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MAO/MOLOTOV'S ATTITUDE TO THE PROGRAM OF THE CPSU

One of the major difficulties in analysing the Sino-Soviet dispute at present is that the Chinese communists - although, like their Albanian sympathizers, they have published the full text of the CPSU's Program - they haven't yet seen fit to comment on it. While their attitude is evidently negative, it is not easy to specify particular areas of friction.

Fortunately, however, the attitude to it of V.M. Molotov has been described in some detail by P.A. Satyukov, the editor-in-chief of Pravda, in his speech to the 22nd Congress (Pravda, 27 October 1961). At the time of publication, it was only beginning to become clear that the main outlines of the current political errors ascribed to Molotov by the CPSU's leaders are in fact those supported by Mao Tse-tung. Consequently in the excitement over the purges of a quarter of a century ago, the significance of Satyukov's speech in the intra-communist wrangling of today was largely overlooked. It may therefore be worth detailing the "subversive factional work," as Satyukov called it, of the former Foreign Minister in October 1961. It should be recalled here that before the Satyukov speech, N.G. Ignatov, at that time a full member of the Presidium, had told the Congress of Molotov's "double-dealing" while in Ulan-Bator during 1960 - an obvious hint at near-treasonable collusion with the Chinese representatives there (see Izvestia, 24 October 1961). The point was underlined by L.F. Ilyichev's¹ speech accusing Molotov of submitting on April 18, 1960 to Kommunist an article on Lenin along "dogmatic" lines - i.e., in the pattern of the Red Flag editorial published on the 16th of April.

Molotov's letter of October 1961, Satyukov said, "again attacked the Central Committee and the Draft Party Program". He had

"decided to criticize Stalin on the question of the possibility of the victory of Communism in one country. However, he is doing this to slander the new draft Party Program, Molotov asserts that the new Program is anti-revolutionary in spirit. This slanderous, shameful statement by Molotov indicates that he has broken with the Party, broken with Leninism."

Molotov's supposed criticism of Stalin is a most unconvincing attitude for a man alleged to be himself an arch-Stalinist. In fact, the theory of the "possibility of the victory of communism in one country" is probably one of the key causes of Chinese dissatisfaction with the Program, which in their view puts too much weight on the development of the USSR - building communism in one country, as they see it - and not enough

¹Then head of Agitprop Department, CC, CPSU.

on helping China and other underdeveloped communist nations out of their economic difficulties. Hence to them the Program is anti-revolutionary in that it is selfishly conceived.

To return to Satyukov:

"Molotov declared that the Draft Program does not tie the building of Communism in the USSR to the prospects of the revolutionary struggle of the working class in capitalist countries and with prospects for socialist revolution on an international scale..."

This too, coincides with what the Chinese are known to think. The Program rests on the assumption of peaceful coexistence for 20 years ahead to allow the building of Communism, with "revolutionary struggle" taking second place. But the People's Daily (January 1st, 1962) inverts the order:

"The general line of China's foreign policy is: to safeguard and strengthen the unity and cooperation between the socialist countries; to support the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed peoples and nations against imperialism and colonialism; to coexist peacefully with countries having different social systems; and to oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war..."

Satyukov underscored this fundamental divergence by saying

"Molotov went so far as to make the appalling statement that the Draft Program passes over the difficulties of the struggle for Communism and orients the Party and people to the idea that further developments toward Communism by the countries of socialist collaboration will be made without revolutionary struggle. From his assertion it appears that further movement towards Communism is impossible without war against the imperialist countries..."

The argument over the building of communism in one country is linked inevitably and inextricably with Chinese aversion to Khrushchev's "revisionist" belief that the peoples should be persuaded into communism by the force of example. The Peking attitude was summed up in Kung-jen Jih-pao (July 20, 22, and 25, 1961):

"Some comrade workers say: 'Those revolutionary traditions of the working class were quite essential in the difficult environments of the past. But why should those revolutionary traditions be upheld now that conditions are vastly different?'...Their view is wrong...We are still required to carry on the battle like our revolutionary predecessors."

Satyukov's speech placed Molotov in a position suspiciously like that described by Kung-jen Jih-pao:

"Molotov went so far as openly to oppose the precise instructions of Lenin concerning the fact that the chief

revolutionary influence of the socialist state on the development of world events is through its economic successes, its example, its victories in building communism...

"In a speech at the 10th All-Russian Party Conference Lenin said that questions of economic construction have exceptional importance for the USSR and that our economic policy is the main influence on international development."

The last major charge which Molotov is said to have raised against the Draft Program is that

"it contains pacifism and even revisionism."

Satyukov comments that

"this is malicious slander of our Leninist Party and its militant revolutionary Marxist-Leninist Party Program... Only a man who has broken with the international communist movement can accuse the draft program of pacifism and revisionism... There is no place in the ranks of our Party for people who oppose its Leninist general line!"

The outside world has only Satyukov's word for it that Molotov considers the program "pacifist and revisionist". But it ~~knows~~ from the Zeri i Popullit article of January 9, 1962 that Hoxha believes it to contain "certain opportunist theses, particularly on questions of world evolution, which are in direct opposition to the two declarations of the communist and workers' parties." Hoxha, needless to say, is influenced not by Molotov but by Mao, and both of them, it appears, find the Program evolutionary, rather than revolutionary - revisionist in a word.

The key to Satyukov's statement that Molotov finds the Program "pacifist" is probably to be found as long ago as June 1960, when Liu Chang-sheng at the WFTU session in Peking spoke out against "indiscriminate" opposition to war. Liu was then opposing the 21st Party Congress of the CPSU, but its principles are incorporated in the Program, and there is no reason to suppose that Peking has substantially modified its views in the meantime.

Satyukov's one-sided presentation of Molotov's letter is no doubt a much distorted version of the original. Nevertheless, its value as the fullest version now available of what Peking is probably saying behind the scenes about the 20 year Program of the CPSU may still be considerable.

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