

NOT TO BE MICROFICED
THE POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION

The Soviet Army,
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Extract from Chapter 19
by J.M. Mackintosh

'The Soviet Army is a political Army' - this phrase is so often quoted with pride or disgust, according to the viewpoint of the speaker. But pride or disgust, do not detract from its fundamental truth. The Soviet Army was founded on a political army, and in spite of vicissitudes in its career, a political army it has remained. For while in the British Army every effort is made by the Government to keep politics out of the Army, in the Soviet Union the Government has created vast organizations for the sole purpose of forcing politics into the Army. For this reason any purely military survey of the Soviet Army would give an incomplete picture.

It must never be forgotten that the Bolshevik Party came to power to spread the revolution not only over Russia, but over the whole world. From the very first, the Red Army was its main weapon in the revolutionary struggle, in which Russia was only the vanguard - a means, and not an end in itself. Whether the Army was fighting counter-revolution at home, invading Finland, defending Stalingrad against the Germans, or imposing Communist régimes on occupied Eastern Europe, the Communist Party has demanded that loyalty to itself should exceed that to the Russian homeland. This is the key to the political character of the Soviet Army.

The direction of the Army's loyalty to the Party has thus been the major task of the Communist Party in the Army since 1918. It has always been an artificial process, involving a huge bureaucratic propaganda machine. This is the Chief Political Administration of the Soviet Army, one of the senior administrations of the Ministry of Defence. Its head is always a Deputy Defence Minister.⁺ With its complicated hierarchy, reaching down to the lowest units in the Army, the Political Administration is responsible for the indoctrination of every officer and man with absolute loyalty to the Communist Party.

It has not had an easy task. The Political Administration has had to struggle against all the obstinacy and passive resistance of the Russian peasant, who has opposed practically every measure of the Soviet Government since the opening of the campaign for the collectivization of the land in the 1930s. It has sometimes been granted powers which made it the real ruler of the Army, while at other times it has been relegated to purely advisory functions.

During the years of collectivization, when a struggle developed between the Army and the Party over the bad effect which collectivization was having on the morale of the peasant

⁺Not in the cases of Golikov and Zheltov.

soldiers, the Political Administration was suspected of siding with the Army leaders, and suffered severely in the purge of 1937. A new generation of political workers was entrusted with wide powers in the years 1937-40, but the defeats of the Finnish War, some of which were attributed to them, brought about a decline in their influence. When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the Party leaders took fright at the early disaster suffered by the Red Army, and reinstated the political officials in their former positions, but at the same time of the Battle of Stalingrad they were finally merged with the Army as fully-fledged officers with, however, purely political and advisory functions. Post-war orders have confirmed this situation by the formal establishment of 'unity of command', in which political officers have no responsibilities beyond their political duties.

The structure of the Chief Political Administration is roughly parallel to that of the military command. A political officer, directly responsible to the Head of the Chief Political Administration, is attached to every department or directorate of the Ministry of Defence, and in the General Staff. Each officer has a large department dealing with all aspects of political indoctrination. At the HQs of the Military Districts the Political Administration is represented by an officer of the General's rank, with the title of 'Member of the Military Council.' The Military Council of a District, Army or Corps consists of the Commander, his Chief of Staff, and his senior political adviser, and meets under the Chairmanship of the Commander. During the war, members of the Military Councils of Fronts were often very senior Party leaders like Bulganin and Khrushchev.

Decisions on all matters affecting morale, political education, or complaints are made by the member of the Military Council, who also has a voice in the administration of the formation. The member is at the same time the head of the whole political hierarchy of the formation. He appoints the heads of the political departments at divisional, regimental, and company level, and approves the members of their staffs. The basic political organization in a formation is at regimental level. The head of the political department is known as the 'Deputy Commander for Political Affairs' (or 'Zampolit' for short), and is often of the same rank as the regimental commander. He carries out his tasks through five main organs: the regimental Party bureau, the regimental Komsomol organization, the regimental propagandist, the regimental club, and the individual political advisors attached to lower units.

The regimental Party bureau unites all Communists in the unit under an officer who is nominally elected, but in fact appointed from above. He is the Party secretary, and sometimes he is even brought in from outside the regiment. The Party bureau is designed to create a hard core of devoted Communists in the regiment, who, by their exemplary fulfillment of Party directives and instructions, should act as leaders in the non-party mass of soldiers.

The Komsomol organization, also under its nominally elected secretary, unites the members of the Komsomol, or Young Communist League, in the regiment. They also try to recruit young soldiers into the League.

The third branch of the political department is the propagandist. He is the active 'missionary'. His task is to lecture himself to the officers, NCOs, and men at political instruction meetings, to move about among the officers, talking to them on the political 'text' of the day, and also briefing junior political instructors at lower headquarters.

Then there is the regimental club, which is a combined schoolroom and rest centre. It contains a political library, rest rooms, perhaps a small concert-hall, and the head of the club is responsible for organizing sporting events, football or athletic matches, and also any literary or artistic activities which are approved under the political syllabus. At company level, wall newspapers are printed, and a small library maintained.

Lastly, the regimental 'Zampolit' is responsible for selection, training, and supervision of the political officers at battalion and company level, whose responsibility it is to see that not one soldier, whatever his duties, is neglected in the drive for political indoctrination.

The method of indoctrination, is, generally speaking, of two kinds: political occupation and political information.

Political lectures (politzanyatiye) normally take place twice a week, in groups, according to the rank and political standard reached by the soldiers. It usually consists of a lecture by the regimental propagandist on a theoretical subject, on the history of the Communist Party, or the development of the Soviet Army. The audience, whether officers or men, may ask questions, and frequently the speaker finds it difficult to answer them, especially pointed questions on the collective-farm system, and the standard of living in the Soviet Union.

Political information (politinformatsia) is held daily, and consists of readings from the Press or a short lecture on foreign affairs, with particular emphasis on criticism of Britain and America. The principle of political information is to keep the soldiers informed on the Soviet interpretation of current affairs, while political occupation aims at actual indoctrination with Communist theory and practice. Sometimes, on important occasions, the regimental 'Zampolit' himself addresses mass meetings of all ranks but generally he restricts his personal activities to the officers, and to the administrative work of the department.

Candidates for the position of political officers are chosen from the ranks of Party members both in and outside the Army. They attend one of the Military Political Schools established in the main centres in the Soviet Union, and after a two-year course they are commissioned as lieutenants. There are shorter courses for NCOs, who undertake less responsible posts, such as the head of a company library. Once these candidates have qualified they come under the Chief Political Administration, and are no longer available to the Army for purely military postings. But although the political officers are thus separated from the commander, they remain officers on the strength of the unit. They should not be confused with the counter-espionage branch, which acts as a kind of secret police within the Army.

The counter-espionage personnel are not soldiers at all; they belong to the State Security Service, and only wear uniforms for their work in the Army. Just as the Political officer is no longer a 'commissar' - i.e., no longer supervises the military functions of the commander - so his police functions have been transferred to the more terrible Security Service, over which the Army has no control. The difference between the two is best summarized by noting that the soldier may dislike, despise or tolerate the political officer, but he avoids and fears the MVD branch like the plague.

To sum up, therefore: the purpose of the political administration is to convince all ranks in the Soviet Army that their first loyalty lies with the Communist Party, and to send them away from their term of service politically educated in Communism. The main propaganda lines used by the political officers are: the raising of morale and discipline; the encouragement of heroism in battle by examples drawn from war experience; the systematic indoctrination of hatred towards the probable enemy; vigilance against spies; and cultural and sporting activities designed to supplement battle training and raise morale.

Now to what extent does the political department succeed? Do the officers and men believe all that they are told? It is difficult to give an accurate answer to this question, but there seem to be two lines of general agreement: first, that all ranks dislike, and even resent political instruction, and second, that on the whole they believe what is said about foreign countries and international affairs, but are sceptical on internal Soviet matters. For an officer or soldier, political instruction after a hard day's training is an unwarranted intrusion on his free time, a boring, unnecessary waste of time. But it is accepted as part of military service. On subject-matter, most material on foreign affairs, especially the Western countries, is couched in terms flattering to Russian patriotism, and this, combined with the fact that very few Soviet soldiers have been abroad, predisposes them to believe stories about germ warfare, mass unemployment, or that novels by Charles Dickens accurately describe life in Britain today. On home affairs the 'Zampolit' has a hard

task convincing peasant soldiers of the benefits of life on a collective farm; the soldiers know from their own experience that the political officer is lying. In short, the Soviet servicemen are realists: the 'Zampolit' has a job to do, an unnecessary job, and one which causes much annoyance and boredom, but a job which has to be tolerated as an integral part of the service. Some make themselves liked in spite of their job, others carry it out in a way which arouses resentment and even hatred; but no 'Zampolit' every made himself liked and respected because he was a 'Deputy Commander for Political Affairs'.

NEW REGULATIONS FOR THE U.S.S.R. ARMED FORCES

By Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Grechko
Krasnaya zvezda
September 7, 1960

The Soviet people are doing all they can to preserve and strengthen world peace. The struggle for the strengthening of peace and for the triumph of the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems is the general foreign policy line of our Communist Party and Soviet government.

In our times, when the relationship of class forces in the international arena has developed in socialism's favor, when it is not imperialism but socialism that is determining the course and direction of world development, real possibilities exist for the prevention of world war and the preservation of peace. But it by no means follows from this that all danger of war has been eliminated. The reactionary imperialist circles, the U.S. imperialists in the first place, are continuing to pursue a line aimed at aggravating international relations and paving the way for a new war, a line aimed against the U.S.S.R. and the other countries in the socialist camp. Legitimate alarm is occasioned in all honest people by the brash actions of the West German revanchists, the Hitlerite generals who were not finished off in the last war, who are demanding atomic and hydrogen weapons for themselves and openly declaring their aggressive intentions.

We cannot and we have no right to underestimate the forces and military capabilities of imperialism, to overlook the fact that on various pretexts the Western powers have been turning down the U.S.S.R.'s proposals on total and general disarmament and the banning of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Our people, the Communist Party and the Soviet government are taking all this into account and are showing incessant concern to enhance the fighting strength of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces.

"To heighten vigilance, to expose and disrupt the aggressive imperialist plans, to strengthen our power and ability to crush any aggressor -- this our party and the Soviet government see as their sacred obligation to the Soviet people and to all humanity. This pertains also to the tasks of the armed forces," said Comrade N. S. Khrushchev in his address at the reception for military academy graduates. Every one of our soldiers and sailors, junior and senior noncommissioned officers, commissioned officers, generals and admirals must be thoroughly aware that the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces, with their great fighting strength, combat readiness and vigilance, constitute one of the decisive factors holding imperialist aggression in check and thereby ensuring the preservation of peace. And until such time as an agreement has been reached on general and total disarmament we must keep our powder dry, heighten vigilance and self-discipline, unremittingly perfect our

armed forces and improve the battle training and political indoctrination (vospitalny) of armed forces personnel.

The regulations of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces are of vast importance in the accomplishment of these tasks. They vividly express the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government on the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, on political and military indoctrination and on the strengthening of discipline and one-man command, and they define the rights, duties and relations of servicemen. They offer exhaustive instructions on the organization of the lives, everyday living and functioning of the troops and on the maintenance in them of firm military discipline, organization and constant combat readiness.

New Disciplinary Regulations and new Service Regulations of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces have been adopted and are now being forwarded to the forces. In view of the special importance of the new regulations in the development of our army and navy and to the end of further enhancing socialist legality in the army and navy, these regulations have been approved by the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet. The practice that existed in V. I. Lenin's lifetime of having the basic armed forces regulations approved by the supreme agency of the Soviet state has thereby been revived.

The appearance of the new Disciplinary Regulations and Service Regulations is yet another manifestation of the concern of the Party Central Committee and the Soviet government for further increasing the might of our armed forces. It signifies at the same time a new stage in the further improvement of the communist indoctrination of army and navy personnel and in the tightening of military discipline, organization and order.

As everyone knows, up to now the Disciplinary Regulations and Service Regulations of 1946, in the drawing up of which the experience of the Great Patriotic War was taken into consideration, have been in force in our country. More than 14 years have passed since their appearance. In this time our country has taken a vast stride toward communism and has achieved notable successes in the development of the national economy, science and culture. The Soviet Armed Forces, too, have become qualitatively new. As Comrade N. S. Khrushchev observed in his report at the fourth session of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, because of the unflagging concern of the Communist Party the Soviet Army now has in its hands military equipment and firepower such as no army has ever had. Rocket troops capable of striking an aggressor over a vast area and at any depth now constitute the basis of its fighting strength. All types of armed forces and branches of the service have undergone fundamental changes with respect both to their organization and to their provision with military equipment.

But the main thing is that as a result of the Communist Party's great organizational and indoctrinational work, the unity of the army and navy and the solidarity of the fighting

men behind the Party, its Leninist Central Committee and the Soviet government have grown even stronger, and there has been a rise in the level of political awareness among the country's defenders. A tremendous and truly historic role in increasing the fighting strength of our armed forces was played by the decisions of the October plenary session of the Party Central Committee.

All this has made necessary the fundamental revision of the regulations that have been in force since 1946.

One of the major principles of Soviet military organization, the principle of one-man command, has received further development in the new regulations. V. I. Lenin repeatedly indicated that one-man leadership is the most correct and appropriate method of commanding troops. Flexibility, centralization and efficiency in command are achieved through one-man leadership, and unity of action of the personnel is ensured, based on the high moral, political and fighting qualities of the servicemen, on the clear-cut organization of troop functions and on conscious military discipline. V. I. Lenin always linked one-man command with a high degree of responsibility on the leader's part to the people, the Communist Party and the Soviet state. On the basis of these Leninist propositions, the new regulations place the strongest possible emphasis on the unit (subunit) commander's being in sole command and bearing personal responsibility to the Communist Party and the Soviet government for the constant combat and mobilization readiness of the unit (subunit) entrusted to him. He is answerable for the military and political training, indoctrination, military discipline and political morale of the personnel, for the state of armaments, military equipment and transport and for the provision of the unit (subunit) with everyday material services and medical care.

The new regulations strikingly reflect the demands of the Party Central Committee and the Soviet government for the intensification of Party-political and indoctrinational work with army and navy personnel, the heightening of the public's role in combating breaches of military discipline and order, the further strengthening of conscious military discipline and organization in the armed forces and the enhancing of the constant combat readiness of the troops.

Strict and absolute observance by all servicemen of the requirements of the Disciplinary Regulations is an immutable law that should serve as a guide in the maintenance of firm military discipline. These regulations set forth the substance of Soviet military discipline, the duties and rights of servicemen in the maintenance and strengthening of military discipline, the types of incentives and disciplinary punishments and the rights of superiors in their application, and also define the procedure for the presentation and examination of complaints and applications.

The force and significance of this document are to be found not only in the high moral obligations that it imposes on servicemen. The regulations express the demands that the Soviet homeland makes upon its defenders for the utmost strengthening of military discipline, which is the paramount requisite for a high degree of fighting efficiency and constant combat readiness of the troops. This is of decisive importance in modern warfare.

In modern war, with the extensive use of nuclear rockets and the outfitting of troops with a broad range of the latest complicated weapons and equipment, when military operations will involve very great troop mobility and maneuverability and will entail all sorts of surprise developments, the importance of sound military discipline increases immeasurably. Discipline imparts good organization, flexibility and enormous power to troops, and this augments their fighting strength and turns the troops into a single, solidly cohesive organism capable of acting speedily, with organization and precision in the most complex circumstances.

V. I. Lenin time and again pointed out that the very strictest discipline, based on deep awareness on the part of servicemen and on unstinting devotion to the socialist homeland, is essential in the army. "What constitutes the basis of the new, comradely discipline in the Red Army, of its rebirth, consolidation and growth," wrote V. I. Lenin, "is the heroism of the toiling masses who are consciously making sacrifices for the cause of the victory of socialism" ("Works" (in Russian), Vol. XXXIX, p. 379).

In line with this statement of V. I. Lenin's, the introduction to the regulations states that military discipline in the Soviet Armed Forces rests not on fear of punishment and compulsion but on the high degree of political awareness and the communist indoctrination of the servicemen, on their deep appreciation of their patriotic duty and our people's international tasks and on the servicemen's unstinting devotion to their socialist homeland, the Communist Party and the Soviet government.

The great strength and invincibility of our army and navy, the main difference between them and the armies and navies of the capitalist countries and one of the criteria of our superiority, is the conscious character of the Soviet military discipline, the personal responsibility of every serviceman for the defense of his socialist homeland.

In the period of the full-scale building of communism the further heightening of awareness on the part of Soviet fighting men takes on even greater importance. The deeper the conscientiousness and awareness of every serviceman in the performance of his duty to his country, the greater his contribution to strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces and to the struggle for the victory of communism.

All commanders and superiors, Party and Young Communist League organizations and the entire personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces must therefore continue to focus their attention on the task of further strengthening conscious military discipline.

"The high moral fiber of Soviet fighting men, their conviction that our cause is right and will triumph -- this is a mighty weapon that endows our army with great and overpowering force," N. S. Khrushchev has said. "Well-organized ideological-indoctrination work with the people is the decisive requisite for further enhancing the might of our armed forces."

The chief method of indoctrinating Soviet fighting men in a spirit of conscious military discipline should be the method of persuasion, taking the form of explanations to the personnel of the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, the aims and tasks of the Soviet Armed Forces and the requirements of Soviet laws, of the military oath, of the military regulations and of the orders and commands of superiors.

The new Disciplinary Regulations emphasize that firm military discipline is achieved by implanting in servicemen lofty moral, political and combat qualities and conscious obedience to superiors, by strict adherence to the regulations in the unit, aboard ship and in the subunit and by the maintenance of exacting standards on the part of superiors with respect to subordinates and the skilful combination and proper employment of measures of persuasion and compulsion.

The new Disciplinary Regulations thus oblige superiors of all grades, along with intensifying indoctrinational work, to be more exacting toward subordinates, to be decisive and firm in insisting on the observance of military discipline and order and to let no single infraction on a subordinate's part pass without bringing action to bear. This does not mean, however, that it is mandatory in all cases for a disciplinary punishment to be imposed at once on an offender. The superior, depending on the nature of the offence, may issue the serviceman who has committed a breach of military discipline or public order a reminder of his service obligations, or he may impose a disciplinary punishment or refer the offense to the public for discussion.

High exactingness is a major feature of the Leninist style of leadership and the foremost responsibility of superiors. It is unfortunate that the maintenance of high and constant exactingness toward subordinates has not yet become characteristic of all our officers, and in particular of sergeants. Accomplishment of the tasks of further strengthening military discipline and of bringing up personnel therefore directly involves the need for increased exactingness on the part of all commanders and a further strengthening of the commander's one-man leadership and authority.

In making high demands on subordinates, our commanders proceed not from personal motives and not out of whim but from the interests of the country's defense and the task entrusted to them. But the exacting standards of Soviet commanders may not be divorced from their concern for people. The exacting commander should also be a good comrade. He should first of all make high demands upon himself. The new regulations therefore make it incumbent upon superiors to set their subordinates an example of strict and precise observance of the requirements of Soviet laws, the military oath, military regulations, orders and commands, and the rules of communist morality. Superiors must by their entire lives, their actions and conduct constantly serve as an example for subordinates.

It is quite clear that rudeness may not be substituted for exactingness. This is inadmissible and contrary to the spirit of communist morality. High exactingness must be based on the regulations, it must be constant and fair and must be combined with the comprehensive indoctrination of subordinates and a tactful attitude to each individual. The coupling of exactingness based on the regulations with a sensitive and solicitous attitude to the needs of subordinates is and must always be a hallmark of our commanders' activity.

The new regulations emphasize that commanders must pay special attention to the prevention of offenses and the elimination of their causes, to the development of an attitude of intolerance toward breaches of discipline and to harnessing the power of public opinion in dealing with them.

In the indoctrination of soliders, sailors, junior and senior noncommissioned officers, and commissioned officers and in the strengthening of military discipline, ever greater importance is being assumed by the power of the collective, its adherence to principle, its moral solidarity and its intolerance of shortcomings and violations of the laws, standards and rules of socialist society. Such forms and means of public influence as personnel meetings at which the unworthy conduct of individual servicemen is discussed and the work of officer comrades' courts have been proving their worth.

However, it should be borne in mind in employing these forms of influence that frequent discussions of the very same infractions at general meetings may lose all effect and meaning. This method should therefore be resorted to within reason. It is the task of commanders and political workers and of the Party and Y.C.L. organizations to prepare each such meeting painstakingly and to conduct it in organized fashion and on a high ideological and indoctrinational plane, so that it contributes to the further strengthening of military discipline and the one-man leadership and authority of the commanders.

Incentives and disciplinary punishments are effective means in the indoctrination of servicemen. The regulations make the point that in indoctrinating his subordinates in a spirit of steadfast observance of all the requirements of military discipline each commanding officer is obliged to offer deserving individuals incentives for displaying intelligent initiative, for zeal and for heroic deeds and distinguished services in the line of duty, and to be stern in imposing penalties on those who are remiss.

Inasmuch as indoctrination should be conducted primarily through positive examples, and incentives are among the major means for indoctrinating personnel in a spirit of conscious military discipline and are aimed at developing the activity and creativity of servicemen, the new regulations first set forth instructions on incentives and then on disciplinary punishments.

In the new Disciplinary Regulations substantial changes have been made in the forms of disciplinary punishments to be imposed upon service personnel. To strengthen the indoctrinational influence of disciplinary rights on subordinates and to bring about a more consistent application of these rights by commanders, especially sergeants, such types of punishment have been introduced as reproofs for conscripted and re-enlisted personnel and stern reprimands for junior and senior non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers. Conscripted and re-enlisted service personnel may be deprived of their outstanding service badges. In addition, a warning of dereliction of duty and reduction in military rank has been introduced for re-enlisted service personnel.

Bread-and-water confinement as applied to conscripted soldiers, sailors and junior and senior noncommissioned officers has been dropped from the regulations, but one type of arrest, confinement in the guardhouse, has been retained. The length of time an arrested serviceman may be kept in the guardhouse has been reduced from 20 days to 15 days for soldiers, sailors and junior and senior noncommissioned officers and from 20 days to ten days for commissioned officers.

Furthermore, the regulations lay special stress on the fact that arrest is an extreme measure of influence and should be employed only in cases where other measures taken by the superior have proved ineffectual.

Major clarifications have also been introduced in the rights of superiors to employ this extreme punishment. The right to arrest soldiers, sailors and junior and senior non-commissioned officers has been granted to superiors from company commander up, and the right to arrest commissioned officers has been granted to superiors from regimental commander up, as well as to superiors enjoying equal disciplinary authority.

The new Disciplinary Regulations considerably enlarge the disciplinary authority of commanding officers of regiments and individual units. This underscores their special role in the armed forces set-up, raises their authority and heightens their responsibility to the Party and the government for the indoctrination of personnel and the maintenance of firm military discipline and order in the units entrusted to them.

The regulations give commanders of regiments (ships of the second rank) and officers holding equivalent posts the right to reduce in rank sergeants (petty officers) from senior sergeant (chief petty officer) down, as well as to transfer them to less responsible posts, and to release into the reserve servicemen from company sergeant and those of equivalent rank down prior to the expiration of their tour of duty. The 1946 regulations give these rights to superiors from division commander up. The rights of commanding officers (superiors) of particular units and officers who enjoy the disciplinary authority of commander of a battalion (ship of the third rank), as well as commanding officers of garrisons and military commandants, are also substantially broadened.

The disciplinary power granted commanders by the Party and the government is a potent weapon in their hands for strengthening the discipline and indoctrination of Soviet fighting men. It is important that every superior use these rights sensibly and with a full sense of responsibility. Punishment must accord with the degree of guilt and the gravity of the offense committed. It is impermissible that decisions concerning punishment be taken in haste and in the heat of the moment, without painstaking study of the nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was committed. Senior officers must periodically check on their subordinate commanders and constantly instruct them in the proper use of the disciplinary power granted them.

The basic revision of the provisions bearing on the procedure for the use of a weapon in dealing with insubordinate servicemen is a fundamental addition to the Disciplinary Regulations and is of great importance for the armed forces. The new regulations contain a more clear-cut definition of the cases where such an extreme measure may be employed. The regulations sharply emphasize the fact that the use of a weapon is an extreme measure and is permissible only in cases where all other measures taken by the superior have proved ineffectual, or where, owing to the particular circumstances, the adoption of other measures may prove to be impossible. A weapon may therefore be used only under battle conditions, or in peacetime only in exceptional cases that permit no delay, where the actions of the insubordinate individual are clearly aimed at treason to the country or the frustration of a military assignment or create a real threat to the life of the superior, other servicemen or civilians.

The new Disciplinary Regulations grant the right of peacetime removal of officers, generals and admirals only to those superior officers who have the right to appoint them to the respective positions. The procedure for removal in time of war has been left as it was.

Other clarifications and supplementary points based on experimental application in the forces have been introduced in the regulations.

The new Disciplinary Regulations, which are the basic law in the matter of establishing, maintaining and further strengthening military discipline, thus contain the fullest reflection of the requirements of the contemporary stage in the development of the Soviet armed forces and are a powerful means for further increasing the constant combat readiness of the forces.

Of great importance for the Soviet Armed Forces are the Service Regulations, which are an inviolable code of laws governing the lives, everyday living and functioning of the troops. They define the principles of political and military indoctrination, the general and functional responsibilities of servicemen, and relations among them. A firm routine and clear-cut daily pattern ensuring a high level of fighting capacity and constant combat readiness in the forces are established and maintained on the basis of the provisions of these regulations.

There is a deep meaning in the provisions of the regulations that define the general duties of servicemen. They are prompted by the need to secure the Soviet homeland's defense and by the character of modern warfare, which makes high demands on the moral and combat qualities of the Soviet fighting man.

The new regulations are permeated with concern for Soviet fighting men and for the improvement of their moral and combat qualities so that they may creditably discharge their sacred duty to their country.

The regulations lay special stress on the inculcation in servicemen of boundless devotion to the socialist homeland, the Communist Party and the Soviet government. Dedication to communism and faith in its ultimate victory inspire Soviet fighting men to the greatest self-sacrifice and to deeds of heroism.

The regulations demand of servicemen that they observe Soviet laws and the military oath as sacred and inviolable, that they be disciplined, upright, truthful, courageous, stalwart and vigilant, show absolute obedience to superiors and defend them in battle.

The regulations demand of Soviet fighting men that in the discharge of their military duty they endure all the burdens and hardships of military service and spare no effort, not life itself, to achieve victory in battle. All servicemen are bound to fight to the finish in discharging their military duty to the Soviet homeland. Nothing, including the threat of death, should make a man serving in the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces surrender; the regulations emphasize that a Soviet fighting man may be taken captive only if he is in a helpless condition in consequence of having been seriously wounded or shell-shocked. At the same time, instructions are furnished on the behavior of a serviceman in captivity.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government are outfitting the army and navy with first-rate, complex military equipment and weapons. The regulations therefore lay special stress on the necessity for continuous study by servicemen of the weapons and military equipment entrusted to them and their proper and skilful use, storage and protection.

The regulations set forth in greater detail the requirements with respect to a serviceman's behavior in daily life and in public places. The regulations oblige all persons of higher rank to insist at all times that those of lower rank observe military discipline, public order and proper dress as well as the rules of conduct and saluting. Those of junior rank must unquestioningly carry out the wishes of their seniors. Those of senior rank have no right to overlook infractions committed by their juniors.

The Service Regulations and Disciplinary Regulations alike require that commanders and superiors pay special attention to improving the quality of indoctrinational work with personnel. The regulations make it incumbent on all commanders and superiors to know the service and political-and-moral qualities of the men under them and to concern themselves personally on a day-to-day basis with their political indoctrination, relying in their activity on the Party and U.C.L. organizations and taking full advantage of their influence for the successful accomplishment of the tasks confronting the unit (subunit). For this purpose the regulations call for closer association by commanders with their subordinates both in line of duty and in everyday life, for the improvement of work with them on an individual basis and for study of advanced indoctrinational experience and its introduction into practice.

With the object maintaining the traditions of the unit and passing on the advanced experience of those who have distinguished themselves in military and political training, each unit keeps an Honor Book in which are inscribed the names of soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers in the last year of service prior to their release into the reserve, as well as students in training units and military academies upon completion of their course of instruction, who have made excellent showings in their military and political training and

discipline and have displayed a high degree of conscientiousness in the time they have been in service. Also inscribed in the Honor Book are the names of soldiers, sailors, students, sergeants and petty officers who have especially distinguished themselves in the performance of their military duty.

The regulations contain a fuller and more clear-cut definition of the legal status and duties of those who hold the main positions in the regiment and its subdivisions. In present-day circumstances, heavy and crucial obligations devolve upon the regimental commander. Progress in military and political training and exemplary performance while in service are directly contingent on the way the commander directs the training and indoctrination of personnel and how he solves the problems involved in the strengthening of military discipline and the protection of armaments, military equipment, ammunition and transport.

He is also obliged to study the unit's personnel comprehensively and to know the service and political-and-moral qualities of every officer and master sergeant in the unit. The regimental commander will fail in his object of maintaining the regiment's combat readiness if he loses sight of staff training and ceases to see to the continuous improvement of the theoretical knowledge and practical skills of the battalion commanders, their seconds-in-command and the commanders of the regimental services.

Socialist competition has been launched in the armed forces in the last few years. This wonderful movement has involved the masses of fighting men at large and has entirely proved its worth. The number of those who have distinguished themselves, masters at the various military specialities and of excellent squads, platoons and companies in the armed forces has been increasing with every passing month. It is the obligation of the regimental commander, of all subunit commanding officers and of political workers to see to it that competition is further developed and to supervise it.

Nowadays troops must always be prepared to carry on military operations under circumstances where atomic weapons and other modern engines of war are used. This obliges the regimental commander not only to make the subunits ready for such operations but, no matter what the conditions, to carry into effect measures for the protection of personnel and materiel against atomic weapons and other means of mass destruction.

As compared with the earlier regulations, the duties of the regimental seconds-in-command subunit commanding officers have been revised and set forth with a detail that ensures day-to-day direction by them of military, political and specialized training. All regimental seconds-in-command and subunit commanders are designated direct superiors of all personnel.

In view of the increased role and responsibility of regimental (battalion) headquarters in organizing the military training and day-to-day lives of the troops, the regimental (battalion) chief of staff is envisaged as the direct superior of all the personnel of the regiment (battalion). The battalion chief of staff, as well as the regimental chief of staff is authorized in cases of necessity to issue commands (orders) to subordinates in the commanding officer's name.

In order to ease the load on officers and to give them more time to work on improving their military and political knowledge, to grow culturally and to bring up the members of their families, the regulations provide for a reduction in the number of days of obligatory attendance at evening roll calls in the subunits, as well as for the exemption of officers from the performance of some duties that can be successfully handled by sergeants. Commanders and superiors of all ranks, and above all unit commanders, must not allow officers to hang around aimlessly in the subunits before and after the completion of the day's activities. Officers must be granted free disposal of their off-duty time. Strict supervision must also be established over the proper planning and expedient use of duty hours by the officers; measures must be taken to make better use of the working day and to increase the efficiency and organization of work.

Senior superiors must show constant concern to have officers and sergeants improve their theoretical knowledge and practical skills, must participate personally in the training and indoctrination of subordinates, and must study advanced experience in the military and political training and indoctrination of servicemen and introduce it in subunits.

The role of sergeants as the immediate superiors of the men has been substantially enhanced. The assistant platoon commander has been renamed platoon second-in-command, which heightens his authority and responsibility for the indoctrination and training of the platoon's personnel and establishes uniform legal status for seconds-in-command in all elements. The performance of several duty details formerly handled by officers has been assigned to sergeants.

The broadening of the rights of persons in authority in the regiment and its subunits and the more concrete statement of the duties of these persons still further heighten their responsibility and enable them to do a better job of organizing military and political training, indoctrinating servicemen and maintaining a firm routine and constant combat readiness in units and subunits.

The new regulations clarify and supplement the instructions on the organization and maintenance of routine in the regiment and its subunits. These important instructions are aimed at ensuring a further enhancement of the combat readiness of our armed forces. The organization of routine duties,

life and everyday living is, after all, the basis for strengthening military discipline. Constant and precise observance of the regulations governing the lives and training of units and subunits implants combat cohesion in the fighting men and ensures proper employment of time for all-round combat improvement and for the upkeep of equipment and weapons.

The new regulations take into account the great organizational importance of the daily routine in the life of the regiment and provide more detailed instructions on its content. Persons on the daily detail have been given a greater role and more responsibility for the maintenance of a firm routine in the unit and subunits, as well as of a clear-cut daily schedule, and for the cleanliness of all premises and of the unit's grounds.

Strict observance of the regulations' requirements as regards the organization and maintenance of routine is the business of commanders of all ranks. It must be remembered that the military routine will have its great indoctrinational and organizational effect only if it is constantly sustained, day in and day out. Any irregularity in the organization and performance of duties must be nipped in the bud and must not grow to limits where extreme measures are needed.

In view of the complete mechanization of the troops, the new regulations substantially enlarge and supplement the instructions bearing on the upkeep and proper utilization of military and other equipment. In place of the chapter in the earlier regulations defining the routine duties and obligations of persons on the daily detail only in the armored and motor vehicle and tractor pools, the new regulations contain a general chapter that pertains equally to other pools.

In order to prevent accidents and mishaps, the regulations require commanders to institute essential safety measures when military and other equipment is in use; when marches are being made; when drill, firing practice of special exercises or projects are being conducted; and when routine and guard duties are being performed, and to bring these measures promptly to the attention of subordinates and demand their strict enforcement.

The regulations lay down instructions on the procedure for the withdrawal of troops to training centers (camps), their disposition and the specific features of the routine in the training centers and camps.

The new regulations set out in greater detail than the 1946 regulations instructions on protecting the health of servicemen and on the carrying out of medical and prophylactic measures in units and subunits.

It is the task of unit and subunit commanders, in keeping with the requirements of the new Service Regulations, to

organize a clear-cut and firm routine in units and subunits. Persons on the daily detail and all servicemen must be precise in observing and maintaining the established routine and daily schedule.

The promulgation of the new regulations marks a new stage in the life of our armed forces. The new regulations will undoubtedly contribute to the further strengthening of military discipline among personnel, to good order in the troops and to improvement in the organization of the routine and in the quality of the military and political training of the troops, and thus to a heightening of the constant combat readiness of the troops. It is the duty of every serviceman to study the requirements of the new regulations thoroughly, know them well and fulfill them day by day.

The new regulations constitute the program for a big project for every commander (superior) and all Party and Y.C.L. organizations in indoctrinating servicemen and strengthening discipline, organization and military order in units and subunits. The task consists in studying the new regulations together with the personnel, in making every serviceman aware of their demands and in seeing to it that they are unquestioningly fulfilled. A love of the regulations and the habit of heeding their requirements at all times must be instilled in servicemen.

It is the duty of every Soviet fighting man to live and learn by the regulations.

NOT TO BE MICROFICED

Current History

December 1960

by Allan Nanes

(Ass't to Dep. Director

Legislative Reference

Serive, Library of Congress)

Although in the closing year of their civil war the Chinese Communist Army swept over those of the Nationalists, it took the Korean war to impress its prowess on American consciousness. In that bitter conflict the Chinese Red troops found the United Nations forces on generally even terms. Few GI's who heard the Chinese bugles or faced the "human wave" charges will ever forget the experience.

Whether as a result of the Korean struggle or not, the tendency ever since has been to evaluate the Chinese Communist army as a formidable fighting force. Some would say that this estimate is exaggerated, on the grounds that the full weight of American power could not be brought to bear in Korea. Yet it is obvious that as the primary arm of a nation of over 600 million, tightly organized and determinedly led, the army of Communist China must be reckoned with by diplomats, military planners, and indeed, the people of the world.

Information on this force is hardly abundant. The Chinese do not have the American penchant for revealing military developments. In addition, the absence of American correspondents from mainland China has diminished the amount of information that might otherwise be available.

Despite these circumstances, some facts can be gleaned about the Chinese Red Army. Thus there is a widespread consensus that it amounts to 2.5 million men, a figure that the Chinese themselves uncharacteristically confirmed when Defense Minister Lin Piao gave out this figure on February 18, 1960.¹

The army, or as it is known, the Land Army, is broken up into from 30-35 armies, composed of two to three divisions each. These Chinese armies are obviously comparable to what would be called an army corps in this country. The active strength of each of these armies is 50,000 to 60,000 men. In wartime they would be grouped together by region to form what the Chinese call a Field Army.

At the division level the Chinese Communist army is said to contain from 102 to 115 infantry divisions, two or three of armor, and one or two airborne.² Obviously, the emphasis

¹Survival, Vol. 2, No. 4, July-August, 1960. London, Institute of Strategic Studies, p. 141.

²Ibid.

Obviously, the emphasis is on infantry, a fact which is to some degree illustrative of the army's history, but also, as we shall see, a product of some of the doctrines of Chinese Communist leadership. Finally, the government of the People's Republic can draw upon a manpower pool of no less than 125 million men of military age.³ Between 500,000 and 750,000⁴ are called up each year, and serve for a three year term. Thus one may conclude that the Chinese Communists have all the manpower they could ever need to fight a conventional war.

Supplementing the army in villages, plants, communes and so forth, is the militia. This vast agglomeration is provided for in the constitution of the communes, under which all able-bodied men between 16 and 60 are to be trained in the use of arms. In reality, the militia is open to women, too.⁵ Although the militia's total strength is not known, the government's declared goal is to enroll one person out of every three. A two year old report said that the total membership was approaching 200 million.⁶

The precise military role of the militia is undefined. Presumably it would be used to harass any invader, should one ever gain a lodgement on the soil of the mainland. But such evidence as is currently available suggests that the militia is designed primarily to serve as an instrument of political control. Although training of militiamen has been stepped up, only small groups are issued arms, and then only for relatively short periods of time.⁷ Rifles, machine guns and grenades have been issued for weapons training, but apparently no live ammunition.⁸

Finally, the Chinese Communists have public security forces of approximately 200,000 men. Presumably these are for purposes of internal order and suppression of political opposition. It should perhaps be equally presumed that they possess some military capability in the event of an actual conflict.

Central Direction

Administrative direction of the army is exercised by the Minister of Defense, who is advised by a National Defense Council.

³Ibid.

⁴The lower figure was more generally quoted in the sources consulted, but Survival, the latest source used, gives the higher figure.

⁵October 19, 1958, p. 8.

⁶Ibid.

⁷New Times, February 16, 1950, p. 6.

⁸Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 28, 1958, p. 3.

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In addition, there is a general staff, which appears to be under the Ministry of Defense.⁹ Directives governing the army are published in the name of this ministry. This machinery for the centralized direction of the military is patterned on the Russian model.

Yet this centralization is the culmination of an evolutionary process. During the long era of Communist eclipse, from the late 1930's until the end of World War II, there was no rigid central command. A People's Military Council, headed by Chu Teh, exercised what was at best a nominal authority over the scattered, largely guerrilla units. During the struggle with the Kuomintang the People's Liberation Army was organized, and Chu Teh was made its Commander-in-Chief. Here again the centralized command was more apparent than real, as regional Communist commanders operated with a substantial degree of independence.

Once victory had been achieved, however, the new Communist government of China, in the process of consolidating its power, decided to reorganize the military establishment. A People's Revolutionary Military Council was set up, directly under the People's Government Council of the Central People's Government. In 1954, when a new constitution was proclaimed, the Chairman of the People's Government Council became ex-officio Chairman of the New National Defense Council, and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The original holder of all these offices was, of course, Mao Tse-tung, the only Communist leader who has written extensively on military affairs. It is interesting to note that more than one-fifth of the membership of the National Defense Council consists of ex-Nationalist generals, but the Defense Minister and all seven vice ministers are Communists.¹⁰

Yet if centralization of defense administration had been achieved, it is apparent that those who administer defense policy are not its actual authors, except insofar as they are privy to the highest echelons of the Communist Party. This is certainly true of the Soviet Union, and undoubtedly of other Communist nations as well. In no country does it apply with more force than in the People's Republic of China, where defense policy has been, and continues to be subordinated to the strategy and objectives of the Communist party. Thus political considerations intrude into an area of purely functional as the army's internal organization, to say nothing of its position in the domestic scheme of things. It goes without saying that they play a paramount part in any assessment of the army's role in China's position vis à vis the Soviet Union, and the entire non-Communist world.

⁹Chiu, S.M. "Chinese Communist Military Leadership." Military Review, March 1960. Vol. XXXIX, No. 12, p. 63.

¹⁰Ibid. This paragraph relies largely on Dr. Chiu's article.

Modernization and Guerrilla Warfare

In a purely military sense, Communist China's first job is a dual one, namely, the creation of a thoroughly professional officer corps and the transformation of what was largely a guerrilla force into a coordinated, modern fighting machine.¹¹ The reorganization of the command structure, outlined above, was one step toward the latter end. The creation of a twelve-grade structure, outlined above, was one step toward the latter end. The creation of a twelve grade structure for officers, and the retirement of older officers, were two steps toward the former.

But this attempt at professionalization has encountered occasional ideological snags. For one thing, what might be called the "guerrilla mentality" seems to survive among some of the older Communist leaders and officers. The result is a tendency to deprecate the need for modernization. Chu Teh, for example, has acknowledged the importance of technology in war, but has asserted that politics, political systems, and what is in people's hearts made the difference between victory and defeat.¹² While this sentiment would be widely shared by many non-Communists, in its particular context it may well be a reflection of a conviction that the tactics that have brought success to Chinese Communist arms in the past will yet be valid in the future.

The guerrilla experience impinged on the drive for modernization in other ways. For one thing, the experience gave the Communist army a character that was perhaps more democratic than is usual in military establishments. This tradition clashes with the attempt to build up an élite officer corps. Furthermore, there is always the ideological risk, from the Communist point of view, that such a military caste might be transformed into a vested interest potentially antagonistic to the purposes of the party. One can imagine that this would give pause to party chieftains.

Finally, and perhaps most obviously, the army's past experiences influence its views on tactics. The mountainous terrain and the lack of good roads militated against mechanized forces in the past, and those conditions still obtain. Airpower was never too effective against the Communists' guerrilla tactics, so they do not appear too concerned about airpower now.¹³ This downgrading of airpower, bred out of their experience, foreshadowed the apparent lack of apprehension with which the Chinese seem to view nuclear weapons today.

How the army is affected by internal needs is perhaps best illustrated by the use of the army as a labor force. Since China's fundamental weakness is economic, the party has been desirous of using the army in construction and production work. The military professionals have not been at all keen about this, but in effect they have had to go along. Thus we get reports of the Red Chinese army contributing 40 million man days building factories,

¹¹Ibid., p. 65.

¹²Ibid., p. 66.

¹³"Substance Behind Peking's Shadow," Washington Star, March 20, 1960, p. B-3.

working on water conservation projects, and so forth.¹⁴ The head of the army's general political department has said that all men must give one to two months each year to this work.¹⁵

The use of the army in this manner is intimately connected with the "generals to the ranks" movement, in which all army officers lacking fighting experience were to serve as privates for at least one month a year. As a result, army officers as high as generals have served in companies, and have participated in economic construction. The theory behind this campaign is that those who run a state must know what it's like to be subject to one's directives down to the lowest level.¹⁶ This presumably will help them run it more efficiently. But one can see why its effect on army training and morale might be questioned.

When we turn to Red China's relationships with the Soviet Union, the impact of Communist strategy, Russian and Chinese, bears most heavily on the army. Soviet Russia is indisputably a main prop of Chinese military strength.¹⁷ China is certainly not in a client state relationship to the Soviet Union, but there is little doubt that outside assistance, principally Russian, is required for the achievement of its economic goals. Since the state of technological and industrial development is so intimately linked to military power, the Soviet Union has been in a position to influence, and one could almost say, to control, Chinese military development. Characteristically, she has not been hesitant to employ this leverage. Furthermore, this Chinese-Soviet interplay has been carried on coincident with a struggle between Peking's military professionals and party dialecticians. The result of all this maneuvering, needless to say, is of critical importance to the West.

Nuclear Arms for China

The issue which is most illustrative of this conflict, and at the same time most vital, is that of nuclear arms for the Chinese Communist army. Given what seems to be the aggressive stance of Red China, the threat to world peace would be increased enormously if her army were to be furnished with these weapons. Yet interestingly enough, probably because of their own industrial deficiencies, Chinese Communist pronouncements at first tended to disparage the role of nuclear weapons. In a speech in 1955, Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, then Defense Minister, appeared to cling to the concept of the long war of attrition.¹⁸ The General Staff composed of old line Communists, favored large scale forces in being, and placed a high valuation on Soviet deterrent capabilities.

¹⁴ New York Times, Feb. 3, 1960, p. 2.

¹⁵ Ibid., April 26, 1959, p. 22.

¹⁶ New York Times, April 16, 1958, p. 13.

¹⁷ Erickson, John. "Sino-Soviet Relationships: The Question of Strategic Combination," Journal, Royal United Service Institution, May 1960, p. 251.

¹⁸ Hsieh, Alice Langley, "Communist China and Nuclear Warfare". Reprinted from The China Quarterly, Survival, op. cit., p. 144.

In effect it was Soviet possession of nuclear weapons that gave the Chinese Communists a flexibility of maneuver that they did not possess on their own. But the reverse of this coin was that the Russians possessed a veto over Chinese strategy. Never was this shown more clearly than in the offshore islands crisis of 1958. The fact that the Chinese provoked that crisis, but never forced the United States to decide to use tactical nuclear weapons, meant that the Chinese would not accept the costs of taking the offshore islands, and that Moscow would not permit the crises to go to the point where its own deterrent could be invoked on Chinese initiative.¹⁹

This crisis also served to bring to a head the difficulties between the Chinese "new" military professionals and the party. The former were dissatisfied with the showing of the armed forces, because their bluff had so obviously been called, and the lack of military means to achieve political objectives had been exposed. The upshot was the appointment of Lin Piao, a veteran Communist military leader who managed to enjoy the confidence of the younger military professionals, as Defense Minister. His appointment is significant, for it means that the party hierarchy wants to bridge the dangerous gap that had developed between it and the military men. It means that a strong effort will be made, and probably is already being made, to modify the Chinese Communist forces in line with latest military techniques, while continuing to maintain party control.

In accord with this development we can expect continued Chinese pressure on the Russians to acquire a nuclear capability. Thus far, despite some Khrushchev bluster, there is no hard evidence that the Russians have furnished any nuclear weapons to the Chinese.²⁰ If they persist in their refusal, the Chinese may be moved to try to manufacture nuclear weapons of their own.

There are good grounds for believing that the Russians would be no keener about that than would the West. Indeed, a case can be made out that the Soviets have tried to limit the Chinese military capability to a defensive one. For example, while the Chinese have a first line airforce variously estimated at 2,000 to 2,5000 planes, most of these are fighters, and largely obsolescent MIG15's and 17's at that. The Chinese bomber force is composed of subsonic IL 28's, an aircraft with a range of 1200 miles.²¹ Fuel supplies are low, hence training is inadequate,²² and the Soviets have not displayed a burning desire to rectify this situation. The result has been Nationalist air superiority, by and large.

But this thesis should not be pushed too far, for after all the Soviets have helped the Chinese double their production of military aircraft; they have supplied them with a short range missile capability; and they are said to be teaching them to

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 146.

²⁰ Washington Post, July 8, 1959, p. A-6. Other sources consulted tend to agree.

²¹ Washington Star, op. cit.

²² Survival, op. cit., p. 141.

build long range submarines.²³ If enough of these are eventually turned out, the capabilities of the Chinese Communist navy might be enhanced beyond its present purely nuisance value.

However Sino-Soviet ideological differences have now reached the point where the Soviet Union seems unwilling, at least for the present, to continue technical assistance to the Chinese. Western newspapers have reported a withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China. If these reports are authentic, then a sharp blow will have been dealt China's hopes for rapid economic and military advance.

Yet it seems premature to regard any current break as definitive. The Chinese and Russians both have a common interest in the solidarity of the "socialist camp". They both desire the victory of communism on a world scale. There is no evidence whatsoever that either country intends to yield its ideological ambitions.²⁴ The Soviets simply have a better understanding of the perils posed by nuclear war to the achievement of that objective. If the Chinese acquire these weapons they may perhaps acquire a better appreciation of their destructiveness as well. Unfortunately, at present they appear all too ready to use them, or to see others use them.

It should be apparent, by way of summary and conclusion, that the army of Communist China is in a state of transition. It survived for years as a guerrilla force, and finds it difficult to slough off the guerrilla tradition. Yet the younger men with professional military training feel it must become a modern force, equipped to use the most up-to-date weapons, including the nuclear. Thus there are reports that its tactics are being revamped, and even that its divisions are being changed to the United States pentomic type.²⁵ We know that its command structure has been altered, and may be altered again, and we know that an attempt is being made to develop an educated professional officer corps. We know that its logistical services have improved, and that its firepower has increased,²⁶ the latter due in no small degree to Russian assistance.

This transition is accompanied by certain morale problems. Some younger officers are reputedly unhappy over the contrast in privilege and perquisites between themselves and senior military men. Conscripts have not always proven so ideologically conscious as the party would wish.²⁷ The élite of the army has not been keen over the party's desire to use the troops in construction work. Indeed, while the broader clash between the army and the party has been settled, it is probable that the

²³ Washington Star, op. cit. Jane's All the World's Aircraft has stated that Chinese Communist production of MIG 17's has doubled with Russian help.

²⁴ See Erickson, Journal, Royal United Service Institution, op. cit., p. 252.

²⁵ New York Times, Sept. 18, 1959, pp. 1 and 2.

²⁶ Chiu, S.M., op. cit., p. 66.

²⁷ Washington Post, June 29, 1958, p. A-6.

army, particularly the young professionals, are not satisfied with the results.

Yet when all of this is taken into account, the army of Communist China remains a formidable opponent for any nation in any conventional war. Its manpower, its ability to use terrain, its endurance, cannot be discounted. True, it has weaknesses, even in the conventional sense. Its communications network is poor; for example, there are only 10,000 miles of railroads.²⁸ China's vast masses have to be fed, and the production and transportation of a food supply that is marginal even in peacetime, could be seriously hampered in time of war. Nevertheless, it would be a brash Western military man who could contemplate with equanimity a land war against Communist China.

If this is the situation with respect to a conventionally armed Communist China, how much more dangerous would it be in the event that China acquired nuclear arms? Thus it is in the West's interests, no less than in Russia's that the latter not furnish her Asian ally with these weapons. Should Russian policy change, or should Communist China succeed in producing her own nuclear weapons (a possibility with which we must reckon), the West would be faced with the gravest challenge of this challenging century. One can only hope that in this eventuality the West will display its greatest wisdom, and China its greatest restraint.

²⁸ Washington Star, op. cit.