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SPECIAL POINTS AT ISSUE

A HANDBOOK OF SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BEHAVIOUR AND PROPAGANDA

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The communique issued at the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact meeting is the programmatic implementation of the Soviet analysis of the current world political situation presented in the Declaration of the Twelve Ruling Parties and the Peace Manifesto in Moscow last November. It is essentially a recapitulation of all Soviet bloc foreign policy initiatives of the past year and an unyielding restatement of Soviet positions on all subjects from atomic armaments to peaceful coexistence. The summary of Points at Issue, prepared with the Summit Conference in mind, provides in outline form, relevant data on many of the problems mentioned in the Communique.

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Published 1958

I. Disarmament

The Soviet Union has given the world three attractive and dangerously over-simplified slogans for disarmament:

- (1) Ban or suspend nuclear test explosions;
- (2) Ban the use of nuclear weapons;
- (3) Destroy nuclear weapon stocks and stop producing more.

All attempts by the Western Powers to reduce these proposals from propaganda to concrete agreement have been thwarted.

Abortive Negotiations

On August 29, 1957, just before the United Nation Disarmament Sub-committee had to adjourn *sine die*,¹ the Western Powers offered the Soviet Union a working paper covering all their proposals for a first-stage, "partial" disarmament agreement and incorporating all the advances towards agreement made at previous meetings. For the USSR, Mr. Zorin rejected the paper out of hand and made it clear that his Government had no further interest in the workings of the sub-committee.

The disarmament question was then taken to the full Assembly of the United Nations. On November 14, 1957, the General Assembly approved by an overwhelming majority,² a 24-Power resolution recommending that agreement should be reached on the lines proposed by the Western Powers on August 29.

Next, threatening that its delegation would boycott the Disarmament Commission and Sub-committee as then constituted, the Soviet Union was again heavily defeated on a proposal³ that a new permanent commission should be set up, consisting of all 82 UN member States. But the Western Powers, prepared to move part of the way towards the Soviet demands, supported a proposal to increase the commission's membership by 14 countries representative of all shades of opinion.

The Soviet Union was not satisfied and put forward Albania to propose the addition of another seven countries to the total. The effect of this move would have been to weight the new commission in favour of the Soviet Union. Again the Soviet Union resorted to blackmail, threatening to boycott the commission and sub-committee unless the Albanian proposal was accepted. By large majorities the Assembly rejected the Albanian proposal⁴ and approved the enlargement of the commission by 14 members.⁵

By refusing to accept this decision and to take part in the commission, the Soviet Government has deadlocked the disarmament talks in the United Nations.

These are the principal points of difference:

Nuclear Test Explosions

The Soviet Union advocates immediate suspension of test explosions

Footnotes at end of section.

for two or three years in advance, and apart from, any disarmament agreement. It rejects any controlled cessation of the manufacture of fissile material for weapons. On March 31, 1958, having completed a large -- and speeded-up -- series of nuclear weapons tests, the Soviet Union announced that it was suspending such tests. The decision was not taken as a result of negotiations with the other Powers possessing nuclear weapons and leaves the Soviet Union free to resume tests any time it chooses.

The Western Powers have proposed suspension of tests for one year immediately a disarmament agreement comes into operation. If this is successful, and progress is made on preparing an inspection system to ensure that, after an agreed date, new fissile material is not used for weapons, the ban on tests will continue for a second year. At the end of this time, if production of fissile material for weapons has ceased, the suspension of tests could become permanent.⁶

Nuclear Weapons

The Soviet Union proposes that each party should enter into a "solemn obligation" not to use nuclear weapons, at least for five years.

The Western Powers, believing that in the present world situation "solemn obligations" are not enough, can undertake only that nuclear weapons should not be used "unless an armed attack has placed the party in a situation of individual or collective self-defence." The Soviet Union seems to offer no more than this in practice.⁷

Production and Stockpiling

The Soviet Union proposes the cessation of production of all nuclear weapons and their simultaneous "elimination." Fissile material from warheads will thereafter be transferred to peaceful uses only. The Western Powers propose that within a month of the installation of an effective inspection system, production of fissile material for weapons will stop and all new fissile material will be diverted to non-weapons purposes. Existing stocks of fissile material will then be transferred gradually to non-weapons uses, in equitable proportion and under international control.⁸

Conventional Armaments and Forces

The Western Powers have suggested manpower limits for three stages of conventional disarmament. In the first stage, armed manpower in the USA and the USSR would be reduced to 2,500,000, and in France and the United Kingdom to 750,000. Agreed quantities of armaments from both sides would be transferred to depôts under international supervision. A split in opinion occurs at the second and third stages.

The Soviet Union accepts the figures proposed by the Western Powers, i.e., for the USA and the USSR to reduce armed manpower to 2,100,000 in the second stage and 1,700,000 in the third; and for France and Britain to 700,000 and 650,000 respectively. The Soviet Government insists, however, that there should be a prior commitment to all three stages and that all these reductions should be free from political conditions.

The Western Powers consider on practical grounds⁹ that the second and third stage reductions should not take place until some progress has been made towards the solution of political issues.

* * * * *

The record indicates that the Soviet leaders are not interested in reaching a fair and balanced disarmament agreement. Their propaganda slogans and vague, sweeping generalizations and promises¹⁰ show that they are interested only in agreement on terms they themselves have dictated.¹¹

NOTES

- 1 On September 6, 1957. The parent body of this sub-committee is the UN Disarmament Commission which was set up by the UN General Assembly in 1952; at present this commission has 25 members -- the 11 members of the Security Council and 14 additional members appointed for one year from January 1, 1958. (See note 5.) In 1954, the General Assembly directed the commission to set up a Disarmament Sub-committee of "the Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution" to the disarmament problem. These Powers are the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and France.
- 2 57 votes were cast for the resolution; nine votes (three from the Soviet Union and one each from the six Soviet satellites) against. There were 15 abstentions.
- 3 November 19, 1957. Defeated by 46 votes to nine (Soviet bloc) with 24 abstentions.
- 4 November 19, 1957. Defeated by 38 votes to 19, with 19 abstentions. The countries proposed were: Austria, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Finland, Indonesia, Rumania and the Sudan.
- 5 November 19, 1957. Carried by 60 votes to nine (Soviet bloc) with 11 abstentions. The 14 additional countries are: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Tunisia and Yugoslavia.
- 6 Agreement has been reached on the principles of inspection posts to ensure that the suspension of tests is honoured. The main difficulty arises over the subsequent halting of production of fissile material for weapons. The Western Powers believe that suspending tests without any assurance of stopping such production would merely give a false sense of security without reducing the danger of war. Nor would it prevent other Powers from producing their own nuclear weapons.
- 7 Despite the Soviet Union's five-year ban proposal, Marshal Bulganin declared on December 11, 1957: "The Soviet Government has repeatedly declared that it has no intention of using any means of destruction unless the USSR is subjected to attack."
- 8 Besides failing to offer a practical method of ensuring that the cessation of production and elimination of stockpiles is carried out, the Soviet Union has declared that such verification would be impossible. A Soviet memorandum to the Disarmament Sub-committee on May 10, 1955, declared that there were "possibilities beyond the reach of international control" for "a potential aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a surprise attack on peace-loving States." Until mutual trust between East and West is established, the Western Powers consider that a control

system is vital, and that the re-routing of fissile material to non-weapon uses is a practical and controllable way of stopping production and reducing stocks. On the basis of past dealings with the Soviet Union, "moral obligations" are not enough.

- 9 The West insists on taking account of the prevailing political situation before going into these further major reductions in manpower because a cut of a million Western troops would mean drastic reductions in American support for NATO and other regional defence systems, which could hardly continue to exist in their present form.
- 10 Communist propaganda claims that all Western nuclear tests are aggressive and all Soviet tests justified by capitalist "warmongering." At the Communist-inspired Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo on January 1, 1958, resolutions were passed calling on Britain and America to adopt the Soviet attitude on the suspension of nuclear tests -- five days after the Soviet Union had exploded yet another nuclear weapon. According to world Press reports up to March 1, 1958, the United Kingdom has carried out four tests in the megaton range, the USSR 12, and the United States about the same number. Since March 1, the USSR has completed a large nuclear test programme.
- 11 This is borne out by Mr. Khrushchev's remark to the Moscow correspondent of United Press on November 14, 1957: "We think that it is better for the Soviet Union not to take part in the sub-committee's work, for the world public will then, at least, see its real worth and will bring greater pressure to bear on the governments of the capitalist countries. These governments will be obliged to take heed of the will of the peoples, and will be compelled to seek agreement." He meant, of course, on Soviet terms.

II. SOVIET OBSTRUCTION IN UNITED NATIONS

The Soviet Union has shown great intransigence and obstruction in the United Nations, despite its pledge to follow a "policy of broadening and strengthening international co-operation."¹

Misuse of the Veto

Since February 16, 1946, the USSR has exercised the veto in the Security Council 82 times² and has thus seriously weakened the rôle of the United Nations. The effect of this Soviet policy was made clear by the then British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Ernest Bevin, in the House of Commons on May 12, 1949: "No such arrangement as the North Atlantic Treaty would have been necessary, if the effectiveness of the Security Council as an instrument for ensuring the immediate defence of any member against aggression had not been undermined and destroyed by the Soviet use of the veto."

Soviet Aims

There have been three main purposes behind the Soviet use of the veto:

(1) To prevent discussion of threats to peace or cases of aggression. When the second Soviet attack on Budapest began on November 4, 1956, the General Assembly called on the USSR to withdraw its forces from Hungary immediately and sought permission for UN observers to enter Hungary. When the resolution came before the Security Council the Soviet Union vetoed it.

(2) To prevent investigation of conditions in the satellite countries. In September, 1946, the Soviet Union vetoed a resolution that a commission should be sent to inquire into Greek relations with Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia after Greece had complained that the three countries were actively supporting Greek Communist guerillas.

(3) To prevent the admission to the United Nations of States which might not support the Soviet bloc. Among the countries whose applications for membership have at one time been vetoed are: Jordan, Portugal, Eire, Italy, Austria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Japan, Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam.

NOTES

¹ On September 18, 1947, the Chief Soviet Delegate to the United Nations, Mr. A. Vyshinsky said: "As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, its policy with regard to the United Nations Organization is a policy of broadening and strengthening international co-operation, a policy of steady, consistent observance of the Charter and of fulfilment of its principles."

² Britain has exercised the veto twice, France four times, Nationalist China once. The United States has never exercised it.

III. INTERVENTION AND INTERFERENCE

The Soviet Government cannot blame Stalin for the dossier of interference which follows. Khrushchev himself admitted, in a speech at the Bulgarian Embassy in Moscow on February 18, 1957, that "...Stalin was an outstanding revolutionary. Our Party ... put the enemies of Socialism to rout ... Stalin loyally served the interests of the working class and the cause of Marxism-Leninism and we shall not let our enemies defame him." Recent events in Hungary prove that the present Soviet Government continues in the same tradition.

COMMUNIST ANNEXATION

The USSR signed an Allied Powers' Resolution of September 4, 1941, which stated that the signatories "seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other." This, however, is the record of its behaviour:

Europe

Since 1939, the Soviet Union has annexed from friend and enemy alike 207,364 square miles (518,410 square kilometers) of territory and 22,403,000 people. The details are:

Eastern Poland, 69,000 square miles and 11,000,000 people.¹ Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, 73,050 square miles and 5,947,000 people.² Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina (from Rumania), 21,000 square miles and 3,500,000 people.³ Karelian Territory (from Finland), 17,050 square miles and 498,000 people.⁴ East Prussia, 4,500 square miles and 300,000 people.⁵ Ruthenia (from Czechoslovakia), 4,920 square miles and 725,000 people.⁶

After the Second World War the Soviet Union, by using its armed forces, either directly or as a threat, organized Communist coups throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The Communist régimes in Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania came to power as a result.

Far East

In 1945⁷ the Soviet Union acquired, at Japan's expense, the southern half of Sakhalin (13,900 square miles and 415,000 people) --- thus gaining control of the whole island -- and the strategic Kuriles (3,944 square miles and 18,000 people).

In Central Asia, Moscow, having consolidated her hold on the State of Outer Mongolia which she set up in 1924, now faces growing Chinese Communist competition.

Chinese Policy

In May, 1951, the Chinese Communists "peacefully liberated" Tibet which, since 1914, had been independent in all but name.⁸ Under a Sino-Tibetan agreement signed in Peking, the Tibetans were forced to accept Chinese direction over foreign affairs and defence; Tibet retained autonomy in internal affairs. Since then, however, the grip of Chinese military and political "advisers" has steadily tightened; Tibet is now an integral part of China.

The Chinese Communist Government views Hongkong as a target for further expansion. It has attempted to incite civil disorder and evidently considers that continued incitement may pay dividends by "justifying" Chinese intervention

in the future.⁹ A map issued by the Chinese Government in 1954 showed Hongkong as part of China.

NOTES

- 1 Treaty of August 16, 1945, signed by Molotov and Osobka-Morawski, fixed the Russo-East Prussian frontier at the "Curzon Line," with minor deviations in Poland's favour.
- 2 Soviet troops entered Lithuania on June 15, 1940, following the acceptance by the Lithuanian Government of an ultimatum handed to it the previous day by M. Molotov. This demanded free access to Soviet troops and the resignation of the Government. On June 16, ultimatums requiring an immediate change of Government and free access to Soviet troops were handed to the Latvian and Estonian Ministers in Moscow. Both Governments accepted the ultimatums and Soviet troops entered the two countries. Pro-Soviet Governments were then established in all three countries and on July 21 the National Assemblies voted in favour of union with the USSR. Laws for the incorporation of the countries were approved by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at the beginning of August.
- 3 On June 23, 1940, Molotov informed Germany that the USSR had decided on immediate annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Germany agreed, and the USSR sent Bucharest an undisguised ultimatum on June 26. On June 28 the Rumanian Government yielded, and Soviet troops crossed the frontier.
- 4 Finland was forced to cede Karelia under the peace treaty of March 12, 1940. On March 21, 1940, the USSR added Finnish Karelia to the Karelo-Finnish Republic. The Finnish province of Petsamo was ceded under the treaty of February 10, 1947.
- 5 The Potsdam Conference in 1945 agreed in principle to the transfer of East Prussia to the Soviet Union. President Truman and Mr. Attlee said they would support the transfer at the forthcoming peace settlement. Today, 13 years later there is still no peace settlement. Nevertheless, on April 7, 1946, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decreed that "Königsberg province (East Prussia) is to be included in the RSFSR."
- 6 On May 15, 1945, the Czechoslovak Government said that, recognizing that the population of Ruthenia was predominantly Ukrainian in speech and culture, they would not oppose the desire of the Ruthenian people for incorporation within the USSR. A Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty sanctioning the incorporation was signed on June 29, 1945.
- 7 Yalta Agreement, February 11, 1945.
- 8 Following the Chinese revolution of 1911, which led to the fall of the Manchu Dynasty in 1912, the Tibetans evicted all Chinese officials and troops who had moved into Tibet a few years earlier when the Manchu attempted to turn China's nominal suzerainty into fact by annexing Tibet as another province of China. Britain repudiated the claim of the President of the new Chinese Republic to regard Tibet as a Chinese province. In 1914 Tibetan, Chinese and British representatives initialled a convention recognizing the autonomy of Tibet proper (Outer Tibet) and creating a zone (Inner Tibet) under Chinese authority subject to certain conditions.

The Chinese did not accept the boundaries between Inner and Outer Tibet and did not ratify the convention, though they accepted the terms of the convention in all other respects. Preparing to justify the invasion of Tibet in 1950, the Tientsin paper Ta Kung Pao of October 18, 1949, said:

"Provided that it plays its part in the war against imperialism, national self-determination is justified. On the other hand, if it is made use of by the imperialists, it is reactionary ... Our revolutionary China cannot permit Tibet, under British imperialist instigation, to plan for independence."

- 9 Following the National Day Riots in Hongkong in 1956, the Chinese Communist Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, told the British Government that if riots broke out again, China might well take "more active measures." She could not allow growing riots to pass unnoticed. China, said Chou, could easily cause trouble in Hongkong if she wished.

IMPOSITION OF COMMUNISM

The Soviet Union imposed Communist régimes on seven East European nations¹ in the years after the Second World War. The method was intimidation, the weapon was terror, the result tyranny. Recently the USSR, deterred from using force, has developed a new technique which aims at binding countries economically to the Soviet bloc, without insisting on a Communist or Communist-supported government. The Middle East has been the first target for this technique of establishing "client States."

Seizure of Power in East Europe

Even before the final collapse of Nazi Germany in May, 1945, the pattern of Communist conquest in East Europe was clear. "Liberation" by the Soviet Army clearly did not mean liberty. Stalin himself admitted that Soviet troops held the ring for the local Communist minorities.² Even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, their proximity carried a constant threat of intervention.

Before the end of 1948 the Soviet orbit extended to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and (a special instance) Yugoslavia.

Soviet tactics varied with differing circumstances, but the broad strategy was the same in all.

Democratic Facade

The seizure of power passed through four main phases:

1. A "Popular Front" was formed. Behind this facade the Communists took office, to all appearances co-operating with other Left-wing parties.³
2. Control of the police was taken over. This was vital to the success of any revolutionary minority, and so, at the first opportunity, a Moscow-trained Communist was installed as Minister of the Interior.⁴
3. The police force was transformed into a secret security police, commanded and manned by Communists. The result was a reign of terror.
4. Opponents were eliminated, the forces of security and justice having been welded into a political weapon. Rival parties were split and absorbed, or suppressed. Rival personalities were destroyed through political trials.⁵

Step by step with this process, parliamentary government was destroyed⁶ and Communist control was tightened over the armed forces, economic life and all organs of opinion.

Breakaways

Once in power, local Communist leaders have tried to resist Moscow's oppression.

The first successful attempt by Tito in 1948 was followed by the purges, trials and execution of "nationalist" Communists in the other satellites.

After the death of Stalin, local resistance to total Soviet control grew. Attempts to moderate the police terror to meet popular discontent only

encouraged that discontent, especially where Soviet economic exploitation was at its worst.

Gomulka's Success

The discrediting of the Polish secret police,⁷ the admission of Stalin's crimes against Polish Communists,⁸ and the weakening of the Stalinist leadership by the death of First Secretary Bierut⁹ made the Polish National Communists' position the strongest in the bloc. With Wladyslaw Gomulka, a survivor of the 1948 purges, as leader, they had the support of the whole nation in their opposition to Moscow.

A Stalinist plot to thwart Gomulka's return as First Party Secretary and a Soviet attempt to brow-beat the Poles both failed. Gomulka insisted on complete independence in internal affairs, although declaring his intention to be guided by Marxist-Leninist principles. His resolute stand won for Poland a limited degree of freedom.

The Hungarian Tragedy

With tragic irony, news of Gomulka's success was one of the principal causes of the 1956 October Revolution in Hungary.¹⁰ The Hungarians went further in their struggle to free their country and, in the end, were brutally repressed.

Between October 28 and November 4,¹¹ after the collapse of the Party apparatus, the Hungarians elected Revolutionary Councils to fill the vacuum in public administration. Workers' Councils took over in industry. Their purpose was to reorganize the economy on a Socialist basis without rigid Party control and the apparatus of terror.

The Government of Imre Nagy promised free elections, the return of the multi-party system and the disbandment of the dreaded AVH (Political Police).¹²

This was too much for Moscow, and the Soviet Army was ordered to accomplish the counter-revolution.¹³ With the ever-present threat of renewed intervention, the Kadar puppet régime systematically destroyed every vestige of the independence for which so many Hungarians died.

The "Client State" Technique

The Soviet Union has long looked on the Middle East as a sphere for Communist expansion.¹⁴ An advance there would give it the warm water ports it wants, the power to threaten world trade, the control of the world's greatest tapped source of oil, and the ability to disrupt Bagdad Pact and Western interests in the area. To achieve these aims it is now using -- in addition to diplomatic methods -- the dual weapon of trade and aid with which, at the time of the Egyptian-Syrian Union,¹⁵ it had almost succeeded in converting Syria into a "client State."

Syria, with the possible exception of Egypt,¹⁶ has received more Soviet aid and agreed to more trade than any other country outside the Soviet bloc.¹⁷ Under loan agreements, arms and machinery have been offered to both countries on terms which may appear advantageous at first sight -- an interest rate of 2½ per cent. and the acceptance of goods as well as transferable credit or cash deposits in repayment.

In reality, the conditions attached to the loans are unfavourable. Numbers of Soviet advisors and technicians have entered the countries, the shape

of industrial development is controlled by the types of machinery delivered by the Soviet Union, and the export markets have been heavily mortgaged.¹⁸

Despite the similarity of Soviet overtures to Syria and Egypt, the degree of involvement of the two countries with the USSR differs considerably. Egypt can be said to have evaded "client State" status and has recently shown signs that she would welcome renewed contact with the West.

It remains to be seen how far the incorporation of Syria into the United Arab Republic will facilitate the extension of Soviet influence in Egypt. While Nasser may hope that the UAR will increase his freedom of manoeuvre, the Soviet leaders will make every effort to counteract this tendency and to turn to their advantage the tension and increased polarization in the Middle East brought about by the creation of the UAR.

NOTES

- 1 East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania.
- 2 Letter of May 4, 1948, from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (i.e., Stalin to Tito): "The Soviet Army... created the conditions which were necessary for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to come to power. Unfortunately, the Soviet Army did not and could not render such assistance to the French and Italian Communist Parties." Similarly in Rumania, Ana Pauker, then Foreign Minister, writing in the Cominform journal for August, 1950, spoke of the Rumanian Communist Party's success "in the favourable conditions created by the presence in Rumania of Soviet troops."
- 3 E.G., in Czechoslovakia in the National Front, in Rumania in the National Democratic Front, and in Bulgaria in the Fatherland Front. After the formation of the "national front" in Rumania, A. Vyshinsky arrived in Bucharest, on February 27, 1945, saw the King and demanded Radescu's resignation. The King finally capitulated and asked Groza, one of the leaders of the front, to form a Government.
- 4 Except in Finland (where Leino, the Communist Minister of the Interior, was dismissed by President Paasikivi on May 22, 1948, after Leino had been censured by the Diet) Communists have controlled the vital Ministries in Poland since July, 1944; in Bulgaria since September, 1944; in Czechoslovakia since April, 1945; and in Hungary since November, 1945.
- 5 The most notorious cases were the imprisonment of the aged peasant leader, Maniu, in Rumania; the imprisonment of the Independent Socialist leader, Puzak, in Poland; and the judicial murder of Petkov, the Agrarian leader, in Bulgaria. Jan Masaryk, the son of the founder of Czechoslovakia, was forced to commit suicide.
- 6 Communist-type constitutions were established in Poland, February, 1947; Bulgaria, December, 1947; Rumania, March, 1948; Hungary, August, 1948; and Czechoslovakia, June, 1948, following the February coup d'état.
- 7 The defection to the West of a leading secret police official, Jozef Swiatlo, and the revelations made by him were followed by the dismissal of the Minister and Deputy Minister of Public Security and a curbing of the secret police (1955-56). In 1957, several high secret police officers were sentenced to up to 15 years' imprisonment for torturing prisoners.

- 8 On February 19, 1956, Stalin's liquidation of the Polish Communist Party in 1937-38 was officially admitted to have been mistaken. Practically every leading Polish Communist in the USSR at that time was shot or perished in forced labour camps.
- 9 Stalin's choice to control post-war Poland, Bierut, died in Moscow on March 12, 1956, shortly after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
- 10 The armed rising in Budapest began on the evening of October 23, 1956, when the AVH (Political Police) fired on unarmed demonstrators outside the Radio Building while a student delegation was negotiating inside for the broadcast of their demands -- i.e., concessions similar to those granted in Poland.
- 11 The Soviet Government announced on October 28 that it would withdraw its troops from Budapest. Early on the morning of November 4, the new Prime Minister, Imre Nagy, announced over Budapest Radio that Soviet troops had "attacked the capital with the obvious intention of overthrowing the legal Hungarian Democratic Government."
- 12 Almost within an hour of this announcement on October 30, political parties were being re-established in Budapest and the provinces. In Nagy's words, the government of the country was placed "on the basis of democratic co-operation between the coalition parties reborn in 1945."
- 13 Bitter fighting lasted until the evening of November 6. Some centres within the city continued to resist until November 8, and in outlying industrial districts until November 11, after which armed resistance, apart from occasional skirmishing, ceased.
- 14 The secret protocol, drawn up on November 13, 1940, to the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, expressed Soviet territorial aspirations in that area as extending "south of the national territory of the Soviet Union, in the direction of the Indian Ocean." (Documents from Archives of the German Foreign Office, Washington, 1948.)
- 15 On February 1, 1958, President Kuwatly of Syria and President Nasser of Egypt announced in Cairo the formation of a new United Arab Republic joining their two countries. Kuwatly nominated Nasser as first President, and a referendum was held in Egypt and Syria on February 21 to confirm Nasser as President and approve the union. The capital of the new State is Cairo. Other Arab States can apply to join the United Arab Republic, either by merging themselves into it completely or on a federal basis. The Yemen has joined on the latter basis, the United Arab Republic and the Yemen being termed the United Arab States.
- 16 Egypt is believed to have received the following Soviet bloc equipment: 40 light jet bombers, 100 jet fighters, 30 transport aircraft, 25 trainer aircraft, 60 J.S. III (heavy) tanks, 250 T. 34 (medium) tanks, at least 200 armoured personnel carriers, 100 self-propelled guns, 500 guns, 40-50 multi-barrelled rocket launchers, two destroyers, three submarines, four mine-sweepers, 14 motor torpedo boats. Large quantities of small arms, ammunition of all types, several thousand military vehicles and a wide range of other military stores, have been delivered. Cairo Radio announced on January 30, 1958, that the Soviet Union is to make Egypt a loan of 700 million roubles (£ 62 million) towards her industrialization plan. In addition, Egypt is reported to have been granted a Czechoslovak credit worth about £ 20 million.

- 17 It is estimated that up to September, 1957, arms to the value of about £ 50 million have reached Syria from the Soviet bloc. They include 60 jet fighters, at least six motor torpedo boats, 200 T. 34 (medium) tanks, 100 SU-100 self-propelled guns, over 200 armoured personnel carriers, over 150 field guns, 200 anti-aircraft guns. Syria has also received large quantities of small arms, ammunition, military vehicles and military stores. At least 250 Soviet bloc instructors went to Syria in 1957 and some Syrian service personnel have gone to bloc countries for training. There is evidence that another arms agreement was signed in August, 1957, under which arms to the value of about £ 35 million were to be supplied. They were reported to include 50 aircraft, two submarines, other naval craft, heavy tanks, multi-barrelled rocket launchers, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns.
- According to the Soviet-Syrian aid agreement signed on October 28, 1957, the Soviet Union will grant an estimated £ 60 million for the following projects: navigation, irrigation, electricity generation and hydro-electric schemes, two thermo-electric power stations, new railway links, road bridges, oil and ore prospecting, etc. Also, the Soviet Union "will provide Syria with the necessary machinery and tools. They will send experts to Syria to give technical assistance in the construction of plants mentioned in the agreement, provide equipment and maintain this equipment in working condition."
- 18 Syria has bound herself to purchase machinery exclusively from the Soviet Union at whatever price the Communists like to name. In effect, the USSR can sell to Syria machinery and merchandise which, owing to design and price, they might not otherwise sell for a negotiable currency. While the Soviet Union has agreed to accept Syrian cotton and wheat in payment for interest and capital and in exchange for general merchandise, no price has been fixed. Even if -- and this is doubtful -- the USSR credits Syria with the ruling world price, there is nothing to prevent it from dumping the cotton or wheat on Syria's old customers at cut rates, as has been Soviet practice in the past. As Egypt already knows to her cost, the producer is the loser if world prices are undercut, while the USSR earns the negotiable currency which the producer forgoes. Alternatively, by manipulating prices, holding off the purchase of Syrian produce until prices are at rock bottom, and otherwise rigging the market, the Soviet Union can make the interest on loans extremely costly.

FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

The Soviet Communist Party and Government -- and under their tutelage, Communist parties throughout the world -- have always regarded ostensibly non-party mass organizations as a means of exerting their influence on the people of the world and as "fronts" for penetration and propaganda.¹ Their aim is to undermine the will and ability of the free world to resist Soviet policy.

The newest "front" organization -- the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Council -- was formed only at the end of 1957.

Political Warfare

There are now 13 international front organizations² which, while simulating independence, are in fact Soviet-controlled agencies of political warfare. Their tasks are: to disseminate Communist propaganda; to convert people to Communism; to act as a cover for clandestine Communists, and sometimes, where Communism is outlawed, to act for the Communist Party itself.

Soviet control is usually exercised through a Communist secretary-general or president who receives his instructions from Moscow.³ He is assisted by an inner circle of handpicked men and women, usually Communists, who form the Bureau. No proper voting ever takes place, either for the "election" of officers, or the approval of policies. It is all done by "acclamation."

In the case of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS), this control is admitted and is described as "leadership."⁴ In other cases the control is not so openly claimed but can be seen from the policy and attitude adopted.

The front organizations never publish any accounts; to do so might reveal the source of their extensive funds.

World Peace Council

In a sense the World Peace Council (WPC) is the key organization. It is the only front organization designed to appeal to all classes of people and it is the only one which has official representatives of most of the other bodies on its Council. This does not mean that the WPC in any way controls the other front organizations, but rather that it uses all of them to publicize its campaigns.⁵ Sometimes it renders a similar service in return, as, for example, when it supports the World Youth Festivals run by the WFDY and the IUS.

Its avowed aim is to defend peace, but as Communist dogma has divided the world into the "peace camp" meaning the Soviet orbit, and the "war camp," defence of peace for the WPC means defence of the Soviet Union. It has consistently defended Soviet policies and attacked those of the West. In particular it has attacked the Marshal Plan, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization -- in short every attempt by Europe or the Atlantic bloc to defend itself.

The WPC has no use for pacifism as such.⁶ The production of armaments is claimed to be an act of peace in Communist countries: elsewhere it is "warmongering."

Non-Communists in most countries have seen through the WPC. In 1951 it was expelled from Paris (where it had its headquarters) for "fifth column" activities. In 1954 it was established in Vienna but was expelled in 1957.⁷

World Federation of Trade Unions

The WFTU is the best organized and the most liberally financed of the front organizations. It also provides a classic example of the capture of a democratically-controlled organization by the manipulation of a determined and unscrupulous Communist faction. It was set up on British initiative in 1945 with Sir Walter Citrine as first president. Its secretary-general was a Soviet nominee, Louis Saillant,⁸ a dedicated Stalinist, who followed Moscow's orders implicitly and packed the secretariat with other Communists.

In 1949 the non-Communists withdrew in disgust and formed the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Since then the WFTU has been a purely Communist organization, representing not the workers of the world but the Soviet Government.

Afro-Asian Arrival

A new organization was formed at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Cairo from December 26, 1957, to January 1, 1958. Called the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Council, it has a permanent secretariat in Cairo with an Egyptian secretary-general and 10 secretaries from the Cameroons, China, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, the Sudan, Syria and the USSR. The plan is to establish Afro-Asian Solidarity Committees in countries where they do not exist.

The claim of the organizers that the Cairo gathering was a successor to the Bandung Conference was soon dispelled.⁹ At Bandung Afro-Asian countries were represented by their Governments, but at Cairo by "people's representatives" who included Communists, fellow travellers, observers from the other international front organizations and individuals who represented no one but themselves.¹⁰ The documents issued by the conference bore a strong imprint of Soviet policies.¹¹

A significant proposal put forward envisaged the organization of Afro-Asian gatherings of all kinds, such as a Youth Conference, Youth Festivals and a meeting of Chambers of Commerce. It is apparently intended to set up a network of subsidiary Afro-Asian front organizations covering many aspects of national life and including a Union of Afro-Asian Youth and an Afro-Asian Economic Committee.

NOTES

1 "Every sacrifice must be made," said Lenin, "the greatest obstacles must be overcome, so as to carry on agitation and propaganda systematically, perseveringly and patiently, precisely in those institutions, societies and associations -- even the most reactionary -- to which proletarian or semi-proletarian masses belong." (The Essentials of Lenin, Vol. 11, p. 596, Lawrence and Wishart, 1947).

2
World Peace Council.
World Federation of Trade Unions.
World Federation of Democratic Youth.
International Union of Students.
Women's International Democratic Federation.
World Federation of Teachers' Unions (FISE).
International Association of Democratic Lawyers.
World Federation of Scientific Workers.

International Organization of Journalists.
International Medical Association for the Study of Living Conditions
and Health (formerly World Congress of Doctors).
International Broadcasting Organization (OIR).
International Federation of Resistance Fighters (FIR).
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Council.

- 3 This was illustrated by the fact that when Stalin quarrelled with Tito, the Yugoslavs were promptly expelled from every front organization. When Khrushchev changed this policy all the front organizations obediently invited them to rejoin.
- 4 "The Komsomol and Soviet youth ... actively participate in all measures effected by the WFDY and the IUS ... The Soviet Union leads the forces fighting for peace and democracy ..." (Kharlamov, Komsomol in Post War Years, Pravda Publishing House, 1949.)
- 5 "The struggle for a stable and lasting peace, for the organization and consolidation of the forces of peace against the forces of war, should now become the pivot of the entire activity of the Communist Parties and democratic organizations." (Cominform resolution published in the Cominform journal, November 29, 1949.)
- 6 "The Soviet Union is the most significant power for peace, a fact which is denied only by the warmongers. We cannot tolerate within the Peace Movement any symptoms of detrimental pacifism ... The military strength of the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies is an important factor in the defence of peace." (Hungarian paper, Magyar Nemzet, July 16, 1952.)
- 7 The Austrian authorities claimed that it "interfered in the internal affairs of countries with which Austria has good and friendly relations" and its activities were "directed against the interest of the Austrian State." (Observer, London, February 3, 1957.)
- 8 Formerly secretary-general of the French Communist controlled Confédération Générale du Travail and Bureau member of the World Peace Council. In 1948 Mr. Arthur Deakin, who succeeded Citrine, complained: "The WFTU is rapidly becoming nothing more than another platform and instrument for the furtherance of Soviet policy."
- 9 Ever since the Colombo Powers convened the Bandung Conference in 1955, the USSR and China have tried to exploit the idea of Afro-Asian solidarity. Before the Bandung Conference the Communist-sponsored "Asian Conference for the Relaxation of Tension" (held in Delhi in pursuance of the World Peace Council proposal) claimed unsuccessfully that it was the preparatory meeting for Bandung itself. This claim aroused much indignation in Asia.
- 10 Iraq was represented by dissidents or elements in exile, and Jordan by exiles sentenced for treason at home. Arab refugees from the Gaza strip represented "Palestine" and room was made for delegates from Cyprus, which is hardly an Afro-Asian country.
- 11 The British and United States Governments were asked to adopt the Soviet attitude on the suspension of nuclear tests. The creation of "an Afro-Asian zone of peace" free of nuclear weapons was proposed. All Western initiatives on disarmament were ignored -- nothing was said about Soviet

nuclear tests (a Soviet megaton weapon was actually exploded at the time of the conference.) A resolution on imperialism made sweeping demands for the immediate independence of colonial territories, reflecting the extreme nationalism which the Communist bloc supports and encourages. The transfer of New Guinea to Indonesia, of Goa to India and of Okinawa to Japan were not forgotten, but nothing was said about former Japanese territory still in Soviet hands. Political and military pacts, economic aid and "interference in internal affairs" were denounced in an exclusively anti-Western context.

IV. ENGAGEMENT AND DISENGAGEMENT

The Warsaw Treaty

The Warsaw Treaty¹ between the Soviet Union and its satellites is one of the most one-sided international alliances ever signed. Although its published terms are similar to those of the North Atlantic Treaty,² it has, in fact, no parallel in the West. The NATO signatories are a free association of nations with mutual defence aims. The Warsaw Treaty countries had no choice but to sign.

Bargaining Counter

Having presented NATO as an aggressive military alliance which threatened the security of the Soviet bloc, the USSR was able to set up the Warsaw Treaty, ostensibly as a counter-balance. But there were two other reasons. The Warsaw Treaty allowed the Soviet Union to elude the provisions of the Hungarian and Rumanian Peace Treaties which called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from these countries when British, American and Soviet occupation forces withdrew from Austria in 1955. For the future, the USSR looks on the treaty as a possible bargaining counter in its efforts to dispose of NATO. As Soviet military control in Eastern Europe rests on agreements³ and practices⁴ that existed long before the Warsaw Treaty, it would lose nothing if, so as to bring about the dissolution of NATO, it tore up the treaty.

Although the Soviet Union's earlier treaties with the satellites allowed it to maintain troops in these countries, the Warsaw Treaty was intended to give the impression that its military stewardship was welcomed -- and legal -- by setting up a Joint Command for Armed Forces. The Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Command is a Russian, Marshal I.S. Koniev; its headquarters are in Moscow. Under the treaty, disposition of the joint armed forces on the territory of participating countries is decided by agreement between them. Poland alone has shown any independence of will,⁵ and even she has had to accept Soviet garrisons in spite of their unpopularity.

UN Authority Flouted

The use of the treaty as a weapon of control was tragically illustrated when it was invoked as justification for Soviet armed intervention to stamp out the Hungarian Revolution of October, 1956.⁶ While the North Atlantic and the Warsaw Treaties provide for joint action when one of the signatories is attacked, both state that emergency measures shall cease as soon as the United Nations Security Council has taken requisite action -- and that such measures will be reported to the Security Council "in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations Organization."⁷

Although the Soviet Union gave the Warsaw Treaty as its authority for intervening in Hungary, it did not report its actions to the Security Council and later vetoed discussion of the Hungarian situation by the Security Council⁸ and ignored several General Assembly resolutions calling on it to stop its intervention.

NOTES

¹ The Warsaw Treaty came into force on June 5, 1955. It was signed by

Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union.

- 2 Several clauses appear to be almost direct translations. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 14, 1949. The member countries are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Iceland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany.
- 3 Following are the dates of the USSR treaties with the satellites: Czechoslovakia, December 12, 1943; Polish National (Lublin) Committee, April 21, 1945; Rumania, February 4, 1948; Hungary, February 18, 1948; Bulgaria, March 18, 1948; East Germany, September 20, 1955. New treaties have since been signed with East Germany, Rumania, Poland and Hungary.
- 4 Most satellite leaders are Moscow-trained and were imposed on the various countries by the Soviet Union. The satellites have Soviet advisers to ensure that everything goes according to the Kremlin's plans. In most, if not all the satellites, Soviet officers were placed in key positions in the armed forces.
- 5 Marshal Rokossovsky, was Polish Defence Minister until the Gomulka coup in October, 1956.
- 6 Budapest Radio said on October 24, 1956: "The dastardly armed attack of counter-revolutionary gangs during the night" has created an extremely serious situation. The governmental organs were unprepared for these attacks and "they have therefore applied for help to the Soviet formations stationed in Hungary under the terms of the Warsaw Treaty. In compliance with the Government's request, the Soviet formations are taking part in the restoration of order..."

In reply to a question from the American newspaperman, Mr. R. Considine, Mr. Khrushchev said: "The Government of Hungary asked the Soviet Government for help in curbing the counter-revolutionary gangs, and the Soviet Government, true to its treaty obligations, true to the principles of fraternal support to Socialist countries, rendered such aid." (Pravda, November 29, 1957.)
- 7 This phrase appears only in the Warsaw Treaty.
- 8 On October 28, 1956.

"Zones of Peace"

During the past few years the Soviet Union has sponsored or given ready backing to Communist "zones of peace" proposals because it sees in them a way of excluding United States bases and Western security arrangements and influence from specific areas.

Rapacki Plan

The most recent proposal of this type is the Polish-sponsored Rapacki Plan¹ for a denuclearized zone in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East and West Germany.²

Marshal Bulganin, in his letter to the British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, on December 11, 1957, took up and endorsed the Rapacki Plan.³ In replying to Marshal Bulganin in a letter dated January 16, 1958, Mr. Macmillan said of the Plan:

"The suggestion, which has already been put forward by the Polish Government, is open to certain obvious objections, but the British Government are studying it with a view to seeing whether there are elements in it which could be made the basis of some alternative proposal."

The Polish First Secretary, Mr. Gomulka, has said:⁴ "Any attempt to combine the Rapacki Plan with the question of unifying Germany is completely unreal." Reunification he maintained, could eventually be brought about only through a relaxation of international tension. The Rapacki Plan could contribute to this. But the Plan, in its present form, would weaken the efficacy of the NATO shield, the only real defence Western Europe has, because it would eliminate the nuclear deterrent within the area and so give the Russians immunity from nuclear counter-attacks up to the frontiers of France and the Low Countries. This would thus increase, not relax, tension and the risk of war by miscalculation.

The Rapacki Plan does nothing to promote the reunification of Germany. The division of Germany, the West insists, is still the most important obstacle to European security. The German problem exists because of the Soviet Union's constant refusal to implement the Potsdam Agreement and other Four Power understandings (see under Section V).

Baltic Campaign

The first example of this new pattern of Communist policy was the "Baltic Sea of Peace" campaign. The Soviet Union has not made a break with the Western Alliance a precondition for co-operation between Scandinavian nations and other Baltic countries,⁵ though this is its aim.

Satellite leaders have made laudatory references to the plan, which suggests that the Soviet Government believes the idea may be more digestible if advanced by smaller nations.⁶

One of the most effective answers to this series of Soviet overtures was delivered by Iceland. Replying to a warning from Marshal Bulganin about the dangers to Iceland of allowing nuclear bases on her territory and suggesting that she might join a denuclearized zone in Northern Europe, the Icelandic Prime Minister, Mr. Jonasson referred Bulganin back to his own letter, which said: "After all, if to mankind's misfortune, the world is plunged into a new war, no country, whether big or small, will feel secure" and "... it would be a

dangerous mistake to think that in present conditions wars could be restricted to some given district."

Thus, even in a conciliatory message to a small country, Bulganin could not veil the true Soviet appreciation of the scale and involvement of a nuclear war. Bulganin, in effect, said: "There can be no neutrals in the next war." Small wonder Iceland affirmed her faith in NATO as the only guarantee of her security.

Afro-Asian Appeal

The proposal for an Afro-Asian denuclearized zone of peace has not yet been followed up by the USSR, since it was first proposed at the Communist-sponsored Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo from December 26, 1957, to January 1, 1958.

The only subsequent reference to such a plan was contained in a Tass statement on the Bagdad Pact Council meeting broadcast on January 21, which suggested the setting up of a denuclearized zone in the Middle East.¹ There was no reference to Asia or the rest of Africa. The proposal may no longer be in accord with Soviet aims in Africa or Asia.

NOTES

¹ "Zones of Peace" exclude Western bases, defence arrangements, etc., from specific areas and thus either reduce Western influence or open the door to Soviet influence. They are to be distinguished from "disengagement" proposals under which both sides would agree to withdraw from a common border. The Rapacki Plan was put forward in the following terms by the Polish Government in the UN General Assembly on October 2, 1957: "In the interests of Poland's security and European détente, after consultation on this initiative with other members of the Warsaw Pact, the Government of the Polish People's Republic declares that, should the two German States express their consent to put into effect the prohibition of production and stockpiling of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons on their territories, the Polish People's Republic is prepared simultaneously to take the same action on their territory." The Czechoslovak and East German Governments have since announced their support.

² The States in the zone would undertake "not to manufacture, maintain or import for their own use and not to permit the location on their territories of nuclear weapons of any type, as well as not to install on or to admit to their territories installations and equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons, including missiles launching equipment.

France, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, together with other Powers with forces in the zone (Denmark, Belgium and Canada at present have contingents in West Germany) would undertake that their forces in the zone would not maintain nuclear weapons there, and that they would not install there "installations or equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons, including missiles launching equipment." Also the four Powers would not transfer nuclear weapons or equipment to the zone. Powers disposing of nuclear weapons would undertake not to use them against targets in the zone.

There would be ground as well as aerial control. "Adequate control posts with rights and possibilities of action which would ensure the

effectiveness of inspection could also be established." (Polish Government memorandum on the Rapacki Plan, issued on February 17, 1958.)

- 3 A Soviet Government statement of February 19, 1958, announced their willingness to undertake obligations similar to those envisaged in the Rapacki Plan. No mention was made of inspection or control proposals.
- 4 Interview published in The Times, London, on February 18, 1958.
- 5 In an article in Izvestiya on September 6, 1957, P. Rysakov said: "The Baltic should, could, and inevitably will, become the sea of peace, and of well-being of nations which live in its basin. Certainly, the way is not easy and there are many obstacles. There is no need, however, to overstate or multiply such obstacles. For instance, one should reject the thesis that because Denmark and Norway are members of NATO they could not co-operate with other Baltic countries in the interests of peace in the Baltic until they have left the /NATO/ bloc."
- 6 The joint Polish-East German declaration signed during Mr. Gomulka's visit to Berlin on June 20, 1957, pledged active support for the Plan. On September 9, 1957, in an interview he gave to the Danish Ritzau Agency, Mr. Gomulka commended the concept to the Danish people.
- 7 Tass said: "The Middle East can and should become a zone of peace free of nuclear and rocket weapons, a zone of good-neighbourhood and friendly co-operation between States. The Bagdad Pact organizers seek to prevent this by using, this time, a session of the Bagdad Pact Council in Ankara."

V. THE DIVISION OF GERMANY

The Western Powers have always stood by a vital principle of the Potsdam Agreement: "To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis." The Soviet Union has steadfastly refused to carry out this promise because all-German free elections and reunification are incompatible with the maintenance of its stranglehold on East Germany. The USSR has continued its obstructive policy for 13 years.

Soviet Violations

The Potsdam Agreement¹ provided for the treatment of Germany as an economic unit while the country remained under Four Power control.² It envisaged the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the various zones to produce a balanced economy and reduce the need for imports: essential imports were to be paid for out of current production and stocks, before the deduction of reparation payments.³

All these provisions were violated by the USSR. In May, 1946, the Soviet Union expressly refused to agree that, until Germany was self-supporting, no occupying Power should remove from its zone reparations from current production and stocks. It proceeded to take reparations irrespective of Germany's need to secure a balanced economy -- a flat contradiction of the Potsdam Agreement. The foreign trade of the Soviet Zone was conducted on an exclusive basis, and no common plan to deal with exports and imports for the whole of Germany was established.⁴

Potsdam guaranteed certain fundamental personal and political freedoms.⁵ These also were violated by the Russians. Thousands of people in the Soviet Zone were arrested, deported to the USSR or sent to concentration camps. The legal system, as in the Soviet Union, was perverted and put on a political basis. Freedom of the Press is non-existent. Monopoly over education was given to one Communist-controlled political group -- the Socialist Unity Party (SED).⁶

Parties which opposed the SED were suppressed or deprived of the power to act as independent political parties.

The breakdown in negotiations on major German issues at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in December, 1947, was followed by the breakdown of the machinery of Four-Power control when the Soviet member withdrew from the Allied Control Council on March 20, 1948. The main issue was the failure of the Soviet Government to implement either the political or the economic provisions of the Potsdam Agreement.

Policy in East Germany

In default of Four-Power agreement, the Western Powers decided to take measures to fuse their zones of occupation politically and economically and ultimately to reform the currency unilaterally. The Russians used this plan as their excuse for breaking up the Control Council and imposing the Berlin Blockade in 1948.

The present German Federal Republic was inaugurated in September, 1949, after the first free general elections held in Germany since 1933. The Soviet Union reacted by sponsoring the creation in the East Zone of the puppet "German Democratic Republic" in October, 1949. Its nominated Government was confirmed in power by rigged elections on a single list a year later.

New Attitude

With the establishment of the puppet State, the Soviet attitude to reunification changed.⁷ It claimed that as German administrations were now established in the East and West Zones the reunification question was primarily a matter for the two German States to decide.

In November, 1950, the Soviet Union proposed the formation of a Constituent Assembly composed of equal numbers from the East and West German Assemblies (ignoring the fact that East Germany has a population only one-third of that of the Federal Republic) to elect a Central Government.

At this time the Soviet Union argued that an all-German Government must first be formed before elections could be held, while the Western Powers maintained -- as they still do -- that free elections must precede the formation of a Government.

At the Berlin Conference (January 25 to February 18, 1954) the USSR put forward proposals for a 50-year security pact open to European States only, to which East and West Germany should be a party, and the withdrawal of all occupying troops, except for small security contingents, pending German reunification.

This, as the French Foreign Minister, M. Bidault, pointed out, was an attempt to bring about the withdrawal of British and American forces from Europe, while Soviet forces retired a few kilometres behind the East German frontier leaving Europe at the mercy of the USSR.

"Confederation" Plan

The 1955 Geneva Heads of Government Conference and the subsequent Foreign Ministers' Meeting made no progress despite the West's offer of a new European security pact to meet Soviet fears that a reunited Germany might choose to join NATO. It was clear that the USSR was still opposed to reunification through free elections.⁸

Following Soviet-East German discussions in Moscow from September 17 to 20, 1955, a treaty was concluded restoring "sovereignty" to East Germany and abolishing the Soviet High Commission.

At present the Soviet Union is pressing the idea of a confederation of the two Germanys as a first step towards reunification.⁹ This plan was first put forward by the East German régime on July 27, 1957, and stressed that reunification could not be achieved through all-German elections, but only through a gradual rapprochement between East and West Germany, the first stage of which would be the formation of an All-German Council.

It preceded by two days a 12-point declaration by the Federal Republic, France, Britain and the United States re-stating their common policy and repeating the offer of a security pact to the USSR.

The Soviet Tass Agency described this declaration as "... another scrap of paper added to the documents on the German question" -- a comment which sums up the Soviet attitude over the many years of discussion.

On March 20, 1958, the Soviet Union announced¹⁰ that it would be prepared to include on the agenda for Summit Talks the question of the preparation and conclusion of a single German Peace Treaty -- provided the two Germany agreed on their respective representation at the signing. The Soviet Union also reiterated its approval of the "confederation plan and its refusal

to consider the question of reunification at Summit Talks.

It is clear that the Soviet Government has no intention of permitting the reunification of Germany except on its own terms, which would involve the incorporation of the whole of Germany into the Soviet bloc. Meanwhile it is trying to obtain the recognition of the East German régime and maintain the status quo in Eastern Europe.

NOTES

- 1 Signed by Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union on August 2, 1945.
- 2 The Potsdam Agreement, Article 14: "During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit."
- 3 Potsdam Agreement, Article 19: "Payment of reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment of such imports."
- 4 On April 5, 1946, in the Control Council's Economic Directorate, the Soviet Union stated that each zone should be responsible for its own trade. The USSR thereafter consistently refused to make a common import-export plan workable by submitting a plan for its own zone, even though the Control Council, on September 20, 1945, had approved the establishment of a common programme.
- 5 Potsdam Agreement, Article 4, ordered the abolition of laws which "established discrimination on grounds of race, creed or political opinion." Article 7 laid down that "German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas." Article 8 ordered the reorganization of the judicial system "in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion." Article 9 (iii) stated that "all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany." Article 10 called for freedom of speech, the Press, and religion, and the formation of free trade unions.
- 6 In April, 1946, the Russians forced the Social Democratic Party (SPD) to fuse with the Communist Party in the Soviet Zone. At the Diet elections in October, 1946, the SED polled less than 50 per cent of the votes.
- 7 In the early days of Four-Power occupation, the USSR wanted a strong, centralized State (in the expectation of its being Communist) and insisted that the peace treaty should be a matter for the Four Powers alone to decide.
- 8 On November 8, 1955, Mr. Molotov, referring to the West's "artificial plan" for "a mechanical merging of the two parts of Germany through so-called free elections," said it might result in "a violation of the vital interests of the working people of the German Democratic Republic." Reunification of Germany, he said, could not be effected except by the mutual agreement of the two German States.

- 9 The plan was put forward by First Secretary Ulbricht at the 30th Plenum of the SED Central Committee in January, 1957, following discussions in Moscow at the beginning of January. (Neues Deutschland, February 3, 1957.) His plan provided for the election of an All-German Council composed of an equal number of representatives from East and West Germany (again disregarding the fact that the population of East Germany is only one-third that of the Federal Republic), to be elected according to the existing electoral laws.

The All-German Council would exercise the functions of a Government of the German Confederation. It would prepare measures for the establishment of an All-German administration and for the holding of free all-German elections to a national assembly.

The official East German Government declaration of July 27, gave as the pre-requisites of such a confederation:

- (a) A ban on the storing and manufacture of atomic bombs and weapons on German soil and a ban on propaganda for atomic war;
- (b) Withdrawal of the two German States from NATO and the Warsaw Pact respectively, abolition of conscription and an agreement on numbers of troops;
- (c) Joint, or separate, requests from the two German States for an early, gradual withdrawal of foreign troops from the whole of Germany.

In an interview with the Süddeutsche Zeitung on February 13, 1958 (Neues Deutschland, February 16), Ulbricht included among his minimal conditions for confederation the ending of the West German ban on the Communist Party and its allied organizations.

- 10 Soviet Government memorandum to the German Federal Government, reported by Moscow Radio.

VI. DISTORTION OF TRUTH

The distortion of truth is calculated to mislead the peoples of the world and to set one nation against another. It prevents real international co-operation.

Communist Censorship

Newspapers, publishing houses and broadcasting stations in the Soviet bloc are State-controlled; their one purpose is to serve the Communist Parties. There are no opposition organs; criticism of the régime is forbidden.

Censorship is absolute -- and can take physical form as shown by the treatment of Hungarian writers after the 1956 uprising.¹

The Press

The Soviet Union and the East European satellites claim that their Press is the "freest in the world"; the Soviet Constitution guarantees "freedom of the Press."² At the same time Communists have admitted that such freedom is withheld from all those who are politically "unreliable."³

The Soviet Communist Party effectively controls all printing works; private printing is forbidden and all opposition newspapers have long been suppressed.⁴ An official censorship agency exists which has its representatives in most of the main publishing houses.⁵ The same system obtains in the satellite States.⁶

Since Communists equate Marxism-Leninism with ultimate truth and all other doctrines are "false," their Press must faithfully carry out the opinions of the Government. The Press is free only to obey.⁷

Publications of all kinds must be in harmony with Party principles.⁸ Books are openly described as propaganda weapons.⁹

Broadcasting

Broadcasting in the Soviet Union fulfills much the same function as the Press. It is subjected to the same degree of Party supervision.¹⁰ This is also true of the satellite States.

Since the 1930's the Communist Party has insisted that the microphone must be placed only in "trustworthy Bolshevik hands,"¹¹ and that every Party organization must ensure that radio workers are "of the utmost reliability and unconditionally devoted to the cause of Communism."¹²

In addition to inculcating positive Communist attitudes, the Soviet régime seeks to eradicate ideas and ideals alien to Communism and prevent Soviet citizens having any direct contact with them. In broadcasting the method used is the jamming of broadcasts from foreign stations.¹³

Soviet jamming of BBC Russian Service broadcasts -- two and a quarter hours a day -- began in April, 1949, and has continued since with the exception of a six-month period in 1956. The interference ended on April 18, the first day of the visit of Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev to Britain, and was resumed on October 28, five days after the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution.

In addition, the USSR jams BBC broadcasts to satellite States and to countries bordering the Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union's broadcasts to Britain -- six and a half hours a day -- are not interfered with.

The stubborn thoroughness of Soviet jamming is well illustrated by its use during July, 1955, when several Soviet delegations visited the West. Benediktov, leader of an agricultural delegation to Britain, gave the BBC Russian Service a statement, but when broadcast it was jammed. The BBC also put out a sermon preached by the Metropolitan Pitirim of Minsk and Byelorussia, leader of a delegation of Russian churchmen. This too was jammed. Even a message recorded by Bulganin and Khrushchev while they were attending the 1955 Geneva Summit Talks -- and broadcast by the BBC and Voice of America -- was jammed.

Chinese Control

The Chinese Press has no freedom. It has been transformed into one more agency by which the Chinese Communist Government strives to control the people for its own ends.

"Freedom of the Press" is guaranteed under Chinese law,¹⁴ but only if it "serves the cause of the Socialist revolution and Socialist construction."¹⁵ To "guarantee this freedom," the State provides the newspapers, but through the Press Administration under the direction of the Committee of Cultural and Educational Affairs, it completely controls them.¹⁶

So that the Press may speak with one voice all sources of news are canalized in the official New China News Agency. It employs the only correspondents permitted to supply news from abroad.

NOTES

- ¹ At least 30 Hungarian writers -- nearly all Communists of long-standing -- were arrested. Many received long gaol sentences, others await trial, some have never had charges brought against them. Their crime was to give expression to the views of the people.
- ² Article 125 of the Constitution of the USSR.
- ³ "Just as an army cannot fight without weapons, so the Party cannot carry on its ideological work successfully without the incisive and militant weapon of the Press. We cannot allow the organs of the Press to fall into unreliable hands. They must be in the hands of the workers who are most loyal, most reliable, politically staunch and most devoted to our cause." (N.S. Khrushchev, Pravda, August 28, 1957.)
- ⁴ This process was initiated by a decree of November 10, 1917, which provided for the closing down of newspapers which "call for open opposition to the Government."
- ⁵ Glavit (Chief Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs) set up June 6, 1931.
- ⁶ Although there was a measure of freedom of the Press in Poland from 1956 onwards, much of this has now been curtailed. One paper, Po Prostu, has been suppressed. There is a little private printing but the works must be submitted to Government censorship.

- 7 At the Czechoslovak Writers' Congress in April, 1956, it was admitted that bureaucratic control had driven many writers to silence and at least one to suicide. It seemed at the congress that writers might be allowed a limited measure of freedom, but this view was shattered at the Party Conference two months later. Writers were attacked for "unprincipled liberalism," and the First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Novotny, said that "Press independence of the Party and its ideas are views we have always rejected and still firmly reject."
- In June, 1957, he told the Congress of Czech Journalists that the task of the Press was "to struggle for the realization of the policy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia."
- 8 Pravda on May 5, 1957, described the Press as "the Party's most powerful weapon /which/ brings to the masses the great all-conquering ideas of Marxism-Leninism."
- 9 Soviet Culture on September 5, 1957, states: "Books are an ideological weapon called upon to strike the enemies of the working class and to educate the masses in the spirit of Communism."
- 10 Soviet Kirghizia on May 7, 1957, said: "In our country radio has become a powerful means of Communist education of the working people, of political information of the masses, a propagandist and popularizer of the immortal ideas of Marxism-Leninism."
- 11 USSR Speaking, magazine of the All-Union Radio Committee, 1935, No. 2.
- 12 Pravda, June 2, 1937.
- 13 Poland alone among the Communist States in East Europe does not jam -- although Russian stations in Poland have been known to jam Western broadcasts.
- 14 Article 87 of the Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic, 1954.
- 15 People's Daily, September 1, 1957.
- 16 One of the provisions of the Organic Law of the Central People's Government.

War Propaganda

The Soviet Government has always accused other of actions which it continually commits itself. War propaganda is no exception.

Soviet war propaganda reached its peak in 1953, but it continues at a high pitch. Today, allegations of Western aggressiveness and warmongering are accompanied by threats of Soviet nuclear power. They are designed to provide a specious justification to Soviet citizens for the restrictions on liberty they have to endure, and to weaken by fear the will of the non-Communist countries to defend themselves.

Campaign Against the West

The allegations against the West are continuous. "Ruling quarters of the imperialist State" are "aggravating relations between States" at the bidding of a small influential "bunch of monopolists" who would like to "intensify the state of cold war with a view to its developing into a shooting war."¹ "The imperialists" are said to be "trying to unleash a war."²

Again, "the imperialists are busily attracting Right-wing Socialists into the anti-popular cause of preparing for a new war ... The more aggressive circles of imperialism are seeking to intensify the threat of war ..."³ The Western Powers "are arming themselves and working out plans for aggressive war against Socialist countries."⁴

Nuclear Threats

Coupled with these allegations are warnings about the ease with which the Soviet Union could deliver nuclear bombs. Britain, France and other European countries are warned that in the event of war their territory would be "within range of atomic and hydrogen weapons."

The United States is told that "no distances guarantee any country against atomic and hydrogen bomb attacks."⁵

Typical of these threats is the one addressed by Marshal Bulganin to the Danish Prime Minister on March 29, 1957. He said: "One can easily see what the use of modern weapons against the bases of an aggressor set up on her territory would mean in Denmark. Suffice it to recall that the explosion of one hydrogen bomb ... can cause destruction over a territory within a radius of hundreds of kilometres. And it is highly unlikely that only one such bomb would be used in such a case."

But for simplicity this remark by Mr. Khrushchev is in a class on its own: "History is on our side whether you like it or not. We will bury you."⁶

NOTES

- ¹ N.S. Khrushchev in a speech to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, December 21, 1957.
- ² Khrushchev in an interview with Brazilian journalists, November 21, 1957.
- ³ Khrushchev in his speech to the joint session of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, November 6, 1957.

4 Ibid.

5 Khrushchev in a speech to the East German People's Chamber on August 8, 1957.

6 Speech at Polish Embassy reception, Moscow, November 18, 1956.