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## EAST EUROPE

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### BUCHAREST, BONN, AND EAST BERLIN: RUMANIA AND "OSTPOLITIK"

Summary: The growing Soviet-West German rapprochement and the possibility that diplomatic ties will sooner or later be established by Bonn with Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, and eventually Sofia have pushed the issue of Rumanian-West German relations into the background. However, since Rumania was the first of the East European states (with the exception, of course, of the Soviet Union), to restore normal diplomatic ties with West Germany since World War II, Rumania's relations with the East European states were particularly affected. The recent favorable response to the Ostpolitik has been a factor in the "normalization" of Rumania's relations with the Soviet Union and East Germany. At the same time it has decreased the uniqueness and importance of Rumanian-West German relations.

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### Introduction

The agreement to establish diplomatic relations was signed by Rumanian Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu during his visit to Bonn on 31 January 1967. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to review the course of events leading up to this decision; suffice it to say that, from the Rumanian point of view, the turning point was the 1966 Bucharest Declaration. At the Bucharest meeting of leaders of Warsaw Pact countries in July of that year, the East European states were willing to admit that in West Germany there were "circles that oppose revanchism and militarism, [which] demand the

establishment of normal relations with the countries of both East and West, including normal relations between the two German states, and strive for a relaxation of international tension." The conference declaration also said that a basic condition for European security is "the establishment of normal relations between states ... regardless of their social systems," (1) implying that bilateral relations could develop between Eastern Europe and West Germany. The Rumanians certainly gave it that interpretation, and the Soviet Union's delay of several weeks in condemning Rumania's establishing full diplomatic relations with West Germany would indicate that the Soviets may also originally have considered this a possible interpretation.

Although the original decision to pursue closer political relations with Eastern Europe was made under Erhard, (2) the

- (1) "Declaration on European Security," Scanteia, 9 July 1966. This declaration was made while the Erhard government was still in power in the Bundestag. The Grand Coalition between the CDU-CSU and the SPD did not come into existence until later that fall.
- (2) Erhard himself emphasized this in an interview with Schweizer Illustrierte, 7 March 1967. Although the interview was given after the signing of the agreement with Rumania on the exchange of diplomatic representatives, and he can be accused of post facto jumping onto the bandwagon, there is no question that the initial contacts which led to the 31 January 1967 agreement were taken under his supervision. This is particularly clear in the case of Rumania. The visit of a Rumanian delegation to Bonn in February 1966 paved the way for a visit by Rumanian Foreign Trade Minister Gheorghe Cioara three months later. During Cioara's stay in West Germany initial steps were taken to forge closer economic and political links. West German Economics Minister Kurt Schmuecker visited Bucharest in September to develop the relationship further, and he invited Foreign Minister Manescu to Bonn. If Erhard's government had not fallen, the agreement with Rumania probably would have been signed sooner, though West Germany might not have approached Prague and Budapest at the time the offer to establish relations was extended to Bucharest. For Bucharest, however, it was better that relations were established after the fall of Erhard, since he wore the mantle of Adenauer, who was long the target of Soviet criticism of Germany. Establishment of the Kiesinger-Brandt coalition gave Rumania the opportunity to claim that realistic circles opposed to "revanchism" were gaining strength in Bonn, hence ideologically justifying the decision to establish ties with the FRG.



### East German Reaction

Rumania took the position that unresolved international questions should be settled on a bilateral basis. The questions of the Munich Agreement, the Oder-Neisse border, and recognition of the GDR were problems to be settled between West Germany and the countries involved. While Rumania would continue to support the Czechoslovak, Polish, and East German positions, these issues should not become an issue in Rumanian-West German relations. The Soviet Union and other states of Eastern Europe -- particularly East Germany and Poland -- held that the resolving of these problems was a multilateral responsibility. No East European state should establish relations with West Germany until the demands of all were satisfied.

The most sensitive of these issues in West German-Rumanian relations was the question of East Germany. On the basis of the Hallstein Doctrine Bonn claimed to be the sole representative of the German people, and Rumania adhered to the Soviet bloc policy of maintaining the existence of two German states. When the decision was made to establish diplomatic ties, it was agreed that each country would reassert its own position on the German question, recognizing that their agreement to establish diplomatic relations did not represent a departure from either government's stand on the question of East Germany. The day after the Rumanian-West German agreement was signed, German Federal Chancellor Kiesinger issued a statement to the Bundestag reasserting Bonn's position that "the Federal Government alone has the right and obligation to speak for the entire German people. We trust that this unchanged attitude of ours is understood and honored as before." (5) In response to Kiesinger's statement, the Rumanian press agency Agerpres was empowered to issue a statement. While taking note of Kiesinger's declaration, Agerpres reasserted the Rumanian government's stand that one of the fundamental realities of World War II and of subsequent evolution of conditions in Europe "is the existence of two German states -- the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. Acknowledgement of this reality is one of the prerequisites for the development of co-operation among European countries and for improvement in the political climate of our continent." (6) Rumania, while reasserting the GDR's right to exist, refused to make West German recognition of the East German regime a precondition for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bonn.

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(5) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 February 1967.

(6) Agerpres, 1 February 1967.

formation of the Kiesinger-Brandt government made the prospect of improved relations with West Germany ideologically more palatable to the Communist states. The aim of the West German government was to improve relations with the Soviet Union as well as with the East European states. Hence, the Kiesinger-Brandt government offered to negotiate diplomatic agreements with Czechoslovakia and Hungary as well as with Rumania.(3) Bonn informed Moscow in mid-December 1966 of its intention to send delegations for this purpose to these states.(4)

Though the Germans approached several East European states, Rumania was the only one to agree to the establishment of diplomatic ties at that time. Bucharest's reasons for this action were twofold. First, Rumania was pursuing a policy of carving out her own independent niche in the Soviet bloc. One dramatic way to demonstrate independence from the USSR was to establish diplomatic relations with West Germany, which had long been the arch symbol of European anti-Communism, the greatest threat (according to Moscow) to the Communist states, and the staunchest of America's allies. Rumania wanted to show that she could follow an independent policy, even on an issue as sensitive as relations with West Germany. Second, Rumania was anxious to increase trade with West Germany. Since Bucharest was seeking to avoid Comecon integration and to expand its trade relations with the West, establishing political ties with West Germany was intended to bring significant economic benefits. Since there were no unresolved territorial questions (such as the Munich Agreement in German-Czechoslovak relations or the question of the Oder-Neisse frontier in German-Polish relations), it was possible for the two countries to agree quickly on the terms of a diplomatic accord.

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- (3) Brandt did not list Bulgaria as one of the states approached about diplomatic relations. However, Sofia sought to improve its political links with West Germany and showed interest in this idea after Czechoslovakia, under East German and Polish pressure, had given up the idea of establishing relations with West Germany at that time.
- (4) Interview with Willy Brandt on West German television, 24 July 1967; Muenchner Merkur, 25 July 1967.



the Rumanian-West German agreement was signed) to discuss the question of relations with West Germany. Rumania's refusal resulted in changing the location of the meeting to Warsaw.(12)

East Germany continued to attack the Rumanians for deviating from accepted bloc policy on the Middle East War in June 1967,(13) and on inter-bloc relations;(14) but the harshest criticism and the real cause of East German antipathy was the state of Rumania's relations with West Germany.(15) Rumanian-East German relations remained strained until after the Soviet Union and other East European countries began to improve their own relations with West Germany this year.

The immediate reaction of the GDR to Rumania's exchange of diplomatic representatives with West Germany was to sign a series of treaties to strengthen its links with the other East European states. In these treaties the states involved agreed to assist the other party against aggression from West German revanchists, to recognize West Berlin as a separate political entity, to consult on important international questions affecting the interests of either state (i.e., relations with West Germany), and that recognition of the existence of two German states is a necessary precondition for European security.(16)

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- (12) Vjesnik, 12 February 1967, and Reuter, 9 February 1967. Rumania's representation at the conference was of a lower level than that of the rest of the delegations. The foreign ministers of all other Warsaw Pact states attended the meeting, but Rumania sent only a deputy foreign minister.
- (13) Neues Deutschland, 12 June 1967.
- (14) Ibid., 11 May 1967.
- (15) See criticism of Brandt's visit to Rumania, Neues Deutschland, 6 and 10 August 1967; Berliner Zeitung, 10 August 1967.
- (16) The treaties were signed on the following dates: GDR-Poland, 15 March 1967; GDR-Czechoslovakia, 17 March 1967; GDR-Hungary, 18 May 1967; GDR-Bulgaria, 7 September 1967.

The reaction of East Germany to the Bonn-Bucharest agreement was understandably critical. Because of the GDR's vital interest in recognition by West Germany, Ulbricht claimed prerogative over all other East European countries except the Soviet Union on this question. Ulbricht apparently once told Gomulka, "Regarding relations with West Germany, we have the ultimate competence. Not every socialist country can go its own way." (7)

When it became obvious that West Germany and Rumania were going to establish diplomatic ties, the East German regime began to register its disapproval. Almost a week before the Brandt-Manescu agreement was signed in Bonn, Neues Deutschland (8) issued a declaration denouncing West Germany's "aggressive and expansionist policy." After the agreement was announced, East German news media attacked "the Rumanian Foreign Minister" who "was not willing to reject the presumptuous West German claim to sole representation," hence, "the preconditions for diplomatic relations did not exist." (9)

Criticism of Bucharest's move (10) and the equally vigorous Rumanian response (11) led to a serious decline in Rumanian-East German relations. They became so strained that Rumania refused to send a representative to East Berlin for a conference of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers (which was called one week after

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(7) Erwin Weit, "Ostbloc Intern," Der Spiegel, 17 August 1970.

(8) 25 January 1967.

(9) East Berlin Radio, 2 February 1967; see also ADN, 1 February 1967.

(10) See front page editorial in Neues Deutschland, 3 February 1967.

(11) See, for example, the Rumanian reply to Neues Deutschland's February 3 editorial in Scanteia, 4 February 1967. Among other things, the Scanteia editorial observed: "The foreign policy of a socialist state is laid down by the Party and government of the country in question, and they need render account only to their people.... The attempt of the newspaper Neues Deutschland to set itself up as the foreign policy adviser to another state, its interference in the internal affairs of another country, do not serve the interests ... of friendship and collaboration between socialist countries."



Although Rumania's establishment of diplomatic relations with West Germany was the most important single reason for the decline in her relations with East Germany, it was merely one of several irritants in Soviet-Rumanian relations. The Soviet leaders were also certainly annoyed at Rumania's position on the Conference of World Communist Parties and later on the Middle East question. However, after the Soviets accepted the East German view that no other East European state should establish diplomatic ties with Bonn, their attitude toward West Germany hardened. After Rumania and West Germany exchanged ambassadors, Moscow described the new Ostpolitik as nothing more than "the old revanchist line of the FRG," and declared that "the policy of West German militarism and revanchism continues to endanger the security of the peoples of the European socialist countries." (22)

#### Development of Relations with West Germany

Despite strong Soviet, East German, and Polish disapproval of the agreement to exchange ambassadors, West German-Rumanian relations progressed rapidly. In a speech to the Grand National Assembly just six months after the Brandt-Manescu agreement, Nicolae Ceausescu praised the establishment of diplomatic relations and declared that economic and cultural exchanges had, as a result, "undergone marked development." (23) Despite bloc criticism, Rumania invited Brandt for an official visit in August 1967. The lengthy and frank discussions between the West German Foreign Minister and the Rumanian leaders, including Ceausescu, Chivu Stoica, and Manescu, were very favorably appraised by both sides.

During Brandt's visit to Rumania it was agreed to begin negotiations on a cultural exchange agreement between the two countries. (24) West Germany and Rumania had begun negotiations on such an agreement as early as August 1965, but the two sides were unable to reach accord on the question of Berlin, and hence, no agreement was reached. (25) Following the diplomatic exchange

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- (22) Radio Moscow in Rumanian, 8 August 1967. This broadcast came just after the visit of West German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt to Rumania.
- (23) Radio Bucharest, 25 July 1967.
- (24) Final communiqué on Brandt's visit (Agerpres, 6 August 1967).
- (25) Handelsblatt, 20 May 1965; Welt am Sonntag, 16 August 1965; Die Welt, 24 November 1965.

### Soviet Reaction

The initial reaction of the Soviet Union to Rumania's establishment of diplomatic relations with West Germany was cautious but not critical. The Soviet Union warned against neo-Nazi and militarist forces in the FRG on the eve of the Brandt-Manescu agreement, and the Soviet embassy in Bonn rejected a West German note reasserting Bonn's right to speak for all Germans, delivered to embassies of all states with which West Germany had diplomatic relations.(17) However, Soviet leaders refrained from criticizing the Rumanian move. At a London press conference Soviet Premier Kosygin, when asked if the Rumanian move was a step in the right direction, replied that "this is a question that could best be answered by the Rumanian leaders." (18) West German steps toward improving political relations with other East European states were not opposed by Moscow for over a month after the Rumanian-West German agreement. Progress in improving Bulgarian-West German relations continued until March 1967.

By April, however, it was clear that the Soviet leaders had definitely decided against further improvement of relations with West Germany. The primary reason for the decision was Ulbricht's strong opposition to the move. He argued that Bonn's new Ostpolitik was intended to "isolate the GDR, then play off the socialist states against each other." (19) Ulbricht evidently used this line of reasoning with Soviet leaders on various occasions, and specifically criticized "the destructive role of Party Secretary Ceausescu and part of the Rumanian leadership which greatly damaged the unity of the socialist confederation." (20) Soviet acceptance of Ulbricht's arguments became apparent when a Radio Moscow broadcast in Rumanian (21) declared that the Ostpolitik's "main objective is the isolation of the GDR," and then went on to praise the solidarity of the "socialist" countries with East Germany.

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(17) TASS, 8 February 1967.

(18) UPI (London), 9 February 1967.

(19) Speech in East Berlin (ADN, 15 February 1967).

(20) Erwin Weit, "Ostbloc Intern," Der Spiegel, 24 August 1970.

(21) 13 April 1967.



However, the West German and Rumanian leaders did agree that the reuniting of families and humanitarian factors should be weighed in considering the requests of Germans to leave Rumania. This issue has been brought up periodically (most recently during Rumanian Premier Maurer's visit to West Germany in June 1970), but it is not a major one and has not been permitted to disturb good political relations.

#### West German-Rumanian Economic Relations

Perhaps more than in any other area, economic relations between West Germany and Rumania intensified after the agreement to exchange ambassadors. Before 1967 (as was the case in West Germany's relations with the rest of Eastern Europe) trade and economic co-operation between the two states were much further advanced than their political relations. Although economic contacts were not begun until 1954 and the first trade agreement was not signed until 1956, in December 1963 a long-term trade agreement was signed in Bonn. This was scheduled to run until the end of 1966, and envisioned an increase of some 30 per cent in annual trade volume. A protocol to the agreement signed in July 1965 extended it to the end of 1969, called for another 30 per cent expansion of trade, and removed German import quotas from some goods in order to help Rumania to overcome a sizable deficit in her trade with West Germany.

Despite reciprocal visits by high economic officers from both countries, the signing of further trade protocols, and Bonn's liberalization of its import restrictions, Rumania continued to show a growing trade deficit with the FRG. Between 1960 and 1966 the yearly deficit increased from 14 million lei to 444.5 million lei. The FRG continued to work with Rumania to find ways of increasing Rumanian exports to the Federal Republic, and at the same time the Bonn government was generous in working out favorable credit arrangements. German-Rumanian trade expanded considerably in 1967 -- the year ambassadors were exchanged. This expansion was achieved largely through purchases on credit since Rumania's exports to Germany increased by only 29 per cent, from 444.7 million lei in 1966 to 578.9 million lei in 1967 while her imports from Germany increased by 73 per cent, from 889.2 million lei in 1966 to 1,536.8 million lei in 1967. The yearly Rumanian trade deficit more than doubled, from 444.5 million lei in 1966 to 957.9 million lei in 1967. Though anxious to encourage further expansion of trade with Rumania at the time diplomatic relations were established, the West Germans expressed the desire to keep their trade in balance. Treasury Minister Kurt Schmuecker, (28) who played a major role in bringing about the resumption of diplomatic ties with Bucharest,

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(28) In an interview with Welt am Sonntag, 29 January 1967.

an agreement on technical and economic co-operation was signed in Bucharest during Brandt's visit in 1967, and a number of papers on expanding and regulating cultural exchanges were signed in Bucharest on 12 May 1969, but these did not represent a formal cultural agreement. This has not prevented the exchange of cultural delegations or scientific-technical information. These exchanges, however, have been modest, owing to the language barrier and to a shortage of financing.

West German-Rumanian cultural relations have not been without their political problems. A West German book exhibit in Bucharest was canceled in November 1969 after books by three former East German authors objected to by East Germany were withdrawn from the exhibit. In February 1970 a West German art exhibit was canceled because it included works by two former East German artists, a fact to which East Germany again took exception.(26) The willingness of the Rumanian government to cancel these two exhibits, both of which had appeared in uncut versions in Belgrade, was attributable to the desire to encourage the beginnings of an improved state of relations with East Germany, and was a logical consequence of Rumania's two-German-states policy. Neither the Rumanians nor the West Germans were willing to let these incidents disrupt their cultural exchanges and good political relations.

The only bilateral problem that has affected Bonn-Bucharest relations is the question of the German minority in Transylvania. In December 1967 the Federal Minister for Refugees and Expellees, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, declared that the number of ethnic Germans leaving Rumania was unsatisfactory. The number had dropped from 2,700 in 1965 to 609 in 1966 and to 314 during the first ten months of 1967.(27) The Rumanian ambassador in Bonn replied to von Hassel's charges by saying that Rumania had invested too much in the education of the German minority to permit all ethnic Germans to leave Rumania.

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(26) See Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 8 and 10 November 1969, and Stuttgarter Zeitung, 12 November 1969. At an East German exhibit in Bucharest, books on the alleged Nazi backgrounds of West German political leaders were not shown, at the request of the Rumanian government.

(27) DPA, 12 December 1967.



policy) and which generally bring low prices. The Rumanian trade deficit has remained substantial despite the gradual liberalization of German import quotas, the introduction of schemes to promote the sale of Rumanian goods in Germany, and increasing German purchases of Rumanian processed and semi-processed goods. The continuing imbalance has forced Rumania to cut back on purchases of German goods, at the same time seeking ways to expand Rumanian exports. The resulting decline in total trade volume has been satisfying to neither partner. Both governments are continuing to seek new ways to encourage the balanced expansion of their economic collaboration.

#### Relations After the Invasion of Czechoslovakia

Rumanian-West German relations have continued to develop unhindered by any major bilateral difficulties. The Rumanians have not been reticent in criticizing aspects of German policy with which they disagree, (29) but generally both sides have been willing to overlook differences of ideology and foreign and domestic policy in the interest of maintaining good relations. Despite Rumania's independent stand in foreign policy, the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia forced Bucharest to be more cautious in its relations with West Germany. In deciding upon military intervention, the Soviet leaders were most concerned with the fact that the Czechoslovak Communist Party appeared to be losing control internally, though the possibility of Czechoslovakia's turning to West Germany for trade and technical assistance was also a cause for concern. Ulbricht, on the other hand, was more concerned about the development of closer ties between the CSSR and West Germany which could lead to the isolation of the GDR. At the meeting (in Warsaw) of the five Warsaw Pact countries which joined in the Czechoslovak invasion a month later, Ulbricht is reported to have stressed that events in Czechoslovakia were part of a West German "policy of encirclement, to enable [the FRG] to attack the GDR on its southern flank." (30) Apparently Ulbricht talked throughout the conference of a West German plot to take over Czechoslovakia. Whether to placate Ulbricht, because of their own convictions, or because it offered a convenient excuse, the Soviet leaders stressed the German menace as a major justification for the Czechoslovak invasion. (31)

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(29) See, for example, criticism of the emergency laws enacted in West Germany during the unrest of May 1968 (Scanteia, 31 May 1968).

(30) Erwin Weit, "Ostbloc Intern," Der Spiegel, 31 August 1970.

(31) See, for example, Pravda, 4 September 1968, which referred to the invasion of Czechoslovakia as "Munich from the inside," and alleged that West German policy sought elimination of the GDR and the separation of Czechoslovakia from the socialist system and her merger with the German Federal Republic."

emphasized in an interview two days before diplomatic relations were established that economic links with state monopoly trading countries required an equilibrium of exchanges. However, West Germany was anxious for a rapprochement with the East, and therefore was most generous in handling Rumania's deficit. Bonn was not willing to jeopardize political relations for the sake of a trade balance.

West German-Rumanian Trade  
(in million lei)

Year	Total Trade	Rumanian Exports to FRG	Rumanian Imports from FRG	Rumanian Deficit
1960	539.2	262.6	276.6	14.0
1961	680.5	300.1	380.4	80.3
1962	789.6	309.8	479.8	170.0
1963	780.7	322.5	458.2	135.7
1964	848.5	321.7	526.8	205.1
1965	1,042.2	379.4	662.8	283.4
1966	1,333.9	444.7	889.2	444.5
1967	2,115.7	578.9	1,536.8	957.9
1968	1,665.1	634.0	1,031.1	397.1
1969	1,790.1	696.0	1,094.1	398.1

Source: Anuarul Statistic al Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1969, p. 546. Figures for 1969 from Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 6 March 1970.

When the SPD-FDP coalition renewed its pursuit of Ostpolitik, Brandt voiced the view that better political relations with Eastern Europe should not be purchased with economic credits. Under these conditions West Germany took steps to reduce the Rumanian deficit but not to reduce over-all trade volume. The structure of Rumanian-West German trade has been a major obstacle in this process. The bulk of Rumanian imports from Germany has been in the form of machinery, equipment, and technology needed for Rumania's industrialization program. Rumanian exports to Germany, for the most part, have been lumber, oil and oil products, and agricultural goods -- items for which there is a limited market, on which quotas are imposed (particularly on agricultural goods, because of EEC



visit produced no spectacular results, (35) it was seen by both sides as another major step in consolidating Rumanian-West German ties.

#### Rumanian Policy Vindicated

In December 1969 the Brandt government renewed an earlier offer to negotiate a treaty renouncing the use of force with the Soviet Union. The change of government in the FRG gave Soviet leaders a favorable excuse to seek improved relations with Bonn, and when Chancellor Brandt suggested that negotiations with the Soviet Union begin on 8 December 1969, Moscow hastily summoned a meeting of East European Party and government heads to co-ordinate approaches to West Germany. After this December 3 summit meeting, leaders of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and even East Germany publicly expressed interest in improved relations with the FRG.

That the Rumanians saw this shift in East European policy as a vindication of their own previous policy toward the FRG was politely but clearly expressed. In a speech to a Plenum of the Rumanian Party's Central Committee just 10 days after the meeting of East European leaders, Ceausescu cited the recent Bundestag election as evidence of the strengthening of progressive forces in Germany, and hailed the beginning of Soviet-West German talks and the likelihood of West German-Polish talks. Then the Rumanian leader continued:

As is known, Rumania has consistently called for normalization of relations between the socialist countries and the FRG. It is in this spirit that Rumania is maintaining relations with the FRG, and promotes the development of economic, scientific, technical and cultural collaboration with that country, deeming that this is in the interests of both nations and of all states on the continent. (36)

Lest the Rumanians be accused of being smug, Ceausescu reiterated concern about neo-Nazi and revanchist forces in West Germany, and called for all states to recognize the GDR. After the signing of the West German-Polish treaty, the Rumanian Foreign Ministry issued a statement that lavished

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(35) During the visit an agreement on scientific exchanges was worked out, talks were held on trade questions, and on behalf of Ceausescu Maurer invited West German President Heinemann, and on his own behalf Brandt, to visit Rumania.

(36) Scanteia, 14 December 1969.

Ceausescu and the Rumanian Party harshly condemned the invasion and the five parties responsible for it. Soviet anger at the Rumanians was obvious, even to the point of open criticism of Bucharest for failing to recognize the West German threat and for being "soft on revanchism." (32) Although Rumania continued to condemn the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Soviet warnings and Rumanian fears led Bucharest to pursue a more cautious policy, which included exercising restraint in relations with West Germany. Contacts with West Germany were maintained, but for several months after August 1968 Rumania was cautious about demonstrating too much friendship for Bonn. A change in this situation came about only after a meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact states in Budapest in March 1969. The declaration issued by this conference was quite moderate in its statement on Germany, and revived the pursuit of Soviet-style détente which the invasion had halted. This opened the way for Bonn and Bucharest to improve their relations. By the summer of 1969, a number of high-level delegations had been exchanged and the Rumanians gave special consideration to their West German guests. (33)

The Bundestag elections in October 1969 and the formation of the SPD coalition were considered favorable for the development of Rumanian-West German contacts. Rumanian commentators saw the new government as marking the end of "20 years of rigid and obtuse policy in relation to... imperative demands of international life." The change of government opened up a possibility for mutual relations to "expand and intensify in the interest of both nations." (34) The Soviets' interest in cultivating relations with West Germany has opened wider the door to improvement in Rumanian-West German relations. The high point so far was the visit of Rumanian Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer to Bonn in June of this year. Maurer's visit was significant because it was the first time an East European head of government had paid an official visit to Bonn, and it came on the eve of the final round of Bonn-Moscow discussions on the treaty on the renunciation of force. Although Maurer's

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(32) Moscow Television, 26 August 1968; Radio Moscow in Rumanian, 27 August 1968.

(33) The West German Minister for Education and Science visited Rumania from 10 to 13 May 1969; the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Rumania, Gheorghe Macovescu, went to Bonn in June 1969; a visit by the FRG Minister of Agriculture and Forestry which had originally been scheduled for September 1968 took place in June 1969; the West German Economics Minister visited Bucharest in August, and in addition to being received by Ceausescu was given a personally escorted tour of a Rumanian economic exhibition by the Rumanian Party leader.

(34) Scanteia, 23 October 1969.



of the independence and sovereignty of the GDR. (39) Now that the Soviet Union and other states of Eastern Europe are improving relations with the FRG, the way has been opened for East Berlin and Bucharest to move in the same direction. The Soviet desire to establish good relations with West Germany is a cause of serious concern to East Germany. However, because the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, in addition to Rumania, are following the same policy, East German disapproval of ties with West Germany can no longer be focused on Rumania alone. In fact, the Soviet Union -- by bringing about a change in the policy of the entire bloc -- and Poland and Czechoslovakia -- formerly the staunchest supporters of the GDR's position -- are at least as reprehensible in Ulbricht's eyes as Rumania, if not more so. The effect of this shift in bloc policy toward West Germany, even though it is disapproved of in East Berlin, has been to lessen the significance of Rumania's relations with West Germany in the eyes of the GDR. Ulbricht's fear of isolation, in light of the growing tendency to establish relations with West Germany without demanding de jure recognition of the GDR by Bonn, has given impetus to improved relations between East Germany and Rumania. The growing volume of economic, political, and cultural exchanges in the last year is an indication of this. The 20-year treaty of friendship soon to be signed between the two countries is a further reflection of improving ties. Ulbricht's postponement of his visit to Rumania for the signing of the treaty and his absence from Budapest are no doubt indications of his disapproval of any approaches toward West Germany. But since Rumania's relations with West Germany are now in line with Soviet policy, East Germany should be able to enter into relations with Rumania that are as good as those with other states of the bloc.

The effect of the Ostpolitik's success upon West German-Rumanian relations has been more complex. To some extent, the significance of the FRG's relations with Rumania has decreased in German eyes. When Rumania was the only East European state with which Germany had established diplomatic relations, she occupied a unique position as the only Warsaw Pact state to be on good terms with Germany. Bucharest could present itself as a channel through which the thinking of the highest leaders of the East European states could flow, and as a broker between West Germany and the Communist states. Now that the FRG has improved its relations with the USSR, signed a treaty with Poland, and begun talks with East Germany, and is soon to hold talks

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(39) See, for example, Ceausescu's speech to the Rumanian Central Committee Plenum, 13 December 1969, as reported in Scanteia, 14 December 1969, and the article in Lumea, 18 June 1970, on the eve of Maurer's visit to West Germany.

even greater praise on Rumania's policy toward the FRG. It reiterated Rumania's concern "for the establishment of new relations and the development of co-operation among the European states, for the maintenance of peace and the implementation of security in Europe," and went on to claim that Rumania's establishment of diplomatic relations with West Germany was "a fact which has contributed to the favorable course of political evolution in Europe." (37) At every example of the success of the Ostpolitik, Rumania has praised the developing relations between West Germany and Eastern Europe. In most cases there has also been added a barbed reference to Rumania's having been the first to establish relations with West Germany. (38)

The effect of the successes of recent Ostpolitik initiatives upon Rumania has been varied. The change in Soviet policy toward West Germany has removed one of the points of disagreement between Bucharest and Moscow. Elimination of this difference was one of several factors in the process of "normalizing" relations between Rumania and the states of the Soviet bloc. The road leading to the new Soviet-Rumanian treaty (signed in Bucharest in July) and to the improvement of Rumania's relations with Eastern Europe was at least partially smoothed out by the switch in Soviet policy on Germany. Rumania, however, has let it be known that she does not intend to sit back while the Soviet Union and other East European states take the lead in developing relations with West Germany. Maurer's visit to Bonn a month before the Soviet-West German treaty was signed last summer indicated Rumania's intention to remain in the forefront.

The Soviet response to the Ostpolitik has had a much greater effect on East German-Rumanian relations. The exchange of diplomatic representatives and the friendly relations between Bucharest and Bonn had been the major obstacle to good relations between the GDR and Rumania. However, the Rumanians have been consistent supporters of the GDR's rights. Praise of West Germany in a speech delivered or an article published in Rumania is always coupled with a demand for recognition

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(37) Agerpres, 9 December 1970.

(38) See the Agerpres commentary on the Bonn-Moscow treaty, which observed: "As is well known, the Rumanian Communist Party and the government of the Socialist Republic of Rumania have aimed at full normalization of interstate relations in Europe." Agerpres, 10 August 1970. See also Scanteia, 24 December 1969, and 16 March and 15 August 1970.



with Czechoslovakia, conditions have altered. Rumania is no longer unique, and Bonn has more direct channels of communication to the leaders of the East European states. On the other hand, Rumania and West Germany have established solid ties. The personal relationship between Brandt and the Rumanian leaders is closer and more open than it can be with the Polish, Czechoslovak, or even Soviet leaders for some time to come. Rumania's relatively independent stance within the Soviet sphere also offers greater possibilities for better relations with West Germany. There is little animosity arising from World War II, and there are no outstanding territorial questions to cloud the scene, as could be the case with the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The West Germans have continued to show particular consideration for the Rumanians as they have pursued their Ostpolitik. (40) Rumanian-West German economic relations have obviously been more important to Bucharest than to Bonn. Germany has found the Rumanian market limited both in scope and ability so far as providing needed goods in exchange for German shipments is concerned. In Eastern Europe, the Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Polish markets are larger and nearer than the Rumanian market. With the expansion of trade between West Germany and these northern East European countries, Bonn is likely to become even more insistent that Rumanian-West German trade be placed on a strictly economic basis.

The effects of the Ostpolitik have been mixed for Rumania. On the one hand it has vindicated Rumanian policy toward Germany over the last four years, paved the way for better relations with East Germany, and also helped in "normalizing" relations with the Soviet Union and other states of the Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, it has decreased the significance and "uniqueness" of relations with West Germany, though relations between Bonn and Bucharest continue to be very good. In the over-all balance, the Ostpolitik has favored Rumanian international aims. Rumania sees her sovereignty, security,

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- (40) Less than a month after the Soviet-West German treaty was signed and just before serious negotiations got under way on the Polish-West German treaty, West German government spokesman Conrad Ahlers spent several days in Rumania. Though he was said to be on vacation, Ahlers was received by Maurer and Murescu, and remained in Bucharest during his stay rather than visiting the Black Sea coast or the Carpathian Mountain resorts. No doubt Ahlers's prime purpose was to keep the Rumanian government informed on the results of and prospects for the Ostpolitik in order to reassure Bucharest of West Germany's desire for continued good relations.

independence of action, and pursuit of national interest possible only in a world where confrontation has given way to détente and where blocs have been dismantled. Then Rumania will not be inhibited by Warsaw Pact ties, and the USSR will not feel itself threatened to the point of finding it necessary to insist on the proscription of Rumanian independence. The Ostpolitik seems to be directed toward achieving these aims, and for this reason has received Rumanian approval.

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