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THE PARTY AND THE ARMY (VI)

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"The growth of ideological and theoretical standards of our commanders and their experience in educational work and the constant improvement of the military and technical knowledge of the political staff, has made it possible for us to solve the important problem of the appointment of commanders to political work and of political workers to command positions. The group of forces in Germany has many examples of correct appointment of commanders and political workers." (Col.Gen. P.A. Lapkin, Radio Volga, 25 August 1959)

"Apparently some leaders of the personnel organs have forgotten the instruction of the USSR Minister of Defense that officers who have graduated from higher military training institutions must be appointed to posts in a manner not infringing upon the interests of officers who have no higher education but good organizational qualities, the necessary military and political knowledge, and great practical experience in work." (Col.Gen.A.P. Beloborodov, Red Star, May 16, 1959)

INTRODUCTION

In contrast to the nearly complete reorganization of the political administration of the Soviet Army¹ which has taken place since the ouster of Marshal G. K. Zhukov in November 1957, the top military commanders have, with only a few exceptions, maintained their posts in Moscow. Although there have been some changes among command personnel in the 20 military districts, these shifts seem to have been primarily the result of promotions, not a "purge" comparable in any way to that implemented in the political apparatus. Thus, nearly 2 years after the test of strength between the Party leadership (Khrushchev) and the Army (Zhukov), the reshuffle of the Political Administration and the relative stability at the apex of the military hierarchy reflect the propaganda image created by the charges levelled against the Army's most famous officer. The responsibility for the shortcomings and errors of the Zhukov period has obviously been placed upon the chiefs of the political administrations, not the military commanders. In return for their support of the Party's rejection of Zhukov's pretensions towards a claim to share political power -- the "old guard"² have maintained their posts and privileges.

The lack of repercussions of the Zhukov removal can best be demonstrated by a summary of the shifts which have resulted as a direct consequence:

Min. of Defense Mars'l R.Ya. Malinovsky replaced Mars'l G.K. Zhukov			
(Com. in Chief,			
(Army Ground Forces & "	A. A. Grechko	"	" R.Ya. Malinovsky
(1st Dep. Min. Defense			
Com. in Chief			
Germany	Army Gen. M. V. Zakharov ³	"	" A. A. Grechko
(1) Leningrad	" " N. I. Krylov	"	Army Gen. M. V. Zakharov
(2) Urals	" " A. A. Lelyushenko	"	" " N. I. Krylov
(3) Transbaykal	" " Ya. G. Kreyzer ⁴	"	" " A. A. Lyushenko
(4) Transcaucasus	" " K. N. Galitsky ⁵	"	" " I. I. Fedyuninski
(5) Turkestan	Army Gen. I. I. Fedyuninsky	"	" " A. A. Luchinsky
(6) Volga	Lt. " V. N. Komarov	"	Lt. Gen. K. L. Sorokin
(7) Voronezh	Col. " A. M. Andreyev	"	Col. " A. P. Belobrodov
(8) North Caucasus	" " I. Z. Pliev	"	Marshal A. I. Yermenko
(9) Baltic	" "	"	Army Gen. A. V. Gorbатов

¹ C. Duvel, Radio Liberty Daily Information Bulletin, 1 Sept. 1959; see below pp. 1-5.

² N. Galay, Military Representation on the 1958 Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the USSR, April 1958; see below pp. 6 ff.

³ Promoted to Marshal in 1959.

⁴ Kreyzer's successor as commander of the South Urals District is not known.

⁵ Formerly Commander in Chief, Soviet troops in Poland; successor not identified.

With more complete data it would, perhaps, be possible to demonstrate that the above listed transfers represent only the minimum chain reaction started by the promotion of Malinovsky to succeed Zhukov. In the Ministry of Defense, the only marshal to "retire" since 1957 was Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, from 1955 until 1957, Deputy Minister of Defense "for questions of military science."⁶ Even for this well-known officer, however, one cannot with certainty fix the actual date of his withdrawal from service in the army command headquarters; there is no reason to connect his retirement with Zhukov's removal. As presently constituted the leadership of the Ministry of Defense is as follows:

<u>Post</u>		<u>Date of Appointment</u>
Minister	Malinovsky, R. Ya	Oct. 1957
1st Deputy	Sokolovsky, V. D.	Feb. 1955
1st Deputy	Konev, I. S.	May 1955
1st Deputy	Grechko, A. A.	Nov. 1957
1st Deputy	Gorshkov, S. G. (Admiral)	1956
Deputy Minister	Rokassovsky, K. K.	Nov. 1956
Deputy Minister	Belokoskov, V. Ye.	Jan. 1957
Deputy Minister	Biryuzov, S. S.	April 1955
Deputy Minister	Vershinin, K. A. (Aviation)	Feb. 1957

Marshal I. Kh. Bagramyan, for a short time in 1956, was listed as a Deputy Minister (Chief Inspector of the Ministry of Defense⁷), but since early 1957 has been the head of the Voroshilov Higher Military Academy in Moscow. A similar assignment in the field of military education has been provided for Marshal K. A. Meretskov whose latest known post is "Assistant to the Minister of Defense for Higher Military Educational Institutions".⁸ Joining these two Marshals of the Soviet Union is Marshal P. A. Rotmistrov, a frequent contributor to military journals, who has been made Chief of the Armored Forces Military Academy;⁹ to succeed him as Commander of the Armored and Mechanized Troops an unknown officer, Col. Gen. P. P. Poluboyarov has moved into the top command structure.¹⁰ The only other post-Zhukov appointment in the service branches has been the replacement of Marshal M. I. Nedelin, since 1953 Commander of the artillery troops, by Marshal S. S. Varentsov.¹¹

⁶ Politichesky Slovar, Moscow, 1958, p. 66; in July 1958 Vasilevsky also resigned as Chairman of the Soviet War Veterans' Committee for reasons of health.

⁷ Politichesky Slovar, p. 37.

⁸ Ibid., p. 350; also Vasilevsky's successor as Chairm. War Veterans Committee.

⁹ Tass, 11 May 1959.

¹⁰ Izvestia, 22 Feb. 1958.

¹¹ Ibid.

After Col.Gen. F. Golkov had replaced A.S. Zheltov as Chief of the Main Political Administration¹², a former military district commander, Col.Gen. A. Beloborodov¹³ moved into the former's key personnel post as Chief of the Main Administration of Cadres of the Ministry of Defense.¹⁴ In the first interpretation of the task entrusted to him, Beloborodov presented a clear and concise summary of the cadre policy which, on the orders of N.S. Khrushchev, is being implemented throughout the entire Soviet bureaucratic machine, Party, Police and ministerial as well as army:

"...The Party principles for the selection and placement of personnel in line with their political and professional qualities are being observed more strictly. The personnel organs are now organizing their work in closer contact with the politorgans and party organizations. There are, however, still many serious shortcomings in the work with officer personnel. Too little attention is paid to the training of worthy replacements for older personnel who retire or are transferred to the reserves, and also to the correct combination of old and young personnel. The speaker stressed that this is a direct request of the 21st CPSU Congress..

As is well known, numerous officers with higher military education are now being assigned to the troops. This is naturally a positive phenomenon which cannot but be welcomed. At the same time, however, some personnel workers have in this connection acquired the opinion that under present conditions an officer without higher military education is not a full-fledged one, and therefore he cannot be appointed to higher posts. Apparently some leaders of the personnel organs have forgotten the instruction of the USSR Minister of Defense that officers who have graduated from higher military training institutions must be appointed to posts in a manner not infringing upon the interests of officers who have no higher education but good organizational qualities, the necessary military and political knowledge, and great practical experience in work."¹⁵

The application of these principles applies only to a limited degree to the prerogatives of the ageing Marshals of the Soviet Union, all of whom except those reaching this grade during the past five years¹⁶ - Chuikov (59), Moskalenko (57), Biryuzov (55), Grechko (56) - were born before 1900. The only other military commanders promoted in the Khrushchev period,

¹² See Background Information, "The Party and the Army III", 14 January 1958.

¹³ Replaced by Col.Gen. A.M. Andreyev as C-in-C, Voronezh Military District, Izvestia, 28 February 1958.

¹⁴ Krasnaya Zvezda, 16 May 1959.

¹⁵ ibid.

¹⁶ April, 1955.

Yeremenko (66) and Zakharov¹⁷ (61) fall on the other side of arbitrarily drawn lines which divide the top Soviet leadership into the following age groups:

Voroshilov ⁺	1881	Yeremenko	1892	Chuikov	1900
Budenny ⁺	1883	Bulganin ⁺	1895	Moskalenko	1902
		Zhukov ⁺	1895	Grechko	1903
		Timoshenko	1895	Biryuzov	1904.
		Vasilevsky ⁺	1895		
		Rokossovsky	1896		
		Bagramyan	1897		
		Konev	1897		
		Meretskov	1897		
		Malinovsky	1898		
		Sokolovsky	1898		
		Zakharov	1898		

⁺No longer active.

If Marshals Bagramyan and Meretskov, now assigned to teaching posts are not included, the Khrushchev proteges now serving under Minister of Defense Malinovsky already account for 6 of the 10 marshals still in command posts; only Konev, Sokolovsky, and Rokossovsky in the central apparatus and Timoshenko in Belo Russia remain of the 1936-37 survivors whom Stalin had made Marshals, primarily on the basis of their World War II records. As the former political (Lt.) General, N.S. Khrushchev, repeats his previous reassurances to the graduates of the military academies of the USSR Armed Forces concerning the need "to strengthen the armed forces in every way", not only the members of the latest generation of officer graduates have been made aware that they must compete for promotions with capable fellow officers who have come up from the ranks without "higher education". For the officer who "fails in his work" to meet the standards now fixed by Khrushchev and his cadre chiefs, "there is no salvation, even in a diploma with honors".¹⁸ In the Army, the Academy graduates, thousands of whom have waited for advancement for years, now face the same challenge as the Party functionaries and factory directors with diplomas from their comrades whose strength lies in their "organizing abilities and practical experience." In the long delayed rejuvenation of the army command posts, from the apex to the base, the "proletarian" factor and party political reliability will once again be given added weights in the determination of future promotions.

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¹⁷Radio Moscow, 3 September 1953.

¹⁸ibid.

THE PURGE OF THE MAIN POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION

Radio Liberty
Daily Information Bulletin
September 1, 1959

Following the ouster of Marshal Zhukov as Minister of Defense and member of the Party Presidium, a certain reorganization of the Ministry of Defense, some top military personnel changes in the Army and Navy were to be expected. There actually have been a few demotions and promotions in the Soviet Army that are presumably linked to Zhukov's downfall. However, these changes seem entirely insignificant if compared with the decimation of leading personnel of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy following the October Plenum (1957) of the CC/CPSU which ousted Zhukov. As a matter of fact, if we compare a list of the leading personnel of the MPA compiled in October 1957, at the time of Zhukov's ouster, with the latest available data, we find that little more than one tenth of those occupying command positions in the MPA at that time have been able to keep these or have been promoted since then. However, the purge, in spite of its mass character among the top-ranking MPA officials, at least, seems to have been relatively merciful, for a number of those demoted have since reappeared in less important positions.

In October 1957 the MPA was headed by its

Chief, Col. Gen. A.S. Zheltov,
Dep. Chief, Lt. Gen. M.M. Pronin,
Deputy Chief, Lt. Gen. N.V. Pupyshchev,
Deputy Chief, Lt. Gen. F.P. Stepchenko,
Chief, PA of Navy, Vice Adm. A.V. Komarov,
Chief, PA of Air Force, Maj. Gen. (Aviation) A.G. Rytov

Of these six top-ranking leaders of the MPA only A.G. Rytov is left. He is now frequently referred to as Deputy Chief of the MPA and has been promoted to the rank of Lt. Gen. (Aviation).

All the others have been demoted:

A.S. Zheltov was replaced as Chief, MPA, shortly after Zhukov's dismissal (first identification of his successor Col. Gen. F.I. Golikov was made by Pravda on January 10, 1958; Zheltov, apparently, was never identified as Chief, MPA, following Zhukov's ouster, but merely as "Col. Gen."). Subsequently Zheltov became Chief of the Department of Administrative Organs of the CC/CPSU department. The same cannot be said, however, about Zheltov's latest appointment as Chief of the Lenin Military-Political Academy (first revealed in KZ, August 1, 1959), where he succeeds to Col. Gen. F.F. Kuznetsov (last identified almost exactly a year ago, in KZ of August 31, 1958). F.F. Kuznetsov, incidentally, was A.S. Zheltov's predecessor also as Chief of the MPA, from which position he was demoted in the shake-up following Stalin's death. Zheltov's present position is clearly 2-3 rungs below those previously held by him in the CC/CPSU and the MPA.

Lt. Gen. M.M. Pronin was last identified as Deputy Chief, MPA, in KZ, March 27, 1958. His present position has not been revealed.

Lt. Gen. N.V. Pupyshchev was last identified as Deputy Chief, MPA, somewhat earlier (Pravda Ukrainy, February 2, 1958). He has been demoted to the position of Chief of the Political Department

of the Frunze Military Academy (first identification: KZ, December 8, 1958; latest identification: KZ, Feb. 19, 1959).

Lt. Gen. F.P. Stepchenko was last identified as Deputy Chief, MPA in KZ, Feb. 20, 1958. He is now Chief of the Political Administration of Odessa Military District (first revealed in KZ, August 14, 1959).

Vice-Admiral A.V. Komarov, the Chief, PA of Navy, was last identified in Sovetskaya Aviatsiya of Aug. 4, 1957, (in specific position: Tass, July 15, 1957), i.e., a few weeks before Zhukov's dismissal. There are no clues to his fate.

As a result of the purge the MPA is now headed by an entirely new team composed of

	first ident.	lat. ident.
Chief, MPA, Col.Gen.F.I. Golikov	1/10/58 Pr.	8/10/59 Pr.
1st Dep.Chief, Lt.Gen.P.I. Yefimov	7/24/58 Iz.	8/10/59 Pr.
Dep.Chief, Vice Adm.V.M.Grishanov	5/27/59 SF	7/25/59 RM
Dep.Chief, Lt.Gen. P.A. Lapkin	10/10/58 Pr.	5/26/59 KZ
Dep.Chief, Lt.Gen. A.G. Rytov	2/17/59 KZ	8/20/59 KZ
Dep.Chief, I.P. Khalipov	2/18/59 KZ	2/18/59 KZ
Dep.Chief, Lt.Gen. M.Kh.Kalashnik	10/1/58 KZ	10/28/58 KZ

Before being appointed to their present high-ranking positions in the MPA, the above-listed officials were identified as follows:

	lat. ident.
F.I. Golikov: Chief, Military Academy for Tank Troops	12/2/57 TASS
P.I. Yefimov: Chief, PA, Group of Sov. Troops in Germ.	2/18/58 KZ
V.M. Grishanov: Chief, PA, Baltic Fleet	4/3/58 KZ
P.A. Lapkin: Dep.Chief, PA Army Ground Forces	2/4/58 KZ
A.G. Rytov: Chief, PA, Air Force	6/17/57 SA
I.P. Khalipov: no records	
M.Kh.Kalashnik: Chief, Agitprop Administration of MPA	7/24/58 Iz.

A survey of the Political Administrations of the Military Districts reveals that these were hit by the purge no less severely than the center: The present PA chiefs of 14 Military Districts (including the Group of Soviet Troops in Germany) were first identified after Zhukov's dismissal. Only three PA Chiefs have been retained: those of the Baltic, Far Eastern and Leningrad Military Districts (N.S. Demin, A.I. Shmelev and V.K. Tsebenko respectively). On two Military Districts (South Ural and Transbaykal) data are not available. The tabulation on the following page shows the changes that have taken place in the PA of the Military Districts.

It is conceivable of course, that one or the other PA Chief listed in the first column of our tabulation was actually demoted after his latest identification, but prior to Zhukov's dismissal just as it is possible that one or the other PA Chief listed as being still in charge of a given Military District has been demoted since his latest identification, but prior to Zhukov's dismissal, just as it is possible that one or the other PA Chief listed as being still in charge of a given Military District has been demoted since his latest identification. However, such minor flaws, which are inevitable in a compilation of this kind, can hardly change the overall picture.

THE CHIEFS OF THE POLITICAL ADMINISTRATIONS OF THE ARMY

Before Zhukov's dismissal

After Zhukov's dismissal

Military District	Chief, PA	Latest Ident.	Chief, PA	First Ident.	Latest Ident.
Group of Sov. Troops in Germany	Maj. Gen. P. V. Vashura	5/21/57 KZ	Lt. Gen. P. I. Yefimov	11/5/57 KZ	2/18/58 KZ
Baltic MD	Maj. Gen. N. S. Demin	5/30/57 KZ	Maj. Gen. S. P. Vasyagin		8/20/59 SA
Belorussian MD	Maj. Gen. I. A. Uzin	12/5/57 SB	Maj. Gen. N. S. Demin	--	2/17/59 SA
Carpathian MD	?	1/19/56 KZ	Lt. Gen. N. A. Nachinkin	11/5/57 SB	7/28/59 SB
Far Eastern MD	Maj. Gen. A. I. Shmelev	8/2/57 KZ	Lt. Gen. P. T. Lukashin	2/4/58 KZ	8/12/59 KZ
Kiev MD	Maj. Gen. A. G. Gromov	7/5/57 Pr. U	Lt. Gen. A. I. Shmelev	--	9/9/58 KZ
Leningrad MD	Maj. Gen. V. K. Tsebenko	7/5/57 Pr.	Lt. Gen. N. M. Aleksandrov	12/5/57 SA	8/20/59 KZ
Moscow MD	Lt. Gen. F. A. Dubovskoy	2/2/58 Pr.	Lt. Gen. V. K. Tsebenko	--	9/17/58 KZ
Northern MD	Maj. Gen. M. F. Drebednev	3/10/55 KZ.	Lt. Gen. N. V. Yegorov	10/1/58 KZ	8/8/59 KZ
North Caucasus MD	?		Lt. Gen. I. A. Lipodayev	9/30/58 KZ	7/26/59 KZ
Odessa MD	?		Maj. Gen. P. V. Vashura	5/6/58 KZ	7/29/59 KZ
Siberian MD	Maj. Gen. G. Yemelyanenko	11/25/56 KZ	Lt. Gen. F. P. Stepchenko	8/14/59 KZ	8/14/59 KZ
South Ural MD	?		Lt. Gen. K. I. Filyashkin	5/22/58 KZ	3/21/59 KZ
Transbaykal MD	Maj. Gen. Marchenko (Ye. T or G. Ya?)	12/17/57 Tass	?		
Transcaucasus MD	Col. A. I. Bukov	12/1/57 ZV	Lt. Gen. D. A. Ivashchenko	1/7/58 KZ	7/31/59 KZ
Turkestan MD	Lt. Gen. K. F. Kalashnikov	5/10/56 KZ	Lt. Gen. Ye. Ye. Maltsev	2/5/58 Pr. V	5/9/59 Pr. V
Ural MD	Maj. Gen. Panshin	11/14/56 KZ	Lt. Gen. V. R. Boyko	8/14/59 KZ	8/14/59 KZ
Volga MD	Maj. Gen. Yegorov (N. V. or M.?)	4/7/55 KZ	Maj. Gen. V. A. Boldyrev	7/16/58 KZ	8/5/59 KZ
Voronezh MD	Col. Mesropov	4/25/57 KZ	Lt. Gen. I. G. Derevyankin	3/27/59 KZ	3/27/59 KZ

It is interesting to note that the Chiefs of the Political Administrations of the Belorussian and Kiev Military Districts, Maj. Gen. I. A. Uzin and Maj. Gen. A. G. Gromov, were demoted to Deputy Chiefs of their respective Political Administration apparently immediately after Zhukov's dismissal. A. G. Gromov was first identified as Deputy Chief, PA of Kiev MD, in Radyanska Ukraina of Nov. 3, 1957. In the Belorussian Military District the newly appointed PA Chief, Lt. Gen. Nachinkin, was first identified in Sovetskaya Belorussiya on November 5. Exactly one month later the same paper again identified Nachinkin's predecessor, Maj. Gen. Uzin, as Chief, PA, and two days later (Dec. 12, 1957) as Deputy Chief, PA. This incident may be regarded as characteristic of the uncertainty which at that time reigned in the MPA.

Another recent appointment -- although not within the framework of the Main Political Administration -- must be mentioned here, because it appears to be linked to the purge of the MPA. On Aug. 8, 1959, Krasnaya Zvezda identified N. R. Mironov as Chief of the Department of Administrative Organs of the CPSU Central Committee. N. R. Mironov thus succeeds the former MPA Chief Col. Gen. Zheltov. It is absolutely no coincidence that N. R. Mironov has the rank of a Major General for we know that the CC Department of Administrative Organs has very close links with the Army, especially the politorgans. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that N. R. Mironov was first mentioned in connection with a Party Secretaries conference in the Army. N. R. Mironov, incidentally, does not appear to be identical with Maj. Gen. N. M. Mironov, who headed the Agitprop Administration of the MPA when Zhukov was Defense Minister (last identification: Feb. 22, 1958, Pr; in specific position: Sov. Kultura Jan. 18, 1958), but rather with Maj. Gen. Nikolay Romanovich Mironov, who was elected this year to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet from Leningrad Oblast' (rpt. Sov. Rossiya, March 6, 1959). Maj. Gen. N. M. Mironov, on the other hand, must be presumed to have been demoted, for shortly after his disappearance Lt. Gen. M. Kh. Kalashnik was identified as Chief of the Agitprop Administration of the MPA (Izvestiya, July 24, 1958).

In the light of the "reorganization" of the MPA described above it becomes clear why in the past 12-18 months there has been continued criticism of the politorgans in the Army, including criticism of the Main Political Administration, i.e. the central leadership, itself. This was merely the "accompaniment" to the purge, the "justification" for the demotion of leading PA officials. It would seem unrealistic, on the other hand, to take the criticism of "shortcomings" of the politorgans at its face value. Shortcomings on such a scale do not at all seem likely. A possible explanation may be that the previous leadership of the MPA was regarded as "protégés" of Zhukov, which Brezhnev replaced by his own "protégés" when he became the overlord of the Main Political Administration within the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, following Zhukov's dismissal. But these are speculations.

The purge of the MPA, of course, is now mostly a thing of the past. Maj. Gen. Vashura, the Chief of the Political Administration of the North Caucasus MD, may perhaps still be ousted in view of the severe criticism to which he was recently subjected by Maj. Gen. G. Belousov in a Krasnaya Zvezda article captioned "The Reorganization Has Dragged on Too Long -- On the Style of Work of the Political Administration of a Military District" (KZ, July 17, 1959). But these would seem to be rear guard actions. The conferences of Party Secretaries which were held in apparently all the Military Districts in the past few weeks seem to have been designed to end the phase of the purge, or "reorganization" as it is officially called. As a matter of fact, reporting about the Conference of Party Secretaries to be held in the Group of Soviet Troops in Germany, Radio Volga said on August 7 that the decisions of the October plenum of the CC/CPSU (1957) would be "summed up" (podvesti itogi) at the Conference. The 1957 October plenum, it will be remembered, decreed the "further improvement of Party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy" (quoted from Yezhegodnik, LSE, 1958, p. 9) and ousted Zhukov.

Newspaper abbreviations used:

KZ	=	<u>Krasnaya Zvezda</u>
SB	=	<u>Sovetskaya Belorussiya</u>
PrU	=	<u>Pravda Ukrainy</u>
ZA	=	<u>Zarya Vostoka</u>
SA	=	<u>Sovetskaya Aviatsiya</u>
PrV	=	<u>Pravda Vostoka</u>
SF	=	<u>Sovetskiy Flot</u>

MILITARY REPRESENTATION ON THE 1958 SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

Bulletin,
Institute for the Study of the USSR
April 1958
by Nikolai Galay

The elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Soviet parliament, reflect to a considerable degree movements within the Party and give some idea of the processes presently taking place inside the country as a whole. They indicate the task now facing Soviet domestic policy, on the one hand, and the relationship between the forces of the various elements of authority and the various executive groups in Soviet society, on the other. The fact that the election of the people's "representatives" is not carried out on a free basis naturally means that these features do not give an unconditionally objective picture, but they nevertheless reflect the true situation.

The internal shifts are also reflected in the composition of the Supreme Soviet, regardless of the authorities' efforts at an arbitrary selection of "suitable" candidates, since they are willy-nilly forced to take into account the relationship of the forces of the State, Party, and administrative apparatuses and the differentiation which exists in the Soviet society and which is bound up with the country's technical development. Thus, as a result of the recent elections, which coincided with major reorganizations in industry and agriculture, of the 1,378 deputies elected to the 1958 Supreme Soviet 712 or 51.7% are connected with these two branches of the economy:¹ In the 1954 Supreme Soviet, on the other hand, they had 502 out of 1,374, equivalent to only 37%.² Similarly, this inevitable reflection of domestic shifts on the composition of Soviet representative organizations must also be taken into account when analyzing the armed forces' representation on the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

At this year's elections 52 of the Supreme Soviet deputies were representatives of the Soviet armed forces. This figure does not include three high-ranking officers - marshals Voroshilov and Bulganin and Colonel General Zheltov, the former head of the Chief Political Administration who was replaced in January 1958 by Colonel General F. Golikov - since they now occupy civilian posts (Voroshilov is the nominal head of state, Bulganin head of the State Bank, and Zheltov head of the military section of the Party Central Committee). Of the 52 military deputies, 14 were elected in special military electoral districts (two per district) covering the Soviet forces stationed abroad and 38 from ordinary electoral districts throughout the country.³

The number of military representatives on previous Supreme Soviets was 46 in 1950 and 73 in 1954.⁴ The 1946 elections,

¹Pravda, March 29, 1958

²Vestnik, Munich, No. 4 (1954), p. 61.

³Pravda, March 19, 1958.

⁴The USSR Today and Tomorrow, Munich, 1953, pp. 54-55; Bulletin, Munich, No. 1 (1954) pp. 23-26; Vestnik, op. cit.

which resulted in an abnormally high military representation in view of the fact that at the time 2.5 million troops were abroad, in 26 military electoral districts, cannot be taken into consideration. Thus, in comparison with the first post-Stalin elections in 1954 the number of military representatives had dropped by about 30%, from 5.1% of the total number to 3.8%. As a result, the number of military representatives on the Supreme Soviet is about the same as it was on the 1950 Supreme Soviet, when Stalin was still alive.

The 52 armed forces' representatives on the present Supreme Soviet occupy the following military positions:+

- A. Minister of Defense (1)
 - First Deputy Ministers of Defense (2)
 - Commanders in Chief of Arms and Simultaneously Deputy Ministers of Defense (4)
 - Head of the Voroshilov Higher General Staff Academy (1)
 - Head of the Civil Air Lines (1)
 - Deputy Minister and Head of the Chief Political Administration for the Armed Forces (1)
 - Admirals - Baltic and Black Sea fleets (2)
 - Chairman of the Administration of the Voluntary Society for the Cooperation of the Army, Air Force and Navy - DOSAAF (1)
 - Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Forces (1)
 - Chief Inspector, Central Apparatus of the Ministry of Defense (1)
- B. Commanders of Military Districts (15)
 - Commander, Soviet Forces in Germany (1)
 - Commander, Soviet Forces in Poland (1)
 - Commander, Soviet Forces in Hungary (1)
 - Commander of Border Troops, Central Asian Border District (1)
- C. Deputy Commanders of Military Districts and Deputy Commanders of Forces Abroad (5)
 - Heads of Soviet Units Abroad (4)
 - Inspector and Deputy Inspector, Fighter Aviation (2)
 - Others - Positions Unknown (2)

These three groups represent the armed forces' higher representatives. The first group, comprising 19 persons, is made up of the heads of departments of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense, the second, also comprising 19 persons, of the commanders of military districts and forces abroad, that is, men who actually occupy the key command positions, while the third group, comprising 14 persons, supplements the second, although Major General Piskunov (a colonel at the time of the 1954 elections) and Colonel Kopylov do not have command positions. However, Piskunov's membership of the Armenian Party Central Committee shows his importance in the Party hierarchy, and Kopylov's position may be analogous. ++

+For a list of the military representatives on the 1958 Supreme Soviet of the USSR, see pp. 9-10.

++Both are police officials in Armenia (MVD) and Azerbaidzan (KGB) respectively; see below p.10.

The forces' representatives can be broken down according to rank as follows:

Marshals.....	16	Lieutenant Colonels	8
Generals.....	8	Major Generals	5
Colonel Generals.....	11	Admirals	3
Others	1		

As before, the middle and lower ranks of the armed forces are not represented, and there is only one officer below the rank of general, as opposed to four on the 1954 Supreme Soviet.

Not all the armed forces' higher representatives are Supreme Soviet deputies; only 15 were elected from the 19 military and 3 antiaircraft defense districts. Five military districts - the Northern, Tavrida, South Urals, Siberian and Transbaikal - and two antiaircraft defense districts - the Moscow and Leningrad - are not represented. The reason for this becomes clear on examination of the Party positions of the Supreme Soviet military deputies.

All high-ranking Soviet officers are Party members, although they occupy varying positions in the Party hierarchy. Of the 1958 deputies, 4 are Central Committee members (Marshals Konev, Malinovsky, Sokolovsky, and Moskalenko) and 11 candidate members (marshals Bagramyan, Biryuzov, Budenny, Grechko, Eremanko, Zhigarev, Nedelin, Timoshenko, and Chuikov, General Gorbатов, and Admiral Gorshkov.) In addition to these 15, 7 or 8 deputies are members of central committees of the union republic Communist Parties.

The military members of the Central Committee occupy the following key positions:

Minister of Defense.....	Malinovsky
First Deputy Ministers of Defense.....	Konev
	Sokolovsky
Commanders in Chief of Arms: Land forces.....	Grechko ++
Naval Forces.....	Gorshkov
Antiaircraft	
Defense.....	Biryuzov
Aviation.....	Zhigarev+
Head of the Voroshilov Higher General Staff	
Academy.....	Bagramyan
Commanders of Military Districts: Moscow.....	Moskalenko
Kiev.....	Chuikov
Baltic.....	Gorbатов
Belorussia.....	Timoshenko
North	
Caucasian.....	Eremanko

These five districts comprise two major metropolitan districts two of the most important Western border districts, and the

+ Since 1957, head of civil air lines.

++ Grechko is also First Deputy Minister of Defense; see Background Information, 11 April 1958; also Politicheskoy Slovar, Moscow, 1958, p. 142.

North Caucasian District, which contains the important strategic triangle Stalingrad-Rostov-Krasnodar, together with the Black Sea coast.

These facts prove that the long-standing principle of having the top military chiefs members of both supreme organs- the Party Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet - has been preserved. Hence, state and Party functionaries are still combined, a feature typical of the whole Soviet structure and the military hierarchy.

Finally, of the 52 military deputies of the present Supreme Soviet, 31 had been deputies of the 1954 Supreme Soviet. This points to a certain stability in the composition of the higher military cadres, all aged between 57 and 65.

The following conclusions may be drawn from what has been said:

1. There are about one third fewer military representatives on the new Supreme Soviet than on the preceding one. However, the previous system of military representation, under which only persons occupying the top posts are nominated as military deputies, has been consolidated. Earlier exceptions to this rule - the nomination of war heroes who had neither occupied key positions nor held high ranks - were completely removed at the recent elections.

2. The system of combining state (military) and Party functions in one person has been preserved in principle for the top-ranking military representatives. More than one third of the military deputies occupy key command positions and are at the same time important Party figures (members and candidate members of the Party Central Committee). Prior to the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, that is, during and immediately after the Stalin era, this "personal unity" of state and Party functions had been broader. Thus, after the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952, of the Supreme Soviet's 46 military deputies 29 were at the same time on the Party Central Committee (6 members and 23 candidate members). In other words, not one, but two thirds of the military deputies were combining state and Party functions.⁵

3. The reduction in the number of military representatives on the new Supreme Soviet and Party Central Committee implies that the armed forces' influence in the higher organs of government has declined. This has come about independently of Zhukov's downfall at the end of 1957. Zhukov's dismissal, which was simply the final stage in this process, meant primarily a reduction in the Army's political importance. The process had begun at the XXth Party Congress, when the number of military Central Committee candidate members was reduced from 23 to 12, and even after Marshals Zhukov, Malinovsky, and Moskalenko replaced Admiral Kuznetsov as members of the Party Central Committee, the balance was not restored.⁶

⁵ The USSR Today and Tomorrow, op. cit.

⁶ Bulletin, op. cit., No. 4 (1956), pp. 3-11; Pravda, Feb. 26, 1956.

Bearing in mind the fact that the armed forces' leaders' elevated position in the Party hierarchy automatically predetermines their participation in the struggle for power going on within the Party the sharp decrease in their numbers on the Central Committee brought about at the Twentieth Party Congress must be considered the first step in the reduction of the Army's political role. This process appeared to have been halted when Minister of Defense Zhukov was introduced onto the Presidium of the Central Committee, first as candidate member and then as member, an act which was widely regarded as proof that the Army's role was increasing. However, it was not noted that Zhukov's increased personal influence and position had gone hand in hand with the removal from their positions as candidate members of the Central Committee of almost half the military figures, mainly commanders of military districts, among whom Zhukov enjoyed greater authority than any of the other marshals. Thus, although admitted onto the Presidium, Zhukov had lost his political support in the Central Committee. Moreover, the military representatives left on the Central Committee - Konev, Solokovsky, Malinkovsky, and even Moskalenko - were more his rivals than his comrades. The events of October 1957 plenary session of the Central Committee resulting in Zhukov's removal clearly substantiate this, for he was not supported by his military colleagues and subordinates.⁷

Thus, Zhukov's removal automatically meant that the army's role, which had increased after Stalin's death as a result of inner-Party differences, was reduced. The recent Supreme Soviet elections merely showed this numerically.

4. The reduction of the Army's influence has, however, taken place without disturbing the structure of the Army's political organization and the principle governing its representation on the higher organs of government. The principle of edinonachalie (the combination of military and political authority) has remained fully in force, and the Army's political apparatus, which the October 1957 plenary session set the task of increasing Party indoctrination in the armed forces, has remained subordinate to a fully authoritative commander at every stage of the Army hierarchy. The appointment of F. Golikov, at once an important political figure, an experienced soldier, a member of the Cheka, and even a diplomat, as head of the Chief Political Administration for the Armed Forces in place of the colorless Zheltov shows the Soviet leaders' intention of strengthening the Party's influence in the Army. This, however, was not reflected outwardly at the Supreme Soviet elections. Military deputies are almost always unit commanders, and only Golikov and two or three generals of the Army's political apparatus have been allowed to become Supreme Soviet deputies; that is, the increase in the influence of the Army's Party apparatus must be greater than it actually appears.

Closely connected with this is the stability of the Soviet armed forces' higher levels of command. The senior military posts are still occupied mainly by men who for the past 15 years have occupied the same positions as deputy ministers of defense, commanders of arms, chief inspectors, commanders of military districts and groups of forces abroad, and so on. Changes in the top Army posts have usually been in the nature of transfers, as

⁷ Pravda, November 3, 1957.

the fact that the new Supreme Soviet contains two thirds of the old military representatives clearly illustrates.

Promotion to top Army positions from the middle echelons of the military hierarchy takes place on a very small scale indeed. In 1957, the only top military men to step down were Zhukov and Marshal Vasilevsky, who was transferred to the position of Chairman of the War Veterans' Society (whether for reasons of health or because he had throughout his career been connected with Molotov is a moot point). These removals and Zheltov's transfer were the only changes on the upper levels: New names do not appear until we reach lower-ranking military deputies. Thus, there are 12 new commanders of military districts and representatives of Soviet forces abroad, all men who have been promoted from the middle ranks of the military hierarchy - former deputy commanders of military districts or commanders of corps and armies abroad. These are colonel generals Komarov, Andreev, Ivanov, Khetagurov, and Getman; Lieutenant generals Grebennik, Efimov, Baukov, Zimin; and major generals Lapin, Ivliev, and Bednyagin.

It may therefore be considered that to date the Party has shown no desire to make any major changes in the composition of the higher military cadres, although age could always have been used as a convenient excuse. This points if not to the Party leaders' unwillingness to trust the intermediate links of the Soviet chain of command, at least to a desire to maintain the status quo. But this tendency contradicts the general process involved in the election of a new Supreme Soviet, reflecting to a certain degree the social changes taking place inside the country. Although 64% of the military deputies were reelected to the new Supreme Soviet, (30 out of 52) reelections make up only 36.5% of the total (502 out of 1,378).⁸

A certain contradiction can be observed in the composition of the new Supreme Soviet and in the tendency to select military representatives exclusively from the upper military hierarchy. By dividing the new Supreme Soviet's basic groups - Party, government, state security apparatus, armed forces, industry and transportation, agriculture, and the intelligentsia into upper and lower levels a picture of the new changes can be obtained on the basis of the 1954 and 1958 Supreme Soviets:

CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

	Upper Level Deputies		Lower Level * Deputies		Total	
	1954	1958	1954	1958	1954	1958
Party	232	244	54	34	286	278
Government	128	90	146	73	274	163
State Security						
Apparatus	23	12	---	---	23	12
Armed Forces	69	51	4	1	73	52
Industry and						
Transportation	78	79	154	252	232	331
Agriculture	167	182	103	199	270	381
Intelligentsia	193	161	---	---	193	161

⁸Based on unpublished material by V. Strizhkov. Manuscript in the possession of the author.

*Officers of the border troops of the KGB.

NOTE: The upper level comprises: PARTY: members, candidate members, and secretaries of the Central Committee, as well as persons attached to it, members of the Central Auditing and Control commissions, secretaries of the union republic, krai, oblast and city Party committees. GOVERNMENT: ministers of the USSR and union republics and their deputies, members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the presidiums of the union republic. STATE SECURITY ORGANS: leading KGB and MVD workers, public prosecutors at the all-union, republic, krai and oblast level, supreme court judges, ministers of justice. INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORTATION: all positions from chief engineers, heads of shops, and engineers upwards. AGRICULTURE: MTS and sovkhoz directors, kolkhoz chairmen, their deputies, agronomists, and technical experts. INTELLIGENTSIA: scholars, writers, artists doctors, teachers, and so on. The lower level comprises: PARTY: secretaries of raion Party committees and below, GOVERNMENT: chairmen of krai and oblast executive committees and below. INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORTATION: foremen, brigade leaders, and workers. AGRICULTURE: MTS, sovkhoz, brigade, team, and kolkhoz workers.

SOURCE: Based on unpublished material by V. Strizhkov. Manuscript in the possession of the author.

Thus, between 1954 and 1958 the following changes have taken place in the composition of the Supreme Soviet:

Industry and agriculture have increased their representation by more than 50%. The increase is particularly noticeable in the lower levels, the number of workers and kolkhozniks being almost doubled.

The government and state security organs have had their representation almost halved. The government has been weakened primarily in the lower levels, while the state security organs, which are made up exclusively from the upper levels, the reduction has been mainly of KGB (Committee for State Security) and MVD workers from 19 in 1954 to 7 in 1958.

The Party has maintained its former number of representatives, although there has been a swing towards the upper levels.

The intelligentsia has had its representation cut by almost 15%.

The armed forces have suffered a reduction of almost one third and now only the upper levels have representatives on the Supreme Soviet.

The conclusion to be drawn is that the complex nature of the domestic political situation and the country's economic difficulties are forcing the Soviet leaders to undertake new reforms

in industry and agriculture and to seek support among the masses, who have been given some satisfaction in the form of increased representation in the Supreme Soviet. The Party and Army, which have in the main retained the status quo, are intended by the authorities as the main supports of the regime and the regulators of the changes taking place.

A feature not only unsatisfactory but even a danger to the authorities is the fact that the role of safeguarding the regime ascribed to the Army and state apparatus as a whole is performed exclusively by the aging cadres of the higher leaders. The stability of the higher military command, as reflected by the composition of the new Supreme Soviet, clearly shows the Soviet leaders' reluctance to place reliance on a new group from the intermediate and lower levels of the military hierarchy. Hence, in opposition to the general trend the latter are not represented on the 1958 Supreme Soviet.

MILITARY REPRESENTATION ON THE 1958 SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

	Rank	Position
ALEKSANDROV, N.M. ⁺	Lt. Gen.	Deputy Commander, Kiev military District
ANDREEV, A.M.	Col. Gen.	Commander, Voronezh Military District
ANTONOV, A.I. ⁺	General	Chief of Staff, Warsaw Pact Forces
BAGRAMYAN, I.K. ⁺	Marshal	Head of the Voroshilov Higher General Staff Academy
BATOV, P.I. ⁺	General	Commander, Carpathian Military District.
BAUKOV, L.I.	Lt. Gen.	Serving with Soviet Forces Abroad
BELOV, P.I. ⁺	Col. Gen.	Chairman of the Administration of the Voluntary Society for the Cooperation of the Army, Air Force and Navy (DOSAAF)
BEDNYAGIN, A.I.	Maj. Gen.	Serving with Soviet Forces Abroad
BIRYUZOV, S.S. ⁺	Marshal	Commander in Chief, Anti-aircraft Defense; Deputy Minister of Defense
BUDENNY, S.M. ⁺	Marshal	Deputy Minister of Defense
CHUIKOV, V.I. ⁺	Marshal	Commander, Kiev Military District
EREMENKO, A.I. ⁺	Marshal	Commander, North Caucasian Military District
EFIMOV, P.I.	Lt. Gen.	Serving with Soviet Forces Abroad
FEDYUNINSKY, I.I.	General	Commander, Turkestan Military District
GALITSKY, K.N. ⁺	General	Commander, Transcaucasian Military District
GETMAN, A.K.	Col. Gen.	Commander of Tank Forces, Germany
GOLIKOV, F.I.	Col. Gen.	Head of the Chief Political Administration of the Armed Forces; Deputy Minister of Defense.
GORBATOV, A.V. ⁺	General	Commander, Baltic Military District
GORSHKOV, S.G. ⁺	Admiral	Commander in chief, Naval Forces; Deputy Minister of Defense
GREBENNIK, K.E.	Lt. Gen.	Chief of Border Guards Troops South West District
GRECHKO, A.A. ⁺	Marshal	Commander in Chief, Land Forces; Deputy Minister of Defense.
IVANOV, V.D.	Col. Gen.	Commander, Baku District Anti-aircraft Defense.
IVLIEV, I.D.	Maj. Gen.	Serving with Soviet Forces Abroad
KASATONOV, V.A.	Admiral	Commander, Black Sea Fleet
KAZAKOV, M.I. ⁺	General	Commander of Soviet Forces, Hungary
KHARLAMOV, N.M. ⁺	Admiral	Commander, Baltic Fleet

KHETAGUROV, G.I.....	Col. Gen....	Commander of Artillery, Germany
KOMAROV, V.N.....	Col. Gen....	Commander, Volga Military District
KONEV, I.S. ⁺	Marshal.....	Commander in Chief, Warsaw Pact Forces; First Deputy Minister of Defence.
KOZHEDUB, I.I. ⁺	Maj. Gen....	Deputy Inspector, Fighter Aviation.
KRYLOV, N.I. ⁺	General	Commander, Leningrad Military District
LAPIN, V.K.	Maj. Gen....	Commander of Border Troops, Central Asian Border District
LELYUSHENKO, D.D.	Col. Gen....	Commander, Urals Military District
MALINOVSKY, R.Y. ⁺	Marshal	Minister of Defense
MALTSEV, E.E.	Lt. Gen....	Deputy Commander, Turkestan Military District
MERETSKOV, K.A. ⁺	Marshal	Dep. Minister of Defense
MOSKALENKO, K.S. ⁺	Marshal	Commander, Moscow Military District
NEDELIN, M.I. ⁺	Chief Marshal of Artillery...	Deputy Minister of Defense.
PENKOVSKY, V.A.	Col. Gen....	Commander, Far Eastern Military District
PLIEV, I.A. ⁺	Col. Gen....	Deputy Commander, North Caucasian Military District.
POKRYSHKIN, A.I. ⁺	Lt. Gen....	Inspector, Fighter Aviation
POPOV, M.M.	Lt. Gen....	Chief Inspector, Combat Training
RADZIEVSKY, A.I.	Col. Gen....	Commander, Odessa Military District
ROKOSHOVSKY, K.K. ⁺	Marshal	Deputy Minister of Defense.
SOKOLOVSKY, V.D. ⁺	Marshal	Chief of the Army and Navy General Staff; First Deputy Minister of Defense
TIMOSHENKO, S.K. ⁺	Marshal	Commander, Belorussian Military District
VERSHININ, K.A. ⁺	Marshal of Aviation ...	Commander in Chief, Air Force; Deputy Minister of Defense.
ZAKHAROV, M.V. ⁺	General	Commander of Army Group Germany
ZHIGAREV, P.F. ⁺	Chief Marshal of Aviation	Head of Civil Air Lines
ZIMIN, G.V.	Lt. Gen	Head of Air Force Units Germany

The following two police officials were included in the author's list:

KOPYLOV, F.I.	Colonel	Chairman of Committee State Security, Azerbaidzhan
PISKUNOV, P.V. ⁺	Maj. Gen ...	Formerly Minister of Internal Affairs Armenia

⁺Member of the 1954 Supreme Soviet of the USSR.