

Radio Free Europe/Munich  
Non-Target Communist Area Analysis Department  
Background Information USSR

22 October 1963

RECENT INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN USSR AND  
THEIR POSSIBLE INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY

Lecture by R.R. Gill to the Dutch Defense  
Study Centre, at Arnhem on October 22nd 1963

The title of my lecture to-night has forced me to ask a preliminary question: what do I mean by recent developments in this context? And it seems to me that the starting point for a good definition of recent should be November 1962, a month when a whole range of extremely important events were taking place within the USSR. Firstly, as you all remember, the Kremlin was busy absorbing the lessons of its political and military loss of prestige stemming from the October show-down in Cuba. Secondly there was a Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, at which the Party was officially divided into two major segments, one industrial and one agricultural, and was given instructions to specialize, to become more concerned with economics and less with political agitation. Thirdly the calamitous visit of Khrushchev to the exhibition of Moscow artists, which caused him to lose his temper and stage a six-month revival of neo-Zhdanovism, was arranged at the end of November. Fourthly it was a month when the esoteric communication phase of the Sino-Soviet dispute was ending after more than two years, and the controversy was beginning to become public within the Communist countries. By that time even Problems of Peace and Socialism, the Soviet-controlled theoretical monthly published in Prague, was attacking the "monstrous" deviation of those who advocate an open split in the international communist movement.

Now let us consider all these developments in turn, and perhaps investigate what has happened in each field since November last year. Moscow's missile muddle in the Caribbean, ending in the ignominious withdrawal of October, was only one of the two highly significant military events which took place last autumn. Almost as important, although far less publicized, was the demobilization of the Berlin class from the Red Army in September. What I call the "Berlin class" was the time-expired class of 1961, which was retained with the colours for an extra year because of Khrushchev's attempt to change the status quo in Berlin by a combination of sabre-rattling and political pressure. Well, as you know, the attempt failed, the time-expired men of the 1961 class were finally sent home, and

thereby Khrushchev indicated quite clearly that conventional warfare, for Berlin or indeed anywhere else, is not among his ambitions.

This point scarcely needs to be driven home, but it is perhaps worth recalling in view of the numerous voices in the West which are constantly urging countries such as Britain and France to neglect their nuclear armaments in order to provide more infantry and armour allegedly "to strengthen Nato". Well, I will only say ~~here~~ that in September 1962, the Kremlin showed every sign of believing that Nato was strong enough. It still does.

Next came the Cuban crisis of October, in which the eventual Soviet retreat showed that Khrushchev, in addition to wishing to avoid conventional land warfare on the continent of Europe, also preferred a major political loss of face to a submarine or nuclear war over the Cuban issue. It is true, as the Chinese rightly say, that he was "adventurous" to put his missiles there in the first place, but an "adventurer" who meekly withdraws his weapons when called upon by adversary to do so, is not really a serious military menace. The element of compromise in his make-up is stronger than the desire for adventure, and indeed this aspect of it is what Peking, in its exaggerated yet revealing verbiage, calls Khrushchev's "capitulationism".

By January 1963, the speech made by Khrushchev to the Congress of the SED in E. Berlin showed that not only the military but also the political pressure on West Berlin had been, if not yet completely abandoned, at least postponed sine die, and relegated to a conspicuously low position on the Kremlin's order of priorities.

The demobilization of the Berlin class taken together with Khrushchev's appeal for a reduction of military budgets in his Moscow speech in July this year probably indicate that the overt Soviet defense budget for 1964 will be lower than the 1963 level. But the cost of ~~the~~ hardening his ICBM sites in Russia, the provision of more Polaris-type submarines for the Red Navy, and the need to begin strengthening the now inadequate garrisons dotted along the Sino-Soviet border all suggest that the actual saving will be remarkably small in terms of either rubles or resources.

Nevertheless since the USSR is no longer attempting to coerce the West by military methods or missile threats, the Kremlin will in 1964 have more money than in 1961 or 1962 available for ploughing into industry and agriculture. It is highly relevant that in the autumn of last year Pravda published a long-forgotten statement by Lenin on priority for economic tasks after the seizure of power. Although this document was partly an anti-Peking manoeuvre, it has real internal significance not only as a guide to what local Party leaders are supposed to be doing now, but also for investment policies.



During the fifties the annual volume of new industrial investment in the U.S. only increased slightly, but in the USSR it tripled. At present the USSR is investing annually nearly half as much again in industry as the United States. These figures should be remembered whenever we read an article in the Western press to the effect that because Khrushchev just "cannot afford" to maintain his industrial, scientific, spatial, military and agricultural investment programs simultaneously something has to give.

The 1964 budget will probably allow for markedly greater investment in chemicals, particularly fertilizers and plastics, more for electric power and appreciably more for agriculture in the state sector. The armed forces budget has already been touched upon, but another sector in which growth may well be deemphasized in 1964 is the steel industry. The scientific and space budgets seem likely to flourish once again, as they have for many years past.

The current Soviet interest in fertilizers, agriculture, and the plastics industry etc. is yet another sign of Khrushchev's recognition that since the military road to communism has had to be ruled out, he must produce reasonable satisfaction for consumer demand before any Messianic propaganda for communism based on economism, the carrot rather than the stick etc, can even begin to be effective. The failure of the Soviet harvest this year, the purchases of twelve million tons of grain from the West, and the restrictions on the sale of bread and flour in the USSR are all reminders of the long, long trail awinding and still ahead of him.

#### Shifts in the Presidium and Secretariat

One of the areas of internal change which has a direct impact on Soviet foreign policy is the permanent jockeying for power and influence within the Presidium and Secretariat of the P.C., CPSU. In November last year the orientation of the Party apparatus towards production problems, with its division into agricultural and industrial sectors, led to a marked inflation of Khrushchev's personal secretariat with the addition of four new secretaries. These are V.I. Polyakov for agriculture, A.P. Rudakov for industry and construction, P.N. Demichev for the chemical and light industries, V.N. Titov for party organs (i.e. cadres) and Yu.V. Andropov for liaison with the parties of the communist countries.

The effect was to increase Khrushchev's own power to intervene in the economy, and to decrease the relative weight of the Presidium and of the Council of Ministers in the running of the country in favour of Khrushchev's own secretariat. Five months later, in April and May of this year, there were a multitude of pointers to a real, though very temporary, weakening of Khrushchev's position. These signs began with Khrushchev's public announcement that, being 69, he did not intend to cling to both his Party and State posts indefinitely. After this there was a natural stress on collective leadership, to imply that even if

Khrushchev is mortal his policies would survive him, yet when one of his "collective" subordinates allowed a harmless Mayday slogan on Yugoslavia to appear in Pravda Khrushchev hurriedly revised it from his holiday resort on the Black Sea, and changed it to a formula chosen deliberately to antagonize Mao Tse-tung.

Then in early May it became publicly known that Kozlov was seriously ill. Since Kozlov was then, and had been since 1959, the heir apparent to Khrushchev, this meant that the succession problem, which Khrushchev had taken so much trouble to resolve, was once again wide open, and it seems likely that there was or is some in-fighting among the more ambitious candidates for the role of Kozlov's replacement. We still do not know at all certainly who is the selected successor, or even whether a decision has yet been made, but the June Plenum of the C.C., CPSU, which ended with the admission of both Brezhnev and Podgorny to the Secretariat, may be a pointer. Since Brezhnev is the nominal head of State, in his capacity as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, is also a full member of the Presidium, has long-standing connections with the armed forces, and is now a member of the Secretariat, he appears to be unusually well-placed to take over Kozlov's former position as heir apparent. However, that must remain in the sphere of speculation. What is a certainty is that the admission of two of Khrushchev's closest colleagues from the "Ukrainian" group to the already swollen Secretariat must have further reinforced Khrushchev's own grip on the reins of power.

Statistically this can be demonstrated by saying that there are now 13 members of the Secretariat and eleven full members of the Presidium (Kozlov excepted in both cases), whereas in January 1957, when the anti-party group was still seated in the Kremlin, there were seven members of the Secretariat but eleven full members of the Presidium. Under these circumstances it is impossible to acquit Khrushchev of the charge of tinkering with the organizational structure for his own fairly transparent ends. Not that this is a disadvantage from our point of view. A man who agrees to ban the harmful types of atomic testing, to ban nuclear weapons from space in principle, to exchange consulates and airline-landing rights with America, to sell gold on an unprecedented scale in order to buy grain, and who simultaneously concentrates more on denouncing Peking than Wall Street while splitting the world communist movement irrevocably into warring factions, is certainly to be preferred to the Stalins, Molotovs and Kaganovichs of recent but unlamented memory. I am not suggesting that the West should make things easy for Khrushchev, only that he is making them easier for us in the short run. Even if his long term ends are no different from those of Stalin or Peking, the very fact that his methods are so different may give us cause for some satisfaction. If Stalin lost Yugoslavia as a political ally of Moscow, Khrushchev has lost China, Albania, N. Korea and probably N. Vietnam. Against this list the gain of Cuba seems a minor advantage of a most expensive nature.



## The Division of the Party Apparatus

The action of the November Plenum amounted to one of the most radical revisions of the Party's organizational structure since 1917. Instead of being a Party built up on the "production territorial" basis, as article 20 of the Statutes claims, it was changed without debate by a Congress to a purely "production" basis at raikom, gorkom and obkom levels - i.e. at county, urban and provincial levels to use the nearest English equivalents.

This "production-oriented" Party was then divided into two independent parts, one responsible for industry, transport and construction, and the other responsible for agriculture. Thus where the oblasts previously had one boss, in the shape of the 1st Secretary, they now have two, of nominally equal rank. It is difficult to imagine that the relationship between them can be much better than that in a nightmare army division which might be imagined as having two generals in command of it, one for armour and one for infantry.

At the lowest level of the party apparatus, the raikoms in the countryside, or county committees perhaps I should call them, were abolished and replaced by an even more clumsily named organization known as the party committees of the territorial production administration. In rural areas where there is some industry but no urban committee of the Party, zonal group industrial committees were established.

It seems probable that any such far-reaching reform of the Party organization as a whole would have led to considerable opposition from the numerous conservatives, fundamentalists and dogmatists who form part of a bureaucratic machine with 11,000,000 members. Therefore perhaps we should recall that of the twelve full members of the Presidium in November 1962, only Khrushchev, Podgorny and Voronov spoke in favour of the reorganization. The others remained silent, which does not mean that they oppose the reform, but does suggest that they may be unenthusiastic about its chances of success.

At the level of the Union Republics, the November reform involved the establishment of a Presidium, the duty of which is to "guide and coordinate" the work of the new bureaus for agriculture and industry. These bureaus, in their turn, supervise the work of the two first secretaries in every oblast, and are themselves in fact much more under the thumb of the Republican secretariat than of the new Presidium which nominally directs them.

The advantages of the reform are that it will permit Party secretaries to acquire some real degree of specialized knowledge in their own field, and to cease having to be a jack of all trades as they were in the past. But naturally the danger of demarcation disputes, of personal rivalry between the two first secretaries of each obkom, and of, for example, the industrial secretary refusing help to his agricultural colleague at harvest time, when the latter needs additional transport or manpower, is now greater than before.

It need scarcely be stressed that at the higher levels of the Party (i.e. oblast, republic and central) the reform has led to a massive inflation of ranks, jobs and status. But at the bottom level the previous 3,200 rural raikoms have been replaced by only 1500 party committees in the territorial production administrations. This halving of the number of units has not, despite Mr. Parkinson, been accompanied by a doubling of their full-time staffs. Consequently some real saving in the lower-paid ranks of Party functionaries has been achieved.

To give you an example of the confusion which followed the party reform, I might point to the central committee apparatus of the Union Republics. Here the sections for ideology and for party organs of the central committees were divided into two halves, one each for agriculture and industry, by the Republican plenums held last winter, in December and January. But this split only lasted a few months, and between April and July 1963 the ideological and party organs sections of the C.C. in the majority of the republics were quietly reconsolidated. Presumably the reversal was intended to achieve greater efficiency, since a personnel policy dependent on two separate sets of files and two card indices must have been extremely difficult to pursue. Inevitably the agricultural first secretaries would have tried to unload their dead wood on their industrial colleagues by sending failures over with a glowing but fictitious account of their past services, and vice versa. Presumably it was Titov who put an end to this particular source of inefficiency.

#### Reform of the Government

The November Plenum also brought with it a considerable centralization of the state's economic machinery. First the long-term planning functions were handed over to Gosplan USSR, while Gosekonsoviet was abolished. Secondly a new body, the All-Union Sovnarkhoz (National Economic Council), under V.Ye. Dymshits, was set up to deal with day-to-day planning and to act as a super minister of economic affairs. However this arrangement only lasted four months, until in March 1963 a still more elevated body called the Supreme Sovnarkhoz of the USSR was organized to which Dymshits' Sovnarkhoz is now subordinated. D. F. Ustinov was put in charge of the Supreme Sovnarkhoz and was made a First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. He is an expert in arms production, but his job is to do what the Presidium and Khrushchev tell him - in other words his former career is not a reliable indicator of the direction of the economy to-day. He has already received a friendly warning from Khrushchev, who reminded him that productivity in the defence industry is too low, and hinted that it was concealing the fact behind a security smoke-screen.

Apart from these measures of organizational centralization, there is also a strong tendency towards geographical fusion. This can be seen most clearly in Central Asia, where a special Bureau of the C.C. and a joint Sovnarkhoz have taken over many of the party and economic functions formerly carried out by the Uzbek, Turkmen, Kirghiz



and Tadzhik Republics. Before long it would be prudent to expect the same process to be started in Transcaucasia and probably in the Baltic States as well. In these cases Khrushchev's motives are only partly economic, and they also include the desire to combat local nationalism more effectively. Now that the British, French and Dutch empires have been largely dissolved or are well on the way to liquidation, it is understandable that Moscow should feel apprehensive about the years to come when Russia, China, and Indonesia will appear to be the surviving colonial powers.

### Effect on the Economy

At this stage we might well ask what effect all these structural changes in the Party and Government machinery have had on the economy. At present it is too early to give a definitive answer, but if Khrushchev is honest with himself he would reply: precious little. Despite the extra labour released by the demobilization of the Berlin class, the first six months of this year showed an industrial growth rate of 8.5% on 1962, compared with one of nearly ten percent in the previous year. No doubt the deceleration was caused largely by the exceptionally tough weather, as was the decline of perhaps 20% or more in this year's harvest. Surplus stocks in the retail trade systems have reached the astronomical figure of 3 milliard rubles, real wages have been almost stagnant since 1962, and the rate of growth of profits has fallen to the very modest level of +3% in 1963.

Hence it is understandable that Problems of Economics, the Soviet theoretical economic monthly, should have discovered that Lenin believed in the profit motive (like Professor Liberman, another of its proteges) and that even Kommunist, the ideological periodical of the Central Committee, in its 12th issue this year, has at last unearthed the law of supply and demand. Well, spät aber doch, as the Germans so neatly put it.

Certainly, then, there are no grounds for being satisfied with the November Plenum because of its economic effects. If they are to show up, they will be a long time coming. And Khrushchev, whose personal control of the economy was markedly extended by the Plenum, inevitably must shoulder a yet greater share of responsibility, in the eyes of the population, whenever things go wrong - for example in the supply of bread, flour and potatoes. The effect of all this on Soviet foreign policy will be to act as a strong restraining factor. The meagre harvest and the need to sell unprecedentedly large quantities of gold not only helps the U.S. Treasury to stem its deficit in the payments balance but also implies that there is unlikely to be any more "adventurism" started by the Kremlin until the granaries are once more reasonably full.

### The Squall in the World of Art

The important point to realize about last winter's Party attack on the Soviet writers and artists is that it was the third in the series since Stalin died. In the first one, during 1954 -

Tvardovsky was sacked from Novy Mir because of the Pomerantsev affair. (Pomerantsev was a courageous writer who demanded sincerity in literature). In the second one, during 1957, Khrushchev told the writers that if necessary "his hand would not tremble" ... by which he meant that he would shoot a few of them rather than allow a Petöfi circle to grow up in Moscow, on the pattern of the source of the Hungarian revolution. In the 1962-63 squall, it was the writers whose hands did not tremble. With very few exceptions, they lay low, allowed the storm of neo-Zhdanovite fury to break over their heads, but are now rehabilitated even in the official press and are once more propagating their own form of revisionist communism. They were supreme in their confidence that Khrushchev needs them more than they need Khrushchev. Time has once again proven them right.

The point of departure for the 1962-63 squall is, however, different from those of the earlier waves of regression. In December 1953 Vladimir Pomerantsev was only asking to be allowed to write the truth. In 1957, the revisionist writers were only asking to be allowed to write like Polish or Hungarian authors. In 1962 it was not a mere request for permission but the fait accompli, actual finished modern paintings hanging in an official exhibition in the heart of Zhdanov's capital, which caused Khrushchev's paroxysm of rage. This was not a premeditated, staged, planned, Machiavellian way of clamping down on art. It was the genuine wrath of the older generation (Khrushchev's taste is akin to that of ex-President Eisenhower or the Earl of Avon) face to face with something it does not understand and therefore subconsciously fears.

Throughout most of December, the anger of the Party was directed solely against the painters and sculptors. It was not until just before Christmas that the writers came under fire and that the editor of the previously revisionist Literary Gazette was changed greatly for the worse. When this happened the key theme in the régime press was that "there can be no compromise in ideology." This phrase makes the whole incident explicable, if not excusable.

At the beginning of November 1962, A. N. Kosygin, a 1st Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, used the anniversary of the October Revolution, of all occasions, to stress the virtues of genuine compromise and mutual concessions in foreign policy. Of course he was explaining Cuba away, but by doing so he offered a splendid opportunity to the intellectuals who seized on it to send a letter to the Central Committee demanding co-existence for various trends in art.

Agency reports from Moscow at the time suggest that this heretical document was signed by Ehrenburg and Konstantin Simonov among the writers, Shostakovich among the composers, Konenkov and Favorsky among the artists, and Mikhail Romm, the director of "9 Days in a Life Time," which is one of the more honest films made recently in the USSR. I mention these names only to show the high level of the support for revisionism.



The letter contained this passage:

"We wish to say in all sincerity that without the possibility of the existence of various trends in art, then art is doomed...We appeal to you to stop the swing in the arts to past methods that are repugnant to the whole spirit of our times."

Nevertheless by the end of December the Party offensive had broadened to include attacks on Voznesensky (who has just been rehabilitated by Pravda), Okudzhava, Yevtushenko and others.

In early March the neo-Zhdanovites became so extreme that they appeared to be contradicting Khrushchev himself. This they did by attacking Solzhenitsyn for his story about a forced labor camp, "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich." Now since both Khrushchev and Ilychev, the Secretary for ideology of the C.C., CPSU, had both praised Solzhenitsyn without qualification, it began to look as though the neo-Zhdanovites were climbing too far out on a limb for their own good.

Two months later, in May, the storm was visibly almost spent. Tvardovsky announced to an American correspondent that his magazine (Novy Mir) intended to publish new works by Solzhenitsyn, Nekrasov (the Ukrainian writer who openly criticized the KGB's absurdly zealous shadowing techniques), and Aksyenov. The latter individual is a brilliant novelist who specializes in works permeated with neo-realism, which are also notably lacking in ideological uplift. Although he has published an abject self-criticism in Pravda, and Yevtushenko has done the same in Yunost, it would be most unwise for the Party to believe that either of these young leopards have really changed their spots. By August Ehrenburg was once more pleading for cultural pluralism, Tvardovsky was attacking the Stalinists of to-day as well as yesterday in Izvestia, and Khrushchev himself had taken a major stride towards cultural coexistence by stopping the jamming (as long ago as June) of western broadcasts by the BBC and VOA. (The broadcasts of Radio Liberty are still being jammed). As a result of these favorable signs, the Soviet intellectuals have heaved a sigh of relief, and quietly congratulated themselves on winning yet another round against the dogmatists of the Party.

What are the main motives behind the relaxation? First, Khrushchev, by and large, is a tolerant Philistine, who realizes in his quieter moments, that he needs the support of his intellectuals if he is ever to modernize the USSR and make it as productive as it must become if his type of "economism" is ever to succeed. Secondly, he must have been concerned at the effects on other communist parties of his verbal persecution of the artists. Cuban and Italian communists were openly saying that they believe in artistic freedom, and were hinting broadly that one simply cannot sell socialist realism as the only school in climates where freedom has flourished for so long.

Lastly, and perhaps most important, the Soviet campaign against China had begun to take precedence over every other requirement. The anti-Peking campaign had become overt, national, racial

and quasi-religious. Every vote that Khrushchev can muster will be needed if, as seems probable, another international communist conference is to be convened by Moscow next spring. Under these circumstances the Presidium must have felt that it is counter-productive to damn Mao Tse-tung for his type of dogmatic Stalinism all over the world while at the same time it was acting like a group of unreconstructed Stalinists against its own artists in the USSR.

I want to conclude by examining the Sino-Soviet dispute in more detail. You might well say that it has to do with foreign policy mainly, and you would be right. But at the same time there has been no foreign policy development for 22 years which is going to have, and is having, such an effect on the day-to-day internal life of the USSR.

Week after week, month after month, whole pages of the Soviet press which used to be devoted to pounding capitalism are now used to enlarge on the almost innumerable deviations of Peking.

Mao Tse-tung personally is under fire, border incidents are taking place almost monthly (there were 5000 "violations" last year alone) and according to Moscow attempts are being made by China to "develop" some parts of Soviet territory without permission. In addition Peking has openly hinted that one day China may wish to revise the "unequal" treaties of the 19th century which established the present borders in a way most unwelcome to the Chinese.

Thus the USSR now has to fight a cold war on two fronts, against the West and East simultaneously. For the first time since 1945, the Russians see the possibility of being confronted, before perhaps two decades are out, by a genuinely aggressive power of vast potential with a variety of revanchiste and imperialist ambitions.

The situation has a whole range of political, military and economic consequences. Politically the need to defeat Mao in vote-winning has driven Khrushchev to reiterate more and more frequently the need for peaceful coexistence, the horrors of atomic war, the desirability of mutual concessions, the wisdom of trade with the West, the need to win by economic competition etc. All of these statements commit him more and more to an internal policy which can well be described as Speckkommunismus, or consumer communism of the Malenkovian pattern.

What it means in practice can best be illustrated by the statement made last week by Soloviev, the Secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, that in 1964 the USSR will switch over to a 36 hour week for all workers and employees in the state sector.<sup>1</sup> Already the Soviet work week, at its present 41 hours is shorter than in many parts of Western Europe. Next year, if Soloviev proves to be right as I expect he will, it will be much shorter. Naturally it is true that this further reduction is partly designed to avoid the emergence of the kind of unemployment problem which permanently plagues the U.S., and certainly Soviet industrial

---

<sup>1</sup> UPI, Moscow, 15/10/63



productivity does not yet begin to justify such a measure (it is still only about one-third of the US level). Nevertheless, if the Kremlin can reduce the work week by an hour a day, without reducing real wages, there will be considerable benefit for about 60,000,000 workers and employees as a result. And I am optimistic in my belief that it can be done. Since Khrushchev came to power the work week has already been cut from 46 to 41 hours, while real incomes, despite the wage pause in 1962 and 1963, have improved sharply.

The internal military influence of the Sino-Soviet dispute is also important. The Red Army has about 60 fully manned, active divisions available of which perhaps 26 are at present tied down in E. Germany, Hungary and Poland. Malinovsky now has to secure the world's longest land frontier, which for more than a decade has been virtually unguarded except by KGB border troops. It is probable that he has about 12 divisions in the Maritime Province, but here he not only has to provide for the defence of Vladivostok but also has to secure the whole Pacific coast-line beyond which American naval and air forces are deployed.<sup>2</sup>

A British expert believes that in the whole area to the north of the 4000 miles of Chinese-Soviet frontier there are at present a maximum of 20 divisions, and that fewer than ten of these could be used for the defence of the Manchurian or Sinkiang frontiers. For a two-front confrontation the Red Army is thin on the ground, for the simple reason that in fixing its present size, a rampant China was not taken into account. There is therefore likely to be a strengthening of the tactical air forces along the Sino-Soviet border, by which I mean bombers, fighter-bombers, reconnaissance and interceptor squadrons since they can effect a real reinforcement without making it necessary to cut back the number of divisions in the Warsaw Pact area.

The KGB's frontier guards are likely to be strengthened considerably, and they will need more air transport squadrons than they have at present for both parachute and airlanding operations. The number of glider troops along the border also seems likely to increase.

When and if the U.S. succeeds in relocating one of its present divisions in Germany to an American base, as a result of the build up of its long-range air transport capacity, Khrushchev will be able to withdraw perhaps three or four of his divisions from E. Germany. They could then be transferred to the Eastern border, but this is a long-range calculation which may have inspired Khrushchev's July speech about "thinning-out" the troops in Germany, but does not solve Malinovsky's immediate problem.

The quandary of the Sino-Soviet border makes it all the more probable that the USSR will continue to display an interest in building up India's defences. The notorious Mig factory for India, the Antonov-12's and helicopters supplied to the Indian Air Force, are a relatively cheap if indirect method of trying to direct more

---

<sup>2</sup> See New Statesman, 4/10/63

Chinese attention to the South. Brezhnev has just been in Afghanistan, furthering the drive of Soviet road-building engineers through the Hindu Kush. Before long we may expect to see a lesser Soviet official in Pakistan, handing out similar largesse in an attempt to persuade the Pakistanis that China is more of a menace to Rawalpindi than the Indians.

By the same token there will be strenuous competition between Peking and Moscow to gain influence in Japan. If one of the West's perennial nightmares is a new Rapallo, one of Moscow's current traumas is the eventual possibility of a Sino-Japanese rapprochement based on colour and mutual economic interests. At present Peking has control of the Japanese C.P. This fact is a real plus for Moscow since it automatically prejudices the Japanese Government towards Russia and against China. Paradoxically, therefore, Khrushchev may have been almost glad to lose that particular party to his Chinese rival.

To return to communist party politics, the evidence in Pravda now suggests that there probably will be an international communist conference in Moscow in a few months' time. It may or may not be attended by the Chinese-bloc parties, but about 70 parties seem likely to declare that Peking has consistently violated the 1957 and 1960 documents, that dogmatism is now the main danger to the world movement and that revisionism, while still a potential menace, has had its teeth drawn as a result of the Yugoslav Party's return to a true "socialist" position. In this way China will be "politically isolated" by the Moscow faction, and effectively excluded from the majority of the movement. As far as I can see, this leaves Peking with the opportunity towards which Mao has worked for at least 3 years-to establish the 5th International at last.

P.P.S.