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THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW

I. Rumania

In the course of its history, the empire created by Stalin in Eastern Europe has undergone a sequence of serious tremors. Some have been short and violent while others have been protracted, more subdued, but perhaps more damaging in the long run. Their combined impact has been to render politically misleading if not meaningless such well-worn terms as "Soviet Bloc" and "satellite", which are retained in the vocabulary of informed discussion largely through the convenience of habit. A complete list of these shaking experiences would have to include the Tito-Stalin break, the Hungarian Revolution, the Polish October, the Sino-Albanian-Soviet dispute, and the assertion by Rumania of limited but distinct independence. All have in common a corrosive influence, manifested in some cases after a temporary consolidation of the status quo ante. All but one have in common the fact that they elicited from the Soviet Union, the great conserver, some sort of clearly identifiable, even forceful, response designed to stem the tide of change. The expulsion of Tito from the Cominform was really a Soviet initiative designed to crush an eccentric independence whose future influence was feared; this event was an excuse to suppress all "domesticism" in the ranks of East European Communism. But Tito survived as did his capacity to do mischief. The intervention of Moscow in the Polish and Hungarian events of 1956 is easily recalled. The growing Sino-Soviet rift found Moscow temporarily at a loss for a response. But eventually and until Khrushchev's successors decided upon a different

tack, it joined open polemics with a will. In all these cases the Soviets came up with some active policy designed to combat the malignancies knawing at the Bloc.

But what of the Rumanian case? This satellite out of orbit has from all public appearances called forth only the meekest Soviet counter-measures to its assertion of independence. The various dimensions of Rumania's pursuit of autonomy are fairly well known in the West. In what appeared to them to be a straight-forward application of orthodox Leninism, Rumania's leaders struck out on the path to industrial development and decided to hold their course in spite of objections from other members of the Bloc. Political autonomy strode forward only a pace or two behind economics, with the Rumanians taking a position of a not-at-all uncritical neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute and busily exploring political avenues to the West.

The public story is almost completely dominated by Rumanian initiatives. Rumania has a policy: to maximize her politico-economic independence as a communist state, remaining within but not dominated by the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. If the Soviet Union has a concrete, active policy vis-a-vis Rumania, its contours and motives are by no means so easily discerned.

Comecon and Soviet-Rumanian Economic Relations

By an ironic manifestation of Marxian law, the causal roots of the "contradictions" between Rumania and the rest of the Bloc appear to lie in the realm of economics, which may properly be explored at the outset. Three general observations must be made to place the economic aspects of the Rumanian case in perspective.

First, as is often observed, Bucharest's economic differences with the other Comecon capitals are fundamentally a conflict between underdevelopment and development. Comecon has always stood for the "socialist division of labor", that is to say, intra-bloc efficiency. Efficiency, when stressed, turns out to be a rather undynamic notion because it always implies doing better what is now being done, rather than launching onto a new path which is always initially inefficient. Thus Comecon has by its nature an inherently anti-developmental bias, which runs counter to the Leninist dogma that each country must industrialize.

Second, as is often misunderstood by non-specialists, the conflict between Rumania's industrialization and Comecon's goals is not pure and simply a Soviet-Rumanian clash. The Soviet economy, while it certainly has its problems, is large, diverse, and developed. For Soviet planners, the goal of an efficient "socialist division of labor" is important, in part for political reasons; but it is economically marginal compared with the role

it plays in more restricted economies. The economic conflict in Comecon is between the developed small members and the underdeveloped small members, Rumanian and Bulgaria on the one hand and Czechoslovakia and the GDR on the other, with Hungary and Poland in between. The fact that Rumania has been able to make a stand is in part due to geological happenstance and in part to political factors. But the GDR and Czechoslovakia are radically dependent upon some sort of international division of labor. If the underdeveloped countries of the Bloc cease to provide a reliable source of primary products and a market for industrial goods because they are protecting nascent industry, the developed ones must depend upon the Soviet Union. Thus, from the point of view of East European polycentrism, Rumania's economic autonomy is not an unmixed blessing.

Thirdly, it should be pointed out that the origins of the Comecon-Rumania dispute are to be found much earlier than is commonly realized. According to J. M. Montias, Rumania was pursuing a policy akin to industrial protectionism already in 1955-1957.¹ A consequence was a sharp drop in Czech exports to Rumania and a shift in Czech oil imports from Rumania to the Soviet Union. Apparently the very first efforts to put real life into Comecon as a coordinating agency in 1955-56 confronted the conflict of the advanced vs. the underdeveloped members.² By 1958 the Rumanians had begun to justify their "separate road" in the ideological literature.

The development of the Rumanian-Comecon dispute from this point has been carefully sketched and is widely familiar. Soviet reactions to the mounting Rumanian drive for economic autonomy went through several phases which are vaguely distinguishable. After the initial efforts to develop specialization within Comecon ran into heavy seas, Khrushchev conceded at the XXI Party Congress that there would be a "more or less simultaneous transition to communism" by all the socialist countries, which was taken to mean that the underdeveloped countries would be allowed and helped to catch up.³ At the same time the Rumanians seemed to avoid too controversial statements of their case possibly for fear of jeopardizing Soviet aid for their 1961-65 industrialization plan.⁴

The apparent compromise of 1958-59, however, began in the years immediately following to give way to increasing accrimony. The Soviets began to voice concern about the need to advance Bloc specialization and exhibited certain misgivings about the

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- (1) J. M. Montias, "Background and Origins of the Rumanian Dispute with Comecon" Soviet Studies (Oxford) October 1964, p. 128.
 - (2) Ibid. p. 130.
 - (3) This theme was first voiced by Ts.A. Stepanyan in Voprosy Filosofii No. 10, 1958.
 - (4) Montias, op. cit., p. 135.

ambitiousness of Rumanian plans.⁵ But by this time the appearance of the Sino-Soviet split complicated the picture and it became impossible to separate economic from political motives. Rumania's position emerged with ever greater clarity and deeper political implications. At the June 1962 Comecon council the Rumanians conceded to specialization in principle but rejected supra-national planning as inconsistent with the Moscow Declaration of 1960.⁶ The Rumanian leadership forcefully reaffirmed its independent economic line at the March 1963 Plenum of the Rumanian Central Committee. It was at this meeting that Barladeanu was praised for his performance at the immediately preceding Comecon executive session where Khrushchev's "suggestions" for a supra-national planning agency, voiced during the winter of 1962, were resoundingly defeated. At the July 1963 session of the Comecon Council, the Soviets for all practical purposes renounced their plans to achieve Bloc economic integration on an all-Comecon level in favor of the means approved by the Rumanians, bilateral and multilateral negotiations that carried no tinge of "democratic centralism." Summer 1963 marked the end of the purely economic phase of Soviet-Rumanian differences. Having sought to develop a formula for unifying Bloc planning at a stroke, the Soviets were forced back upon a policy of kleine Schritte for Comecon.

Assuming that the Soviets entertained strenuous objections to the character of the Rumanian industrialization drive, one would also assume that the development of Soviet-Rumanian economic relations would reflect Soviet displeasure. But, in fact, as the data presented below suggest, there is hardly any evidence that the Soviets imposed economic sanctions designed to bring their wayward comrades to heel. Table 1 shows, for example, a rapidly growing trade turnover between the USSR and

TABLE 1

Index of Soviet Trade Turnover with Comecon Members and Rumania
(Excluding Albania and Outer Mongolia)

	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>
Comecon	100	121	131	144	169	186	n.a.
Rumania	100	99	112	130	149	167	189 ^a

Sources: Vneshnaia tórgovlya SSSR za 1960, 61, 62, 63.

a. Radio Moscow in Rumanian, 13 May 1965.

(5) See J. F. Brown, "Rumania Steps out of Line" Survey, October 1963, p. 17ff.

(6) Randolph L. Braham, "Rumania: Onto the Separate Path" Problems of Communism May-June 1964, p. 15.

Rumania which, excepting the single stagnant year 1959, keeps up very nicely with the growth of overall Soviet-Bloc trade. Stagnation of Soviet-Rumanian trade in 1959 was due to sharp reductions in Rumanian imports from the Soviet Union of certain intermediate metal products (such as pipe), chemicals, and agricultural commodities. These shifts can not be ascribed to Soviet discrimination. Thereafter rapid trade growth is shown in precisely the period when Soviet-Rumanian differences became explicit.

An examination of certain critical sectors of Soviet-Rumanian trade over the past half-dozen years also fails to yield any convincing evidence of economic pressure on the Rumanians from Moscow. As indicated on Table 2, the Soviets have delivered a steadily rising amount of machinery to the Rumanian economy. The growth of these deliveries has nearly kept pace with deliveries to the European Bloc and outstripped considerably the growth of total Soviet machinery export. At the same time one sees a rapidly rising level of Rumanian machinery export to the Soviet Union that is entirely consistent with Rumania's impressive industrial growth rate.

TABLE 2

Index of Soviet Machinery Export and Import, Total, Comecon and Rumania

(Excluding Albania and Outer Mongolia)

	<u>Export</u>					
	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>
Total	100	147	144	121	147	181
Comecon	100	155	175	202	203	331
Rumania	100	145	169	192	264	282
	<u>Import</u>					
Total	100	127	157	163	211	232
Comecon	100	121	140	130	188	216
Rumania	100	205	236	442	585	635

Sources: Vneshnaia trgovlya SSSR za 1960, 61, 62, 63.

An interesting aspect of Soviet machinery trade deserves mention at this point. As is to be noted from Table 2, Soviet machinery exports dipped sharply in 1960 and 1961, largely as a result of curtailment of deliveries to China. At the same

time, however, one sees a tendency for the growth of Soviet machinery exports to the European members of Comecon to slacken, paradoxically just at the moment when the Soviet supply was freed of enormous burdens in Asia; after a 55% increase in 1959, Comecon (Europe) received only 13% and 15% more in 1960 and 1961, with a large jump, 35%, registered again in 1962. Perturbations in the machinery demands of individual Comecon countries do not adequately explain this 1960-1961 slump since the growth of Soviet deliveries to each tends to slacken in these years. The fact was that there was a distinct pinch on the Soviet machinery supply during these years because 1) imports from the GDR fell off dramatically in 1961, a product of Ulbricht's economic troubles, and 2) the Soviet arms effort had produced temporary stagnation in the civilian machine-building industry in the immediately preceding years.⁷ As a result the Soviet Union seems to have dampened the expansion of its machinery exports to East Europe. But Rumania appears not to have suffered out of proportion with Comecon members as a whole from this retrenchment.

On the machinery front, available Soviet data shows that Moscow has shown no inclination to hamper Rumania's industrialization drive by curtailing deliveries or refraining from purchase of its fruits. This leaves open, of course, the question of Soviet credits to Rumania and the terms on which they are being repaid, a matter where data are lacking.

As is well known, Rumania's developmental drive, aimed at the creation of a heavy industry base, has generated large needs for iron ore which cannot be met domestically. On this score she is extremely vulnerable to Soviet economic pressure and has understandably sought cautiously to expand non-Bloc ore imports. But if Bucharest may fear a future tightening of the Soviet fist on its ore supplies, such a squeeze does not yet appear to have materialized. In fact, Soviet ore deliveries to Rumania have increased faster than total exports, as indicated by Table 3.

TABLE 3

Index of Soviet Iron Ore Exports, Total and to Rumania

	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>
Total	100	113	127	137	159	174
Rumania	100	112	119	149	194	228

Sources: Vneshnaia torgovlya SSSR za 1960, 61, 62, 63.

(7) See Greenslade and Wallace, "Industrial Production in the USSR" in Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 1962, pp. 115ff.

The picture presented above is deficient for the recent past because Soviet trade data for 1964 are not yet available. But several recent indicators of Moscow's attitude toward Rumania's economic policies are to be noted. The Soviet Rumanian trade agreement for 1964 planned a total turnover of 760 million rubles or an increase of only 4% over actual turnover in the previous year. The actual trade level for 1964, however, reached 823 million rubles, or an increase of about 13%. Actual trade turnover has been running markedly above planned levels for the past several years. It is thus impossible to interpret the planned level for 1965, 790 million rubles or 4% above 1964's planned level, as any sign of Soviet trade discrimination. There is no reason to believe that Soviet-Rumanian trade will fail in 1965 to exceed planned amounts.

There are positive signs, moreover, that the post-Khrushchev leadership in the Kremlin has chosen to provide significant support for Rumania's industrialization drive in spite of its anti-Comecon implications. On 13 March 1965 it was announced that the Soviet Union has committed itself to deliver substantial aid to the Iron Gates hydroelectric project, accounting for approximately half of an initial planned power output of 2000 MW.⁸ This agreement followed an earlier commitment, of 17 October 1965, to provide the Rumanians with thermoelectric power plants with an aggregate capacity of 1000 MW. The degree of Soviet magnanimity implied by these arrangements must be viewed as considerable. Of the four integral Comecon projects in which Rumania participates, the bank, the rolling-stock pool, the highway project, and the unified power net, only the latter involves the sort of integration that might conceivably limit her economic independence. That the Rumanians are earnestly bent upon minimizing their vulnerability on this score is indicated by the recently announced power development plan for 1966-75, drafted "with a view to covering the power required by the development of the national economy from internal resources to the greatest extent..."⁹ The Soviets are now committed to provide substantial support for this project. It is highly unlikely that undisclosed "integration" riders were written into the aid agreements, else Bucharest would not have accepted them.

One of the haziest aspects of Soviet-Rumanian economic relations over the past several years has been the issue of Soviet aid in the construction of the vast Galati steel combine. The Soviets first committed themselves to material support in 1960, but the aid then failed to appear. During his visit to Rumania in summer 1962 Khrushchev made no mention of this vital project, while his hosts constantly brought the matter up in their speeches.¹⁰ Whether technical or political, difficulties appear to have arisen which cast the prospects of Soviet fulfill-

(8) Rumanian Situation Report. 17 March 1965.

(9) Agerpres, 5 June 1965.

(10) Brown, op. cit., p. 24.

ment in doubt. Montias judged late in 1964 that the aid was not likely to come through at all.¹¹

Whatever Khrushchev may have hinted in private, it seems that the Soviets never seriously threatened to renege on this agreement. A Soviet volume on Bloc economic relations released in early 1964 confirmed "...the Soviet Union will provide technical assistance in the construction of a steel complex for the production of about 1.5 million tons of steel a year, with the installation of a blooming-slabbing and a semi-continuous rolling mill for a metallurgical combine being constructed in Rumania, having a capacity of 4 million tons of steel a year..."¹² This reference is clearly to the Galati complex and, while there is some textual vagueness on precisely the form of the aid, it would appear that at this juncture the Soviet commitment was still on. Apparently, the difficulties that had left the Galati project somewhat in limbo were overcome, for a Radio Moscow commentary in Rumanian on 7 April 1965 indicated that, among other manifestations of Soviet-Rumanian cooperation, the delivery of Soviet equipment will begin this year.

From the data presented on the foregoing pages one must come to the conclusion that the Soviets never seriously sought to bring economic levers to bear against Rumania's drive for an independent and developed economy. Moscow may have had its misgivings about Rumanian policies; it may have applied a certain measure of high-pressure salesmanship to sell Comecon integration and division-of-labor concepts. But the prevailing tone of Soviet policy has been one of resignation to, even cooperation with Rumania substantially on the latter's terms. In pronouncements to or on Rumania, the Soviets have stressed the important role of Soviet aid in the process of Rumanian development. If these reminders constitute a form of veiled threat, the threat is of the very weakest order. They come rather, it would seem, from a Soviet need to stress the positive in Soviet-Rumanian relations.

The Soviets have not ceased to stress the importance of developing patterns of specialization and integrated planning among the members of Comecon. But they have repeatedly underscored their agreement with the principle, adopted largely at Rumanian insistence, that all multilateral arrangements must emerge from the interests of the participants and that no decisions can be imposed upon the dissenter.

Moscow cannot afford to forget that Rumania is not the sole eccentricity in an otherwise uniform Bloc economic harmony, but rather the most outspoken of several contending parties. Soviet policy must be geared to holding a heterogeneous group together. The effort toward Comecon integration has not been

(11) Montias, op. cit., p. 141.

(12) V. I. Zolotarev, Vneshnaia trgovlya sotsialisticheskikh stran, Moscow 1964, p. 200. (Emphasis added)

without its small successes, moreover. Such examples of specialization as Intermetal and the ball-bearing agreement indicate that small steps taken through bilateral and non-compulsive multilateral consultations can achieve a sort of socialist division of labor which, while hardly monolithic and comprehensive, serves as a cohesive element within the Bloc.

Insofar as the Soviet Union has a specific, clearly articulated economic policy toward Rumania it would appear to be predicated upon the following basic principles: First, while Rumanian single-mindedness on the issues of industrial development and economic independence is annoying, it can be tolerated. The application of economic sanctions would surely create enormous tensions and produce only meager results in the long run. Second, as Rumania achieves her economic goals, her interest in integrative schemes will tend to increase. This is a reflection of a more general postulate that differences within the socialist camp, both economic and political, stem essentially from differential levels of economic development. It seems, in short, that the Soviet Union has found its interest to lie in contributing to Rumania's industrial drive. In the meantime, however, the fact of Rumania's political quasi-independence must be faced.

The Political Crucible 1963-1964

As any good Marxist-Leninist knows, it is impossible to separate economics from politics. The Rumanian drive for industrialization within the context of Soviet and Comecon interests obviously had political overtones from the very beginning. It would be most difficult to decide on any precise moment when Rumanian policy became a fundamentally political problem for Moscow, when the common denominator of all Rumanian actions became their pay-off in terms of autonomy, when the Soviets were forced to consider the impact of Rumanian behavior on the solidity of the Bloc as a political unit. It is convenient, however, to regard the end of 1962 as something of a milestone. By this time Rumanian-Soviet differences were public knowledge in the West; Rumanian policy was clearly oriented toward political independence within the Bloc. Between 1962 and the present the challenge posed by the Rumanian deviation confronted Moscow in increasingly stark form. Thus one may usefully concentrate on this period in searching for the guidelines of Soviet policy.

Rumanian policy in the years since 1962 has been based on several imposing pillars which, while they are commonly recognized, deserve enumeration if only to contrast them with the rather obscure bases of Soviet action:

First, the Rumanians have adhered consistently to the policy of industrialization based upon heavy industry, a line to which they ascribe ideological permanence.¹³

Second, as a corollary to industrialization but with clear political implications, they have explored the utility of stronger economic ties with the West.

Third, they have established a position of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute. This element of Rumanian policy is based in turn upon the insistence on independence and equality for all communist parties -- polycentrism, in short; substantive but not very vocal agreement with the CPSU on the ideological questions at issue in the dispute; and the maintenance of good party and state relations with all contenders.

Finally, the Rumanians have exhibited profound sensitivity toward certain marginal issues which reflect on their national dignity, such as the history of the Second World War.

13) See Agerpres Statement, 9 June 1965.

Now one may be relatively certain that occasions arose when the Rumanian leadership encountered difficulty in making tactical decisions on what means to employ and how fast to move. But the direction of motion does not appear ever to have been in doubt. This can not be said at all of Soviet policy. While the Soviets naturally desire to strengthen the economic and political unity of Bloc, they have been able neither to articulate a clear image of what they want the Bloc to look like nor to formulate effective tactical measures to move them in the desired direction.

A crucial top-level Soviet-Rumanian confrontation after 1962 occurred when Podgorny and the former Soviet ambassador to Rumania, Yepishev, visited Bucharest in May 1963. This meeting came on the heels of that spring's Comecon disputes and preceded the Bloc summit in East Berlin (which Dej boycotted) and the July council sessions of Comecon. The May mission, clearly of the highest competence, was apparently commissioned with the task of gauging Rumanian positions and reaching some definition of Bloc unity. The public record indicates that the Rumanians firmly held their line. At every whistle stop on an extended tour, Ceausescu praised Rumanian economic policy while Podgorny voiced "understanding" of the Rumanian position.

No doubt the Soviet side had certain concrete proposals to make on Comecon at this juncture. Although supra-national planning had been scuttled early in the year, the Soviets must have had a second line from which to defend their concept of integration. Nevertheless, they appeared completely unwilling to engage in hard-sell tactics, as evidenced by the absence of any clear public statement of their position. At best, Moscow learned from the Podgorny visit how difficult it would be to move its obstreperous ally from her chosen course and that Soviet-Rumanian differences were about to escalate to the political level. It may well have been that fear of disagreement in new areas prompted the Soviets to beat a wholesale retreat on Comecon integration at the council session in July.

Rumanian divergence from Soviet policy on handling China was already evident by the end of 1963, especially with Maurer's November call for an end to public polemics. By this time, the Soviets had decided to attempt a showdown with the Chinese Party designed to push the onus of the split onto Peking and to rally the pro-Soviet parties within some "organizational" framework, a decision articulated in Suslov's Central Committee report of 14 February. In full knowledge of Soviet intentions, the Rumanians attempted an end run by sending a mission of honest brokers to China. It was indeed Rumanian misgivings that caused the Soviets to delay publication of the Suslov speech. At the same time, the Soviets had no choice but to acquiesce grudgingly in the moderating mission to Peking, otherwise they could hardly thrust the full blame for a final split onto the Chinese. Khrushchev received

the returning delegates at Gagra with greater enthusiasm than he displayed at their embarkation. The Rumanians brought tidings of utter implacability in Peking; and Khrushchev surely did not refrain from crowing, "I told you so." As a consequence he felt himself free to press forward his plans for an international conference of the parties and organizational measures to increase proletarian discipline.

These developments faced the Rumanians with a crucial decision; they had either to choose sides, with the Soviet being the only real choice, or to refuse participation in the game. By their April declaration of independence, they opted for the latter course. This action, along with the grumblings of other parties in the pro-Soviet camp, cast a dense pall over Soviet plans; for without a united front against Chinese factionalism there could be no showdown, and very likely not even a polemical conference.

One notes at this point the intrusion of an understated but perceptibly nasty tone in Soviet pronouncements esoterically relevant to Rumania's deviation. On 27 April Radio Moscow reminded the Rumanians that "relying on ones own forces" was a Chinese line and could only bring failure to its adherents. On 30 May the station labeled as perverse the contention that socialist cooperation must lead to permanent agrarianism and railed against fraternal countries which refused such cooperation but turned to the West for aid. A June issue of Kommunist listed the communist parties which supported the CPSU's call for a world conference; Rumania's was conspicuous by its absence.¹⁴ While visiting Warsaw late in July, Khrushchev issued some rather stern warnings against nationalism, exclusiveness, and insufficient vigilance toward the corrosive influence of economic ties with the West. He also hinted darkly that the socialist camp was in for "a test of loyalty to the principles of internationalism."

This was surely a period of increased tension in Soviet-Rumanian relations. Both sides took steps, however, to keep the critical strands from snapping. Stoica spent a rather protracted sojourn in the USSR in June. In July, Maurer, Bodnaras, and Rauta met Kosygin, Podgorny, Andropov and Lesechko in order to clear the air on what the composition of the delegations indicates was a very broad range of issues. In late June Izvestiia took pains to rebuke the tactless suggestions of Professor Valev on lower-Danubian economic integration, to which the Rumanians had reacted with severe indignation. This placating gesture was then broadcast by Radio Moscow in Rumanian.

Again one may assume that there was a great deal of pulling and hauling between the two parties. But the public record indicates no significant Soviet pressures, other than private persuasion, to bring the Rumanians into line. It is especially worthy of note that just at the moment when the Soviets were vigorously attempting the isolation of China -- this was at the moment the only unambiguous plank in their current platform for Bloc unity -- Radio Moscow appears to have ceased beaming anti-Chinese polemics to Rumania.

At the end of July, Podgorny undertook a mission to Rumania once again, probably returning with renewed conviction that the Rumanians were not to be cajoled or frightened from their course. With Khrushchev's ouster, the campaign for an international conference lapsed and with it the pursuit of new organizational forms to secure proletarian discipline.

(14) No. 9, 1964.

It is reasonably likely that Khrushchev's policy on the world conference played some role in his deposeure. The fact that no public evidence of this has emerged ex post facto is not really determinant since any such disclosure would have tended to restrict the already limited leverage his successors possessed. They were bound to confine their explicit de-Khrushchevization to internal matters. But Khrushchev had worked himself into a narrow blind alley. He had attempted to work out a sweeping formula for the economic integration of the Bloc, but the project foundered on resistance led clearly by Rumania. He then committed himself to a policy of isolating the Chinese; but in the absence of monolithic unity among the pro-Soviet parties this was bound to fail. His lieutenants, judging by their subsequent decisions, feared that failure in this effort would be more destructive than a more moderate policy of halting polemics and muddling through with their allies.

The Sino-Soviet dispute forced Khrushchev to search for new forms of Bloc cohesion to replace the hollow shell left by Stalin and against which Khrushchev himself had dealt such lethal blows. But he moved too late. The decay of the previous decade had robbed Moscow of the levers of power to restore the situation. The frustration which characterized his position very likely tended to erode his sense of prudence as well as his analytical judgment, neither of which were strong points in his make-up.

In this connection, one may be permitted to give some credence to the totally unsubstantiated but persistent rumors that Khrushchev sought a way out of his impasse by securing the replacement of Gheorgiu-Dej. Rumania was clearly a lynch-pin in his policy for the Bloc simply because here was where the stoutest resistance was to be found. Given to impulsive conclusions, he could well have reckoned that his problems stemmed from personalities. How Khrushchev may have tried to remove Dej can not even be speculated upon. Unguarded remarks at a reception, which Khrushchev was also given to, may have been the source of rumored unpleasantness in his relations with Dej. From an analytical perspective, in any event, it is clear that Khrushchev had no power to alter the Rumanian leadership, nor was the personality of Dej a critical factor. By this time, the Rumanian deviation and the disintegration of the Bloc were rooted, to borrow from the Marxist lexicon, in "objective" political development.

Policy after Khrushchev or "Turning the Other Cheek"

It would be something of an overstatement to say that Soviet policy toward Rumania saw a change after 15 October. Khrushchev's dealings manifested more a search for policy than its execution. But one does detect a change of style or tone in the manner in which the Soviets confront their Rumanian problem. While the pre-October mood was one of frustration, the period since has been characterized more by resignation on the part of Moscow.

The major factor behind this perceptible change of mood was not an alteration in the Moscow-Bucharest relationship, as such, but the fact that, having given up the show-down policy against China as unworkable, the new leadership was under no compulsion to put pressure on the Rumanians for conformity, which at some point or other Khrushchev would have had to do. Many commentators have stressed that the March Consultative Conference in Moscow was a failure because Rumania and other parties declined to attend. The essence of the matter is, however, that the world conference was degraded to the consultative level because it was clear to Moscow that Rumania and other parties would refuse to take part. It was not so much a failure itself as a face-saving way of avoiding the catastrophe that would have ensued had the Soviets attempted to coerce the pro-Soviet parties which wanted no part of a rump anti-China gathering. As the only dissident ruling pro-Soviet party, Rumania's role in this development hardly requires stress.

Rumania's policy on the Sino-Soviet dispute has continued along the guidelines indicated above and is in many respects similar to the line expressed by Castro in his 13 April speech.¹⁵ The CPSU has tended to adopt the posture of a long-suffering elder who sticks to his principles, calls for public and tactical unity in front of the neighbors (i.e., the imperialists), continues to do his family duty (in Vietnam), and hopes privately that the Chinese brethren will hang themselves in their fanatical verbiage without doing something politically or militarily irresponsible which would threaten the entire clan with incineration or humiliation.

Knowing the depth of Chinese intransigence as well as anyone, the Rumanians probably regard this as an acceptable policy. This at least provides a basis for a modus vivendi with Moscow as regards the condition of international communism. It leaves the Rumanians the leverage accruing to them by reason of continuing Sino-Soviet differences. At the same time, it does not confront them with the necessity of combating Khrushchev's organizational measures for proletarian unity, which the current Kremlin leadership has explicitly given up.¹⁶ Moscow, meanwhile, continues to woo the Rumanians by stressing the positive aspects of the Soviet-Rumanian relationship, as shown, for example, by its treatment of Dej's death.

(15) See Ermarth CAA Background Information, "Fidel, the Giant Killer", 20 March 1965.

(16) See R.R.G. CAA Background Information, "B + K against a Second Cominform", 1 June 1965.

The economic side of Soviet-Rumanian relations, already described above, continues to reveal a cooperative attitude in Moscow. The Soviets have by no means given up the advocacy of Comecon integration. But they have been careful to stress that Bloc economic cooperation proceeds within the framework of the respective members' sovereignty and that it is geared to promoting, not shackling industrialization of the underdeveloped members.¹⁷ They have proceeded, moreover, with a policy of kleine Schritte within Comecon, developing limited spheres of integration on a bilateral or multilateral basis when opportunities appear.

The Soviet hope that an industrialized Rumania will be more cooperative in the future is not, it should be noted, without some basis. Autarky is, of course, out of the question for the Rumanian economy. As its industrial base develops, some forms of integration will appear relatively attractive, while Western trade would permit rejection of the more constraining forms. In the tug of war between the divergent economic objectives of Moscow and Bucharest, it is to be hoped that Rumania pursues an open-ended Comecon rather than a position of semi-isolation, which may not contribute to the freedom of the other members.

One of the most obscure elements to intrude into the complex of Soviet-Rumanian relations in the recent past has been the matter of Rumania's role in the Warsaw Pact. A number of tantalizing bits of information on this theme are available, but they do not add up easily to a coherent whole. The Rumanians have consistently for the last several years emphasized the autonomy of their military establishment -- at least verbally -- by all but completely refusing to credit, as the other Bloc parties do, the guiding role of the Soviet Army in building and maintaining the armies of East Europe. They have also emphasized the dignity of their military heritage by rather slanted interpretations of the history of World War II. The Soviet Union, moreover, has on frequent occasions dutifully published Rumanian statements along these lines in its general and military press.

(17) See, for example, B. Miroshenko, "Economic Cooperation among the Fraternal Countries", Kommunist No. 4, 1965, pp. 78ff.; and K. Mikul'sky, "Complex Development of Economies and the International Division of Labor", Ibid., No. 8, 1965, pp. 83ff. The question of what sort of industrialization Comecon promotes remains a serious source of disagreement, no doubt. Bulgaria's concentration on electrical equipment, an example offered by the latter article, may not strike the Rumanians as particularly persuasive.

At the same time, the Rumanians have not exhibited nearly the stand-offishness toward the Pact that they have shown toward Comecon in public statements. They joined the rest of the Bloc in celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Pact, but not that of Comecon. It is probable that the independence asserted by the Rumanians in their statements on military policy is to be a large extent a propagandistic ploy; but it is not simply a fiction. While Stalin employed deep penetration by Soviet cadres in the satellite armies as a means of political control, this situation is long terminated. All the peoples democracies now possess a great deal of administrative autonomy in the military sphere. It is all but impossible to gauge the precise limits of this autonomy or, more crucial in this case, the relative degrees possessed by different members of the bloc.¹⁸ In a negative sense, each can exert a policy influence on the Warsaw Pact by budgetary limitations, manpower policy, or blocking the use of its territory for some Pact activity. But their autonomy for active or creative military policy is more limited because of the obvious strategic predominance of the Soviet Union and technical dependence on it. The underdeveloped members of the Bloc are especially constrained in this respect.

Rumania's shortening of her military term of duty last November represents a form of negative autonomy. But there is no obvious military reason why the Soviets should have been particularly disconcerted by this move, which does not substantially alter the marginal contribution which the Rumanians could make to Pact operations in a general- or even limited-war context. The Soviets may be faced with a mild form of "Gaullist" obstructionism from the Rumanians within the Pact, but there exists very little concrete evidence to back this case. It is merely reasonable to assume that the Pact, as a Moscow-centered Bloc organization, has been the object of Rumanian criticism and that the Soviets have been under pressure to revise decision-making procedures. Marshal Grechko's several recent visits to Bucharest should probably be related to this procedural problem, although Soviet provision of new weaponry to Rumania could also be involved.

In the political, economic, and military spheres just reviewed, the prevailing themes over the past several months have been continued Soviet-Rumanian friction on a rather low key, but also the operation of a modus vivendi in which the concessions appear to be coming from the Soviet side.

There is one feature, however, which mars this relatively tranquil landscape. This is the concern shown by Moscow for the implications of Western, particularly West German, economic

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- (18) A corresponding situation prevails in the area of secret police activity. But it is similarly unsusceptible to analysis. One of the few pertinent indicators available is the rumor that Rumanian agents have on occasion been assigned to shadow Soviet officials in Rumania. In contrast, the April plot in Bulgaria was reported to have been uncovered by Soviet counter-intelligence.

and diplomatic penetration of the Bloc. The DDR has given voice to a series of shrill pronouncements on this theme.¹⁹ When Neues Deutschland protested Bonn State Secretary Lahr's "misuse of his rights as guest of Rumania by proclaiming Bonn's aggressive aims against the DDR," Bucharest was surely the principal target.²⁰ Soviet admonitions on this theme have been relatively subdued, but nevertheless pointed. Warning against the subversive aims of Western diplomacy, a recent article in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' declares, "In mutual relations with the outside world, among the socialist countries there can be no efforts to use their relations with capitalist countries at the expense of other fraternal governments."²¹

While Rumania is not the only Bloc country pursuing a Drang nach Westen for opportunistic reasons, she is in the forefront of this movement. And while protecting the DDR is surely not the sole reason for Soviet misgivings, it appears to be the most immediate one. Here the Soviet Union finds itself in a delicate position, for it would also like to extend its economic relations with the West, including the Federal Republic. But it is not only unprepared to make substantive concessions on East Germany to the West, it appears subject to increasingly effective pressures from Ulbricht's regime to support his pursuit of added legitimacy in the diplomatic sphere and vis-a-vis Berlin. It is possible that the need to guard East Germany's interests will revive Moscow's enthusiasm for more effective instruments of Bloc unity.

The Dilemmae of Bloc Management

If the Presidium of the CPSU has, like other top leadership bodies of the world, its secret policy papers, the one concerning the handling of Rumania probably sets out the following basic guidelines:

1. The political difficulties between the Soviet Union and Rumania, as well as those between the socialist commonwealth and Rumania stem from objective factors of the stage of economic development through which the Rumanian comrades are now proceeding. To these factors must be added certain subjective causes which include national feelings and reactions against the errors of the personality cult and the subjectivist period.

(19) Dorothy Miller CAA Background Information, "East German Still Afraid of Bloc - West German Trade Expansion", 21 May 1965.

(20) 20 May 1965.

(21) See Fritz Ermarth CAA Background Information, "Bridges East and West: A Soviet Word of Caution", 1 June 1965.

2. It is incumbent upon the CPSU to assist Rumania in making the economic transition to full industrialization, to help in providing a basis for the construction of communist society. At the same time, this aid should be geared in such a way as to ease Rumania's integration into an international socialist division of labor. Rumania must be persuaded that no fraternal country can profit from isolation from the socialist community.

3. The CPSU should strive in its line to minimize the disruptive influence of the subjective factors alluded to above. It should demonstrate a magnanimous spirit, but should not capitulate in principle before nationalist exclusiveness or polemical arguments derived from past difficulties.

4. Specific issues of disagreement should at all levels be resolved in fraternal discussion before they become objects of polemics. We must strive to assure the Rumanian comrades that their interests are always taken into account in our policies. But they must not be led into pretending to an influence inappropriate to their authority in the socialist commonwealth and the international workers' movement.

The Presidium must, by and large, make its decisions in much the same manner as other collective leadership groups do. Especially at the present moment, with internal agreement a prime value, there is certain to be a tendency to gloss over difficult issues that do not obviously demand immediate resolution. Thus a policy document such as the above, drawn up by Secretary Andropov after protracted debate, is hypothetically conceivable. It appears to cover the vital problems and all who are interested in internal tranquility would subscribe to it.

Yet it is hardly a policy in the constructive or creative sense. It is a rationalization for accepting a dynamic status quo, based upon the ideological hope that Rumania's development moves her naturally in the right direction. At best, it is a policy of watchful waiting. This is not to say that the Soviets mount no activities toward Rumania. Through economic cooperation, propaganda, and high-level political exchanges, they are engaged in a campaign of persuasion. But it is a soft sell designed to keep limits on current developments which they are not seeking now dramatically to alter.

The fundamental reason behind the Soviet policy of resignation to Rumanian deviations is not difficult to ascertain. It is the course of least resistance. Some Soviet leaders must surely have misgivings about the possible future implications of Rumanian behavior for Bloc cohesion. There seems little doubt that Khrushchev did. But in order to avoid possible future difficulties, Moscow would have to take fairly drastic action now. Various alternatives for a more vigorous Soviet policy have probably been rejected as ineffective or conducive to wider disruption in the socialist camp.

Neither public polemics nor economic sanctions would offer impressive prospects for bringing the Rumanians to heel. Both would enormously complicate other international policies of the Soviet Union. No political leader and much less a collective leadership finds it easy to adopt a dangerous course of action in the present in order to forestall a future danger that is only vaguely discernible and which may not materialize. The current Soviet leadership is certainly capable of taking dramatic action; but this is likely only if the need is obvious and the prospects of success are good. Both prerequisites are absent in the Rumanian case. To employ a military metaphor, Soviet strategic objectives for East Europe are essentially defensive. Use of offensive tactics for a defensive strategy always requires an enormous preponderance of power when the threat is only vague. While the Soviet Union has never been physically stronger, it lacks the psycho-political dimensions of power required to declare preventative war against the decay working within the Bloc. The result is a policy of drift.

Fritz Ermarth

APPENDIX

Notes In Search of Bessarabia

On 28 June 1965 the towns and villages of Moldavia were, according to Radio Moscow of that date, decked out in their festive best to celebrate the "return of all Moldavian lands into a single Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic." Twenty-five years previous, Rumania had capitulated to a Soviet ultimatum which, at German sufferance, demanded the return of Bessarabia to the patrimony of the tsars. But for the note above, the Moldavian celebration was passed over in silence by the central Soviet media. Last October, in contrast, when the 40th anniversary of Moldavian republic was celebrated, Pravda carried lengthy pronouncements by the local first secretary, I.I. Bodyul. Perhaps in the intervening period, a note of embarrassment has crept into matters Moldavian.

The purpose of these notes is not to review the history of the Bessarabian problem nor to recall the recent developments in Rumania and the USSR pertaining thereto which are part of the public record.¹ Nor has it been possible to undertake an exhaustive search of Soviet and Moldavian literature for information relevant to Soviet handling of its "Bessarabian problem", if indeed there is one. The following pages merely attempt to set on record certain statistical data on Moldavian ethnography and the republic's political elite. It was hoped that these easily obtainable facts might cast some light on the manner in which Moscow views the problem of ruling Moldavia, whether or not the Soviets consider Moldavia as a potential Rumania irredenta which must be kept under special political control. Unfortunately the data turned out to be rather ambiguous. They can be rather adequately explained by resort to purely "objective" sociological arguments having no relation to the presence of a territorial claimant across the Pruth. They are presented nevertheless, as a foundation for possible further research.² In a number of instances Moldavian data are compared with those of the Baltic republics since they would appear hypothetically to present similar problems of political control.

- 1) Reference is here to the Marx-Engels notes published in Rumania and an "answering" volume on Bessarabian history by Soviet scholars.
- 2) Population and ethnographic data have been taken from various republic volumes of the 1959 Soviet census: Itogi vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniia... 1959 goda. Moscow, 1962. Economic data have been taken from successive volumes of Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR. Data on the composition of the CPSU and the CP Moldavia have been taken from Partiinaia zhizn' No. 10, 1965, "KPSS v Tsifrakh".

Population and Ethnography

The exhaustive Soviet census of 1959 counted the total population of the Moldavian SSR at 2,888,477 persons. It forecast a population growth rate for the republic of approximately 1% per annum, leading one to an estimate of about 3 - 3.2 million persons in 1965. If the 1959 nationality ratios are taken as more or less constant, the ethnic composition of Moldavia today is about 65.4% Moldavian, 14.6% Ukrainian, and 10.2% Russian. Gagauzi, Jews, and Bulgars constitute the bulk of the remainder. In 1959 there were 1663 "Rumanians" in Moldavia.

In keeping with the predominately agricultural economy of the region, the population is overwhelmingly rural (78.5%), while the average rural-urban ratio in the USSR as a whole has been around 50-50 in recent years. According to the census, 90% of the Moldavians are rural citizens, as are 70% of the Ukrainians. On the other hand, 67% of Moldavia's Russians are urban dwellers. The population of Kishinev, the capital, is one-third Russian. These data clearly point to Russian domination of the MSSR's administrative and cultural elite.

Population Distribution and Resettlement

On several recent occasions sensationally couched rumors have circulated in the West that the Soviet regime has been deporting Moldavians from the MSSR to Central Asia in order to reduce the legitimacy of Rumanian ethnic claims to Bessarabia. It is common knowledge that such deportations were applied extensively in all the territories acquired in the course of World War II, especially in the Baltic states. While these rumors have a basis in fact, the facts appear less sensational than the rumors.

Political deportations and resettlement can range from wholesale population transfers designed to alter the ethnic complexion of a given region, (i.e., Stalin's treatment of the Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars) to selective removal of "anti-social" or politically recalcitrant elements. While it is perfectly reasonable to assume that the Moldavians, like other Western border peoples, have suffered to a certain degree from the latter policy, there is no evidence of the former's application in any concerted manner.

According to the 1959 census, 85.2% of the USSR's Moldavians live within the borders of the Moldavian SSR. In comparison with the Baltic peoples, who are known to have been victims of mass deportations, the Moldavian concentration appears weak, for over 90% of the Baltic ethnic groups live within their respective republics. But all these figures really prove is that deportations did not really alter the ethnic complexion of the Baltic states. These ethnic groups are today the most concentrated of the entire Soviet Union.

About 242,000 Moldavians, or 10.9% of the USSR's Moldavian population, lived in the Ukraine in 1959. Of these, 204,000 lived in the Odesskaya, Chernovitskaya, and Kirovogradskaya oblasts, that is in oblasts directly adjacent to Moldavia where significant Moldavian concentrations are historically explicable. Another 12,200 lived in the industrial oblast of Donetsk, very likely as the result of natural migration to an area of economic opportunity. This leaves 25,450 Moldavians who lived in other areas of the Ukraine unspecified by the census figures. In addition 62,200 lived in unspecified regions of the RSFSR.

The 1959 census listed a significant concentration of Moldavians in Kazakhstan. Of about 15,000 in this republic, more than a third lived in Tseliny krai, the "Virgin Lands" center, alone. This was the area to which many of the "deportees" were reported to have been dispatched. Since 1959 it appears that more Moldavians have been resettled in Kazakhstan, largely under the direction of The Main Administration for Resettlement and the Organization of Labor Selection of the Moldavian Council of Ministers. In 1962, the head of this operation, V.N. Lamaskin, received an award for his services.³ The main requirement has been for agricultural workers, particularly with technical training.⁴

It would be unreasonable to ascribe to purely punitive or political deportation the residence of 15,000 Moldavians in Kazakhstan and about 110,000 more in other areas of the USSR not adjacent to Moldavia. Since the Virgin Lands campaign was initiated, labor has been recruited from many regions of the western USSR which have traditionally been plagued with rural overpopulation. Moldavia has been only one of the labor sources, and quantitatively not a very significant one at that. The dispersion of Moldavians over the rest of the USSR can be linked largely to the natural ethnographic effects of industrialization. Since Soviet labor recruitment has always used a combination of material incentives and "administrative measures", these massive migrations have a certain quality of forced resettlement. But it is impossible to prove that the Moldavians have suffered out of proportion with other ethnic groups and for distinctly political reasons.

3) Sovetskaya Moldavia, 30 December 1962.

4) See Izvestia, 28 February 1962; Sovetskaya Moldavia, 10 June 1964; Ibid, 13 January 1965.

Leadership in Moldavia

According to the latest figures released by the CPSU, the Communist Party of Moldavia was 85,379 strong as of 1 January 1965. Assuming a total population in Moldavia of about 3 million, a ratio of party to non-party members of approximately 1:35 currently prevails. This is about one-half the average USSR density of party members. It is a significantly lower density than the 1:26 ratio in the Baltic states and the 1:27-30 ratio of the four Central Asian republics.⁵ The low density of party membership in Moldavia must be to a large extent explained by the traditional difficulty the CPSU has encountered in penetrating rural areas. The Baltic states are more urbanized and Kazakhstan has been the target of high-priority developmental projects, which would explain a higher party density in these regions. Since 1 January 1961, however, the CP of Moldavia has grown by about 41%, a rate exceeded only in Estonia where the Party grew by 45% in this period.

From Soviet data on the current ethnic composition of the CPSU, it appears that about 40,300 Moldavians belong to the Party. If one assumes that they are all members of the Moldavian CP, the republic party is about 47% Moldavian. In actuality, many Moldavians must belong to the parties of other republics, leaving the Moldavian CP perhaps less than 40% Moldavian. However, the data are sliced, Moldavians are significantly under-represented in their own republic party. Given the predominantly rural residence of the Moldavian population, one should be hesitant in ascribing this fact to positive discrimination against Moldavians.

As the preceding data tend to suggest, ethnic Moldavians play a disproportionately low role in the administrative-political life of their republic. This is confirmed by a glance at the ethnic composition of the Moldavian Central Committee, which should offer a fairly representative portrait of the local elite. While ethnic identification from names is always a hazardous enterprise in the case of the USSR, as large a sample as a republic central committee should preclude enormous error. Of the 140 members elected to the Moldavian Central Committee in 1963, about 85 have names easily recognized as Russian or Ukrainian, while only about 35 bear clearly Moldavian-Rumanian type names. Relative to their strength in the republic's population, Russians and Ukrainians are over-represented on the

5) A range must be shown for Central Asia since rapid population growth in this area prevents accurate projection from the 1959 level.

Central Committee by a factor of 2.48 (where 1.00 denotes direct proportionality). Corresponding representative factors for the Baltic states are as follows: Lithuania, 2.40; Latvia, 1.04; Estonia, .93.⁶

Moving to a higher cross-section of the republic's leadership pyramid presents grave analytical problems because the sample is small and biographical data on the individuals are scanty. The Presidium of the Moldavian CP is described below:

Ivan Ivanovich Bodyul: First secretary since 1961. Apparently an ethnic but transdnistrian Moldavian. Born in 1918 (place not given). Joined CPSU in 1937. Agricultural and veterinary education. Higher party school. Military service 1942-46. Agricultural and party work in Moldavia in late 1940's and early 1950's. Advanced from second secretary. Member of CC CPSU.⁷

Nikolai Afanasyvich Mel'nikov: Second Secretary since 1961. Born in 1918. Joined CPSU in 1939. Higher Party School. Came to Moldavian Second secretaryship directly from central CPSU apparatus.⁸

Aleksandr Filipovich Diorditsa: Chairman of the Moldavian Council of Ministers since 1958. Apparently another transdnistrian Moldavian. Born in 1911. Joined CPSU in 1938. Finance education in Leningrad in 1938. Higher Party School. Involved in sovietization of Bessarabia in 1940.

P.V. Voronin: Secretary of Moldavian CC, Chairman of Moldavian Party-State Control Committee.

K.F. Il'yashenko: Chairman of Presidium of Moldavian Supreme Soviet.

D.S. Kornovan: Secretary of Moldavian CC.

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- 6) Baltic figures refer to CC's elected in 1960. The comparability of the Moldavian and Lithuanian situations shown above is somewhat misleading. Moldavia's population is 24.8% and her central committee is 60.5% Russian-Ukrainian. In Lithuania the percentages are 9.2% and 22% respectively.
 - 7) Bol'shaia Sovetskaya Entsiklopediia, Yezhegodnik 1962, p. 588.
 - 8) Ibid., p. 605.

P.A. Paskar: Secretary of Moldavian CC, in charge of agriculture.

B.A. Steshov: Secretary of Moldavian CC, in charge of industry and construction.

N.A. Shchelokov: Deputy Chairman of Moldavian Council of Ministers.

Candidate Members

G.I. Lavranchuk: Komsomol First Secretary.

I.T. Savchenko: Chairman of Moldavian KGB?

S.S. Sidorenko: Deputy Chairman of Moldavian Council of Ministers chairman of trade union council.

As might be expected, the top leadership of Moldavia is dominated by Russians and Ukrainians. One sees in Moldavia a pattern that is common in the Central Asian and other "out-lying" republics, a local first secretary and an imported second secretary. Although this can not be proven because data are lacking, it appears that prominent Moldavians have by and large come from east of the Dniestr and have their roots in pre-1940 Soviet Moldavia.

At the Presidium level, political considerations have clearly determined the composition of the leadership. At the Central Committee level, this explanation can not be stressed so strongly. While it is possible that indigenous Moldavians have been prevented from rising in larger numbers to this level for political reasons, the factor of ability unquestionably has played a crucial role here. Data from the 1959 census indicate an abysmally low educational level in Moldavia. For every 1000 persons, Moldavia had 186 with secondary or partial-secondary education; only Lithuania was lower with 175. Estonia had 304 and Latvia 344. The USSR average was 263 at this time. For every 1000 persons, Moldavia had only 10 persons with higher education, a rock-bottom position shared only by Tadzhikistan. Lithuania was slightly higher on the list with 13; both Latvia and Estonia had 21. In 1959 the USSR average was 18. Thus in both Moldavia and Lithuania, which have educational levels far below average, a marked over-representation of Russians and Ukrainians is to be noted at the central committee level. But only in Moldavia does this over-representation constitute an outright majority.