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"Recalling the unequalled feats of the soldiers of the first cavalry army, one cannot fail to speak of the heroism of the rifle units; everyone knows that the first cavalry army included the 9th and the 12th rifle divisions.

The political worker and revolutionary fighter Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev served with one of these divisions."...

Recorded statements by Gen. Ivan Tyulenin
40th anniversary of the first cavalry army
(Moscow, Soviet European Service, Nov. 22,
1959)

"Never before has the live Marxist word been heard in America so loud, clear, and convincing. All, without exception, listened to him. Those who risked challenging the 'No. 1 Communist' ('pervovo kommunistà') to a public theoretical debate may well blame themselves for it."

D. Zaslavsky, Pravda, 7 Nov. 1959

INTRODUCTION

On the eve of the 80th anniversary of the birthday of J. V. Stalin, the Soviet press has, for the first time,¹ presented explicitly and unmistakably that direct connection between V. I. Lenin and N. S. Khrushchev which has been implicitly suggested countless times during the past three years in Soviet propaganda media. Its appearance in an anonymous letter selected for publication in the second book on Khrushchev's U. S. trip, "Face to Face with America", is not just another interesting detail in the image of the new leader which has been carefully constructed to replace the idol shattered by Khrushchev's considered attack on Stalin at the XX Party Congress; this direct association between Lenin (the Vozhd) and Khrushchev (the Rukovoditel) marks the completion of the propaganda process through which Stalin has been reduced to human proportions and his successor increased in stature to tower far over all his subordinates. With these simple words the line of Soviet history from Vladimir Ilich to Nikita Sergeevich now passes over the head of J. V. Stalin:

"I shall not be mistaken if I say that since Lenin you are the first person who has enjoyed the real respect of all Soviet citizens and, apart from respect you arouse the admiration of all of us, compelling us attentively to follow your every action."²

Although the anniversary article for Stalin's birthday³ carefully proportions the space allotted to Stalin's services and shortcomings according to the new standard measures, its claim that the cult of personality has been liquidated is obviously as invalid as its conclusion that the "consequences (of the personality cult) can never be repeated in the future." The dynamics of dictatorship have, in an amazingly short time, again produced the familiar forms from which charismatic content will inevitably flow. Increasingly the stream of "letters to N. S. Khrushchev" must invoke recollections of the torrent of epistles unleashed -- for more than 18 months -- by the celebration of Stalin's 70th birthday. In less than 5 years, when Khrushchev will have reached the same age, the consequences of the concentration of absolute power in the hands of the leader of a totalitarian dictatorship will have again been demonstrated.

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¹ Izvestia, 20 December 1959; see below p. 1.

² Ibid.; see also front page photo of Khrushchev and Lenin, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 18 December 1959.

³ "A Steadfast Fighter for Socialism", (unsigned), Pravda, 21 December 1959.

WE ARE INTERESTED IN PEACE BUT NOT IN WAR

Izvestia

20 December 1959

Dear Nikita Sergeevich!

I am not signing this letter, not because, following the example of many heinous anonymous ill-wishers, I intend to hiss and howl, but only because I cannot write of my respect for you, of my admiration for you and simultaneously give my name and address. It seems to me that even a man like Stalin would have understood that such an outpouring of affection could not be unselfish.*

I shall state honestly that when you took over the helm, I like many citizens of Leningrad, and particularly the intellectuals, greeted your appearance without special enthusiasm, to put it mildly, but your striking capacity for work, your indomitable, almost frenzied -- if you will excuse me -- energy have swiftly conquered our hearts. Now you can hardly find a man in Leningrad who would not say of you with warmth and respect:

"Our Nikita doesn't goof!"

Don't think that when we call you Nikita, Nikitushka or Nikita the Corn Man, we are thereby displaying some sort of disrespect or familiarity. No, this is affection, great and real, as great as was displayed by all the Russian people for their heroes when they call Ilya Muromets Ilya, Dobrynya Nikitich Dobrynya,¹ or any favorite girl by a caressing diminutive.

Believe me: none of us would have begun to call nor did call Stalin Josif, whereas everybody to a man affectionately called Lenin Ilyich.

I shall not be mistaken if I say that since Lenin you are the first person who has enjoyed the real respect of all Soviet citizens and, apart from respect you arouse admiration of all of us, compelling us attentively to follow your every action....

* (This footnote is supplied by the authors of the book "Face to Face with America" from which the letter above is taken.) We think that the author, Leningradets, is mistaken when he writes that people who sign patriotic letters are following some sort of selfish aim. We do not agree with this part of the letter: many thousands of people like Leningradets, express their innermost thoughts in their letters, writing whole-heartedly and from the depths of their being.

¹ Dobrynya literally means "The Good".

NOT TO BE MICROFICED

KHRUSHCHEV: A POLITICAL PROFILE

IV

The Russian Review

July 1959

Vol 18, No. 3

By William K. Medlin

The patronage powers that derived from the post of Party secretary were skillfully used at all levels by Khrushchev over twenty-five years, gradually building up a group of loyal supporters dedicated to his brand of leadership. By the time of the Twentieth Party Congress in February, 1956, this group had developed into an impressive and vocal faction within the Communist Party. With this force and through his own political artistry, Khrushchev sought to gain specific advantages in major policy issues that faced the Soviet Union's collective leadership after Stalin. Some examples to which Khrushchevian techniques were applied are particularly illustrative of his maneuvers that helped to bring him to the summit.

Impact on Society. Upon being appointed formally chief administrator (First Secretary) of the Central Committee in September, 1953, Khrushchev launched into a general and severe criticism of Soviet agricultural policies and urged ambitious schemes for expansion (more extensive than intensive) during the years ahead. ¹ This move condemned agricultural policies under Stalin and was a direct strike against G. M. Malenkov, who in 1949 had announced that Soviet production of grain was no longer a problem. ² The move at the same time attracted peasant interest in and possible support for Khrushchev's measures. His personal sponsorship of agricultural re-organization revealed that he also took fundamental issue with the Malenkov government's consumer-goods policy, since expansion in agriculture was closely linked to heavy industrial production. As if to bolster his heavy industry posture--and therefore improve his relationships with industrial managers--Khrushchev became belligerent on international questions in 1954, especially on East-West relations (e.g., see his April 1954 address before the Supreme Soviet). Heavy defense industry was alerted. He clearly implied that it was no time for the USSR to adopt a "soft" internal policy in favor of the consumer. It may be recalled that the polemics in the Soviet press on the question of heavy-light industry emphasis ended in a firm reinforcement of the "Leninist" policy of giving priority to heavy industry. Malenkov's leadership had been challenged and put on the defensive. In February, 1955, Malenkov confessed before the Soviet people and the world to having committed serious policy errors, especially in agriculture, and announced his unfitness for the post of premier. Khrushchev nominated and obtained Bulganin as the new head of Government.

All during 1953-54, Nikita Khrushchev, in very un-Stalin like fashion but in his own characteristic way, traveled about the country mending his political fences, damaging those of others, and generally raising the Party's prestige and level of activities, which had been low in Stalin's last years of police rule. In November, 1953, one of his tactical maneuvers took him to Leningrad where he personally supervised the firing of V. M. Andrianov, Party head there after the Zhdanov period and an old Malenkov associate. Frol Kozlov (currently Khrushchev's first deputy premier) took Andrianov's place.³ Similar changes occurred in other important regions. The three key posts, Moscow, Ukraine, and Leningrad, as well as a number of others, after 1953 fell into the hands of Khrushchev's friends.⁴

During 1954-58 he traveled abroad extensively and personally met Tito, Nehru, Mao Tse-tung, U Nu, Eden, and Queen Elizabeth II. He became the most widely traveled Russian leader since Lenin, and under such different auspices! He has not concealed his sincere desire to practice his folksy charms in the United States, which has already had a pictorial glimpse of the leader over television. Popular in his own country and known in many areas of the world through his tireless personal contacts, Khrushchev is listened to by vast audiences unknown to Stalin.

After his 1953 rise to Party leadership, Khrushchev espoused a series of new measures in economic, social, and cultural affairs which were popularly received by various sections of the Soviet public. Some of the more noticeable examples of liberality were his call for higher prices for agricultural products--a boon to peasant life; granting peasants the right to retain for personal use the entire produce derived from their private plots; an increase in old age benefits; denunciation of the brutal aspects of Stalin's rule and the rehabilitation of scores of citizens persecuted under Stalin; revision and improvement of police administration and judicial procedures, bringing greater respect for individual integrity; revision of Soviet Marxist theory, whereby several paths (including parliamentary evolution) toward Communist society are recognized as possible; liquidation of the Machine-Tractor Station system (a socio-economic control device of the State) and the transfer to collective farms of agricultural machines; redressing Party practices abusing religious societies; expansion of housing construction; decentralization of administrative controls whereby local authorities enjoy considerable leeway in finding solutions to immediate problems; and still other measures. These acts have all occurred in the post-Stalin era and have, in varying degrees, been connected with Khrushchev's calculated rise to power. While a number of them bore his personal imprint, others issued from collective demand for change. Some Khrushchev ideas may not have evoked enthusiasm among certain strata of society, especially entrenched bureaucratic groups dating from Stalin days. Furthermore, his liberal policies unleashed trends and forces at home and in satellite countries that brought forth firm--sometimes brutal (as in Hungary)--counter measures by the Khrushchev-Bulganin Government to preserve the regime.

In many policy statements, travels abroad, and receptions in Moscow for foreign dignitaries, Mr. Khrushchev deliberately eclipsed Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, and in effect became his own minister for foreign affairs. He concerned himself with major policy matters of other cabinet posts as well; military affairs, where he apparently disagreed with Marshal Zhukov over the relationship between ground and air forces, finally dismissing the Marshal; culture and education, fields in which Khrushchev made major policy pronouncements during 1957-58 pertaining to literary license and education reforms; economic planning, whereby the five-year plan was revised into a seven-year plan (1959-1965) which will terminate during Khrushchev's seventy-first year; and agriculture, where through land reclamation and crop diversification, especially in grains, Soviet farming patterns received the most radical alterations since forced collectivization in the early 1930's. His personal implementation of these measures made Khrushchev, at various times, ex officio minister in their respective areas. There are few ministries in the Government today that have not felt the direct hand of the Premier in their daily affairs.

Khrushchev's policy maneuvers and alterations provided him not only with substantial popularity but also with opportunities to introduce new personnel into the vast Soviet bureaucratic system. By the time the Twentieth Party Congress met, Soviet information media left little doubt as to his pre-eminent place in the Soviet ruling group. At that Congress he gave the Report of the Central Committee (Malenkov had done so in 1952); he delivered the major denunciation of the Stalin personality cult and of Stalin's criminal and blundering acts; and he brought many of his supporters into the top ruling group.⁵ Khrushchev's primacy in the Party hierarchy was no longer a question, it was a demonstrated political fact. Thereafter it took less than two years to have the Central Committee dismiss leading members of the highest organ, the Party Presidium, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Saburov, Pervukhin, Shepilov, Zhukov, and, later, Bulganin,⁶ and to replace them with persons who had ties with or had served under Khrushchev, namely, Brezhnev, Furtseva, Kozlov, Kirichenko, Kirilenko, Koshchev, Mzhvanadze, Podgorny, and Polyanski. Thus, a substantial number from the political slate of candidates in 1956 were moved into full membership in subsequent months; and to take their old places, in turn, other Khrushchev supporters were brought up into the "anti-chamber" of power. The next most conspicuous change has been the almost complete displacement, except for Mikoyan and Kosygin, of veteran economic administrators from the Presidium. Without exception, those dismissed have been replaced by career Party managers rather than by experienced economic or financial specialists.⁷

The political phenomenon of Party careerists dominating the ruling group under Khrushchev's chairmanship represents a new phase in the development of Soviet government and society. He is leader and spokesman for a new, younger set of the political elite. Since moving into power they have initiated changes and reforms which go further, and are more ambitious, than those pushed by Khrushchev during the years 1953-56. One wonders what will be the response of society to the various programs which now demand

ever more effort and personal deprivations from society; and how will its task-masters respond to society's strains? Solutions devised by Soviet politics will determine whether Khrushchev's monopoly of power will revert to the dark periods of Stalin's rule or not. Assuming we have a true picture of the Khrushchev personality, there is cause for some hope; but that personality will not always be at the Russian helm.

Personality and Family. The Soviet Premier is not intimately nor even well known to anyone outside his own circle of relatives and friends. For this reason, a truly candid description of the man is impossible to trace here. It is nonetheless worthwhile to study those aspects that emerge from the more informative, personal encounters.⁸ While his roundish (5' 5", 200-pound) physique, bull neck, and bald pate are not particularly attractive and strike a plebeian appearance. He has a quick, alert mind that pounces eagerly upon any advantage dropped in verbal exchanges. This alertness serves him especially well in the art of repartee, at which he shows great skill. He loves an argument, and after even eight hours of it can still beam with zest. Change of pace to catch his opponent off balance is a technique he employs cleverly. While in the main more clumsy than polished, he can be fair, courteous, and logical in debate. Contrariwise, he can be abusive to those not present, vain, and deceitful if it suits his purpose. He exhibits a sense of humor--a hearty feeling for the human drama and the trials of everyday folk. By using an old Russian literary device, the proverb, he embroiders his speeches and coins quips with the aim of pointing to life's lessons and to morals he seek to inculcate.

Come of his uses of this technique are revealing. When reminded of the high standard of material living in the United States Khrushchev retorted: "Every snipe boasts about his own swamp!" On another, similar occasion, referring to Russian priorities, he said, "Better fill a man's stomach than his eyes." Speaking to agricultural managers about the huge program cut out for the, Khrushchev put it bluntly, "We must pull our socks up and churn out more butter." He admonished, "You must believe in corn as you believe in clover." Needling the collective farmer to recognize the possibilities of new agricultural policies, he said, "corn is...sausage on the handle--it's beefsteak and bacon." To suggestions that political troubles in the USSR leadership group would follow dismissals of high officials like Marshal Zhukov, Khrushchev quipped, "A hungry man dreams of buns." Albeit inconclusively, one can surmise that this side of his personality connotes a kind of basic reasonableness about human affairs and a respect for human nature. Garrulous and extroverted, Khrushchev is always ready to communicate and discuss. These habits illustrate peasant background and long association with peasant and working people. Somewhat like the European peasant attracted to and won over by the town, Khrushchev is curious about new gadgets and anxious to innovate or alter. Although he had not yet assumed a Government position in 1955, he sent one of his old Ukrainian associates, V. V. Matskevich, to the United States to study farm management for whatever advantages it might

have for the Soviets. Some changes ensued which can in part be traced to American influence.

Khrushchev likes to meet people, and urges everyone to "live it up." Once while motoring in Yugoslavia he wrestled Mikoyan in a field by the side of the road; recently he rowed U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold in a boat for two hours on the Black Sea; and at a Kremlin party he more than played the "gay blade" by waltzing ladies around the floor, soloing forth with old folk songs, and liberally jesting about with the crowd. Khrushchev has little taste or patience for the "egg-head" or stuffed-shirt intellectual, but yet wastes no time in praising Soviet scientists for their achievements.

Khrushchev's origin, education, training, and experience have not made him tolerant of others' views, except when there is special advantage to him. He became tolerant of Tito in 1955-56 when he thought that the Yugoslav leader, a popular hero in Russia, could be brought back into the Soviet politico-military fold. He has shown dogged determination to vindicate his convictions, and has on occasion been so enthusiastic about his ideas that he failed of capacity to express them coherently. A peasant-worker raised to supreme power, he is exuberant, overconfident, and self assertive. These qualities are dangerous in the absence of constitutional controls. Like many politicians the world over, he is frequently caught in contradictions. To cite but one of many examples, in one breath he insists that in relations with "capitalist" countries "we (the Soviets) want to compete in housing construction, food, and services to the people. But in another breath, he boastfully proclaims to the world that Russia is leading the world in the missiles race for military supremacy. Khrushchev is not doctrinaire as far as "Marxism-Leninism" is concerned: he is a pragmatist, a shifter, an opportunist, an eclectic.

He has announced revisions of traditional Soviet Marxist doctrine on such questions as international war, class revolution (as the only road to Communism), the role of leaders in socialist society, etc. He quotes Lenin to suit his own purpose and will tell collective farmers that his grandmother knew more about cabbage growing than the farm brigades with all their mechanical equipment, without a thought for "scientific socialism." Khrushchev even evinces a strain of bourgeois mentality when he says that opportunities and rewards for bright young men in present-day Russia are about the same in all the leading professional fields: it doesn't make much difference whether one chooses engineering, the armed forces or academic life, since the opportunities for advancement and financial benefits are about the same for all--for all those favored with the proper qualifications one may add.

Khrushchev has pointed to his Christian upbringing at home, while adding that he turned to atheism. On many occasions, however, he has referred to God in ways not disrespectful of Deity, yet not reverently either. Referring to a Christmas message of

President Eisenhower, Khrushchev said, "God knows that we have not counted their (the American's) money," apparently implying that invocations to protect the free world's culture from the revolution are not necessary in these times. He once told Russian youth that wavering between belief and dis-belief in God was foolish. On another occasion he advised people to "have the fear of God" when considering the uses of nuclear weapons. He is familiar with the Bible and can recite its moral stories.

What emerges from our knowledge of Nikita S. Khrushchev is a man of much native ability, alert and shrewd, who will not be easily fooled and can be tough. It is a man who seems to know the pulse of the people because he understands them, having long lived among them and keeps in touch with them. This is a man who is less concerned with the philosophical formulations of things than he is with finding ways to solve immediate problems in order to enhance the power and efficiency of a newly industrialized society and to increase the political hold which he and his faction have in the regime. He is an adroit politician who knows the political elements at his control and how to maneuver himself and his partisans into greater power. Khrushchev is impetuous, anxious, and eager to forge ahead on ambitious plans. He is more confident than cautious. He is an organizer and builder of industrial and agricultural developments whose scope may transform Russian Eurasia in another generation.

Khrushchev has not yet proved himself a statesman; he is too mundane, too practical for that. In terms of personal experience and understanding, he is relatively ignorant of the outside world, of the cultural, social, and economic ideas that have motivated other societies for centuries. He owes this ignorance in great part to his origin from the great mass of Russians who lived in isolation from other European cultures, and to their almost complete lack of social mobility up to recent times. As late as 1954 Khrushchev could say, when he went to Uzbekistan in Soviet Central Asia, that it was his first visit to that part of the Soviet Union. Since that time he has journeyed widely in Europe and Asia, but he has yet to "fill his eyes" in the land of his chief "competitor," North America.

The Premier is married, reportedly for the second time. There is little information about Madame Nina Khrushcheva, but she is described as a reserved, soft-spoken, and gracious person who, it might be said, serves as a quiet reservoir of strength for her ebullient husband. The Khrushchev family is large, with "many" daughters and at least two sons, one of whom lost his life in World War II. A second boy, (Sergei) studied engineering. There are at least two grandchildren, whom Khrushchev allegedly loves to cajole with and carry piggy-back. They spend their holidays at his Black Sea mansion, to which he often retreats for rest from his dynamo-like political life. Kidney trouble and age have forced him to slacken his pace in the past year. His health and mind appear otherwise unimpaired, and it seems that he plans to stay at the helm at least until the conclusion of his seven-year plan, when he will be seventy-one.

In Conclusion. Nikita Khrushchev is not a singular, isolated political phenomenon. In one sense, he represents, in part at least, the Russian answer to 1861, the year Tsar Alexander II undertook to liberate nearly fifty million serfs. Russian peasants in the last one hundred years have been subject to great social, cultural, industrial, and political revolutions--bringing forth men, who like Khrushchev, are experiencing for the first time mastery over material power. The Premier declares himself a Communist, but before that he is a tenacious and awakened Russian peasant. His inborn traits and sentiments have to some extent conditioned his rule, but he has shown but slight interest in the traditional goals of Russian peasantry. Soviet experience has made him a representative of a small core of Party careerists who together seek to perpetuate their rule and their plans, semi-feudal and collectivist, on the entire country.

Through his own activities and speeches, and through the sacrifices of propaganda, Khrushchev has built a small but direct ideological bridge between himself and Lenin, the Communist demi-god. The ouster of nearly all leading Stalinist lieutenants made this step possible and has ushered in a new period of Soviet history. Behind the new leadership are forces demanding new methods and new goals. Although the latter are dressed in much the same jargon as before, the differences show themselves. One of the principal new goals, and one in which Khrushchev has taken a personal part, is the development of Russia's vast tier of land facing on Mongolian Asia, an Asia in revolution. If the leader's programs in Siberia and the East are successful, he may go down in history as a primary builder of Russian Eurasia. It is the saga of Europe moving eastward, not westward, of which Peter the Great could only faintly see the features. But like his ancestors, Khrushchev faces both internal and external problems that challenge his plans for Russia. He is faced in the West by a technically superior civilization that twice in his lifetime has been mobilized by the Germans against Russia, and in the East by poor and hungry masses whose ancestors, in hordes, twice have swept across the Russian-guarded plain into Europe. In the years ahead, Khrushchev and his aides will have to secure Russian Eurasia through tremendous human and material investments. They will be faced with a choice of "going it alone," or getting an accommodation with major powers whose interest will be stability in the cultural-political evolution of the peoples inhabiting the world's heartland.

As an experienced agricultural and industrial manager, Khrushchev must realize what is involved, and doubtless he will seek internal solutions mainly along Soviet lines. If he is sensitive to his own responsibility toward the need for world balance in the great enterprise of human development, he may seize an opportunity to crown his career with statesmanship. The visible features of Khrushchev the politician, and of his immediate successors, may conceal from us this possibility. Khrushchev could still surprise the world.

NOT TO BE MICROFILMED

Footnotes

- 1 Pravda, September 13, 1953.
- 2 Pravda, November 7, 1949
- 3 Pravda, November 29, 1953; cf. The Russian Review, April, 1959, p. 142 esp. footnote 48.
- 4 Respectively Kapitonov-Furtseva, Kirichenko, and Kozlov. The importance of the big three fell off at the nineteenth party Congress to 29% (compared to 40% in 1939), and to 23% at the XX Congress. But in 1956 Khrushchev had old associates at the head of other important organizations as well: Brezhnev in Kazakhstan (having transferred from Ukraine), with 50 delegates; Mzhavanadze in Georgia, with 38 delegates, and others. Pravda, October 9, 1952; XX S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 14-25 fevralia 1956 g., Stenograficheski otchet, Moskva, 1956, vol I, pp. 233 ff.
- 5 While the full membership of the Presidium (Politburo) remained the same as before the Congress, the new candidates to that body and the new Secretaries of the Central Committee were mostly close associates of the First Secretary.
- 6 The roles of Marshal Zhukov and the military hierarchy, especially during Khrushchev's rapid ascent, are key problems requiring clarification for a full understanding of this Byzantine-like episode. The military crisis created in the Middle East and over-dramatized by Khrushchev in the fall of 1957, for example, terminated upon the ouster of Zhukov from Party and Government posts.
- 7 Bulganin, Kaganovich, Perukhin, Saburov, and, in later years Malenkov, all held major responsibilities for economic programs. While "Marshal" Bulganin held military posts for a number of years, his training and experience were chiefly in economic administration.
- 8 I am indebted to Senator Hubert Humphrey, who spent eight and one-half hours with Khrushchev in December 1958; Mr. Marshall MacDuffie, former UNRRA Representative in the USSR, who saw Khrushchev many times (1946, 1953, and 1955); Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, who has met at length with Khrushchev and members of his family; and Mr. James Reston, of the New York Times, who interviewed the Russian leader. I have used, N.S. Khrushchev, Verbatim Reports of Two Interviews Granted to American Newspapermen (London, 1957); Soviet Affairs Notes, No. 215, 1957; and Paul Reynaud in Le Figaro, August 8, 1958.

ESOTERIC COMMUNICATION IN SOVIET POLITICS

By Myron Rush
World Politics
July 1959

Current Soviet politics have been somewhat neglected as an object of study in the American academic community, in favor of research on social and political institutions for which there is considerable data.* Investigation of Soviet elite politics has been left largely to journalists and government analysts, some of them able scholars. However, these specialists are chiefly engaged in assessing the existing situation and basic trends in the USSR, rather than in testing significant hypotheses or in working out fruitful methods of research. Unfortunately, the products of their inquiry tend to be somewhat ephemeral, and their potential contribution to progress in understanding the character of Soviet politics has not been adequately realized.

The reluctance of academic scholars to engage in research on Soviet elite politics and to put others' writings in this field to scholarly use¹ stems partly from the uncertain validity of the evidence on which these studies rest. In a totalitarian society, where decisive political processes are hidden from outsiders and serious opposition to the sovereign ruling body is a crime, much of the evidence on important political developments is necessarily indirect. Yet the indirectness of the available evidence does not deprive it of validity, and the special problems it raises should not deter scholars from using such evidence to investigate basic questions of Soviet politics.

One major type of indirect evidence consists of the traces left by top Soviet leaders in their contention over questions of policy and power. Often these traces are published texts whose surface meaning does not reveal their political significance. They are "esoteric communications," hidden messages, which enable factional leaders to communicate quickly, safely, and decisively with the sub-elites whose support they solicit.² Most writers on current Soviet politics, aware that esoteric communications play some role, scrutinize Soviet publications for hidden messages and try to elicit

* This article was prepared on the basis of research undertaken by the author as a staff member of the RAND Corporation.

¹ There are, of course, significant exceptions. E.g., see Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, especially ch. x.

² I have discussed the role of esoteric communication in Soviet politics at length in The Rise of Khrushchev, Washington, D.C., 1958, pp. 88-94.

their meaning. On the other side, Soviet leaders and publicists employ their ingenuity to screen such messages from eyes for which they are not intended. They have had a good measure of success in this, partly because Western observers tend to underestimate the refinement and subtlety of Soviet esoteric communications. Many such messages, being designed for relatively wide Soviet audiences, are thinly veiled and thus readily observed; but the most sensitive and politically significant ones are extremely elusive. Let Beria not attend an opera with his Presidium colleagues and even the morning newspaper ponders his fate. But let the party Central Committee elect Khrushchev Pervi sekretar (First secretary) instead of pervi sekretar, and the change may well go unnoticed.³

Even among Soviet specialists the search for minute variations in key formulas is not common, and those who discover them are sometimes labeled "talmudists," as though they, rather than some Soviet politician or publicist, had devised these variations. Of course, the true author may have learned his verbal subtlety from study of the Talmud, but it is far more likely that he absorbed it from his political environment. The tradition of esoteric communication developed early in the Soviet regime, being a direct offspring of Bolshevik practices in evading the czarist censorship. The reluctance of Western observers to believe that esoteric communication has a central place in Soviet elite politics is not surprising. Men whose understanding of political reality has been formed by a free society find it difficult to suppose that piddling with stereotyped formulas can be an important mode of political behavior for powerful leaders. Even in default of the customary data used in political analysis, they are understandably reluctant to accept far-reaching conclusions drawn from this elusive evidence. Yet the fact remains: these minutiae -- no less than purges and policy debates -- are the very stuff of Soviet politics.

The role of esoteric communications in Soviet politics, as well as their usefulness as evidence in research on current Soviet politics, can perhaps best be conveyed by a detailed illustration. As might be expected, the writer prefers one that he is personally familiar with and that has led to seemingly valid inferences.⁴

³ Compare the communiqué of the Central Committee issued following its plenum of February 1956 (Pravda, February 28, 1956) with the one issued after the September 1953 plenum (KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh i Resheniiakh (Resolutions and Decisions of the CPSU), Moscow, 1954, iii, p. 610).

⁴ See the work of the FAO Committee on Commodity Problems, including the Communication in the U.S.S.R., "The RAND Corporation, Research Memorandum RM-1883, March 20, 1957, Santa Monica, Calif., pp. vi-viii, 70-80, 189-93; also The Rise of Khrushchev, pp. 35-41, 71-72, 104.

On November 3, 1955, Soviet newspapers published a telegram in which a New Zealand official, K. Holyoake, inadvertently addressed Khrushchev by Stalin's title of "general secretary." The gratuitous publication of this error suggested that Khrushchev might be making a bold bid for Stalin's old title, or at least for the great powers that had been associated with it. From this hypothesis one could readily draw the following deductions: (1) Stalin's famous office of party general secretary was probably a highly sensitive theme at the time of his death and afterward; (2) Khrushchev's title as the senior secretary in the party Secretariat must have been even more sensitive. These deductions suggested where to look for hidden messages as well as what kind to expect. A few weeks of research led to a series of discoveries:

(1) Inspection of Stalin's obituaries to see how they treated his famous title of general secretary revealed that they did not even mention it.

(2) Further investigation showed that Soviet newspapers had not once mentioned the title of party general secretary in the two-and-a-half years from Stalin's death until the Holyoake telegram.

(3) The articles on Stalin in Soviet reference works published since his death disagreed remarkably as to whether he had remained general secretary until his death in 1953, or had abandoned the post in October 1952.⁵

(4) A few weeks after publication of the Holyoake telegram which initiated this research, the Central Committee's theoretical and political journal mentioned, for the first time since Stalin's death, his incumbency as general secretary.⁶

(5) Inspection of Khrushchev's own party title revealed that just a few months previous to publication of the Holyoake telegram Pravda had elevated that title by capitalizing its initial letter.⁷ (As noted above, this change was subsequently confirmed by the Central Committee in February 1956, when it elected Khrushchev First secretary.⁸)

One test of the validity of a hypothesis is its capacity to bring the researcher to important new evidence. If the search set off by deductions from the hypothesis had disclosed nothing of political import -- if Stalin's title of general secretary had been treated after his death in the same way as

5 Compare the article, "Stalin," in Kratkii Filosofskii Slovar' (Short Philosophical Dictionary), Moscow, 1953, with the one in Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar' (Encyclopedic Dictionary), Moscow, 1955, iii, p. 310.

6 Kommunist, No. 18 (1955), p. 40.

7 Pravda, May 27, 1955, and thereafter.

8 See note 3.

before, and if Khrushchev's party title had not been tampered with -- this would have lessened its credibility. Instead, by leading to the discovery of important political facts, the hypothesis gained a measure of confirmation.

All the discoveries, it will be noted, involve unobtrusive symbolic facts which are pregnant with political meaning. They belong to a world of meaning which is largely closed to the ordinary reader of Soviet publications. To detect the most elusive of these symbolic facts a reader must anticipate them. He must expect to find something relevant to the object of his inquiry, although not necessarily the particular discovery which actually turns up. It follows that a Soviet specialist cannot simply wait by the stream of Soviet communications and hope to fish out their hidden messages; he must cast into it at points where he believes a hidden message lies concealed. He is led to these points by reflection founded on knowledge of Soviet politics and an understanding of the current situation.

A pregnant symbolic fact can provide the stimulus to such reflection. One symbolic fact leads to another. That is why, when such a fact is stumbled upon, it should be pursued. The first step in the pursuit is not a frenzied search for more symbolic facts, but an effort to explain by means of a hypothesis the one at hand. Once the hypothesis is articulated, deductions can be drawn to test it. In order to form fruitful hypotheses and to make verifiable deductions from them, an assessment of the political situation is required. Without some assessment of the political situation it is logically impossible to draw any inference from symbolic evidence; moreover, one cannot draw valid inferences without taking account of the many complex factors which influence Soviet developments.

By leading to new evidence, as noted above, the hypothesis that Khrushchev publicized the Holyoake telegram in a bid for dictatorial power acquired some measure of confirmation. Of course, a better test of a hypothesis is whether subsequent events support it, and particularly whether predictions deduced from it are confirmed. The test is generally difficult to apply in the social sciences, and in Soviet studies an added difficulty arises from the regime's concealment of much relevant data. Yet the present hypothesis, which was formulated at a time when many Soviet specialists believed that a stable oligarchy (collective leadership) ruled the Soviet Union, accords well with subsequent events.⁹

The following interpretation of the Holyoake telegram's publication was presented in March 1957: "Amid the intensive

⁹ Khrushchev was then widely believed to be simply the spokesman for the collective leadership. He seemed to lack a dictator's bearing and self-control, and apparently received no special deference from his colleagues, several of whom have since been designated members of an "anti-party" group.

maneuvering which marked the months before the XX Congress (February 14, 1956), and particularly at this time (November 3, 1955) when the election of delegates to the Congress was being prepared, Khrushchev had good reason to persuade the sub-elites standing just below the Central Committee that his power was ascendant and he was aiming high. This intelligence would encourage his supporters to hope for great rewards, his enemies to cease their opposition, and neutrals to seek his patronage. Apparently Khrushchev saw in Holyoake's letter a fateful opportunity to accomplish this aim. By publicly associating his name with the forbidden title of 'general secretary' he at once revealed the breadth of his ambitions and implied an estimate of his power, for he was not likely to reveal his ambitions unless he possessed, or anticipated, the power to realize them."¹⁰

(1) In the months after this was written, Khrushchev usurped power from the "collective leadership" by removing a majority of the party's leading body, the eleven-man Presidium.

(2) Khrushchev further revealed the extent of his dictatorial ambitions in March 1958, when he entered the Soviet government, for the first time in his life, as its head; by thus combining in his own person formal leadership of party and government, Khrushchev increased his authority and consolidated his personal dictatorship.

(3) Despite the campaign against the "cult of the individual" which was launched soon after Stalin's death and reached a crescendo following Khrushchev's attack on Stalin's crimes (February 25, 1956), a cult of Khrushchev has since been established with rites comparable to the eulogies of Stalin in the early years of his dictatorship. Now, just as then, history is falsified in order to legitimize the dictator's power. For example, secondary students are now taught that following Stalin's death in 1953 "leadership in the Central Committee was entrusted to N. S. Khrushchev."¹¹

(4) Once Khrushchev had consolidated his position as dictator, the controversy as to whether Stalin remained "general secretary" until his death was quickly resolved. A recent secondary textbook flatly states that "the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and General secretary of the Central Committee died March 5, 1953."¹²

Tests of the hypothesis that Khrushchev publicized the Holyoake telegram in a bid for dictatorial power, the, if they have not wholly confirmed it, have substantially increased its credibility.

¹⁰ "Khrushchev and the Stalin Succession," p. 75.

¹¹ Istoriia SSSR, spokha sotsializma (History of the USSR: The Epoch of Socialism), Moscow, 1958, p. 681.

¹² Ibid., p. 682.

The important role of esoteric communication in Soviet elite politics is established by the numerous esoteric communications which have been identified, and the important messages which they appear to convey.¹³ Their frequency, and the ends served by them, may vary widely. But they will remain a necessary link between leaders and followers until such time as men are allowed to go openly into the Soviet political arena to seek support for their views. When politics, in this sense, ceases to be "anti-party" activity, the Soviet political system will have become something different from what Stalin made it, and from what it remains today.

If esoteric communications have this vital role, then they can provide important evidence on the character of Soviet politics. Two questions arise in connection with such studies: what kinds of knowledge can they provide, and how should they be conducted?

The particular knowledge which can be obtained necessarily depends upon the content of the hidden messages which can be uncovered. In recent years, when factional conflict has permeated Soviet politics under cover of "collective leadership," hidden messages have chiefly served factional ends. But this has not always been true. In Stalin's last years, for example, although contending leaders used their limited access to publications for factional purposes, the most important esoteric communications were the dictator's programmatic pronouncements, which he delivered in an appropriately oracular style. Thus it should not be supposed that esoteric communications can only be made to yield conclusions about dissension among the leaders. Important information on other problems can also be derived from them.

Until now, Soviet specialists have for the most part limited their search for hidden messages to current Soviet publications, hoping to find there clues to future developments. However, the uses of esoteric communication in research are not limited to short-run predictions.¹⁴ Retrospective examination of Soviet publications in the light of subsequent events frequently reveals hidden messages which eluded contemporary investigation. Such esoteric communications, when considered in the light of the events which they helped bring about, can enhance our understanding of the situation in which they appeared. By such means, for example, the use of key institutions as power bases by contending leaders during the Stalin succession crisis might be considerably illuminated.

The second question which arises regarding studies of esoteric communication is how they should be conducted.¹⁵ The researcher who makes extensive use of symbolic evidence adopts special procedures, develops uncommon skills, and accumulates abundant data. Yet it would be wrong to isolate esoteric communications from other kinds of evidence. The rigorous and exhaustive analysis of symbolic evidence can contribute to our

¹³ They provide the principal evidence in The Rise of Khrushchev. See also the articles of Boris Nicolaevsky in the New Leader and Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik (New York).

¹⁴ and ¹⁵, see next page.

understanding of Soviet politics only if the researcher maintains a broad political outlook and considers all relevant evidence in arriving at his conclusions.

The researches of "talmudists," like all serious studies of current Soviet politics, can usefully contribute to academic research on the Soviet political system. They can provide valid evidence on important problems, bring plausible hypotheses to areas of admitted ignorance, and raise provocative objections to views held uncritically. More generally, they can stimulate reflection on the very nature of the Soviet political system.

14 An important historical study based on such evidence is The Ritual of Liquidation, by N. Leites and E. Bernaut, Glencoe, Ill., 1954.

15 See Alexander L. George, Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II, Evanston, Ill., 1959.

WHAT HAPPENED TO "COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP"?

By Merle Fainsod
Problems of Communism
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On April 19, 1959, two days after Khrushchev's sixty-fifth birthday, the Soviet press erupted in a rash of congratulatory tributes, the tenor of which evoked vivid memories of the Stalinist "cult of personality" condemned only a few years ago. Of the many messages which were printed, the most important came from Khrushchev's fellow members of the party Presidium, who saluted his career as a "model" and "example" of "devoted service" and referred to him deferentially as "senior comrade and friend, true disciple of Lenin, and outstanding leader of the Communist Party, the Soviet state, and the entire international Communist and workers' movement." While the reasons for the press delay in celebrating Khrushchev's birthday remain somewhat mysterious, the contents of the congratulatory messages came as no surprise. They had been foreshadowed by an outpouring of lavish tributes at the 21st Party Congress in the course of which delegate after delegate joined in praising Khrushchev's "Leninist firmness," "profound practical knowledge," "fatherly solicitude" and "tireless energy," as well as his "brilliant, comprehensive, and profound report."¹

At the 20th Party Congress Khrushchev had denounced Stalin's craving for flattery and his insistence on presenting himself as a superman who "knows everything, sees everything," and "can do anything..."; at the subsequent party gathering Khrushchev interposed no objections as one speaker after another offered effusive thanks for the personal guidance and initiative which Khrushchev had supplied in every sector of Soviet life from foreign policy and the development of guided missiles to cotton-growing in Tadjikistan. If these genuflections still represented a far cry from the heights of glorification witnessed during the Stalin cult, they left little doubt that Khrushchev had reached the summit of the Soviet power structure and that his position of undisputed leadership was universally acknowledged.

The image of Khrushchev's personal leadership which emerged from the 21st Congress was obviously modelled on that of Lenin. As Khrushchev himself put it in his secret speech to the previous congress:

Lenin resolutely stood against every attempt aimed at belittling or weakening the directing role of the party in the structure of the Soviet state...He tried to convince; he patiently explained his opinion to others. Lenin always diligently insisted that...the party statute be

¹ See Problems of Communism, March-April, 1959, pp. 4-5.

enforced, that the party congresses and the plenary sessions of the Central Committee take place at the proper intervals...²

Taking his cue from these precepts, Khrushchev sought to project himself as the true custodian of the Leninist tradition -- a leader who maintains his contact with the masses, who embodies his authority in the party and its Central Committee, and who insists on rigorous observance of the Leninist norms of party life. It is in this sense, and perhaps in this sense only, that it was still possible for delegates to the 21st Congress to refer to collective leadership at all.

If by collective leadership is meant an equal sharing of authority by all members of the party Presidium, then collective leadership must clearly be regarded as a thing of the past. The proceedings of the last Congress provide unmistakable evidence that Khrushchev now towers high above all his associates. While future events may demonstrate that his position is not impregnable, the possibility that he will soon be dislodged by another cabal in the party Presidium seems remote indeed. The levers of power in the Soviet system appear to be firmly in his hands, and the charismatic qualities of popular leadership which he has displayed contribute to give his authority a secure base. At the present time it is difficult to discern the direction from which a challenge to his supremacy might arise.

Disorder and Forgotten Sorrow

What happened to collective leadership? A retrospective analysis of the struggle for the succession may help to shed light on the problems of collective rule. When Stalin died, no single member of the Presidium loomed as the clearly anointed heir with an unquestioned title to supreme power. In the first few days after Stalin's entombment, there were some signs that Malenkov aspired to Stalin's role. But the Pravda announcement on March 21, 1953, that Malenkov had been "released" from his duties as party Secretary "at his own request" seemed to indicate that his colleagues in the Presidium were making a determined and successful effort to dilute his power. At the same time the delicate problems attendant on the transition and the need to consolidate the authority of the new regime compelled the new rulers to submerge their differences in the interest of presenting a united front to the nation and to the world. In these circumstances, collective leadership emerged as the natural formula to describe the divided and uncertain distribution of power.

² Russian Institute, Columbia University, The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism. N. Y., 1956, pp. 5-6.

Its long-term stability was in question from the start. Collective rule may attain a degree of solidity when those who share power are bound together by common dangers, interests, and purposes which outweigh their individual interests, where no one of the group possesses the ability, ambition, or will to stake out a claim to supremacy, and where power is so dispersed within the group as to make it dangerous for any member to try to dominate the rest. On the other hand, the stability of collective leadership is obviously endangered when deep policy differences begin to divide the group and one or more members strike out for the additional increments of power which make them a real threat to their colleagues.

The legacy which Stalin bequeathed to his successors did not easily adapt itself to collective rule. In the absence of the Supreme Despot, power was precariously apportioned and distributed with no point of coordination short of the Presidium itself. Malenkov, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, rested his authority on command of the administrative apparatus and on such informal connections as he retained in the party organization itself. Beria, as head of the MVD, had a formidable weapon in his hands. Molotov as Foreign Minister and Old Bolshevik, enjoyed the prestige of an elder statesman, but lacked an organizational power base. Khrushchev, who succeeded Malenkov as senior party Secretary, identified his authority with that of the party functionaries, but in the first months of the new regime, he remained largely in the background. Bulganin as Defense Minister supervised the armed forces, but the degree of personal control which he exercised over them was unclear. With Stalin gone, the interrelationship of these plural power centers was, to say the least, ambiguous. Since party, police, and administrative controls overlapped and penetrated each other, it was difficult to envisage how a clash of wills and interests could be avoided.

Moves and Countermoves

The possibility of conflict was magnified by the issues which the collective leadership confronted. Should the Soviet ship of state continue to be steered on a Stalinist course, or should new departures in policy be ventured? Should the new regime strive for a detente in its relations with the outside world, and if so, on what terms and conditions? Should large-scale concessions be made to the desire of the populace for more consumer goods, or should heavy industry and armaments continue to enjoy top priority in planning future economic developments? With power dispersed in the ruling groups and ambitions unleashed, a complete harmony of outlook on questions such as these could hardly be anticipated. In a political system where opposition is outlawed, policy conflicts ordinarily lead to the suppression or elimination of one or another of the antagonistic forces. This deeply-rooted party practice augured ill for the stability of collective leadership.

The first challenge came from Beria. The very existence of a powerful secret police controlled by one member of the oligarchy posed a constant threat to his colleagues, and their fears were doubtless reinforced by the uses to which the secret police had been put in past party struggles. Even though the charge that Beria endeavored to use his subordinates in the police hierarchy to gain control of the party and administrative apparatus cannot be fully documented, the remark attributed to Khrushchev (by the French socialist Senator Pierre Commin) that Beria "was clearly preparing a conspiracy against the Presidium" has a ring of authenticity.³ It expressed the underlying concern which ultimately resulted in Beria's liquidation.

While the arrest of Beria in July 1953 eliminated one of the chief contenders for supremacy, it left the problem of the control of the police still to be resolved. The appointment of Kruglov, a professional police officer, as head of the MVD and the strengthening of party controls over the police at all levels served both to downgrade the police and to neutralize its role in the power struggle. The decision in the spring of 1954 to transfer the political police from MVD jurisdiction to a newly organized Committee on State Security (KGB) under Colonel-General Serov marked another phase in the dilution of police power. By the same token these actions also served to underline the residual importance of control of the armed forces.

The designation of Khrushchev as First secretary in September 1953 set the stage for his bid for supreme power. After Lenin's death Stalin had used his position as General Secretary to consolidate his control of the party apparatus and to extend his authority into other spheres. Khrushchev's associates in the Presidium undoubtedly were aware of the precedent, and one must conclude that they either underestimated Khrushchev or displayed excessive confidence in their capacity to contain such ambitions as he cherished. The series of moves which he initiated, beginning in the fall of 1953, to install his henchmen in leading party posts in Moscow, Leningrad, and other key areas could hardly fail to arouse concern among his colleagues in the Presidium; one can only surmise that at this juncture some of them, at least, saw an even greater danger in the ambitions and programs of Malenkov.

Malenkov vs. Khrushchev

The search for an explanation of the alignments of the early post-Stalinist period cannot be limited to moves on the chessboard of power. Important policy differences divided the ruling group, and while they are only faintly illuminated by Soviet press comment, they are visible enough so

³ See B. D. Wolfe, Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1957, p. 316.

that patterns can be discerned. During this period Malenkov and Khrushchev emerged as the major antagonists. In the area of foreign affairs Malenkov saw nuclear war as a spelling "the destruction of world civilization," developed a thesis of peace based on mutual deterrence which minimized the danger of war, and called for improvement in relations with the United States through a process of patient negotiations. Khrushchev took a harder line. Speaking before the 10th Congress of the Czech Communist Party on June 12, 1954, he hailed a nuclear war as inevitably leading to a collapse of capitalism rather than of "world civilization." He accused reactionary capitalist circles of seeking a way out of their difficulties "By the preparation of a new War" and stressed the aggressive intentions of the imperialist camp. Similar views were expressed in a series of speeches delivered by Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and Bulganin.⁴

Malenkov's optimistic outlook on the prospects for peace found its reflection on the domestic scene in his identification with the consumer goods program. Here again it was Khrushchev who took the "hard" line. In calling for a reassertion of the priority of heavy industry and armaments, he drew on the support of the armed forces as well as on those members of the Presidium who shared his world outlook. The alignment on such new agricultural programs as the opening of the virgin lands was somewhat different. Here it was Khrushchev who was the innovator, while, if later testimony is to be credited, Malenkov was joined by Molotov and Kaganovich in conservative opposition.

These cross-currents suggest the danger of viewing the struggle for the succession as merely a series of maneuvers for power and place. Coalitions were cemented by principle as well as by calculations of advantage and fear. The opposition to the Malenkov program provided a powerful rallying point which reinforced the position of Khrushchev. The erosion of Malenkov's strength can be traced at least from the spring of 1954. In a speech on April 26, 1954, which represented a complete concession to the views of his opponents, he declared that a third world war "would inevitably lead to the collapse of the capitalist social system."⁵ It was not without significance that this speech of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers was addressed to the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, while the greater honor of addressing the Council of the Union was reserved for Khrushchev.

Meanwhile, the battle over the priority of heavy industry versus consumer goods continued to be fought. The conflict came into sharp focus with the appearance of a curious pair of editorials on December 21, 1954. Izvestia, the presumed organ of Malenkov, called for the increased production

⁴ See H. S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1959, pp. 71-75.

⁵ Ibid., p. 74.

of consumer' goods; Pravda, the organ of Khrushchev, summoned "the Soviet people to direct their main attention to fulfilling plans for the further growth of heavy industry." The issue between Khrushchev and Malenkov came to a head at the meeting of the Central Committee in late January 1955. The published version of Khrushchev's speech to a plenary session on January 25, 1955, named no names, but its intent was unmistakable. Said Khrushchev:

In connection with the measures lately taken for increasing output of consumers' goods, some comrades have confused the question of the pace of development of heavy and light industry in our country....These pseudo-theoreticians try to claim that at some state of socialist construction the development of heavy industry ceases to be the main task and that light industry can and should overtake all other branches of industry. This is profoundly incorrect reasoning, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism -- nothing but slander to our party. This is a belching of the rightist deviation, a regurgitation of views hostile to Leninism, views which Rykov, Bukharin, and their ilk once preached.⁶

The denouncement was not long in coming. On February 8, 1955, Malenkov "resigned" as chairman of the Council of Ministers, after signing a letter acknowledging his administrative "inexperience" and his past "guilt and responsibility for the unsatisfactory state of affairs in agriculture."⁷

By previous standards, his punishment was mild indeed. Although demoted to the positions of Minister of Power Stations and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, he remained on the party Presidium.

The Shrinking Collective

The demotion of Malenkov opened the way to a reconstruction of the top leadership. Bulganin replaced Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and at the same time held his post as Minister of Defense to Marshal Zhukov. Khrushchev remained First secretary. Five Presidium members, Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, and Pervukhin, served as First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers. Voroshilov, the senior member of the Presidium group, continued to discharge the protocol functions of head of state. At the July 1955 session of the Central Committee two new Presidium members were elected, A. I. Kirichenko, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party, and M. A. Suslov, the senior Central Committee secretary after Khrushchev.

⁶ Pravda, February 3, 1955.

⁷ Ibid., February 9, 1955.

At this same session of the Central Committee, Molotov was marked out as the next candidate for demotion and disgrace. As was subsequently revealed, the chief subject of discussion at this meeting -- which came soon after the "B&K" state visit to Belgrade -- was the question of policy toward Tito.⁸ Khrushchev favored reconciliation and an attempt to recapture Tito for the Soviet cause; Molotov opposed concessions to Tito as unnecessary and dangerous. But Molotov's views found little support in the Central Committee, and from that point on, his influence sharply declined. The party theoretical journal, Kommunist, in its issue of September 1955, administered an added blow to his prestige as an Old Bolshevik when it published a strange letter of recantation signed by Molotov. In it he acknowledged that in a speech delivered some seven months earlier he had committed a major ideological error by describing the Soviet Union as only having constructed "the foundations of a socialist society" instead of adhering to the orthodox formula that the Soviet Union had achieved socialism and was now building communism. A further sharp rebuff followed in June 1956 when Molotov was replaced as Foreign Minister by D. T. Shepilov.

Meanwhile, Kaganovich was undergoing a similar process of downgrading. In march 1955 his authority in the industrial sphere was reduced when Mikoyan, Pervunkin, and Saburov joined him as First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers. His appointment as Chairman of the State Committee on Labor and Wage Problems in May 1955 was terminated in June of the next year, and in September 1956 he was transferred to the still lower post of USSR Minister of the Construction Materials Industry. Despite these humiliations, which were shared with Molotov and Malenkov, all three remained members of the party Presidium, where, it can reasonably be assumed, they continued to harbor their grievances and thoughts of revenge.

The Hard Climb to the Summit

The maneuverings which attended the 20th Party Congress marked a further stage in the development of the intra-Presidium struggle. The attack on Stalin and "the cult of personality," which was first launched by Mikoyan and then documented in detail in Khrushchev's secret speech, was interpreted at the time as an effort to bar the way to the emergence of another Stalin. Yet if we assume, as in the light of later events we must, that Khrushchev was determined to consolidate his authority, his secret speech can also be read as an effort to discredit his major opponents in the Presidium. In the process of attacking Stalin, he made a studied effort to dissociate himself from responsibility for Stalin's excesses, and to single out others -- particularly Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich -- as having been tarred with the brush of

⁸ Ibid., July 4, 1957.

NOT TO BE MICROFILMED

their master's misdeeds. Conversely, he attempted to demonstrate -- though somewhat lamely -- that he and Bulganin had opposed Stalin's methods and policies. Despite the fact that Khrushchev had served as one of Stalin's proconsuls during the Great Purge, first in the Moscow party organization and after January 1938 in the Ukraine, he insisted that he had nothing to do with the purge, that it was engineered by Stalin and Yezhov, and that they alone were responsible for the liquidation of Postyshev, Kossior and other prominent party figures in the Ukraine whom Khrushchev both succeeded and, at the time, denounced. Even though the explanations were labored, their intent was unmistakable. Khrushchev was seeking to demonstrate that the party had nothing to fear from him, while it had a great deal indeed to fear from those who had been more intimately involved in Stalin's crimes.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev also moved to use his powers as First secretary to extend his influence in the leading organ of the party. More than a third of the Central Committee members -- 53 out of 133 -- and more than half of the candidate members of the Central Committee -- 76 out of 122 -- were newly elected at the 20th Congress, and in numerous instances their elevation in the party apparatus was directly traceable to earlier associations with Khrushchev. Five additions were made to the alternate membership list of the Presidium -- Marshal Zhukov; Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Kazakhstan party organization; Mukhitdinov, the Uzbek First Secretary; Furtseva, head of the Moscow party organization; and Shepilov, editor of Pravda. All of them appeared to owe their appointments to Khrushchev, although both Marshal Zhukov and Shepilov were later to break with him. Khrushchev strengthened his hold over the Central Committee Secretariat through the appointments of Brezhnev, Furtseva, and Shepilov as party secretaries. In addition, a special Russian Republic Bureau of the Central Committee was established with Khrushchev as Chairman; of its ten members at least nine could plausibly be identified as part of Khrushchev's entourage.

The 20th Congress was followed by a series of blows directed at the Stalinist Old Guard. On June 2, 1956 Shepilov replaced Molotov as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Molotov was moved to the lesser post of Minister of State Control. Soon thereafter, Kaganovich was demoted. By mid-1956 Khrushchev appeared to be riding high with no competitor on the horizon to offer a serious challenge.

But appearances were deceptive. The shock of Khrushchev's revelations at the 20th Congress opened up a Pandora's box of wholly unintended consequences. The Hungarian uprising in October and the political overturn in Poland threatened the Soviet satellite system with disintegration. All this gave powerful ammunition to Khrushchev's Presidium opponents who could now argue that Khrushchev's policies at the 20th Congress had placed the entire Soviet bloc in jeopardy.

During this period evidence accumulated that Khrushchev was in trouble. The delegation which was hastily dispatched to Warsaw on October 19 to discuss "topical problems" with the Polish Politburo included Molotov and Kaganovich, as well as Khrushchev and Mikoyan -- a juxtaposition which seemed to point to a new correlation of forces in the Presidium. The break with Tito which followed the Hungarian events served to discredit Khrushchev's policy of reconciliation. Increasing difficulties on the industrial front, which were complicated by the need to buttress the shaky satellite economies, contributed to undermine Khrushchev's leadership. Significantly, at the Central Committee session in December 1956, which revised the industrial targets downward and sought to tighten the planning machinery, Khrushchev did not even deliver an address. The main speeches were made by Bulganin, Saburov, and Baibakov. At this session the Central Committee greatly broadened the powers of the State Economic Commission, which was charged with current planning. Pervukhin was designated chairman of the Commission and became something of an "overlord of overlords," exercising primary responsibility for the operation of the national economy. The effect of this move was to strengthen the authority of elements in the Presidium identified with the state, rather than the party machine. The scheme was approved by the Supreme Soviet on February 12, 1957.

The very next day Khrushchev launched a counterattack. Appearing before a specially summoned session of the Central Committee, he offered a plan which was designed to emasculate the Economic Commission, to strengthen the role of Gosplan as the supreme planning authority, to abolish a number of central ministries, and to devolve many of their operational responsibilities on new regional economic councils, or sovnarkhozy. The plan which Khrushchev espoused was clearly calculated to weaken the power of his ministerial competitors, to enlist support from local and regional managerial personnel, and to leave the field free for the party apparatus to become the primary integrating and centralizing force. This bold move by Khrushchev to consolidate his authority served to bring matters to a head.

Open Conflict

The question may well be raised why Khrushchev was prepared to throw down the gage to his opponents in February when he was not willing to do so in December. While the answer must be speculative, certain considerations appear to be relevant. By February, far more than in December, the unrest in the satellite empire appeared to be under firm restraint and less of a threatening factor. The bountiful harvest in the virgin lands provided a vindication of Khrushchev's agricultural program and strengthened his position. And perhaps most important of all, Khrushchev's readiness to act indicated that he counted on the program which he had devised to rally the party apparatus to his banner.

From this point on Khrushchev moved swiftly to consolidate his position. A law approved by the Supreme Soviet on May 10, 1957, established the regional economic councils, abolished the State Economic Commission and made Gosplan the dominant economic planning agency. By a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet a week earlier, I. I. Kuzmin, one of Khrushchev's subordinates in the Central Committee apparatus, had already been installed as Chairman of Gosplan and First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev's opponents in the Presidium were also gathering their forces. By June Khrushchev found himself in a minority in the Presidium. Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich were joined in opposition by Bulganin and Saburov, making a total of six out of eleven full members of the Presidium; they also enlisted the support of Shepilov, an alternate member of the Presidium. The details of the cabal remain obscure, but judging by the special violence of the attack on Malenkov at the 21st Party Congress in January of this year, it is probable that he was the moving and organizing spirit. Despite previous disagreements with both Molotov and Kaganovich, he was able to find common ground with them in the effort to curb Khrushchev's bid for supremacy. Bulganin, Pervukhin, and Saburov were late comers to the conspiracy. Bulganin, in his speech at the December 1958 plenum of the Central Committee, abjectly confessed to having been not only an "accomplice" of the anti-party group, but as Chairman of the Council of Ministers its "nominal leader as well."⁹

Pervukhin's participation was directly traceable to the dispute over industrial reorganization. As he put it in his speech to the 21st Congress:

In the Central Committee discussion on the problem of reorganizing the management of industry and construction, I cast doubts on and objected to certain propositions in the suggested reorganization. My incorrect position in this most important matter and the discontent connected with it caused me to commit a gross political mistake; namely that I upheld the attacks of the anti-party group on Comrade Khrushchev at the sessions of the Central Committee Presidium which preceded the plenum in June, and consequently, as I later became aware, also attacks on his stand with regard to several problems of internal and foreign policy.¹⁰

But he also added that "once the anti-party group openly put forth the question of a change of leadership in the Central

⁹ Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, December 15-19, 1958, Stenographic Report (in Russian), p. 338.

¹⁰ Pravda, February 4, 1959.

Committee, I disagreed and did not support this request." Saburov similarly confessed at the 21st Congress to having manifested "political instability" prior to the June Central Committee meeting.¹¹ Nevertheless, in a subsequent speech at the Congress Kuzmin took both Pervukhin and Saburov sharply to task for seeking to minimize their parts in the conspiracy, and Pervukhin was singled out as having placed a particularly active role, together with Molotov and Shepilov, in resisting Khrushchev's plans for industrial reorganization.¹²

The opposition group's attempts to unseat Khrushchev by confronting him with a hostile majority in the Presidium misfired. Khrushchev refused to resign and took his appeal to a hastily assembled special session of the Central Committee where, according to the official report, he received unanimous support, with only Molotov abstaining. The resolution of the Central Committee, which was published on July 4, centered its fire on Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov, as well as Shepilov "who joined them." That the conspiracy had wider ramifications could be inferred from the fact that Saburov was dropped from the Presidium and that Pervukhin was demoted to alternate membership. In the resolution, the "anti-party group" was accused of having used "factional methods in an attempt to change the composition of the party's leading bodies..." and of having disagreed with and fought the party line on a number of issues, including industrial reorganization, agricultural policy and foreign policy. Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov were expelled from the Presidium and the Central Committee; Shepilov lost his posts as a Central Committee Secretary, Presidium alternate, and Central Committee member.

From Rout to Triumph

The reconstruction of the membership of the Presidium which followed the June plenum represented a striking triumph for Khrushchev. The Presidium was enlarged to 15 members. Marshal Zhukov was promoted from alternate to full membership, an action which seemed to imply that the Marshal had given full support to Khrushchev in the struggle against the "anti-party" group. The other new members of the Presidium -- Furtseva, Aristov, Belyayev, Brezhnev, Ignatov, Kozlov, Kuusinen, and Shvernik -- had all been closely associated with Khrushchev in his rise to power and were appropriately rewarded.

The treatment of the conspirators was far less harsh than might have been anticipated. All of them retained their party membership. Molotov was honorably exiled to Outer Mongolia as an ambassador; Malenkov was dispatched to manage an electric power station in Kazakhstan; Kaganovich was sent to

¹¹ TASS Summary, February 4, 1959.

¹² Pravda, February 5, 1959.

the Urals to run a cement plant; and Shepilov was reported as occupying a teaching position somewhere away from Moscow. The other major participants in the conspiracy, who were not publicly identified at the time of the June plenum suffered a series of retaliatory demotions. Pervukhin, after stepping down to an alternate membership in the Presidium, lost his position as a First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, became Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Relations, and was then shifted to East Germany as ambassador. Saburov's disgrace was more complete. After losing his Presidium membership he became a Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations under Pervukhin, was subsequently moved from that post, and at the 21st Congress was identified merely as a "factory manager in Syzran."

The treatment of Bulganin followed a particularly curious course. After the June plenum he retained both his seat in the Presidium and his position as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Although his public role as government spokesman declined greatly, he was not replaced as Chairman of the Council of Ministers by Khrushchev until March 27, 1958, remained on the Presidium until September 5, 1958, and was not formally linked with the anti-party group until Khrushchev's speech of November 14, 1958. His consignment to the relatively obscure post of Chairman of the Stavropol Economic Council completed his humiliation.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev also found it necessary to settle accounts with Marshal Zhukov. While it is at least possible that the Marshal had Bonapartist pretensions, it is more likely that the purge of the popular World War II hero was a prophylactic action taken to eliminate a potential rallying point of military discontent. The issue was precipitated by friction between the party's political apparatus in the armed forces and the more professionally-oriented officers who followed Marshal Zhukov in seeking to subordinate political indoctrination to combat training and military control. Even before the 20th Congress the Army newspaper Krasnaia Zvezda reported in its issue of January 25, 1956, that Marshal Zhukov -- speaking at a party conference of the Moscow military district -- had complained:

...certain efforts have been made to subject the official activity of commanders to criticism at party meetings. Such efforts are blameworthy. Our task is the comprehensive strengthening of the authority of the commanders, giving support to exacting officers and generals.

This doctrine proved unpalatable to Khrushchev. The Central Committee resolution of October 1957, approving the ouster of Zhukov from his positions as Minister of Defense and member of the Presidium and Central Committee, charged that he had "pursued a policy" of underestimating and curtailing party leadership of the Army and Navy.¹⁴ It reminded the armed

¹⁴ Pravda, November 2, 1957.

NOT TO BE MICROFICED

forces of the paramount role of the party and called for an intensification of political work in the armed forces. The reorganization of the military high command in the wake of the Zhukov purge also involved the elevation of such Khrushchev protégés as Marshal Konev to top command responsibilities.

The consolidation of Khrushchev's authority was manifest in every sphere of Soviet society. His assumption of the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers in late March 1958 represented merely a formal recognition of the leadership which he already exercised in the area of governmental administration. His own party henchmen were increasingly moved into key control positions. The so-called Ukrainian contingent, who had formed part of Khrushchev's entourage during his long period of service in the Ukraine, forged rapidly ahead under Khrushchev's tutelage.¹⁵ This was also true of assorted functionaries in the Central Committee Secretariat who worked closely with Khrushchev as First secretary. As early as February 1, 1956, the professional police officer S. N. Kruglov was replaced as MVD chief by N. P. Dudorov, a former Khrushchev associate in the Ukraine and a section chief in the Central Committee Secretariat. On December 26, 1958 Pravda announced that A. N. Shelepin, former head of the Komsomol, would succeed General Serov as KGB chairman, and it was not without interest that Shelepin's successor as Komsomol chief for a period was one V. E. Semichatnyi, who had earlier occupied a corresponding post in the Ukraine.

The published proceedings of the December 1958 plenum of the Central Committee provide particularly dramatic evidence of Khrushchev's supremacy. Almost every important speaker at the meeting was interrupted by Khrushchev with questions or comments, and the kowtowing to Khrushchev which took place left no doubt that homage was being paid to the leader. The speeches at the 21st Congress represented variations on the same theme and were sufficiently fulsome in their praise to suggest that Khrushchev was being lifted to a new pedestal.

WHAT THEN HAS HAPPENED to collective leadership? In an interview with Henry Shapiro, chief Moscow correspondent of the United Press, on November 14, 1957, Khrushchev was asked, "When you speak of the collective leadership, do you mean the Central Committee or its Presidium?" Khrushchev replied:

I mean the Central Committee of our Party. The Presidium is an executive body of the Central Committee.... The collective leadership consists not only of the members of the Central Committee. Collective leadership is exercised in our party from top to bottom...¹⁶

¹⁵ For an authoritative account, see John A. Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1959, pp. 146-150.

¹⁶ Pravda, November 19, 1957.

Those who accept Khrushchev's assurance that collective leadership still prevails in the Soviet Union may point to the undoubted fact that the party Central Committee assemblies with considerable frequency and that local party organizations function with greater regularity than was true during the latter part of Stalin's reign. But it may be worth remembering that Stalin at one time was also lavish in his praise of collective leadership and that he too made effective use of the Central Committee in his march to supreme power. Khrushchev's style of governance has its own distinctive characteristics, but the swiftness with which he has moved to consolidate his authority leaves little doubt that he is now, not merely primus inter pares, but the new master of the Soviet state.

MALENKOV

To the Chairman of the Joint Session of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities:

I beg you to inform the Supreme Soviet...of my request to be freed from the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

My request is motivated by a businesslike consideration for the necessity of strengthening the leadership of the Council of Ministers and the expediency of having, in the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, another comrade, more experienced in governmental work. I see clearly that my insufficient experience in local work and the fact that I had no...direct experience in the administration of various sectors of the national economy had a negative effect on the way I carried out my complex and responsible duties of Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

I also feel obligated...to state that now, when the CP of the Soviet Union and the workers of our country are concentrating all their energies for the further upsurge of agriculture, I see with particular clarity my guilt and responsibility for the unsatisfactory state of affairs in agriculture....In turning to you with the request to free me from my duties...I would like to assure the Supreme Soviet...that in my new post I shall, under the leadership of the monolithic and unified Central Committee of the CPSU, carry out the duties that are entrusted to me in a most conscientious manner.

--Pravda, February 9, 1955.

MOLOTOV

In my report to the February 8, 1955, session of the USSR Supreme Soviet I permitted an erroneous formulation

concerning the question of the building of a socialist society in the USSR....I consider my formulation...to be theoretically erroneous and politically harmful...

-- Kommunist, No. 14, September 1955.

PERVUKHIN

I am profoundly aware of my guilt before the party and I am trying to prove this in the work that has been entrusted to me....I shall never forget the just lesson which the party has administered to me. I must express my ardent and sincere gratitude to the Central Committee and to the Central Committee Presidium, which, guided by Leninist standards of party life, have given me a chance to show by deeds in important state work that I can atone for my guilt before the party and be of use to it. I shall do everything in my power to justify this high trust of the party.

--Pravda, February 4, 1959.

SABUROV

It is known, comrades, that I made a mistake and showed political instability in the struggle of the Central Committee against the antiparty group in June 1957....My error, comrades, consisted in that, before the June Plenum...I criticized shortcomings in the work of the Presidium, not from the position of the healthy section of the Presidium...but from the position of the antiparty group which, using petty and easily-corrected shortcomings as a screen, attacked Comrade Khrushchev, striving for a change in the leadership of the Central Committee....The June Plenum...noted the political instability which I showed at that moment, and taking into consideration the fact that I had helped the Plenum in exposing the antiparty group, removed me from membership in the Presidium of the CC but let me remain a member of the CC. Later, by decision of the CC of the party, I was sent to work as director of a plant in the city of Syzran. I acknowledged this decision to be correct and, in working at the plant, I am devoting all my powers to correcting my mistake. ...Comrades! An honest acknowledgement of my mistake gives me hope that the delegates of the 21st Congress will find it possible to forgive me my past and thus open for me the prospect of active participation in the building of a Communist society under the leadership of our party and under the banner of the great Lenin.

--Stenographic Report of the 21st CPSU Congress
(in Russian), Moscow, 1959, Vol. II, pp. 289-92.

BULGANIN

What, then, is Molotov...? Molotov is a person who has cut himself off from the life of the Soviet people and is totally ignorant of both industry and agriculture. Kaganovitch is a phrase-maker who obstructed work with his long, confused speeches. Malenkov is an intriguer who proved himself capable of every sort of vileness...(As for) my position, comrades...I must honestly say that prior to the events of June 1957, I was not with Malenkov, Kaganovitch, and Molotov. ...But...a fact is a fact:...in 1957 I joined them, supported them, and...later shared with them all the antiparty filth....

Today I am honestly striving to fulfill the duties that the Central Committee has entrusted to me....In my day-to-day work I see all the genius and wisdom of the policy of our party and our Central Committee....I am filled with the thought of being useful to the party....I consider it my sacred duty ...to justify the high trust of the party and to merit the title of party member....I promise...that I will be an honest and devoted member of the Communist Party and that is what I will be. I repeat that I will make every effort in my day-to-day work to merit the high calling of party member....

--Pravda, December 19, 1958.

HAPPY BIRTHDAY!

Khrushchev to Stalin:

All peoples of the Soviet Union and progressive mankind throughout the world are observing a precious date -- the 70th birthday of our inspired leader and teacher, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin....

Soviet citizens link all their achievements in the struggle for communism, in rebuilding a multi-national socialist state, with the name of the immortal Lenin, with the name of the great continuer of Lenin's cause -- Comrade Stalin. Comrade Stalin's name is the banner of all victories of the Soviet people, the banner of struggle for the workers of the entire world....

Like a careful gardener, Comrade Stalin cultivates and trains...personnel in a spirit of ardent Soviet patriotism. He has taught and is teaching them the Bolshevik mode of work and sharp implacability toward the slightest manifestation of alien bourgeois ideology....

For centuries the Ukrainian, Belorussian and Moldavian peoples dreamed of joining their lands into united national

states. But thanks only to Comrade Stalin's fraternal solidarity for the fate of these peoples...were these treasured dreams and aspirations of the people realized....For all these successes, the Ukrainian people, like all peoples of the Soviet Union, are indebted to the Bolshevik party and to the leader of the party and the people, the great Stalin.

--Pravda, December 21, 1949.

Presidium to Khrushchev:

Our dear Nikita Sergeyevitch!

On your 65th birthday we warmly and cordially greet you -- our elder comrade and friend, Lenin's loyal disciple and outstanding leader of the Communist Party, the Soviet state and the entire international Communist and workers' movement.

We wish to note in particular your bold and creative Bolshevik approach...to the solution of urgent problems.... The major political and economic measures taken by the party ...have been carried out on your initiative and under your leadership....

Dear Nikita Sergeyevitch! Your entire activity is to us an example of a party and state approach to the solution of big and small questions, an example of selfless service to the historic cause of the working class, an example of inseparable bond with the people and of unshakable fidelity to the principles of Marxism-Leninism....All these remarkable qualities have won for you the deserved love and respect of the party and of the people.

We warmly embrace you, our dear Nikita Sergeyevitch, and from the bottom of our hearts wish you good health, many, many years of life and fruitful activity for the benefit of communism!

--Pravda, April 195, 1959.

THE NEW PARTY HISTORY ON THE ANTI PARTY GROUP

Istoria KPSS
Moscow, 1959,
(pp. 654-657)

...At a time when the party, under the leadership of the Central Committee, was putting into effect the decisions of the 20th Party Congress and had achieved considerable successes in the development of the economy and in raising the living standard of the working people, there were persons who opposed the party line. These constituted the anti-party group which formed within the Presidium of the Central Committee, consisting of G. M. Malenkov, L. M. Kaganovich, and V. M. Molotov.

The antiparty group acted against the Leninist course of the 20th Party Congress in domestic and foreign policy and set as its goal the alteration of the political line of the party and the frustration of its undertakings. The participants in the antiparty group opposed expanding the rights of the union republics in economic and cultural construction and they resisted the steps taken by the party to curtail the state apparatus and to fight against bureaucracy. They attempted to frustrate the reorganization of the administration of industry and construction.

The antiparty group did not acknowledge the need for strengthening material incentives for the kolkhoz peasantry to expand agricultural production; it was against abolishing mandatory deliveries of agricultural products from kolkhoznik households; and it was against replacing the old methods of agriculture planning with new methods. The group opposed the movement which arose in the kolkhozes and was actively supported by the party to overtake and surpass the US in the next few years in production of milk, butter, and meat per capita. A member of the group, Molotov, resisted the implementation of a most important measure, mastering the virgin and fallow lands, a measure which has proved itself in practice and has acquired vast significance in the country's economy. The antiparty group opposed the foreign policy of the party, a policy which aimed at easing international tension, strengthening the cause of peace, and developing cooperation and friendship between peoples.

Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov acted against the undertakings of the party which aimed at eliminating the consequences of the cult of personality. This was no coincidence. Occupying a high position in the party, they were involved in the mistakes (oni byli prichastny k oshibkam) which were engendered by the cult of personality.

The Presidium of the Central Committee, and the Central Committee, persistently struggled against the errors of the participants in the antiparty group; they corrected them, anticipating that the latter would draw the necessary lessons

from the criticism of their errors and would get in step with the whole leading collective of the party. But the participants in the group more and more often slipped into anti-party, un-Leninist positions and embarked on the course of factional struggle against the leadership of the party. Uniting themselves on an anti-party basis and resorting to methods of intrigue in their struggle, they arranged a secret plot (ustroili taynyy sgovor) against the Central Committee of the party. Using factional methods, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, and Shepilov, who joined them, were striving for a replacement of the leading organs of the party, with the aim of changing party policy and returning the party to the incorrect methods of leadership which were condemned by the 20th Party Congress.

N. A. Bulganin also, in effect (fakticheski), joined this factional group. In his insidious (kovarnyy) anti-party behavior, he did much that contributed to the anti-party group's boldness in opposing the Leninist line of the party.

In June 1957, a stubborn and bitter struggle against the anti-party grouping (gruppировка) developed in the Presidium of the Central Committee. During this struggle, N. S. Khrushchev; members and candidate members of the Presidium: secretaries of the Central Committee A. B. Aristov, N. I. Belyayev, L. I. Brezhnev, A. I. Kirichenko, F. P. Kozlov, A. I. Mikoyan, N. A. Mukhitdinov, P. N. Pospelov, M. A. Suslov, Ye. A. Furtseva, N. M. Shvernik; and Central Committee members, N. G. Ignatov, O. V. Kuusinen, D. S. Korotchenko, Ya. E. Kal'nberzin, A. P. Kirilenko, A. N. Kosygin, K. T. Mazurov, V. P. Mzhavanadze; and others decisively opposed the anti-party grouping and delivered a crushing rebuff to its fierce onslaughts on the Leninist line of the party and its Central Committee.

The plenum of the Central Committee CPSU which took place in June 1957 examined the question of the anti-party group. All members and candidates of the Central Committee and members of the Central Auditing Commission unanimously condemned the behavior of the schismatics. Those who spoke proposed that the most severe party measures be applied against them. The plenum unanimously adopted a decree condemning the factional activity of the anti-party group. (Note: Molotov abstained.)

The plenum noted that the anti-party group had violated the party statutes and the decision of the Tenth Congress, "On the Unity of the Party," worked out by V. I. Lenin. The participants in the group were the prisoners of old ideas and outmoded methods of work. They were divorced from the life of the party and the country; they did not see the new conditions they showed conservatism; they adhered to dogmatic views on questions of the building of Communism; and they stubbornly clung to forms and methods of work which had outlived themselves, forms which did not answer the interests of the movement toward Communism. All this comprised the foundation of their anti-party position. They attempted to pull the party backwards and they rejected that which had been engendered by

life, that which issued from the interests of developing Soviet society, from the interests of the whole socialist camp. "Both in domestic questions and in questions of foreign policy," the decision of the Central Committee plenum reads, "they are sectarian and dogmatic and they have a literalist, lifeless approach to Marxism-Leninism. They fail to understand that under present conditions.... (etc. Quotation is a full paragraph from decree published in Pravda, 4 July 1957.)

The June plenum of the Central Committee declared the activities of the antiparty group to be incompatible with the Leninist principles of the Communist Party. Faced with the incontrovertible facts disclosed at the Central Committee plenum, the participants in the antiparty group acknowledged the harm of their factional, antiparty activities and bound themselves to submit to the decisions of the party. The plenum removed Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, and Shepilov from the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee.

N. A. Bulganin was given a severe reprimand and a warning. Bulganin pledged himself to correct his blatant errors and to fight actively for the party line. But experience showed that he did not keep his promise and did not justify the trust extended to him as a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee. Therefore a plenum of the Central Committee subsequently released Bulganin from his duties as a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee CPSU. Earlier he had been released from his duties as Chairman of the Council of Ministers USSR.

The exposure and condemnation by the Central Committee of the factional, antiparty activities of the group (composed of) Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Bulganin, and Shepilov, who joined them, further strengthened the Leninist unity of the party and was a new victory for its general line, a victory for creative Marxism-Leninism. The decision of the Central Committee plenum was unanimously approved by the party and the whole Soviet people. Communists and nonparty people decisively condemned the participants in the antiparty group, who were in a position of isolation, cut off from the party and the masses. Communists and all Soviet people rallied even closer around the Leninist Central Committee for the successful implementation of the historic decisions of the 20th Party Congress.... (pp 654-657)

In conducting a fight against a retreat from Marxism-Leninism, and against all violations of the Leninist principles of leadership, the party uncovered serious failings in party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy. It was discovered that G. K. Zhukov, who was Minister of Defense, had violated the Leninist principles of leadership in the Armed Forces of the USSR. He conducted a policy aimed at curtailing the work of party organizations, political organs, and military councils; his policy aimed at eliminating leadership and control over the Armed Forces by the party, its Central Committee, and the Soviet government. In the Soviet Army,

with the personal participation of Zhukov, a cult of his personality began to be planted, an unwarranted exaggeration of his role in the Great Fatherland War. In this way, the true history of the war was distorted. The efforts of the Soviet people, the heroism of the Armed Forces, the role of Communists and political workers, the military mastery of Soviet commanders, the leading and inspiring role of the Communist Party -- all these began to be belittled.

The October 1957 plenum of the Central Committee CPSU, in its decree entitled "On Improving Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy," condemned the blatant violations of the Leninist principles of leadership in the Armed Forces and removed Zhukov from leading organs of the party.

The plenum emphasized the decisive significance of Communist Party leadership for the development of the country's Armed Forces. The great source of the might of the Soviet Army and Navy, the plenum decision says, consists in that their organizer, leader, and educator is the Communist Party. In the strengthening of the Armed Forces, an important role goes not only to individual commanders but also to the military councils, the political organs, and the party organizations of the Army and Navy, which are called on to implement the policy of the Communist party firmly and properly. The plenum outlined measures for strengthening party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy.... (p 657)