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THE HOUSING PROBLEM IN POLAND

Summary: The acute housing shortage has currently become Poland's No. 1 national problem. Along with many other privations in everyday life, the housing shortage is causing such widespread public dissatisfaction that in effect, it has become a political problem.

Many factors have contributed to the present desperate housing situation, including the state of housing in Poland at the turn of the century. However, the most vital role in this sphere was played by the postwar housing policy. A lack of consistency in this policy, its vacillation between extremist concepts, its primitive errors, and also its disregard of social needs have all helped create a potentially explosive situation. From the point of view of the number of dwelling units constructed, as well as of their standard, the situation in Poland has become one of the worst in the East European bloc. In 1970, there was even a severe reduction in housing construction.

After the political crisis of December 1970, housing construction was officially recognized as one of the most important parts of the socioeconomic program. The authorities appointed a special commission, consisting of some CC members and professional experts, which was given the task of preparing the draft of a project for housing construction up to the year 1990. This draft has now been worked out in general outline and will be discussed in the near future by a forthcoming CC plenum and by the Sejm. In its maximal version, this draft anticipates a full satisfaction of housing needs by 1990. However, the implementation of the plan of housing construction in 1971, as well as the outlines of the housing plan for the current five years, raises doubts about the practical feasibility of this program.

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Introduction

In the early 1960s, a majority of party members and administration officials began to share the view that the scale of the gap existing between the authorities and the community was by no means immeasurable and that, in fact, it could be effectively reduced through some comparatively simple moves. Those people thought that only a part of that gap arose from causes which were organically linked with the political system and that these causes did not (then) have a decisive impact on the mood of the community. They thought that the latter is mainly shaped by the effects of administrative and economic errors which are suffered in everyday life -- errors caused more by the individuals involved than by the political system itself. What is more, they implied that, if such shortcomings in the economy and in administration were ever associated with the political system, then even a small deterioration in satisfying the daily needs of the population could cause a political upheaval of incalculable measure. In short, this theory was summed up in a cynical saying that, should the present political system ever break down in Poland, such a thing would be directly due to shortages in meat and coal rather than to the hostile attitude of the community toward general party policy.

In view of the fact that the December riots in 1970 to a certain extent confirmed the aptness of such a "utilitarian" school of thinking, it would be worth while to recall the problems which were at that time the mainsprings of the explosion. There were:

- a) systematic shortages of food, especially of meat;
- b) the fact that the amount and quality of industrial consumer goods on the internal market were both inferior to what was available in other countries, even other communist countries;
- c) the exorbitant prices of some industrial consumer goods, making some of these goods (for instance, cars) practically out of reach of potential customers;
- d) a disastrous situation in housing construction, which frustrated the aspirations of people for more civilized conditions in private life;
- e) the creation of the atmosphere of a "detention camp," caused by the formal barriers which limited the movements of the population, even within the Eastern bloc.

However, it was the supply of meat which was accepted as the symbol of all kinds of large and small privations in everyday life in Poland. It was thought that only a political leadership capable of solving the problem of the meat shortages on the internal market could succeed in ruling the country without arousing immediate conflict with the community. (1)

(1) The fact that these concepts still linger on is confirmed by the following statement which appeared in the February issue of Polityka-Statystyka:
(cont'd)

It is significant that the new political leadership began the task of consolidating its power with attempts to eliminate the most drastic of the above-mentioned privations in Poland's everyday life. (2) During the very first months after assuming power, the new leadership managed to soften some of these most drastic irritants (improvement in meat supplies and in the assortment of industrial consumer goods, prospects for expanding motorization); later it tackled others (lifting restrictions on the movement of people between the GDR, the CSSR, and Poland) and attempted to improve the situation regarding such problems as those whose solutions would require a longer time before the existing state of affairs could be improved. The housing problem was one of the latter.

Causes of the Present State of Housing

The current state and structure of housing in Poland are the result of many factors, among them the following:

- a) The structure and quality of housing inherited from the partition era, which greatly varied in the different parts of the country, and resulted from the type of legislation and the level of civilization of each of the occupying powers;(3)
- b) Inadequate urbanization of the country and the historical creation of hasty concentrations of the labor force in conglomerates which lacked elementary sanitary and communal facilities (as was the case of Lodz, Zyrardow, and some of the Silesian towns);

(cont'd) "It seems that, for many years to come, the meat problem will remain as a vitally important factor in the economic equilibrium and the frame of mind of the community" [emphasis added].

- (2) This was certainly not accidental, but the result of a deliberate method -- something along the line of "socialism with a human face." While reporting on Gierek's meeting with the party aktif in Katowice (on 21 February 1972) and referring to the improvement of supplies on the market and to the prospects for improving the housing situation, which were stressed by Gierek on that occasion, Jakob Kopec wrote in Kultura (5 March 1972): "There is need for strong, stimulating ideas which would appeal to the imagination. Yes, socialism! Socialism is certainly such an idea, but socialism can be visualized in many forms, and currently we need it precisely in this model which is emerging" [emphasis added].
- (3) According to the Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland, 1938, in 1931 only 12.9 per cent of urban dwellings had indoor sanitation, 15.8 per cent had running water, and 37.8 per cent had electricity. The average density of occupation was also very high. For example, in Warsaw it amounted to 2.07 inhabitants per room, while in the same period the corresponding figure in Prague was 1.44, and in Berlin 1.01. The fact that this old housing still has considerable impact on the current situation is confirmed by the report of the Main Statistical Office, according to which 60 per cent of the dwellings in use in 1970 were built before World War II (4,900,000), of which 2,500,000, or 31 per cent of the available housing (!) were constructed before 1918.

- c) Extensive damage suffered by the available housing during World War II;.
- d) The loss of the underinvested and poorly urbanized Eastern Territories and the acquisition of the better urbanized, but virtually devastated Western Territories;
- e) The shortage and generally low standard of housing in the rural districts -- partly an after-effect of the excessive parceling of farm lands;
- f) The results of the extreme fluctuations in policy and the political errors committed since World War II (especially the adverse effects on rural building construction caused by the threat of collectivization), and finally, the inadequate rate of increase in urban housing construction, as well as insufficient modernization of the older housing available.

The last point requires further explanation. The general cause of underdevelopment in housing construction (of course, a relative underdevelopment, because the limited financial means -- at least in the first postwar phase -- would in any case not have permitted the achievement of a rate which would satisfy rising needs), was the fact that the authorities treated housing as an unproductive sphere of activity -- in other words, as a necessary evil. There were only few exceptions to this rule, such as Warsaw, where emotional and propaganda reasons played a dominant role, or Nowa Huta, which was treated as a showcase of the social transformations taking place in Poland.

The above-mentioned attitude during the postwar period hit small towns in the nonindustrialized areas particularly. It was in such towns that large amounts of the then available housing were lost through neglect and ruin because of the authorities' reluctance to allot necessary funds for repair and renovation. A lot of housing has been gradually lost through the system of the so-called public administration of buildings, introduced in the larger cities, which transferred the dwellings from the status of privately administered property to the jurisdiction of the local municipal administration. In the case of privately owned houses (which represented a majority here), the house-owners were deprived of their right to choose the tenants and received only symbolic rents from the latter (which for many years remained "frozen" at the prewar level); thus they could not afford to do the necessary repairs. A similar problem also appeared in the case of housing blocks constructed by the state, because the low rents did not provide adequate sums for running repairs and all renovations had to be made from the separately appropriated -- and as a rule insufficient -- funds provided by the state.

The situation changed somewhat after 1956. In the first place, the authorities changed their policy on housing construction in the former German territories, which previously were particularly discriminated against. There was an increased interest in housing construction in the smaller towns. In order to protect the state from the burden of directly financing housing construction, the authorities introduced co-operative building on a large scale. This was principally financed by the people themselves, with some help from

credits allotted by the state. (4) With time, however, the disproportions between the financial burdens carried by the members of housing co-operatives and those paid by dwellers in state-built houses (people's councils) had become incongruous. Therefore, in the middle of the 1960s the authorities increased rents in the state-owned houses, bringing them approximately up to the level of the financial contributions paid by the members of the housing co-operatives. Thus, the authorities made nonco-operative housing self-supporting so far as operating costs and seasonal repairs go.

During more or less the same period, the pressure on part of the community to step up housing construction also increased. The people began to feel that they were entitled to more human -- and later also to more modern -- housing. In the first phase (in the early 1960s), the authorities tried to stymie this urge by harsh regulations, which limited the standard and facilities of the newly-built dwellings. They produced and put into practice various "ingenious" plans for "simplifying" and cheapening housing construction (as was the case with the notorious experiment in Gdansk). The eagerness reached such absurd proportions that some eager beavers produced the blueprints while others approved the plans for apartments with shared toilets or with one single bathroom for every floor of an apartment house. Wladyslaw Gomulka was himself the mainspring of these ideas, whose execution was then supervised by Vice-Premier Julian Tokarski. However, it soon became clear that these ideas had misfired. After a few months of euphoria, the press launched a campaign of criticism against these concepts, accusing their perpetrators of creating modern slums, and -- what was even more decisive -- there were difficulties in finding prospective tenants for such housing. The people reasoned that once they accepted such a "utility" apartment, they would be stuck for years, while in the meantime the standard of newly-built housing was likely to improve. Therefore, they preferred to remain for a time in their basement quarters or in overcrowded dwellings rather than jeopardize their future prospects for a modern apartment.

Although the original "ingenious" concept for utility (substandard) housing proved a fiasco, nevertheless, it did, to some degree, influence later concepts (applied in the middle of the 1960s) which were designed to make housing construction cheaper and more utilitarian.

These concepts introduced:

- a) a far-reaching unification of building projects;
 - b) a reduction in the square footage of the average apartment, especially in the size of the kitchen; and
 - c) the omission of equipment specified in the original plan (such as bathtubs, washbowls, etc.).
- (4) In 1970, the total area of co-operative housing represented 12 per cent of the total housing area in urban areas. In that year, the housing co-operatives constructed and handed over for use twice as much housing space as did state-sponsored housing construction (Rocznik Statystyczny 1971, Warsaw).

During the last few years, the Polish authorities, with their tendency to lower the general standard of newly-built housing, were moving in a direction diametrically opposite to the policies adopted by all other European countries, including the countries of the Eastern bloc.

The deep conviction of Gomulka and his advisers that investments in housing were unproductive resulted, in 1970, in an absolute reduction in the volume of housing constructed, in spite of the above-mentioned attempts to make it more economical. (see Appendix). What is worse, in the immediately preceding period, the authorities had wasted all available developed tracts of land, while simultaneously cutting down outlays on further land development. Thus, the conflict reached its apogee.

The Present State of Housing and the Scale of Needs

Although by now nearly one half of all urban dwellers live in housing constructed or renovated since 1945, and the average standard of dwellings has greatly improved, the general situation is far from satisfactory. Even among the communist countries, Poland occupies a position which is not flattering. The table below contains selected data (5) indicating the state of housing in the urban and rural areas.

Size of Dwelling and Average Occupancy Density				
Countries	Year (records or estimates)	Average number of rooms per dwelling	Inhabitants per	
			dwelling	room
Poland	1970	2.9	3.9	1.4
Bulgaria	1965	2.3	4.0	1.7
Czechoslovakia	1961	2.7	3.6	1.3
GDR	1965	2.6	2.9	1.1
Hungary	1960	2.4	3.5	1.4
Rumania	1966	2.6	3.6	1.4
USSR	1960	2.8	4.2	1.5

Taking into consideration two facts, that the statistics from Bulgaria did not count the kitchen unless the latter was also used for other purposes, and that the data concerning Poland apply to December 1970, while those from the other countries apply to the years 1960-1966, it can be concluded that the housing situation in Poland is one of the worst in the Eastern bloc. (6)

(5) Rocznik Statystyczny 1971, Warsaw.

(6) Many interesting comparisons on the state and structure of building construction and housing resources are contained in Harry Trend, "Analysis of Polish Economic Policies for 1971-1975 and Beyond," Polish Background Report/27, Radio Free Europe Research (EERA), 13 December 1971.

Currently there are only 100 dwelling units in Poland for every 114 households. The shortage of self-contained dwelling units seems to be particularly threatening in view of the fact that the total number of marriages increases with every year. In 1970, the proportion of new dwelling units handed over for use in proportion to every 1,000 new marriages distinctly deteriorated. (In 1966-1970 that proportion was 740 new dwelling units per 1,000 new marriages, while in 1970 it had dropped to only 640 dwellings); it is also known that, over the next few years, this disproportion will steadily increase for quite a period. This stems from the fact that, during the 15 years between the years 1966 and 1980, the number of young people reaching 18 years of age will total 10,000,000, of whom 3,500,000 will reach 18 during the current five-year plan. The number of new marriages will probably increase from 280,000 in 1970 to about 400,000 in 1980. Therefore, as demonstrated in the table below, it should be expected that the shortage of dwellings will persist, in spite of the anticipated increase in housing construction. (7)

Period	Average number of new marriages (in thousands)	Average number of new dwelling units (in thousands)	Ratio between columns 2 & 3
1	2	3	4
1966-1970	255	188	0.74
1971-1975	310	215	0.66
1976-1980	365	330	0.90
1966-1980	310	245	0.79

It is this situation which seems to justify the opinion cited below (8):

The most important fact is that, in spite of the improvement in the housing situation of the population during the 1960-1970 decade, it must be concluded that this period was wasted. It offered a unique opportunity to make up arrears in the sphere of housing during the then existing specific demographic situation (a comparatively small number of new marriages due to the demographic low during the war years), but this opportunity was wasted. From this point of view, the severe limitation of housing construction during the last years of that decade -- just at a time when the numerous age-groups of the postwar demographic high were reaching marital age -- must be viewed as a peculiar oddity [emphasis in the original].

The situation in this sphere can only alter after 1980, when the average number of people reaching the age of 18 will fall off from 700,000 (between

(7) Gospodarka Planowa, February 1972.

(8) Slowo Powszechne, 22 February 1972.

1971 and 1975) and 650,000 (between 1975 and 1980), to about 265,000 per year (between 1981 and 1985).

One of the demographic factors which is due to play a considerable role in all this is the growing number of elderly people. The number of people who are past retirement age, which in 1970 amounted to 11 per cent of the population, is expected to reach 16 per cent in the year 2000. This fact confronts the country with the urgent problem of constructing an adequate number of suitable buildings which could serve as old people's homes, boarding houses for the retired, etc., catering to the needs of these elderly citizens.

As far as the urban areas are concerned, a vital role in the housing situation will be played by the migration of the rural population to the cities, which in future will greatly exceed the scale of the birth rate. (9)

Period	Share of birth rate in per cent	Share of migration in per cent
1951-1960	60	40
1961-1970	50	50
1971-1980	25	75

It is expected that the increase in the urban population, which by the year 2000 will reach a total of 8,000,000 people, will, to a great extent, be due to the migration of the population from the rural districts. By 1990, this increase will amount to about 6,500,000 people.

In addition to the above-mentioned demographic factors, the scale of housing needs is greatly influenced by the number of available dwelling units which have become obsolete and must be replaced: undersized and temporary structures, typical slums, quarters which were not originally meant for human habitation, basements and attics, and all types of movable "trailers," are now being classified as "substandard" housing. In the immediate future, dwelling units without running water and toilets will be also included in "substandard" group. According to figures provided by the Narodowy Spis Powszechny 1970 (The National Census, 1970) the number of urban dwelling units without running water was 1,100,000, and of those without toilets was 2,000,000 (see Appendix). According to moderate estimates, about 3,000,000 new dwelling units ought to be constructed between 1970 and 1990, if only in order to replace the losses resulting from the demolition of substandard dwellings.

As a result of the earlier-mentioned process of building "miniature" dwellings, there is already a need to rebuild some of them, converting them

(9) Gospodarka Planowa, February 1972.

into larger apartments. This will, in effect, diminish the number of housing units available.

In a rough estimate, the figures representing total housing needs during the 1971-1990 period will look approximately as follows:

To satisfy existing, officially registered needs (10)	1,000,000 dwelling units
To cover the needs caused by demographic changes and of the migration to urban areas	3,400,000 dwelling units
To replace the available housing which has become obsolete	3,000,000 dwelling units
Total:	7,400,000 dwelling units (11)

However, one must note that the strongest impact of demographic changes which will result in a housing need of 2,000,000 new dwelling units, will fall between the years 1971 and 1980.

The situation is also further complicated by the necessity to deconcentrate the density of housing. Up to 1964, the accepted norms specified that there should be a density of 800 persons per hectare of building site (in housing settlements). Lately, however, the authorities have begun to approve housing projects in which the density of occupation is 1,200 persons per hectare. Stopping this anomaly, and allowing adequate space in future building sites for garages and parking areas (in view of the expected rapid development in motorization after 1980), will boost the costs of housing construction and may, in turn, have an impact on the scale of quantitative tasks.

- (10) In actual fact, the needs are much greater, because many people do not even attempt to obtain a new dwelling, because of the existing difficulties, if not outright impossibility.
- (11) According to the estimates published by Slowo Powszechne on 22 February 1972. According to another assessment (Zycie Warszawy, 23 October 1971), the total needs amount to 7,700,000 dwelling units. However, both of these assessments are too low, because they do not take into consideration either the needs not registered to date, or the results of reconstructing too small dwelling units. It also seems that the reserve of dwellings (340,000) accepted in the estimate made by Zycie Warszawy is too low in the light of the considerable geographic fluctuation of the labor force which will be essential for the implementation of economic plans during that period. Moreover, all these estimates fail to make a true assessment of the scale of construction in the rural districts, because they do not take fully into consideration the greatly increased incomes of people employed in agriculture — who, in fact, will spend a large part of these incomes on the building of better dwellings.

The results of the first year of the new housing construction program do not give much ground for optimism. In spite of strenuous effort, partly because of the lack of appropriately developed building sites, the building industry achieved only a 2 per cent increase in the total housing area handed over for use over the corresponding results of 1970, (12) and so far as actual number of dwelling units goes, it probably did not even match the output of 1970. Moreover, it must be remembered that the number of dwellings constructed in 1970 was 3 per cent lower than in 1969.

The Projected Program for Housing Construction up to 1990

On 9 February 1972, at the third CC plenum, Politburo member Jan Szydlak presented a progress report on the preparations for the projected housing construction program. (13) The plenum accepted the draft of a resolution on this matter. According to the information given by Trybuna Ludu on March 2, this project had already been delivered to the higher party organizations and to the experts (builders, architects, etc.). So far, however, neither the draft of the program nor the pertinent resolutions have been made public. This invites speculation that either during the discussions at the plenum, or directly before its presentation, the plan was subjected to some hasty corrections. Perhaps because of that, Szydlak limited himself in his report to citing only a few figures of lesser importance. He said, for example, that between 1971 and 1975 "at least 1,075,000 new dwelling units would be handed over for use." (14) Szydlak also confirmed the fact that current needs are already in excess of 1,000,000 dwelling units. Hence also his pessimistic statement that the outlined increase in housing construction "will not mean, alas, any radical progress in this sphere -- in proportion to the growing needs." In his report, Szydlak also announced that, within the next few years, the authorities will create a construction industry genuinely adjusted to modern conditions; he promised a broadening of free choice in standard and form of ownership of housing and he stressed the desirability of maintaining roughly the same -- as that currently existing -- proportion between (the dominant) co-operative housing construction and that which is state financed.

Szydlak also stressed that the draft program had been presented only in its initial form, and that only after broad discussion in party and professional circles -- in which "anyone who has any suggestion can contribute" -- will the project be presented once more to the CC. A future CC meeting will again be devoted to these problems. In the next phase, the project will be presented to the Sejm, where, after final discussion, it will be passed as a bill.

In spite of the official "secrecy," some points of the draft got out to

(12) Trybuna Ludu, 2 February 1972.

(13) Ibid., 10 February 1972.

(14) During the 1966-1970 period, the total number of dwelling units handed over for use was 942,200 (according to The Statistical Yearbook 1971, Warsaw).

the press. According to the version given by Tygodnik Demokratyczny, (15) the current proposals for the development of housing construction should be regarded as a departure from hitherto normal habits and practices. The long-range program of construction up to 1990 contains both the final perspective and its five-yearly stages. Another feature of the program is that it is presented in three variant forms.

According to Tygodnik Demokratyczny, the first variant, called "A," anticipates full coverage of housing needs, through constructing up to 1990 about 7,500,000 new dwelling units. During the first five years (1971-1975), the program outlines the construction of 1,200,000 dwelling units (thus 125,000 more than was accepted in the plan); between 1976 and 1980, there is to be construction of another 1,700,000 units, 2,200,000 between 1981 and 1985, and about 2,400,000 new units during the 1986-1990 period.

The realization of such a program would not only require a very rapid expansion of the building industry, but the need, from 1981 onward, of keeping up the rate of construction at the level of 12 and later on of 13 dwelling units for every 1,000 inhabitants. In Europe, such a level is currently achieved only in Sweden and the USSR; in most of the developed European countries, it hovers between eight and nine dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants.

The variants "B" and "C" also anticipate a satisfaction of housing needs caused by the population increase, but do not provide for a full exchange of the so-called "used up" housing resources.

Thus, these two variants give priority to demographic needs; they foresee the demolition of houses only in cases where they have become completely unfit for habitation and where major repairs or modernization would be uneconomical and pointless. Both variants also have set limits on the "housing reserve" (variant "B" to 240,000 dwelling units and variant "C" to 140,000).

All three above-mentioned variants outline a concentration of housing construction in the urban areas (from 70 per cent in variant "A," to 72 per cent and 74 per cent in "B" and "C," respectively). The variants vary in respect to the intensity of the rate of construction. While in "A" this intensity would increase from 9.3 dwelling units per thousand inhabitants in 1970 (!) to 13 in 1990, in "B" it would increase to 11.9 units, and in "C" to 10.6 units per thousand by 1990.

In spite of different scales of building construction, as a result of the smaller amount of demolition in variants "B" and "C," all three variants allegedly guarantee in their final stage complete solution of the shortage of individual dwelling units. Variant "A" anticipates a doubling in the number of dwelling units built (in comparison to 1970) by about 1980, variant "B" by about 1982, and "C" by about 1986. All the proposals provide for raising the quality of dwellings, as well as for increasing their space. The size of the average dwelling unit is supposed to increase from 45.7 square meters to 59 square meters.

(15) 13 February 1972.

The number of dwellings per thousand inhabitants is expected to increase from 250 in 1970 to 331-336 in 1990. The number of households per 100 dwelling units will decrease to 102-104. The average number of persons per room will drop to 0.85-0.90. All urban dwellings are expected to have running water and toilets and 85 per cent of them will have full bathrooms.

In variant "A" only 30 per cent of all buildings existing in 1990 will have been constructed prior to 1960; in variant "B" it will be 34 per cent, and in "C" 39 per cent. There will still be differences in the housing of the urban and rural areas, not so much with regard to the size of dwellings, as to their standard. Improvement in this sphere depends mainly on the development of communal facilities in rural areas, above all running water, and later sewerage.

When one compares Szydla's optimistic prognoses, which were nevertheless somewhat restrained (and the rather unreal starting level foreseen in variant "A"), with the fact that the draft program contains three variants, one is forced to conclude that variant "A" is not likely to be adopted. In view of this, it is all the more surprising that Gierk made the following statement at a pre-election meeting in Katowice (16):

... The realization [of the housing construction program] will call for doubling our housing resources within more or less the next 15 years -- or to put it more vividly, for building a second Poland.

Reflecting that "the first Poland" had, in 1970, about 8,100,000 dwelling units and that the expression "more or less 15 years" could be stretched to cover the period of 19 years up to 1990, one could conclude from Gierk's statement that, in principle, the authorities have already accepted the maximal variant "A" (outlining the construction of about 7,500,000 new dwellings). This would be a very ambitious target indeed. Is it also realistic? It would be hard to give an absolutely positive answer to this question, especially in view of the rather unsuccessful implementation of plans during the first 18 months in which the new leadership has been in power.

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APPENDIX *

Housing Resources

Specification	Total			Urban			Rural		
	1960	1966	1970	1960	1966	1970	1960	1966	1970
Dwellings in thousands	7,026	7,723	8,102	3,564	4,094	4,521	3,462	3,629	3,581
Rooms in thousands ^a	17,265	20,209	23,301	8,902	10,779	12,515	8,363	9,430	10,787
Average number of rooms per dwelling unit	2.46	2.62	2.88	2.50	2.63	2.77	2.42	2.60	3.01
Useful area ^b in millions of m ²	- ^c	-	409	-	-	211	-	-	199
Average useful area per dwelling unit in m ²	-	-	50.5	-	-	46.6	-	-	55.5
Persons per dwelling unit	4.08	4.00	3.93	3.83	3.72	3.62	4.35	4.31	4.31
Persons per room	1.66	1.53	1.37	1.53	1.41	1.31	1.80	1.66	1.43
Useful area in m ² per person	-	-	12.9	-	-	12.9	-	-	12.9
Households in millions	8.3	-	9.2	4.4	-	5.3	3.9	-	4.0
Households per 100 dwellings	117.5	-	113.9	122.2	-	116.6	112.6	-	110.4
<p>a - Together with kitchens larger than 4 square meters.</p> <p>b - Total area of a dwelling unit including kitchen, bathroom, hallway, etc.</p> <p>c - This symbol indicates that no information is available.</p>									

* All tables have been prepared on the basis of the data contained in The Statistical Yearbook 1971, GUS, Warsaw, 1971.

Percentage of Dwelling Units Equipped with Facilities and Utilities

Type of Utility	Urban	1960	1966	1970
	Rural			
Running water	U	55.4	67.5	74.6
	R	3.6	6.3	11.7
Flush toilets	U	35.6	47.8	55.6
	R	1.7	2.7	5.1
Bathrooms	U	26.0	40.0	-
	R	-	-	-
Pipe-in gas	U	33.7	43.1	48.2
	R	0.4	-	0.9
Central heating	U	13.2	24.9	-
	R	-	-	-
Electricity	U	97.8	-	-
	R	61.8	83.7	-

Dwellings, Rooms, and Useful Area of Urban Dwellings

Handed Over for Use

Years	Dwelling units in thousands	Rooms in thousands	Useful area in thousands of m ²	Area of the average dwelling unit in m ²
TOTAL				
1960	93.5	272.8	4,907	52.5
1966	133.0	375.1	5,775	43.4
1969	145.8	437.3	6,719	46.1
1970	141.5	439.9	6,694	47.3
IN SOCIALIZED ECONOMY				
1960	76.9	210.2	3,905	46.9
1966	120.6	325.9	4,807	39.9
1969	132.0	378.3	5,559	42.1
1970	127.0	375.5	5,429	42.8
IN NONSOCIALIZED ECONOMY				
1960	16.6	62.6	1,302	78.1
1966	12.4	49.2	968	78.2
1969	13.8	59.0	1,160	83.9
1970	14.5	64.4	1,265	87.1

Some Data Concerning Dwellings and Rooms Handed Over for Use

	Dwelling units per 1,000 new marriages			Number of Rooms					
				per 1,000 inhabitants			per 1,000 population increase		
	1961- 1965	1966- 1970	1970	1961- 1965	1966- 1970	1970	1961- 1965	1966- 1970	1970
Poland (overall)	677	740	693	14.6	17.9	19.2	1,271	2,061	2,249
Urban areas	979	1,068	965	21.6	25.0	26.0	2,311	3,659	3,717
Rural districts	358	393	394	7.8	10.5	12.0	577	995	1,176

Housing Resources in Some European Countries*

Countries	Date of record or assessment	Total number of dwelling units	of that number				
			dwelling units	rooms	Average number of rooms per dwelling unit	Average number of persons per	
		in thousands				dwelling unit	room
CSSR	1.3.1961	-	3,820	10,478	2.7	3.6	1.3
GDR	1965	-	5,856	15,367	2.6	2.9	1.1
Hungary	1.1.1970	2,758	2,711	6,639	2.4	3.5	1.42
Poland	8.12.1970	-	8,102	23,301	2.9	3.9	1.4
Austria	21.3.1961	2,250	2,153	7,501	3.5	3.2	0.91
FRG	1960	16,407	13,379	54,231	4.1	3.5	0.88

* Note: The data concerning Poland are from 1970; other figures from between 1960 and 1965.

Structure of Urban Dwellings in Some European Countries

Countries	Years	Dwelling units with the following number of rooms				Dwellings equipped with				
		1-2	3-4	5-6	7 and more	running water	toilet	bath-room	electricity	pipedin gas
		in per cent of the total number of dwellings								
CSSR	1961	44.3	50.5	4.9	0.3	69.5	48.7	49.4	98.5	38.2
GDR ^a	1965	55.6	44.3	0.1	-	80.0	-	27.2	-	-
Hungary	1960	61.9	36.9	1.2		55.7	50.6	37.1	93.2	38.1
Poland	1966	54.2	41.6	3.9	0.3	67.5	47.8	40.0	97.8	43.1
Austria	1961	30.0	55.0	15.0		69.3	-	-	99.4	60.4
FRG ^b	1960	10.0	60.6	23.2	6.2	99.5	96.3	70.2	100.0	71.3

a - Structure of urban and rural dwellings.

b - Data about equipment of dwellings from 1965.