

Radio Free Europe/Munich
Evaluation and Analysis Department *Sino-Soviet*
Background Information USSR

22 June 1960

KHRUSHCHEV IN BUCHAREST

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For his visit to Bucharest, N. S. Khrushchev has assembled one of the strongest ideological teams to leave the USSR in recent years. Not only P. N. Pospelov, a candidate member of the Presidium, but also B. N. Ponomarev, believed to be the head of the Section of the CC CPSU responsible for liaison with foreign Communist parties, Ya. V. Andropov, who is presumed to be head of the Section of the CC CPSU for liaison with Communist parties of the "socialist" countries, and P. A. Satyukov, the chief editor of Pravda are members of it. This galaxy of talent has presumably assisted in the preparation of the advance text of Khrushchev's speech, which was issued on the morning of June 21st with an embargo until further notice. The unusual embargo procedure was an indication of the importance which Khrushchev attached to the speech, and also of his own willingness to adopt Western methods -- even in the publicity field -- wherever he believes they may be of advantage. Almost at the beginning of the text, Khrushchev obliquely drew attention to the main international problem now confronting every communist leader, the need for unity spotlighted by the ideological differences between Peking and Moscow, by denying their very existence:

"Between our parties, between our countries there exists unity of views both on internal problems of the development of our countries and on all international questions: the fight for peace, for peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, for the peaceful settlement of all disputed problems between states, for disarmament, and on all other questions.

"Between our parties, between our socialist states there have never been different points of view, there have never been a different understanding or even shades of understanding on vital international problems, the problems of the international revolutionary workers' movement, of ensuring the victory of the great cause of communism."

This unconvincing affirmation of idyllic unity by no means represents the true state of affairs in the communist camp, where prior to this speech, Soviet and Chinese sources have been issuing widely different theories concerning the inevitability of minor wars, the possibility of peaceful co-existence and the practicability of general disarmament. Nevertheless it probably described what Khrushchev hopes to achieve, perhaps without much real confidence on his part that the party in Peking will stop rocking his ideological boat.

Shortly afterwards Khrushchev turned to Rumanian internal affairs, and here he made a veiled but unmistakable criticism of Peking. He congratulated Georgiu-Dej on the soundness of the Rumanian 6-year plan, which Khrushchev describes as based on "the development of the material-technical basis for socialism, the completion of the process of the establishment of socialist relations throughout the national economy in order to complete the building of socialism in Rumania." Since on the previous day (June 20th) Pravda had criticized those who are "running too far forward" and forgetting to "synchronize their watches," none of Khrushchev's audience can have doubted that he was reminding them of the wisdom of avoiding short cuts -- such as the people's communes -- when the necessary pre-conditions, i.e. socialist relations, have not yet been consolidated.

Khrushchev made great play with his belief in the economic superiority of "socialism" over capitalism, and revived an unusual Lenin quotation, which emphasized the importance of economic successes to the cause of socialism and stressed that "we exert our main influence on the international arena through our economic policy." In short he reiterated ad nauseam the current 20th Party Congress line that capitalism can be defeated in peaceful competition, and thereby he implied that recent bellicosity of the Peking variety is not only unnecessary but undesirable as a current policy.

In the section of the speech dealing with Soviet internal policy, Khrushchev gave the usual praise to the entirely fictitious "abolition of taxes" and to the wholly real cuts in the work-day, both of which he holds up as an example to be followed in due course by other "socialist" countries. He added:

"It cannot be doubted that in the not too distant future similar steps will be taken in all socialist countries."

Khrushchev reminded his audience that there is likely to be "considerable" overfulfillment of the Soviet economic plan for 1960, and went on to say that "whole raions, oblasts and republics are undertaking to fulfill the 7-year plan in five years."

After some orthodox remarks concerning the need for economic cooperation with the "socialist" camp, Khrushchev soon returned to his main theme, the need for unity under Moscow's leadership.

"It is already clear to everyone that only by close economic and political cooperation between the countries of the world socialist system is it possible successfully to advance to socialism and communism. There is no other way...." He indulged in some mild criticism of Yugoslavia for joining the "Balkan bloc" with Greece and Turkey, and then made an interesting subdivision of the communist countries according to their stage of industrial development: Czechoslovakia was placed in the top category, with Bulgaria and Poland in the medium grade, while Albania and Vietnam were said to have been "backward in the past." Khrushchev seemed to imply that he thinks they still are.

On the hotly-contested issue of war or peace, Khrushchev continued to advocate avoidance of world war as the right policy for all Marxist-Leninist parties, and later said that local wars should also be avoided, because of the danger that they might grow into world wars. Here his attitude contrasted clearly with that of Peking, which now argues that though major wars can possibly be avoided, local wars are still inevitable (see Hsinhua, Liu Chang-sheng, June 8, 1960, Background Information, June 9, 1960).

He also sharply attacked those who "mechanically repeat what Lenin said many decades ago...and go on asserting that imperialist wars are inevitable until socialism triumphs throughout the world." Khrushchev argued that as the conditions have changed since Lenin's day, to go on repeating what he said then is to act "like children compiling words from letters." This discourteous reference to the Chinese, who have tended to portray themselves as the defenders of pure and unadulterated Leninist doctrine on imperialist wars, was the sharpest formulation used against any communist capital in the entire speech.

Khrushchev also pointed to his proposals for complete disarmament, for stopping nuclear tests, banning atomic weapons and to the reduction in the communist armed forces as evidence of his devotion to peaceful coexistence. This part of the speech can scarcely be much to the liking of Peking, which still regards the idea of general disarmament as naive wishful thinking.

The speech devoted much space to the construction of an image of the Pax Sovietica which is supposed to have been forced on the capitalist world (Egypt, Syria and Iraq are cited as examples) by the resolute USSR. Here too the picture of Khrushchev the peacemaker seems unlikely to satisfy

his Chinese critics, who feel that a more vigorous policy is needed, and who might justifiably note that in all three countries the Communist Party is now illegal, and seems likely to remain so -- scarcely a good advertisement for Khrushchev's methods.

In his references to the U-2 incident, Khrushchev conspicuously ceased to assert that President Eisenhower is a man of peace, and went further than he has previously done in arguing that the "US imperialists" were preparing for a preventive war. Presumably these minor verbal concessions were intended to mollify Peking, but Khrushchev showed that he himself does not take them seriously by saying that nevertheless the correct policy is still that of the 20th Party Congress.

Finally at the end of his speech Khrushchev praised the Rumanian party in the usual glowing terms, but referred significantly to its "consistent struggle for the purity of Marxism-Leninism" and its "resolute defense of proletarian internationalism." He pointed out that Rumania is giving full support to the foreign policy of the CPSU, and seemed to be giving a delicate hint to some other parties that they should do likewise.

As regards intra-bloc relations, it was on the whole a moderate and restrained speech, avoiding any of the vigorous charges of "left-wing extremism" which the Soviet press has uttered during the past fortnight. Khrushchev appeared to want to suggest to Peking that a similar attitude on its part might yet bridge the ideological gap which continues to divide it from the Kremlin.

Whether these relatively soft words in Bucharest will erase from Chinese minds the resentment which must have been caused by the Pravda and Sovetskaya Rossiya articles is open to question. Had Khrushchev's angry reference to those who read Lenin but do not understand him not crept in, the prospects for a narrowing of the Sino-Soviet ideological differences would have been appreciably brighter.

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THE LEGEND OF THE CHAINED NIKITA

By Alexander Dallin

The New Leader

June 20, 1960

The bothersome U-2 story and the drama of the summit conference--that--was--none have provoked an orgy of speculation about Soviet motives and intentions. High officials and prominent newsmen have indulged in it more freely than any time since Stalin's death. Such hypothesizing is both healthy and understandable; political analysis must be based on assumed probabilities even if access to the source is barred. What is startling and disturbing in the recent wave of reassessments is the ease with which the view has spread that Nikita Khrushchev was in fact constrained to act as he did; that he was (as one authority put it) "under strong pressure," or (as another writes) a "prisoner," a tool of nefarious hidden forces.

To the best of our knowledge, I submit, this is simply not so.

The legend of the chained Nikita includes three evil spirits, which operate either singly or together, depending on whose version you read. These are The Military, The Stalinists and The Chinese.

So far as the Soviet military is concerned, it will be well to remember, first of all, that it has never constituted a united political force. It has been faction-ridden and divided on important problems of military (and, implicitly, foreign) policy. But it has never been in a position to challenge the political leadership. Soviet marshals and generals are members of the Communist party, almost to a man, and they accept Party discipline in political affairs. From Frunze and Tukhachevsky to Zhukov (surely, men more powerful and more popular than the Konevs and Malinovskys of today), the military leaders have been, in the last analysis, at the mercy of the dictator, who has been able to dispose of them as he saw fit. There is no evidence whatever that this relationship has changed.

If in 1955-56 there could be any doubt about the priority of the Communist party, it was emphatically and unmistakably removed in 1957. The tightening of controls and the struggle against "revisionism" included among its various manifestations the reinforcement of political control over the armed forces. Since then the priority of the Party -- in word and in fact -- has explicitly been raised to unprecedented heights. And the image of Marshal Rodion Malinovsky following Khrushchev's every step in and out of Paris as a watchdog of the hidden junta in Moscow is too silly to take seriously.

As for the Stalinists, the question is of course, "Who are they?" Invariably, speculation centers on Mikhail Suslov as the leader or spokesman of this "camp." Granting for the sake of argument that Suslov represents a "tougher" line than Khrushchev, what are his levers of power and who are the others who back him in the top echelons of the Kremlin? Either one grants the reality of some measure of collective decision-making there -- and then Khrushchev's complete and systematic packing and control of the Party Presidium, Central Committee and Secretariat must be clearly recognized (the changing relationship among these three bodies is irrelevant for our purposes, as Khrushchev now fully controls all three); or else one assumes that numbers and majorities do not matter in these bodies -- and then there would be no reason to believe that a hostile but victorious Suslov would continue to tolerate Khrushchev in power if he could dispense with him (much as the Molotov-Malenkov bloc would have dispensed with him in 1957).

If one trend emerges unmistakably from the various personnel shifts in the Soviet Government and Communist party leadership in recent years, it is the almost uninterrupted consolidation of control by the Khrushchev machine and the elimination of any power base for a possible challenger. The latest shifts, including Frol Kozlov's and Leonid Brezhnev's reappointments, merely underscore this trend. Of the old-timers, the only ones who remain are Anastas Mikoyan (usually considered either opportunistic or relatively "soft") and the virtually impotent Kliment Voroshilov and Otto Kuusinen. Just about everyone else is an appointee of the Khrushchev era. As one runs down the list of the three top bodies, one fails to see more than a few names of men who could turn, or could have turned, on the khoziain. To be sure, a "Khrushchev man" may turn against him, just as Khrushchev himself turned against Stalin after his death. But we are talking about probabilities or, better yet, evidence and clues. And, here, the thesis of the Stalinists' ascendancy does not stand up. Unless that is, one is satisfied (as one well-known correspondent says) that this trend must be taken on faith and evidence for it may not be apparent for months.

As usual, the role of China is most obscure. Without going into the complexities of the Sino-Soviet relationship, it may be said as a general proposition that the Chinese tail does not wag the Soviet dog (nor, for that matter, vice versa). For years, differences between the two powers have demonstrably existed over a wide range of issues, without seriously jeopardizing their alliance. These issues have included the inevitability of war, the cult of the individual, tactics toward the United States, the communes, the availability of nuclear weapons and no doubt a good many others as well. But I know of no shred of evidence showing that Khrushchev has now, after years of modulating and mitigating Sino-Soviet differences, been compelled to accept Peking's views, on this or on any other matter.

The permutations and combinations of the three evil genies add little of substance. Thus, the attempt to link Vyacheslav Molotov, as the leading Stalinist (which he was) in his Outer Mongolian quasi-exile, to Chinese Government head Liu Shao-chi in an alleged anti-Khrushchev drive is an artificial construct which has been tried and found wanting more than once before. (For that matter, Peking's publication of Molotov's speeches and statements, which Moscow failed to print, is by no means unprecedented, as recent comment has suggested: Precisely the same was true, for instance, in November 1958.) Moreover, the notion of an explicit coalition of Stalinists, Militarists and Chinese Communists joining hands to choke Nikita fails to reflect much insight into totalitarian politics.

All this is not a critique of Kremlinology. Close scrutiny of Soviet sources, even frequency count and pecking order, can be essential for hints about intramural politics. Nor is this to suggest in any way that there are not real tensions and differences in Soviet society and the Soviet regime. Of course there are, and the image of a homogeneous totalitarian apparatus is as unrealistic as the thesis I am trying to contest.

Disagreements at the apex of totalitarian regimes are epidemic. In the Soviet case, we know that such disagreements have existed, in recent years, over such issues as the relative priority of consumer goods, the long-range effect of foreign aid, the universal fatality of nuclear warfare and the possibility and desirability of relaxing the cold war. It is plausible to assume that such differences were present in March-April 1960 when the general lines of Soviet foreign policy were reviewed. The confusion of American voices is not likely to have clarified matters for the Muscovite observers. There were, and no doubt are, real divergences about proper Soviet strategy in foreign affairs.

Similarly, the breakdown of the Paris conference has no doubt pleased Peking and produced greater concord between the two leading Communist powers. But this is a by-product of the story, not its cause. The differences between Moscow and Peking continue to be as great as ever, it seems. In the aftermath of his exhibition of vilification and vulgarity, Khrushchev continues to refrain from signing the peace treaty with East Germany; he submits new proposals on disarmament-by-stages and continues negotiations on nuclear test suspension; he continues to promote a variety of cultural, commercial and scientific exchanges with the West -- the U.S. included. There is no surrender to Chinese dragons, whatever the balance of Soviet decisions.

And the same is true of the military. No doubt, there is some truth in the recent analysis of the large number of Soviet officers facing demobilization and viewing their loss of status and income with something less than enthusiasm. No

doubt Khrushchev's militant stance helped to reassure those in Russia, in and out of uniform, who have been bothered by the gnawing fear that the Man in Moscow might be taking his "peaceful coexistence" seriously, or might let his impulses jeopardize rational defense requirements. But all this has nothing to do with officers forcing a decision upon him. It is he who has the ultimate authority to decide about crucial shifts of military policy and personnel, not the other way around.

There is, in other words, no one to challenge his effective control. Others can suggest, argue, make themselves heard -- and they can do so more successfully and with greater impunity than in Stalin's days. At times, Khrushchev is apparently prepared to listen to them. But no man and no faction can force its will on the Khrushchev machine.

Nothing is impossible in Soviet affairs. But I suggest that if those who detect an inhibited Russian Prometheus should be proved right, it will be for the wrong reasons -- or rather for reasons not now in the public domain. In the absence of inside information, we must probe Soviet intentions by a process of triangulation which includes Soviet ideology, Soviet pronouncements and the record of past Soviet performance. All three militate strongly against the view which I have been contesting here. Neither the theory (or, to use Nathan Leites' term, the "operational code") nor the record of Bolshevik behavior over half a century would permit tolerating a leader who is anything less than a complete master of all his own decisions.

As for Soviet pronouncements, Khrushchev would not have made his statement of May 28 if a real crisis of confidence or control had been involved. No such denial was made, for instance, when either the Molotov-Malenkov group or Marshal Georgi Zhukov or, later, Nikolai Bulganin were ousted. Now, Khrushchev confidently ridicules those "silly allegations" which contend that he "is being opposed by army officers and generals," or that "other socialist countries are pressing the Soviet Union to give up the policy of détente and other things of this kind." And if Mikoyan were about to be axed (as some commentators have suggested), Khrushchev would scarcely have ridiculed such speculation by relating that Mikoyan had just invited him to his vacation ground in the Caucasus.

Quite the contrary. The style of the Paris performance smacked not only of Bolshevik tactics but reflected Khrushchev's personal amalgam of bullying and smiling, his immense flexibility and the characteristic ease with which he can shift gears suddenly, completely, from subject to subject, from vulgar diatribe to humility, from insult and insecurity to sweet reasonableness -- and back. Anyone who has been the man in action for a few hours can confirm that the recent performances were fully and typically his own, both in content and in form.

The speed and ease with which the image of Khrushchev as the instrument of some grey eminence has spread in this country reflects, I believe, more about ourselves than about Soviet reality. Some who have swallowed it are either unwilling to re-examine their assumptions about the nature of "co-existence," or else cannot reconcile the memory of the burly politician, who last fall toured the U.S. with a smile and a simile and a sandstorm of hope, with the angry old man in Paris. That so many responsible men, after years of following and interpreting Soviet affairs closely in this country, should have adopted this inversion of wishful thinking strikes me as more than deplorable.

To assert that Khrushchev is being forced to act as he does is no sounder than it was, 20 years ago, to portray Hitler as a tool of the German General Staff or of the Krupps; no less far-fetched and no less dangerous than the present Soviet insistence that Eisenhower (or any other American political figure) is a tool of the Pentagon and/or Wall Street.

The present mood reveals above all -- if my line of argument is correct -- our continued failure to focus on, and accept as given, the long-range nature of Soviet outlook and objectives, and to see against this background the skillful but by no means unerring flexibility of Moscow's hand.

K-MAO - 2^e ROUND AU RUSSE

By François Fejto
Democratie
June 16, 1960

Avec la récente réunion de Bureau de la Fédération Syndicale Mondiale, à Pékin, le différend idéologico-politique entre l'U.R.S.S. de Khrouchtchev et la Chine populaire de Mao Tsé-toung vient d'entrer dans une nouvelle phase. Tout se passe comme si d'un côté comme de l'autre, on ne se préoccupait plus autant que par le passé, de dissimuler les divergences. En tout cas, dès le premier jour de la réunion de Pékin, à laquelle ont participé les délégués des syndicats communistes ou communistes d'une quarantaine de pays, les représentants de la Chine ont porté devant l'aréopage international le débat sur la coexistence pacifique dans lequel ils se trouvent engagés contre les Russes.

Le but des Chinois était clair: jeter le discrédit sur les récentes propositions de désarmement de Khrouchtchev et par ce biais attaquer toute la conception des Soviétiques en politique étrangère. Les principaux orateurs chinois, Liou Ning Ying et Liou Chang Cheng, respectivement président et vice-président des syndicats chinois et proches collaborateurs de Mao, ont affiché un scepticisme total quant aux chances de succès des propositions khrouchtcheviennes que le gouvernement de Pékin venait d'approuver sans grande conviction dans une déclaration officielle où il faisait une large part à ses propres idées.

"Il est inconcevable, a dit notamment Liou Chang Cheng, que les impérialistes acceptent les propositions soviétiques." Et pourquoi? Parce que "comme Mao Tsé-toung l'a dit, la nature agressive, pleine de subterfuge et de trahison, de l'impérialisme américain ne changera jamais." Dans ces conditions, la tâche la plus importante des syndicats affiliés à la F.S.M. était, selon les Chinois, de combattre "l'illusion naïve qui consiste à croire à la possibilité d'un accord avec l'Occident." Tant que l'impérialisme ne sera pas détruit, on ne saurait songer à supprimer la guerre. Et les données du problème étant ainsi définies, les porte-parole de Mao soulignaient que les propositions soviétiques avaient uniquement une valeur de propagande. Elles devraient permettre aux activistes communistes et syndicalistes du monde entier de démasquer les Occidentaux comme fauteurs de guerre.

Les Chinois contre le désarmement nucléaire

Les délégués chinois ont exprimé le même scepticisme quant à la possibilité d'un accord sur le désarmement nucléaire. Même si un tel accord venait à être conclu à Genève, ont-ils dit, les impérialistes pourraient le rompre à tout

moment. Aussi, la seule tactique raisonnable que la F.S.M. devrait suivre d'après eux consisterait à mobiliser les masses populaires de tous les pays non-communistes contre l'armement atomique et contre l'imperialisme en général pendant que "U.R.S.S. et les autres pays socialistes poursuivraient sans relâche leurs efforts afin de conserver leur avance dans le domaine de l'énergie atomique." Ce qui veut dire que les Chinois, avant de parler de désarmement, souhaitent posséder la bombe.

Les Soviétiques parlent-ils de la nécessité de poursuivre la "lutte pour la paix?" D'accord, disent les Chinois, à condition que "cette lutte soit conduite dans le cadre d'une offensive générale contre les pays occidentaux et subordonnés à cette offensive." C'est pourquoi ils rappelaient à leurs camarades les thèses de Lénine sur les guerres justes et injustes. Sont justes toutes les guerres révolutionnaires, déclenchées par les peuples colonisés. Les syndicats groupés par la F.S.M. se doivent de les aider par tous les moyens dont ils disposent. Et le principal reproche fait par les Chinois à la "clique de Tito," qu'ils essayaient de faire condamner une fois de plus par la F.S.M. c'est de vouloir subordonner l'aide aux soulèvements nationalistes, celui de l'Algérie notamment, aux intérêts de la coexistence.

Mao a subi une défaite à Pékin

Certes, en faisant preuve ainsi d'une intransigeance absolue à l'égard de l'Occident, les Chinois ont réussi à entraîner dans leur sillage plusieurs des délégués afro-asiatiques et sud-américains les plus extrémistes, notamment ceux de l'Indonésie et de Cuba. Mais contrairement à leur attente, la grande majorité des délégués n'a point approuvé leurs thèses. En effet, la politique de Khrouchtchev a trouvé d'ardents défenseurs, notamment dans la personne du délégué polonais. Loga-Sowynski, dont l'intervention, fait significatif, a été censurée par la presse chinoise. Celle-ci a reçu pour ordre de passer sous silence tous les passages où cet ami de Gomulka avait fait l'éloge des "efforts inlassables de Khrouchtchev pour désamorcer la guerre froide." De même, le délégué italien, Romagnoli, dans un discours qui a fait une profonde impression, a mis en garde les délégués contre "toute sous-estimation de la puissance de l'Occident, ce qui pourrait conduire à des décisions très aventureuses et à des mesures néfastes." Romagnoli a protesté aussi contre l'opinion suivant laquelle la politique de coexistence, telle que Khrouchtchev la préconise, signifierait un compromis avec l'impérialisme.

En fin de compte, à la suite de très vives discussions à huis clos, le point de vue soviétique, défendu par Grichine, l'a emporté. La résolution finale adoptée par le bureau équivaut à un vote de confiance dans la politique soviétique, et fait un devoir à toutes les organisations de la F.S.M. "de faire connaître les propositions faites par l'U.R.S.S. à la masse des travailleurs afin que ceux-ci les soutiennent activement." Et la résolution ne comprend pas un mot contre Tito et contre le révisionnisme.

Khrouchtchev contre-attaque

C'est sans doute ce succès qui a encouragé Khrouchtchev à sortir de sa réserve à propos du travail de sape incessant mené contre lui par les Chinois. Jusqu'à présent, il s'était borné à la défensive, en laissant plaider en sa faveur des amis tels que Otto Kuusinen (discours prononcé à Moscou le 22 avril) ou Gomulka, sans mettre en cause ses adversaires. Or, au lendemain de la réunion de la F.S.M. à Pékin, Khrouchtchev est passé à l'attaque. Dans deux articles publiés, le premier le 10 juin dans le quotidien Sovietskaya Rossia, le second le 12 juin dans la Pravda, il a fait dénoncer "la mentalité sectaire de gauche" qui consiste à apprécier "de manière erronée, comme une prétendue déviation, des positions du marxisme-léninisme, la politique qui préconise la coexistence pacifique des pays ayant des systèmes politique différents, la lutte pour l'arrêt de la course aux armements ainsi que les pourparlers entre dirigeants de pays socialistes et capitalistes" (Pravda). La Sovietskaya Rossia va même plus loin, en reprochant aux "gauchistes" de considérer "la plus petite aggravation de la situation internationale (allusion discrète à l'affaire de l'U-2 et à l'échec de la Conférence au Sommet) comme une preuve du bienfondé de leurs convictions sectaires." Et le journal d'ajouter:

"Il arrive que non seulement des groupes de communistes, mais que la direction de certains partis ne soient pas à la hauteur de leur tâche... qu'elle perde l'orientation marxiste-léniniste et tombe dans le gauchisme ou dans l'opportunisme de droite."

Ainsi, Khrouchtchev a ramassé le gant jeté par Mao et a laissé entendre qu'il se sent assez fort pour répondre du tac au tac au néo-trotskyisme des Chinois. On peut en conclure que le jour n'est plus loin, où le chef du parti soviétique convoquera une conférence internationale des chefs communistes, l'invitant à arbitrer le conflit entre lui et Mao.

Que fera alors ce dernier? Lui qui, tout en attaquant continuellement Khrouchtchev sous le prête-nom de Tito, ne cesse de souligner son désir de conserver l'unité du camp communiste, se soumettra-t-il au verdict de ses pairs? Ou bien, convaincu de tenir la vérité absolue, prisonnier du culte de sa personnalité qu'il a communiqué au parti chinois, maintiendra-t-il ses positions?...