

RAD Background Report/170
(World Communist Movement)
14 September 1984

THE YALTA STORY

by Kevin Devlin

Summary: Twenty years ago the Italian CP published the "Yalta Memorandum," which its veteran leader, Palmiro Togliatti, had written in preparation for talks with Nikita Khrushchev of the CPSU. The memorandum contained radical criticism of Soviet policies, and particularly of the plan to "excommunicate" the Chinese CP at a world communist conference. The "Yalta Testament," as it now became, strengthened the PCI's independent positions. The Soviet motives for publishing this historic document in full in *Pravda* are unclear, but the affair may have been one factor in the sudden ouster of Khrushchev a month later. The conference project had to be shelved; and, although world and pan-European conferences were later held, in 1969 and 1976, they were marked by a decline in Soviet authority.

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I. Togliatti's Posthumous Challenge

Twenty years ago, on 21 August 1964, Palmiro Togliatti, leader of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) for almost four decades, died at Yalta in the Crimea from a cerebral hemorrhage. At his funeral in Rome on August 25 his deputy and successor, Luigi Longo, revealed that he had left behind a "memorandum" in preparation for talks with the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev. On September 4 the PCI published the full text of this historic document in the weekly *Rinascita* and the daily *l'Unita*, with a preface in which Secretary-General Longo described it as "a

precise expression of the position of the party on the problems of the international workers' and communist movement and its unity."¹

With that, the "Yalta Memorandum" became the "Yalta Testament," with significant consequences (it is hardly too much to say) for the post-Stalinist development of the international communist movement. By publishing it--with a resonance that more or less obliged other communist parties, including the CPSU, to follow suit--the Italian CP committed itself to upholding a critique of Soviet interparty policies more direct and radical than Togliatti ever expressed in his subtle, balanced writings for publication. The impact was increased by the timing. In the summer of 1964 the Soviet leadership was pressing forward, against the opposition of the PCI and some other parties, toward a world conference of communist parties, one of the principal features of which would be a collective condemnation of the Chinese leadership: in effect, the "excommunication" of the Maoist "splitters" from the international movement. The Yalta Memorandum, and the use that the PCI made of it, helped to ensure that a conference of that kind would not take place; and it may well have been one factor among others in the sudden ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964. Finally, publication of the memorandum strengthened--and, as it were, institutionalized--the PCI's posture of independence: condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968) and of Afghanistan (1979), for example, would follow logically.

Natta's "Hours of Yalta"

As it happened, three Secretaries-General of the PCI were involved in this "Yalta story": Togliatti himself; Luigi Longo who replaced him; and Alessandro Natta, who has now succeeded Enrico Berlinguer. It was Natta who revealed some of the details of that story six years later, in a short book entitled *The Hours of Yalta*.²

The historical background was provided by the Italian CP's unprecedented opposition to the Soviet project for a "showdown conference" to deal with the Maoist challenge to Moscow's authority. In October 1963 the PCI's public opposition to a world conference proposal made by the French and several other loyalist parties evidently decided a wavering Soviet leadership to postpone the plan.³ It was publicly revived in April 1964, with the publication of the intransigent Suslov Report. The Italian Communists repeatedly expressed opposition and reservations, notably in Togliatti's Central Committee report of late April; but they also made vain attempts to persuade the Soviets to abandon or modify their conference plans.⁴

Ironically, it was a counterproductive Soviet attempt to put the recalcitrant Italians in their place that led to the challenge of the Yalta Memorandum/Testament. In early August Togliatti went to Moscow to thrash matters out with Khrushchev--

only to find on arrival that the Soviet leader was off touring Siberia with the British press magnate, Lord Thomson. Stung by this snub (we may imagine), he proceeded to Yalta to await the meeting with Khrushchev. On reaching Yalta he immediately set to work on a long, hand-written statement of the PCI's positions with regard to the conference, the challenge of the Chinese, the role of Western communist parties in the international movement, the failings of communist regimes, and other controversial issues to be discussed with Khrushchev.⁵ He wrote the 4,500-word "memorandum" at one sitting, on the morning of August 13, made some changes, and left it to be typed while he and his wife, Nilde Iotti, visited a nearby youth camp. There he was felled by a cerebral hemorrhage (like Enrico Berlinguer 20 years later), and never recovered consciousness.

Mario Alicata of the Secretariat, who was with Togliatti's party, telephoned news of the stroke and the memorandum to PCI headquarters in Rome and to Togliatti's deputy, Luigi Longo, on vacation in Poland. Longo, before leaving for Yalta, immediately grasped the potential importance of the memorandum: he told Alicata to bring a copy to Rome at once and put it before the party leadership. On August 18 a meeting of members of the Executive Committee and Secretariat decided that the memorandum should be given to Khrushchev with an accompanying letter saying that the PCI leadership "fully shared and made its own" the views expressed in it. Alessandro Natta (of the Secretariat) was sent to the Crimea to implement this decision.

"The Choice of Courage"

When Natta got to Yalta he found that Longo was considering a bolder decision still. Knowing that Togliatti was now on the point of death, the two men paced in the darkness through the czarist garden, while light shone from windows where Russian translators were diligently at work on the memorandum handed over hours earlier to Boris Ponomarev (Khrushchev not being expected until the following day). As Natta tells it:

Longo said: "If Togliatti dies, we'll have to publish it." Not understanding what he meant, I replied that, yes, the time to publish this document would certainly come. "The time is now," said Longo. "We must make it public immediately." And he explained why: that it would be unthinkable and, moreover, mistaken, to say nothing about a document like this, or to keep it hidden; that its importance and political impact were such that we were obliged to make it known; that no other act or stand by our party could at this point do more to make our line and orientations, in the communist movement and in Italy, persuasive, incisive, and penetrating; and that, finally, we could not hesitate about this if we were convinced that our positions--the ideas expressed by Togliatti in the memorandum--were correct and valid, not just for our party but more generally for the whole workers' movement.⁶

Natta, taken aback, made what he calls "common sense objections." Although it was based on the known positions of the PCI, the memorandum went farther than any previous statement: it had "a very different political scope, an impact that Togliatti's death would make still more explosive." Moreover, it was a private document, and for that very reason Togliatti had given it "a critical stamp and a polemical force which, however, made still more delicate and serious the decision--which in my view could only be a unilateral one--to make it public." But Longo had already made up his mind: he would make "the choice of courage."

Courage was, however, tempered by discretion. Natta notes that when Longo and Khrushchev met, several hours after Togliatti's death, neither of them mentioned the memorandum (nor did anyone else on either side). Longo, having made his decision, would naturally have preferred to wait until he was on home ground before announcing it; Khrushchev probably hoped that the PCI would respect the private nature of a memorandum addressed to him in preparation for a face-to-face discussion, and meanwhile judged it better to let sleeping dogs lie.

The first public mention of the Yalta Memorandum was made by Longo in his speech at Togliatti's funeral on August 25. The next day he took part in talks with Brezhnev and other East European leaders. It is difficult to accept his claim, in an interview with the West German magazine *Der Stern*, that the memorandum was not discussed; at the time, several Italian press reports, apparently based on PCI sources, said that Brezhnev had argued in vain against publication, while Yugoslav and Romanian delegates had encouraged it.

Radical Challenge

What, it may be asked, was so explosive about this document that one elderly communist leader penned in preparation for talks with another two decades ago? Only the highlights of this historic text can be touched on here; but it will be clear that its publication constituted a challenge to Soviet authority more direct and radical than Togliatti himself had ever contemplated; and this (unintended) heritage was to be gradually developed by his party until, in December 1981, Enrico Berlinguer would conclude that the October Revolution had lost its "propulsive capacity" and that the international communist movement, as such, no longer existed.

In the introduction to his memorandum Togliatti settled one question: the PCI would attend the preparatory meeting for a world conference, which the CPSU had now set for mid-December 1964; but it would do so only to work against the kind of conference that Khrushchev wanted, since

We still have doubts and reservations about the opportuneness of the international conference, above all because it is now clear that a not inconsiderable number of parties, apart from the Chinese, will not participate in it.

Togliatti's critique, however, went beyond the conference project: together with subtle but probing criticism of Soviet policies in many areas, the memorandum offered an alternative perspective: a vision of a world movement in which differences to be aired in open debate need not result in rifts; in which dogmas would have to meet the test of reality or be discarded; in which the right of each party to chart its autonomous course would be recognized in practice as well as principle; in which, finally, democratic freedoms would form an essential element of the socialist ideal.

Turning first to the crucial issue of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Togliatti bluntly told Khrushchev that the line he had followed, and had tried to impose on other communist parties, was, in his opinion, mistaken. The memorandum revealed that the PCI had vainly proposed to the CPSU an alternative course for "an effective struggle against the mistaken political positions and splitting activity of the Chinese."

This would involve maintaining a continuous polemic against Chinese positions on the level of principle as on that of politics, but conducting "this polemic, unlike the Chinese, without verbal exacerbations and sweeping condemnations, dealing with concrete themes, in an objective and persuasive manner, and always with a certain respect for the adversary." More important, however, was the proposal for a sort of movement-wide debate, sector by sector, which, not at all incidentally, would involve the abandonment of the Soviet drive for an early conference.

At the same time [we should] proceed by groups of parties to a series of meetings for a profound examination and better definition of the tasks that today face the different sectors of our movement (Western Europe, the countries of Latin America, the countries of the Third World and their contacts with the CPs of capitalist countries). . . .

Only after this preparation, which could take a year or more of work, could one have examined the question of an international conference that could truly mark a new stage for our movement, its effective strengthening on new and correct lines. . . . Furthermore, once our tasks and political line had been clarified, sector by sector, one might also have given up the conference [plan], if this appeared necessary in order to avert a formal split.

Having sketched the alternative strategy proposed by the PCI, he added dryly: "A different line was followed and I do not consider the results as altogether good."⁸

The necessary struggle against Chinese positions, he insisted, should be conducted as a struggle for unity, since "it is inconceivable that China and the Chinese Communists could be excluded from this unity [of anti-imperialist action]." This was a central theme to which he returned repeatedly from different angles, as when he warned against the danger of arriving at "a declared rift within the movement, with the formation by the Chinese of an international center that would create its 'sections' in all countries."

Merely averting a split, however, was not enough. What Togliatti wanted (but surely did not expect) was that the inter-party crisis be made the occasion for a movement-wide ferment of renewal and adaptation: a dialectical process of analysis and action that would involve the abandonment of "old formulas no longer corresponding to the realities of today." He proceeded, in the latter part of the memorandum, to offer his own brief but searching analysis of the world movement's present state and future prospects; and the result, Natta remarked, was "a judgment on the work of Khrushchev."

Regimes Lacking Freedom, Democracy

Self-deceiving triumphalism was a primary target. For example, "our international trade union organization (WFTU) only conducts generalized propaganda," failing either to win real gains for workers or--"a serious error"--to seek any collaboration with noncommunist labor organizations."⁸ Again, noting that the PCI's strategy involved an approach to Catholics in general, Togliatti said: "For this purpose the old atheistic propaganda is of no use to us." As with religion, so with culture:

We must become the champions of liberty in intellectual life, of free artistic creation, and of scientific progress. . . . In this field, much assistance could come to us, but has not always come, from the countries in which we already direct the entire life [of the nation].

In the last part of the memorandum, on "Problems of the Socialist World," the criticism became more direct:

It is not correct to speak of the socialist countries (including the Soviet Union) as if everything always went well in them. . . . The worst thing is to give the impression that everything is always going well, while suddenly we find ourselves facing the necessity to speak of difficult situations and try to explain them.

That led to his culminating criticism, of the lack of basic liberties and real democracy in communist regimes. Referring to the crimes of the Stalinist period, he said flatly: "To explain

everything solely through the grave personal vices of Stalin is not accepted." What was needed, he insisted, was more thorough-going de-Stalinization:

The problem, however, that most demands our attention today, one affecting the Soviet Union as much as the other socialist countries, is especially that of overcoming the regime of restrictions and the suppression of democratic freedoms that was introduced by Stalin. . . . The general impression is that of a slowness and resistance to return to the Leninist norms that ensured, within the party and outside it, a wide liberty of expression and debate on culture and art, as well as in the political field. . . .

We always start from the idea that socialism is the regime in which there is the widest freedom for the workers and in which they do in fact participate in an organized manner in the management of the entire social life. We therefore welcome all positions of principle and all facts indicating that such is the reality in all socialist countries, and not only in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, facts that occasionally demonstrate the contrary do harm to the entire movement.

Such criticism from an elder statesman of the international movement would have been hard for any Soviet leader to take. What Palmiro Togliatti said was one thing, however; what Luigi Longo made of it was another.

II. The Impact of Togliatti's Testament

The Italian Communist Party's publication of Togliatti's "Yalta Memorandum" was a political event that owed everything to calculation and nothing to chance. Translations prepared beforehand in English, French, and other languages ensured wide international publicity. Overnight the nature of the document itself was changed and with it, to some extent, the role of the PCI in the interparty drama. Memorandum became testament, thereby both committing and helping the PCI to follow the independent path that it charted, while at the same time it greatly increased the Italian party's prestige and influence as a vanguard force of "progressive," anti-Stalinist communism. Pressing their advantage, the Italian Communists used every available device of publicity and interparty diplomacy to augment the impact, as when they promptly reprinted, without comment, the judgment of the *London Times* that "a third center of international communism was being set up in Rome.

Even the most conservatively pro-Soviet communist parties in Western Europe could hardly ignore a document that was being avidly discussed by the bourgeois press, although the French, for example, did their best to minimize its impact by publishing in the daily *l'Humanite* a markedly inadequate account (the full text came later in the small-circulation monthly *Cahiers du Communisme*), with a cold comment noting that the PCF did not share Togliatti's views on the international conference.⁹

The crucial question, however, was how the East European regimes, under no such constraints, would react. It was, of course, no surprise that the independent Yugoslavs, alert to any development that strengthens their position by weakening that of the Soviets, gave prompt and extensive publicity to the memorandum.¹⁰ The brooding silence of the other regimes lasted for nearly a week; and then, on September 10, *Pravda* published the full text without commentary. It was certainly the first time that that single-minded journal had ever carried such an extensive critique of Soviet policies. The Soviet lead was followed within a few days by most of the other East European regimes.¹¹ The only one that failed to do so (apart from Albania) was Bulgaria. The reasons for this unprecedented Bulgarian departure from a bloc-wide pattern remain unknown.

Publication Puzzle

Equally puzzling and more important, however, are the reasons why the Soviet leadership decided to publish in the mass-circulation *Pravda* the full text of a document that represented a radical challenge to the authority of the Kremlin within the international communist movement. None of the possible answers seems entirely adequate. For example, one might think that the motive was to weaken an already publicized Italian challenge by first acknowledging and then answering it, except that the answer never came. In any case, that purpose (if it was such) could have been achieved by publishing extracts from the document in a smaller circulation publication. Moreover, it is hard to see why the Soviets should have authorized or encouraged publication of the text in other East European countries, in view of the possible impact on intermittently unstable regimes of this critique of the system by a communist leader of international prestige.

Perhaps the most plausible explanation is that the decision to publish the memorandum in full was made by the impulsive Khrushchev himself, presumably against the opposition of others in the Soviet leadership (notably the ideologue Mikhail Suslov). If so, this would have been another point in the indictment of his "voluntarism" and "subjectivism" when he was suddenly ousted a month later. It is worth noting that on September 4, the day the memorandum was published by the PCI, certainly with the prior knowledge of the Soviets, Khrushchev gave an indirect answer to Togliatti's arguments in a speech in Prague, when he referred

dismissively to the "good intentions" of some fraternal parties that sought the postponement of the international conference, pending efforts to bring the views of all parties closer together. The Chinese, he explained, were not open to honest discussion and just did not want unity.

Khrushchev's Showdown

As this comment indicated, whatever the explanation of the Soviet decision to publish the memorandum (and of the subsequent failure to reply to its challenge), it certainly did not represent any concession to Togliatti's arguments. The day after publication of the memorandum, *Pravda* (11 September 1964) carried "Theses on the 100th Anniversary of the First International," the clear drift of which was toward the organizational showdown with the Chinese that the PCI (along with the Romanians and some other communist parties) strongly opposed. The theses, drawn up by the CPSU Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism, declared that the organizational principles of the First International were still valid. These included "the duty to observe decisions adopted within the framework of the International, with the subordination of the minority to the will of the majority" (which would oblige the PCI to accept the outcome of a Soviet-dominated international conference, its "revisionist" say having been to no avail), and "the banning of factional, schismatic activity within the ranks of the International" (grounds for the "excommunication" of the Chinese CP).

This "showdown mood" also found expression, before and after publication of the Yalta Memorandum, in Soviet readiness to carry deep differences with the formerly pro-Chinese Japanese party to the point of an open rift, not only by making public their private polemical exchanges, but by publicly backing a pro-Soviet splinter party, the Japanese Communist Party (Voice of Japan).¹² This suggested that Nikita Khrushchev had now "written off" the intractable Japanese and was resolved, despite the opposition of the Italians and others, to rally the loyalist majority of communist parties at a world conference. The Chinese, who were to be the target of a collective denunciation at that conference, tauntingly told the Soviet leaders that the planned showdown would result in their being shown up:

You are falling into a trap of your own making and will end by losing your skin. If you do not call the meeting, people will say that you have followed the advice of the Chinese and the Marxist-Leninist parties, and you will lose face. If you do call the meeting, you will land yourself in an impasse without any way out. . . . We firmly believe that the day your so-called meeting takes place will be the day you step into your grave.¹³

As it turned out, however, there was a showdown; but it took place within the Soviet leadership, and its victim was Nikita Khrushchev. The special role that the Italian party had won for

itself in international communist affairs, partly through exploitation of the Yalta Memorandum, was shown by the fact that the Soviet leaders informed the PCI leadership of the ouster on October 15, before TASS made it public,¹⁴ in a message assuring the Italian party of continued Soviet commitment to the cause of peaceful coexistence. It seems that the PCI was the only non-ruling party thus honored: certainly, the other two major West European CPs, the French and the Finnish, made it sourly clear that they had not received the news in advance of its general publication.

Post-Khrushchev Concessions

On the very day on which the ouster was announced *l'Unita* carried a CC report in which Enrico Berlinguer elaborated the independent line traced in the Yalta Memorandum and declared that the PCI would "do everything possible" to avert "a conference meeting without the participation of the Chinese CP and other parties." In contrast to the French Communists (who the day before had published a strongly anti-Chinese CC resolution supporting an early conference), the Italians were thus in a strong position; and they proceeded to exploit it with skill and vigor.

A statement by the leadership reserved judgment on the ouster of Khrushchev and gave notice that the PCI would not change its own positions, whatever happened in Moscow. Later Berlinguer led a delegation to Moscow to discuss the departure of Khrushchev, the international conference, the issues raised by the Yalta Memorandum, and other problems, including those of "the development of democratic life and political debate in socialist countries."¹⁵ On their return, the Italian delegates (Berlinguer, Paolo Bufalini, and Emilio Sereni) calmly reported that three sessions of talks with Soviet leaders had simply confirmed their differences of opinion not only on the Khrushchev case but on "the situation in the international communist movement, relations between communist parties, the international conference and the preparatory commission, and the "memorandum of Comrade Togliatti" (Berlinguer), as well as on "the question of developing socialist democracy" (Bufalini).¹⁶ The other Western CPs that sent envoys to Moscow to discuss the ouster (they included the French, British, Danish, and Austrian CPs) were either reliably loyalist or of minor importance; but the very fact that they sent envoys was itself a tribute to the PCI's growing regional influence.

One of the most pressing problems facing the new Soviet leadership was Khrushchev's commitment to a preconference preparatory meeting on 15 December 1964. Three days before that deadline *Pravda* announced a postponement until 1 March 1965. Welcoming the postponement, the PCI stepped up the pressure by demanding that the meeting "should be of a predominantly consultative character, thus avoiding giving to the presence or absence of a [particular] party any politically discriminating significance."¹⁷ As the date approached, TASS reports quietly adopted

the adjective "consultative." Even so, the Romanians joined the pro-Chinese and "neutralist" CPs (of the 26 invited) in boycotting the meeting. Saving a vestige of Soviet face, the communique of the March meeting still put forward a world conference as an eventual goal but stated that consultations with all the 81 CPs that attended the 1960 Moscow Conference would now be necessary "to solve the question of calling . . . a preliminary consultative meeting," which in turn might (or might not) convene a new international conference, in which it was desirable that "all fraternal parties" should take part.¹⁸ In fact, the Soviet showdown project had been indefinitely shelved; and much of the credit for that went to the post-Togliatti PCI leadership.

When the Soviet leaders, exploiting the revulsion caused by the early excesses of the Maoist Cultural Revolution, relaunched the drive for a world conference in the autumn of 1966, they rapidly gained the support of a majority of the world's communist parties, but not that of the PCI, which maintained what Secretary-General Luigi Longo later described as "reservations about making the 'Chinese question' the subject of a . . . conference, which would function as a sort of tribunal charged with passing judgment on the errors of the Chinese CP." That opposition was enough to block the project. It lasted a full year, until Longo published a series of four articles that, in effect, laid down the PCI's conditions for taking part in a world conference.¹⁹ Just after the last article appeared, the announcement that a consultative meeting to prepare for a new world conference was made simultaneously by the CPSU and the PCI, thereby highlighting the special role of the latter. During the preparatory process the PCI led other Western CPs in a chorus of condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (August 1968).

Partly as a result, the Moscow Conference of June 1969 marked a further stage in the post-Stalinist evolution of the communist movement: the institutionalized decline of Soviet authority found expression in the open admission of differences and disunity; in debates and amendments; in the failure of the PCI and 13 other CPs to subscribe (either at all or in part) to a nonbinding document that contained no criticism of the Chinese and accorded no special status to the CPSU. This process was carried a stage further at the pan-European conference held in East Berlin in mid-1976: during a 16-month struggle the Italian, Yugoslav, and other independent parties exploited the new principle of decisions by consensus to block attempts by the pro-Soviet majority to impose something like a "general line."²⁰

How much of all this could have been foreseen or desired by Togliatti himself? Speculation would be profitless, although one supposes that much of what happened would have shocked that Comintern veteran. In this connection the views of his present successor, himself a protagonist in the Yalta drama, are of interest. In a recent interview, Alessandro Natta said that the weakest aspect of Togliatti's idea of "progressive democracy" had been the "uncritical exaltation of the Soviet Union." He had,

indeed, stressed that the PCI should not and could not follow the Soviet model, and after 1956 had emphasized not only "the diversity of socialist ways and solutions" but also "our duty to undertake a critical examination of the experiences" of existing regimes.

But what Togliatti never questioned was the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which he always judged to be an element of equilibrium and peace. The Yalta Memorandum itself did not go beyond that limit. I hold, however, that he would have gone beyond it. I am profoundly convinced that the critical judgments we have expressed with regard to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Afghanistan have been possible thanks to the great heritage that Togliatti left us. . . .

The PCI has developed the intuition of Togliatti. With Longo and Berlinguer it has opened up new frontiers, in relations not only with communist parties but with European social-democratic [parties] and with progressive movements in every part of the world.²¹

Perhaps the final lesson of the Yalta story, for those communist parties and regimes that choose to learn it, is that boldness and flexibility pay off in confrontations with the CPSU.

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- 1 English text in *The New York Times*, 4 September 1964; this paper uses the writer's own translation.
- 2 Alessandro Natta, *Le Ore di Yalta* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1970).
- 3 *L'Unita*, 26 October 1963. Urging the need for a "unity in diversity and autonomy" in the international communist movement, the PCI Central Committee resolution warned that a conference could produce "either a further worsening of the present divergencies, even to the extent of a rift, or else a completely formal and unsatisfactory compromise."
- 4 In April 1964 the PCI leadership sent the CPSU a secret letter that, according to Natta's book, warned bluntly that to hold the conference as planned would be "an error" (*Le Ore di Yalta*, p. 29). In early May the Italians sent a three-man delegation to Moscow for talks which again proved fruitless.
- 5 At a PCI Secretariat meeting before he left Rome Togliatti remarked that it would be a good idea to put the party's positions in writing; when he had a brief meeting with Brezhnev in Moscow, having been snubbed by Khrushchev, he announced that he would do so, and it must have sounded like a warning.

- 6 *Le Ore di Yalta*, op. cit., p. 48.
- 7 This alternative line may have been proposed in a secret PCI CC letter of April 1964, mentioned in Natta's book (p. 29); in this the Soviet plan for an anti-Chinese conference was described as "an error."
- 8 Togliatti advised the Soviets to avoid being drawn into dogmatist polemics but rather to "combat the Chinese with deeds, not just with words." One possibility, he suggested, would be the development of a campaign for anti-imperialist unity of action; the Chinese might find it difficult to reject that. (Khrushchev's successors did, in fact, launch just such a campaign with reference to Vietnam in 1965-1966, but with obviously opportunistic motives, and the Maoists scornfully condemned it; but that was not what Togliatti had in mind.)
- 9 Relations between the Italian and French CPs were notably poor at this time. Natta (*Le Ore di Yalta*, p. 30) has revealed that Togliatti wanted to attend the PCF congress in May 1964, in order to have talks with his counterpart, Maurice Thorez (who was himself to die suddenly on the shore of the Black Sea, a month before Togliatti). "But his proposals were not positively received, for reasons which aroused in Togliatti . . . some bitterness."
- 10 The Yugoslavs published the full text in *Politika* (Belgrade), 5 and 6 September 1964; in *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), 6, 7, and 8 September; and in *Delo* (Ljubljana), 9 September.
- 11 Within a few days the Hungarian, East German, Czechoslovak, and Polish regimes published the memorandum in their daily or weekly journals; the Romanians gave the full text in the monthly *Lupta de Clasa*, September 1964, and extracts in the daily *Scinteia*, 19 September 1964.
- 12 The pro-Soviet faction led by Yoshio Shiga and Ichizo Suzuki (expelled from the JCP in May 1964) did not formally become a secessionist party until early December 1964, but in mid-July *Pravda* welcomed the appearance of a secessionist newspaper, *Voice of Japan*. Later (September 27) *Pravda* praised the faction's "well-founded criticism of the wrong road taken by those who . . . have seized the leadership of the party," following this the next day with an article by Shiga himself to the same effect ("renegades . . . have usurped the leadership"). Soviet support for the splinter party continued after the ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964, though it became considerably less emphatic. Compared with this crass interference, low-key Soviet recognition of splinter parties formed in New Zealand (1966), Australia (1971), Sweden (1977), and Spain (1984) has been less offensive.
- 13 Reply of Chinese CP CC, dated 28 July 1964, to Soviet Central Committee's letter of 15 June 1964; *Peking Review* no. 31, 31 July 1964.
- 14 The socialist party daily *Avanti* noted the next day (October 16) that when the first rumors about Khrushchev's fall (picked up by Western cor-

respondents in Moscow) began to circulate in Rome, Gian Carlo Pajetta of the PCI Secretariat was able to tell journalists that they were true "several hours" before the TASS announcement.

- 15 Statement by Berlinguer on leaving for Moscow, 3 November 1964.
- 16 *L'Unita*, 8 November 1964.
- 17 Giuliano Pajetta's CC report, *l'Unita*, 14 December 1964. In mid-February 1965 another CC report by Berlinguer restated the demand that the "preparatory" meeting be merely "a simple consultation and exchange of opinions on the situation of the movement and means of improving it."
- 18 *Pravda*, 10 March 1965.
- 19 One condition laid down in these *Rinascita* articles was that a conference should be of a consultative and nonbinding character; again, nonattendance could not affect any party's membership in the international movement; and any party had to have the right "not to accept or to accept only in part or with reservations any eventual [collective] decision."
- 20 See Kevin Devlin, "The Decline and Fall of Conciliar Communism: The 1969 Moscow Milestone," RAD Background Report/116 (World Communist Movement), *Radio Free Europe Research*, 26 June 1984; and "Pan-European Miscalculations," *ibid.*, no. 124, 6 July 1984.
- 21 *Il Messaggero* (Rome), 20 August 1984.

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