormous advance; it would first of all bring you your experiment in controlled disarmament, it would secondly solve the German problem and reduce the danger from that, and it would thirdly at least advance the prospect of a greater degree of freedom and independence for the three satellite states." (New York Post, 16 March 1958)

(d) An interview of Mr. Gaitskell on 16 March was reported in the following terms by The New York Times:

"Mr. Gaitskell does not believe that there is imminent danger of a Soviet attack or that the international situation is comparable to that of August, 1939. But he does see grave dangers to peace in Central Europe in the event of new uprisings in East Germany or Hungary.

#### Five-Point Proposal

"Having studied suggestions by members of his party and by Adam Rapacki, Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Gaitskell put forward proposals on behalf of the Labor party. They envisage five steps to disengagement in this order:

- "1. The gradual withdrawal of all foreign military forces from East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
- "2. An agreement to limit and control conventional forces permitted to the nations covered by the agreement. No nuclear weapons are to be allowed them.
- "3. The reunification of Germany in freedom.
- "4. The conclusion of a security pact by the great powers guaranteeing the frontiers of the countries in the neutral zone.



- "5. The withdrawal of West Germany from the Atlantic Alliance and of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary from the Warsaw Pact.

"Mr. Gaitskell's approach to talks with the Russians is governed by his conviction that the West is at the beginning of prolonged negotiations with the Soviet bloc."

(New York Times, 17 March 1958)

#### E. AN OFFICIAL JAPANESE STATEMENT

Note Verbale of 24 February 1958 of the Government of Japan in reply to the letter of the Government of the USSR dated 10 December 1957 (translation from Japanese original)

"... The Japanese Government expresses its agreement with the righteousness of the development of young independent nations of Asia and the Middle East, and is determined to undertake efforts to assist the pacific development of these new nations freed from the dependence on, and oppression of, foreign countries. On the other hand the Japanese Government expresses the desire that the Soviet Government heed the many criticisms concerning the status of Eastern European nations and considers that it is an indispensable condition for the stability of Europe and the peace of the world that the people of Germany, on the basis of its freely expressed will, form a single Government and a single State..."

(Asahi-Shimbun, 26 February 1958)

#### II.

#### THE POLISH PLAN FOR THE CREATION OF A DENUCLEARIZED ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE

1. Statement by Mr. Adam Rapacki, Foreign Minister of Poland, on 2 October 1957 at the twelfth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

"...In the interest of Poland's security and of a relaxation of tension in Europe, and after consultation with the other parties to the Warsaw Treaty, the Government of the People's Republic of Poland declares that if the two German States should consent to enforce the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, the People's Republic of Poland is prepared simultaneously to institute the same prohibition in its territory."

(A/PV.697, para. 136)



2. The Polish memorandum of 14 February 1958 on the creation of a demuclearized zone:

(a) Summary:

The memorandum, which was transmitted to the Governments of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, German Democratic Republic, USSR, UK and the USA, stated that the Governments of Czechoslovakia and of the German Democratic Republic declared their readiness to accede to the zone proposed by Mr. Rapacki on 2 October 1957 at the General Assembly. The memorandum presents "a more detailed elaboration" of the original Polish proposal and suggests that the proposed zone should include the territory of Poland, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic and German Federal Republic, and within its confines "nuclear weapons would neither be manufactured nor stockpiled, the equipment and installations designed for their servicing would not be located there, the use of nuclear weapons against the territory of this zone would be prohibited".

The Four Powers (France, USA, UK and USSR) would undertake certain obligations to implement the proposed demuclearized zone, as well as to establish "a system of broad and effective control in the area of the proposed zone".

(The complete text of the memorandum, which was issued in a press release of the Permanent Mission to the United Nations of the Polish People's Republic, 17 February 1958, is in Annex.)

(b) The Foreign Ministry of the Polish People's Republic issued a declaration on 19 March in which it was stated that the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic had supported the Polish memorandum of 14 February.

(c) Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, made the following statement at his news conference of 10 January 1958 on the "so-called Polish Plan for a nuclear-free zone":

"I assume the question related, as indeed my reply related, primarily to the Polish proposal which was repeated more or less in the Bulganin letter. As you point out, that was not a proposal for total neutralization, but partial neutralization, you might say, in the terms of the elimination from the area of nuclear weapons, missiles, and the like.

"I might add, however, that it seems to be the opinion of some, at least, of our allies that such a step would in practice be indistinguishable from an almost total neutralization of the area because, if it is not possible to have in the area modern weapons then it might be imprudent to maintain any forces in the area at all because they would be in a very exposed position."

(Department of State, for the press, No. 7  
10 January 1958, p. 6.)



ANNEX

POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC  
Permanent Mission to the United Nations  
151 East 67th Street  
New York 21, N.Y.

February 17, 1958

Press Release

Memorandum on the denuclearised zone

Following is the text of a memorandum containing the proposal of the Government of the Polish People's Republic on the denuclearised zone in Central Europe transmitted on February 14, 1958, by the Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki through respective diplomatic representatives to the Governments of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, German Democratic Republic, Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

This memorandum has also been transmitted for information to certain other Governments and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

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On October 2, 1957, the Government of the Polish People's Republic presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations a proposal concerning the establishment of a denuclearised zone in Central Europe. The Governments of Czechoslovakia and of the German Democratic Republic declared their readiness to accede to that zone.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic proceeded with the conviction that the establishment of the proposed denuclearised zone could lead to an improvement in the international atmosphere and facilitate broader discussions on disarmament as well as the solution of other controversial international issues, while the continuation of nuclear armaments and making them universal could only lead to a further solidifying of the division of Europe into opposing blocks and to a further complication of the situation, especially in Central Europe.

In December 1957 the Government of the Polish People's Republic renewed its proposal through diplomatic channels.

Considering the wide repercussions which the Polish initiative has evoked and taking into account the propositions emerging from the discussion which has developed on this proposal, the Government of the Polish People's Republic hereby presents a more detailed elaboration of its proposal which may facilitate the opening of negotiations and reaching of an agreement on this subject.

I. The proposed zone should include the territory of Poland, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic and German Federal Republic. In this territory nuclear weapons would neither be manufactured nor stockpiled, the equipment and installations



designed for their servicing would not be located there, the use of nuclear weapons against the territory of this zone would be prohibited.

II. The contents of the obligations arising from the establishment of the denuclearised zone would be based upon the following premises:

1. The States included in this zone would undertake the obligation not to manufacture, maintain or import for their own use and not to permit the location on their territories of nuclear weapons of any type, as well as not to install on or to admit to their territories of installations and equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons, including missiles launching equipment.

2. The four powers (France, United States, Great Britain and USSR) would undertake the following obligations:

A. Not to maintain nuclear weapons in the armaments of their forces stationed on the territories of States included in this zone, neither to maintain nor to install on the territories of these States any installations or equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons, including missiles launching equipment.

B. Not to transfer in any manner and under any reason whatsoever, nuclear weapons nor installations and equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons - to Governments or other organs in this area.

3. The powers which have at their disposal nuclear weapons should undertake the obligation not to use these weapons against the territory of the zone or against any targets situated in this zone.

Thus the powers would undertake the obligation to respect the status of the zone as an area in which there should be no nuclear weapons and against which nuclear weapons should not be used.

4. Other States, whose forces are stationed on the territory of any State included in the zone, would also undertake the obligation not to maintain nuclear weapons in the armaments of these forces and not to transfer such weapons to Governments or to other organs in this area. Neither will they install equipment or installations designed for the servicing of nuclear weapons, including missiles launching equipment, on the territories of States in the zone nor will they transfer them to Governments or other organs in this area.

The manner and procedure for the implementation of these obligations could be the subject of detailed mutual stipulations.

III. 1. In order to ensure the effectiveness and the implementation of the obligations contained in part II, par. 1-2 and 4, the States concerned would undertake to create a system of broad and effective control in the area of the proposed zone and submit themselves to its functioning.



This system could comprise ground as well as aerial control. Adequate control posts, with rights and possibilities of action which would ensure the effectiveness of inspection could also be established.

The details and forms of the implementation of control can be agreed upon on the basis of the experience acquired up to the present time in this field, as well as on the basis of proposals submitted by various States in the course of the disarmament negotiations, in the form and to the extent in which they can be adapted to the area of the zone.

The system of control established for the denuclearised zone could provide useful experiences for the realization of broader disarmament agreement.

2. For the purpose of supervising the implementation of the proposed obligations an adequate control machinery should be established. There could participate in it, for example, representatives appointed (excluding ad personam appointments) by organs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Warsaw Treaty. Nationals or representatives of States which do not belong to any military grouping in Europe, could also participate in it.

The procedure of the establishment, operation and reporting of the control organs can be subject of further mutual stipulations.

IV. The most simple form of embodying the obligations of States included in the zone would be the conclusion of an appropriate international convention. To avoid, however, complications which some States might find in such a solution, it can be arranged that:

1. These obligations be embodied in the form of four unilateral declarations bearing the character of an international obligation, deposited with a mutually agreed upon depository State.

2. The obligations of great powers be embodied in the form of a mutual document or unilateral declarations (as mentioned above in par. 1).

3. The obligations of other States whose armed forces are stationed in the area of the zone, be embodied in the form of unilateral declarations (as mentioned above in par. 1).

On the basis of the above proposals the Government of the Polish People's Republic suggests to initiate negotiations for the purpose of a further detailed elaboration of the plan for the establishment of the denuclearised zone, of the documents and guarantees related to it as well as of the means of implementation of the undertaken obligations.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic has reasons to state that acceptance of the proposal concerning the establishment of a denuclearised zone in Central Europe will facilitate the reaching of an agreement relating to an adequate reduction of conventional armaments and of foreign armed forces stationed on the territory of the States included in the zone.