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Poland/21

25 November 1970

THE POLISH-WEST GERMAN AGREEMENT:

A PRELIMINARY VIEW

Summary: This paper deals with certain aspects of the Bonn-Warsaw agreement reached on November 14, examining the immediate antecedents as well as the general background to this first step in the process of normalization between Poland and West Germany. In addition, it raises several hypotheses regarding the Polish motivation for accepting the treaty and speculates on some of the possible implications and consequences of the agreement.

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Believing as we do in a realistic and constructive policy, we have expressed the wish to establish normal relations with the German Federal Republic. If some government politicians in the German Federal Republic make contradictory statements on this subject, which are obviously dictated by pressing considerations of domestic policy, we are in no hurry: we can wait.

Wladyslaw Gomulka
14 January 1957

For the 21 years of existence of the German Federal Republic we have been waiting for a government to take office which would be ready to confirm the irreversible character of the existing western frontier of Poland, so we can wait a week or two longer.

Zygie Warszawy
13 November 1970

The negotiations have been successfully concluded and the text of a treaty on normalization of relations between the Polish People's Republic and the German Federal Republic has been finally agreed.

Polish Foreign Ministry Spokesman
Poleszczuk
14 November 1970

During the morning hours of 14 November 1970, the West German and Polish delegations, led respectively by Foreign Ministers Scheel and Jedrychowski, finally reached agreement on the text of a treaty that (according to Radio Warsaw of the same day) foresees "the building of foundations on which normalization can take place." The text of the treaty, which had been initialed by Scheel and Jedrychowski in Warsaw on November 18, was released to the press on November 20. It is now definitely planned that Chancellor Brandt will travel to Warsaw in the first half of December to sign the accord.

The breakthrough in the negotiations came on the 11th day of the 7th round of discussions, the first round having begun in February 1970.¹ That the two sides were able to reach agreement during the final plenary session, which lasted till nearly 0500 hours is all the more remarkable in view of the statements of official spokesmen and the press on November 13 that many differences, primarily involving the implications (both political and legal) of the Oder-Neisse formula and "humanitarian questions," still had to be ironed out. That these were overcome would seem to confirm, in the words of the Polish spokesman, "the will and the aspiration of both sides to bring the decisive stage of the negotiations to a successful conclusion, and thereby prepare the foundations for a new stage in the relations between the two countries." Relatedly, as numerous observers of the negotiations have pointed out, neither side could really afford a failure -- both having invested a certain amount of prestige and authority in their successful conclusion.

In commenting on the Polish-West German treaty, Radio Warsaw asserted that the Poles were satisfied because the accord "fulfills all our demands and expectations."² Judging from the text of the treaty, the agreement probably does accurately reflect Polish "expectations" if not "demands." Aptly titled a treaty on "the bases of the normalization of mutual relations," the text includes a preamble and five articles. As expected, the latter include: 1) the frontier formula, 2) a renunciation-of-force clause, 3) a statement of the two sides' intention to take further steps leading toward a "full normalization" of relations, 4) a proviso that other treaties will not be affected, and 5) an implementation clause.

1. Regular coverage of the seven rounds of negotiations is to be found in Radio Free Europe's weekly Polish Situation Reports.
2. 19 November 1970.

On the two fundamental issues of the difficult negotiating process -- the border formula and the "humanitarian questions" -- it is evident that both sides have made concessions.³ The former question is dealt with in Article One of the treaty, while the latter is the subject of a Polish statement made available to the FRG for publication in Bonn. The first paragraph of Article One states:

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Polish People's Republic declare themselves in agreement that the existing border line, the course of which was established in Chapter IX of the decisions of the Potsdam Conference, running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinoujscie and then along the Oder River to the confluence of the Lusatian Neisse River and along the Lusatian Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, constitutes the Western border of the Polish People's Republic.⁴

In the second and third paragraphs, the two sides "confirm the inviolability of their borders now and in the future," "pledge to respect unreservedly their territorial integrity," and "declare that they have no territorial claims in the future." Moreover, the treaty's preamble contains another reference to the "inviolability of frontiers" as a "fundamental condition for peace." Thus West Germany, for her part, has granted de facto recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western frontier, clearly indicating, at the same time, that only the FRG can be bound by this commitment. This was explicitly stated in separate West German notes to France, Britain, and the United States (released by Bonn at the same time as was the treaty), which also affirmed that "the rights and responsibilities" of these three nations, as well as of the USSR, for an eventual German peace settlement were not impaired by the treaty. In this latter sense, the FRG's obligation to her three Western allies (i.e., as contained in the Paris agreement) is reflected in Article Four of the treaty, which notes that "bilateral or multilateral international agreements previously concluded by the parties or concerning them" are not to be affected.

3. This has been recognized, or at least alluded to, by the Polish side. Thus, on November 19, Trybuna Ludu noted that "neither side was the loser. The winner is the paramount issue, that of peace and international co-operation." More recently (November 23), the chief Polish negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz, asserted in a West German television interview that the treaty, although a compromise solution, was "a gain for both states, both peoples, and Europe."

4. For comparative purposes, Article One of the July 1950 Zgorzelec (Goerlitz) agreement between Poland and the GDR regarding the Oder-Neisse border states: "The high contracting parties state concurrently that the fixed and existing frontier running from the Baltic Sea ... to the Czechoslovak frontier constitutes the state frontier between Poland and Germany." The reference to the Potsdam Conference is contained in the preamble, where it is stated that the latter "established the frontier on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse." Therefore, the two formulations, though similar, have one important difference. The Polish-GDR treaty refers to the "fixed and existing border line," whereas the Polish-FRG treaty refers only to the "existing border line," i.e., a less definite and more geographically descriptive formulation.

Poland, on the other hand, while not receiving the "final" recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier, has secured a commitment from the FRG which, under the circumstances (Bonn's legal and treaty obligations) is as definitive as seemed possible to achieve. Furthermore, it is no doubt satisfying to the Poles that the border clause is phrased in far firmer terms than was that contained in the Soviet-West German treaty. This will probably be a source of consolation to those in Warsaw who felt disappointed, if not angered, by the fact that the latter treaty appeared to limit Poland's margin for maneuver in her own negotiations with the FRG. Since the signing of the Soviet-West German treaty in August, the Polish press, and even Gomulka himself,⁵ have -- within permissible limits -- let it be known that Poland did not consider sufficient the border clause contained in Bonn's treaty with Moscow (which referred merely to the "inviolability" of frontiers). Being able to present the treaty as a triumph for Polish diplomacy may indeed be of crucial importance to the Gomulka leadership in overcoming potential opposition to the agreement in Poland. Another possible aspect of the regime's sensitivity to such opposition is to be found in its interpretation of the treaty, or, more exactly, the border formula. Thus, the initial Polish press reaction was to greet the agreement as "the confirmation by the West German government of the final character of the Polish western frontier." Writing in Zycie Warszawy, the well-known foreign affairs commentator Ryszard Wojna went so far as to claim that "the final sanctioning of the existing frontiers ... is binding not only for the GFR but also for its eventual legal successors."⁶ This extreme interpretation, certainly not justified by the formulation of the treaty, seemed to be prompted at once by satisfaction and the need to present the maximum justification of it to the Polish public.

The second major issue -- the "humanitarian questions" -- is not touched upon in the treaty but is the subject of a Polish government statement released in Bonn together with the treaty. The statement reviews Polish policy in the past regarding the emigration to the FRG of ethnic Germans, acknowledging that approximately 400,000 such people had left Poland between 1955 and 1969. It added that figures were not available of the number of those remaining who might wish to emigrate, but indicated that the Polish Red Cross would be authorized to negotiate with its West German counterpart about emigration applications. The statement differentiated, however (as has the Polish press of late),

5. See, in particular, his harvest speech of September 6, an analysis of which is to be found in K. Zamorski (Polish Unit), "Poland's Insistence on Total Recognition of Oder-Neisse Frontier," Polish Background Report/13, Radio Free Europe Research, 11 September 1970.

6. 19 November 1970.

between those people with "valid" qualifications and reasons for emigration and those who sought to do so for purely economic reasons. (Those provisions, while including the possibility for some ethnic Poles to be reunited with German members of their families in either the FRG or GDR, would exclude Poles whose applications would be deemed as motivated mainly or primarily from considerations of economic betterment.) As might be expected, the statement contains a carefully worded defense of the Polish position on this question rather than a firm commitment to facilitate the processing of subsequent cases. It would seem, as indeed was pointed out in the statement, that progress on these issues may in large measure depend on the subsequent "normalization" of relations. Thus, the West German delegation accepted the Polish stand that "humanitarian questions" were not a subject for the treaty itself, but did succeed in including the problem in the over-all negotiating package. During the earlier rounds, the Polish press had maintained that these matters were a subject neither for a treaty nor negotiation. While the Polish statement is indicative of greater understanding for Bonn's position on this question, the issue remains a particularly sensitive one for the Polish leadership.⁷

The Background in Brief

That the Polish-West German negotiations should prove so difficult, and at times confusing, is perhaps not surprising in view of the tortured history of the post-World War II relationship and the legacy of enmity from the wartime experience and before. After the death of Stalin and the gradual re-emergence of a more "Polish" foreign policy, bilateral relations had passed through three distinct stages prior to the chain of events that led to the Gomulka proposal of 17 May 1969.⁸ As early as March 1955, but more particularly in 1956-1958, the Polish regime held open a nearly unconditional offer of normal (including diplomatic) relations with the FRG. After Bonn's rejection of these approaches, Poland increasingly envisioned the solution to her national insecurity problem -- that of her location in Europe -- within the context of a general European settlement; hence her promotion of the successive versions of the Rapacki Plan in 1958, 1960, and 1962, and the Gomulka Plan of 1964. Concomitantly with these

7. This has been reflected in the censorship of references to the problem. Thus, Polish Foreign Ministry spokesman Poleszczuk's statement on November 11 that "the reunion-of-families issue could be solved in a suitable way" (DPA) was not published in the Polish media. Nor was that part of Scheel's statement after the initialing ceremony which expressed hope that "concrete progress" on the humanitarian issue would be one of the first signs of an improved relationship between Poland and West Germany.
8. This brief review of the background draws heavily on several analyses by A. Ross Johnson, in particular "A Survey of Poland's Relations with West Germany 1956-1967," Polish BR/5, RFER, 26 February 1968, and the three-part series "A New Phase in Polish-West German Relations," Polish BRs/13, 14, and 17, RFER, 20 June, 13 July, and 14 August 1969. In addition, Neal Ascherson's poignant article, "Poland's Place in Europe," (The World Today, December 1969), was extremely useful.

initiatives, Poland continued to express interest in improved relations with the FRG, but prior West German recognition of the Oder-Neisse now became an essential precondition. This, coupled with the continued West German insistence on the validity of the Hallstein Doctrine, resulted in immobility on both sides.

The third phase began in 1964-1965, with the development of closer relations between Poland and East Germany, whose interests Poland had previously been willing to overlook in favor of improving ties with West Germany. This marriage of convenience was perhaps consummated in 1964 when Khrushchev's abortive efforts vis-à-vis the FRG struck sensitive nerves in both Warsaw and East Berlin. Henceforth, the Polish regime increasingly adopted the GDR's cause as its own, and West Germany's de facto recognition of East Germany became an additional precondition for the normalization of Polish-FRG relations. Thus at the very time that a more flexible approach to East Europe was being developed in Bonn (especially with the installation of the Kiesinger-Brandt coalition in November 1966), Polish national interests were subordinated to a totally negative policy (toward the FRG) whose principal premise consisted of solidarity with the East German position. This policy (which saw Poland and East Germany resolutely joined together in opposition to Bonn's success with Rumania in early 1967 and in apprehension regarding the extent of West German penetration of Czechoslovakia in 1968) was to end officially in early 1969, with the new phase in Poland's German policy ushered in by Gomulka's 17 May 1969 proposal of an agreement with the FRG that would recognize the Oder-Neisse line.

As was true in the case of Poland's earlier approaches to Bonn in the post-1958 period, this initiative was also part and parcel of a general European security proposal -- that contained in the Budapest Appeal of 17 March 1969. That Gomulka's statement was partially a consequence of this Warsaw Pact initiative was alluded to by Premier Cyrankiewicz, who noted that Gomulka's May 17 proposal had been made "on the basis of the Budapest Appeal, in the name of European security, not only in the name of strictly Polish interests"⁹ (emphasis supplied). In effect, however, Cyrankiewicz revealed that Polish interests were indeed very much at the center of the resumption of an active German policy on Warsaw's part. The possible explanations for this shift in policy need be only briefly listed here.¹⁰ Chief among them was perhaps the realization that the defensive stonewalling of the previous four or five years, plus the opprobrium resulting from her participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, threatened Poland with political isolation on her most sensitive foreign policy issue -- the German question. In late 1968-early 1969 the

9. Trybuna Ludu, 29 June 1969.

10. They are dealt with in depth in A. Ross Johnson, "A New Phase in Polish-West German Relations. - Part III: A Preliminary Analysis," Polish BR/17, RFER, 14 August 1969.

apparent intention on the part of the USSR to improve relations with the FRG could only be viewed with concern in Warsaw, where time had not yet attenuated the deep-rooted "Rapallo" complex. Relatedly, a more assertive foreign policy was undoubtedly viewed by some influential circles in the Polish Party and government elite as necessary not only as a natural emanation of Poland's interests, but in order to counteract the extensive damage to her international reputation caused by the events of 1968, especially the anti-Zionist campaign in Poland and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. These concerns were probably augmented by Polish dissatisfaction with the economic advantages derived from closer co-operation with East Germany, and the concomitant desirability of expanded economic relations with the FRG, particularly in view of Poland's plans for industrial modernization. Finally, positive developments within West Germany (as perceived by the Polish leadership) perhaps played an important role in determining the possibilities for and timing of such an initiative.

This, then, was the immediate background to Gomulka's May 17 proposal. After Brandt's election victory and the formation of the "small coalition," an exchange of notes between Warsaw and Bonn in late 1969 foresaw the initiation of the bilateral negotiations on a political agreement that began in February 1970. Subsequently, discussions began on a new long-term economic accord (involving, *inter alia*, a substantial West German credit at favorable interest rates), on a protocol expanding the authority of the respective trade missions to include consular privileges, and on consideration of the reunion-of-families issue (at the level of the respective Red Cross chairmen). While no substantial progress has yet been achieved on the latter questions, the economic accord -- a five-year agreement on trade exchanges and economic, scientific, and technical co-operation -- was initialed in Warsaw on June 23 in the presence of West German Economic Minister Schiller and Polish Foreign Trade Minister Burakiewicz, and signed on October 15. Although this pact provides for increased economic co-operation and the liberalization of import quotas, it was undoubtedly a source of disappointment to the Poles that no agreement was reached on immediate long-term credits.

Motivations and Implications

In assessing the possible consequences of the Polish-West German treaty, both short- and long-term considerations invite inspection.¹¹ From the purely chronological point of view, the

11. In view of the nature of this paper and the material currently available, this section will be devoted exclusively to possible repercussions on Polish-West German relations, on Polish-Soviet relations, and on selected aspects of Polish policy itself. As such, important considerations like the expected opening of negotiations between West Germany and other East European countries, the East German attitude toward the Bonn-Warsaw rapprochement, the Vatican's position on church administration in the Oder-Neisse territories, and the entire complex of European security issues will be dealt with in subsequent analyses.

treaty will be signed in the first half of December, at which time intentions of the two countries regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations will be announced. As for ratification, no timetable has yet been laid down, but it is interesting to note FRG government spokesman Ahlers's statement that the treaty with Poland could come before the Bundestag before the West German-Soviet accord, if no progress is registered on the Berlin question (the solution of which has been made a precondition for ratification of the latter treaty). It would appear that no such preconditions exist in the Polish case. On November 18, Foreign Minister Scheel let it be known that ratification of the Warsaw-Bonn accord would not be made dependent on progress achieved in solving the "humanitarian question."¹² This is not to say, however, that the ratification process in the FRG will be without difficulty, as has been already suggested by the critical reaction to the treaty on the part of the CDU/CSU opposition. This fact has indeed been recognized by the Poles; as was noted by Trybuna Ludu,¹³ the ratification process will be of "particular importance ... revealing social and political changes inside West Germany."

As for related discussions, the second round of negotiations on widening the functions of the trade missions (the first having taken place in Warsaw from July 7 to 9) was resumed in Bonn on November 13; on November 18, Radio Warsaw reported that "progress had been made" in these negotiations. Moreover, as has already been noted, bilateral discussions seem imminent on the "humanitarian questions." Already in September 1970 the chairmen of the Polish and West German Red Cross societies met twice -- in Warsaw and in Geneva -- to discuss this issue.

Any evaluation of the long-range implications of the Polish-West German agreement should perhaps begin with an attempt to assess Poland's rationale for accepting this treaty. In particular, why has the Polish side agreed to a treaty that will not incorporate Bonn's "final" recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier? This question assumes all the more importance in view of the fact that the Polish position on the border never wavered in the face of West German statements that existing agreements precluded the "final" determination of the frontier in a bilateral

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12. Earlier, West German delegation spokesman von Wechmar had referred to a Red Cross "arrangement" prior to ratification, a statement that might have been taken to mean that the coming into force of the treaty -- as far as Bonn was concerned -- would in part depend on the Polish attitude toward this question.
 13. 19 November 1970. Indeed, this realization may in part be responsible for the apparent shift in the Polish press and radio coverage of the treaty. While the emphasis in the November 14-19 period was on the border formula (i.e., that it constituted "final recognition"), subsequent reaction (since the publication of the treaty) has been of a more general nature, tending to emphasize the importance of the accord and avoiding extreme interpretations of the border clause.

accord; i.e., right up until the night on which the agreement was reached, the Polish spokesman and the press continued to maintain that "normalization of relations" depended on the recognition of the "final character" of the Oder-Neisse line,¹⁴ and gave no indication of a willingness to compromise on this issue. Of the possible hypotheses that might explain the Polish decision to accept less than had been demanded, several deserve mention. The first would presume that Poland, aware of the limits imposed on Bonn by commitments to her allies and domestic considerations, sought to negotiate a border formula that would expand those limits to the utmost. In this case the Poles may have considered that any adopting of a posture of "understanding" toward Brandt's position might lead to a less "satisfactory" treaty than one they could achieve if they maintained the maximum demand up to the very last minute. Having thus obtained the best possible agreement under the circumstances, the Poles could then interpret the border formula to their own satisfaction, as indeed has already been done.

The second hypothesis is that the Poles have simply accepted the treaty as the "foundation" for improved relations with West Germany, but that full normalization, as they interpret it, must await the "final" recognition of the Oder-Neisse, possibly within the framework of a European security settlement and the eventual signing of a German peace treaty. Such a scenario would be more convincing if there were sufficient evidence to suggest that for the Polish side, even in the period just prior to the agreement, final recognition of the border had become a prerequisite for normalization of relations alone, rather than for the signing of a treaty. While there are inconsistencies (in the Polish position) on this point, most of what the Poles have been saying indicated that they favored the latter position. Moreover, if a shift in their position on this point had taken place, one would not have expected Trybuna Ludu's post mortem on the treaty to read:

Polish public opinion welcomes with satisfaction the fact that the starting point for normalization of relations between Poland and West Germany is the confirmation by the German Federal Republic of the final character of the Oder-Neisse border, which has existed for 25 years and was fixed by the Potsdam agreement, and its renunciation of any territorial claims, present or future.¹⁵

14. See, for example, Gomulka's statement on November 12, during his official visit to Rumania, and Trybuna Ludu on November 13.

15. 15 November 1970.

There is another possible explanation that might be used in support of either of the above-mentioned hypotheses, or indeed may stand by itself as the reason for the Polish decision. This is that the Polish leadership had not only committed its prestige and authority to reaching an agreement with West Germany, but that in fact such an agreement was viewed as absolutely essential to Poland's national interests. The factors that influenced the shift in the Polish position in early 1969 are still operable, and, as seen from the Polish side, are no doubt a source of greater concern today than they were 18 months ago. The Soviet Union had indeed improved its relationship with the FRG, by signing a treaty which did not appear fully to defend Poland's vital interests, and, in fact, seemed to many in Warsaw to undercut her bargaining position vis-à-vis West Germany. This in itself seemed to necessitate a more distinctive and flexible Polish foreign policy, as had been called for by many influential Poles.¹⁶ Moreover, the Polish economic situation had further deteriorated, and certain members of the technical elite may have been convinced that a transfusion of West German trade, technology, and credits was the only remedy. Finally, Brandt was now the West German Chancellor and eager to improve relations with Poland. It might well have been argued in Warsaw that it was these considerations -- not "final" West German recognition of frontiers that were not endangered anyway -- that constituted Poland's national interests and made necessary an agreement with the FRG.

Considerations of motivation aside, it is obvious that the Polish-West German agreement will have an important effect on relations between these two historic antagonists, and could have a considerable impact on Polish policy itself. On this latter point, it is worth recalling what a noted observer of Polish affairs stated in a book published several years ago:

The Polish Communists ... can keep reminding the nation that the Oder-Neisse frontier, which every Pole considers an irrevocable part of his national life, has been questioned by no one so emphatically as by the German Federal Republic -- and guaranteed by no one so effectively as by the Soviet Union. If the Polish Communists join in the general Eastern bloc campaign against the Federal Republic with obvious

16. Particularly in the pages of Zycie Warszawy during the summer of 1970, when a number of distinguished journalists and academicians debated "Poland's New Concerns." See Michael Costello, "The Poles Look at Their Country and at Themselves," Polish BR/14, RFER, 16 September 1970.

feeling, then it is not simply because they are toeing Moscow's tactical line but because they have a reasonably sincere conviction, which the Polish public share with them -- and vice versa -- and which, in fact, is one of the few really firm bonds between them.¹⁷

This passage helps to explain the regime's propagandist exaggeration of the "German threat" as a means of ensuring a primary source of legitimacy. Yet even so the PUWP has been unable to transform this political capital into mass support for internal policies. This problem, then, will become of more crucial importance following the Polish-West German treaty. While it may be expected that the regime's propagandists will continue to single out certain "negative" circles in the FRG, such as the expellee groups or, perhaps, initially the opposition parties, the caricature of a "revanchist and militaristic" Bonn will have to be considerably revised and this very fact will end the regime's ability to rely on emotive slogans as a socioeconomic palliative. While clearly the agreement will not immediately overcome the widespread feelings of fear and mistrust of the FRG still prevalent within the Polish population, it will indirectly place an additional element of pressure on the Polish leadership to develop and follow through on constructive domestic policies, especially in the economic sphere, and to end the stagnation into which Poland has fallen.

These policies will in turn largely determine Poland's ability to play a more significant role within the Communist world and beyond. As was succinctly articulated by the world-famous sociologist, Professor Jan Szczepanski, in the Zycie Warszawy discussion on "Poland's New Concerns,"¹⁸

...The future of every state depends on its contribution to some international community, on the role it plays in a group of states, on its economic and military strength, its technical and scientific creativity, its political, intellectual, and artistic activity.

17. Hansjakob Stehle, The Independent Satellite, (New York, 1965), p. 246.

18. 4 June 1970.

This, according to Szczepanski, is of particular importance to Poland since the new era of negotiations and settlements has led to a "shifting of forces [and the] emergence of differences ... within blocs." These differences were apparent in the Polish reaction to the Soviet-West German treaty, and would appear to have been an important factor in the Warsaw-Bonn agreement. It remains to be seen whether or not the Polish regime, having taken a potentially decisive step vis-à-vis the FRG that would seem to alleviate its debtor status to the Soviet Union, will henceforth assert itself more vigorously in the political and economic affairs of the East European system and of Europe as a whole. It would appear at this point that, as a result of the Polish-West German agreement, such a development is no longer the remote possibility it once seemed. Although she has not lost her fear of West Germany or abandoned her fundamental reliance on Soviet defense, Poland at last seems to be looking after her own interests.

At the present time, of course, these considerations greatly depend on the subsequent course of Polish-West German relations. Without underestimating the historic importance of and the advance registered by the November 14 accord, it is obvious that many problems still confront even the "foundations" of the normalization process. As might be expected, these will probably involve the interpretation of the frontier formula and the resolution of the "humanitarian questions." Despite the seven arduous rounds of negotiation and the final agreement, it would seem that both questions still remain open to somewhat varied interpretation in each capital. This may introduce certain strains at each stage of the normalization process -- i.e., in the signing and ratification of the document. While both sides may have in effect anticipated (and accepted) the possibility of disparate interpretations of the border clause, the "humanitarian questions" hardly afford such a luxury. Needless to say, this is an extremely sensitive issue for the Poles, involving economic, political, psychological and emotional considerations. Clearly, the normalization process will depend on the good will of both sides.

Another important aspect will be the manner in which the treaty is presented to each nation, a factor that will strongly influence popular acceptance of it. This will be particularly relevant in the case of Poland, where Gomulka must contend with elements in the leadership who are lukewarm toward, if not opposed to, the agreement with Bonn, for tactical, ideological, and other reasons. Moreover, as already mentioned, the reservoir of anti-German feeling among the Polish population will not easily be overcome. In order to surmount such reservations, one would suspect that the Gomulka leadership will present the treaty as a victory for Polish diplomacy, ensuring that which was not secured in the Bonn-Moscow pact. As for the rapprochement between the Polish and West German populations, the well-known Polish commentator on foreign affairs Ryszard Wojna has observed on

several occasions¹⁹ that "normalization of relations presupposes a change in the psychological climate." His assertion that "the degree to which it has changed will be shown by the way in which the treaty is accepted by political forces and public opinion in the German Federal Republic" holds equally true as a barometer of Polish attitudes and intentions. As the weekly Economist pointed out recently, "the problem of making the normalization of relations between [Poland and West Germany] ... a reality ... may in the end demand even more effort than the negotiation of the treaty itself."

Michael Costello

19. See, for example, his Radio Warsaw commentary on November 14.