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RFE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION DEPARTMENT

Background Report

THE "PARTISAN" GROUP IN POLAND'S COMMUNIST PARTY

Introduction

During the last few years information about Communist Eastern Europe has become much more plentiful. Economic statistics have become more abundant, more meaningful and more accurate. Official speeches have become more articulate, more informative and more candid. The press, now easily obtainable in Western Europe, covers a much wider range of subjects, with more latitude than ever before. Western press correspondents, traders and ordinary visitors have freer access to the whole area and find contacts more easy to make. The products of Communist culture and the achievements of Communist education are now common knowledge among interested circles in the West.

But in the all-important political sphere these societies still remain essentially closed. Political developments are, of course, officially reported -- a Party secretary is dismissed in Bulgaria, a cabinet reshuffle takes place in Hungary -- and reasons (sometimes true) are given. But the political background against which the changes have taken place, their implications and possible repercussions must remain the subject of a speculation which is not officially permitted. Foreign journalists trying to ferret out these matters face either a closed door or complete expulsion; residents of the country who try to enlighten them still face a loss of livelihood or even of freedom.

Even in Poland which, despite the retrogression of the last three years, remains clearly the most free country in the socialist camp, this is still very much the case. The expulsions of Mr. Abe Rosenthal of "The New York Times" in 1959 and of Mr. Jean Wetz of "Le Monde" earlier this year were clear warnings against inquisitiveness and a thorough practice of the journalistic craft in the Western sense. Normal political reporting on Poland is, therefore, impossible. Information on what is happening behind the scenes in the Polish United Workers Party or in the government must be obtained by more devious means; through reports of private citizens or of public officials speaking privately either inside Poland or when visiting the West, through reports of foreign visitors with good contacts.

Such a method of gathering information, though inevitable, presents two serious problems. The first is the familiar one of assessing the accuracy of the information and the second, having skeptically sifted the information with as much expertise as possible, that of having what is finally accepted -- and this is usually very little -- in turn accepted by a larger public without, for obvious reasons, being able to give any documentation or cite any sources. Such inhibitions could, of course, prevent any kind of political reporting or analysis on East European political developments. Though this would be absurd, they must be accepted as further restraints on the work of those who are operating in this field even if they cause some information to be withheld which might well be true.

Any report on the "Partisan" Group within the Polish United Workers Party presents even greater difficulties and imposes even greater restraints than usual. For here is a tight factional group operating inside a Party which is in itself very much a closed society. Much of the information passed on about such a group is, therefore, bound to be in the nature of improbable gossip or rumor. A vast amount of information about the group has become available. Much of it was obviously worthless, some had to be rejected after closer investigation. Only a small amount was retained and this is included in the following report together with a necessary minimum of background information and with evidence which, though not of a direct nature, is circumstantially so strong as to be acceptable or, at least, seriously arguable. The criteria applied for the acceptance of direct evidence were the complete personal reliability and professional competence of sources, the plausibility of the evidence given and the existence of other evidence corroborating it. The report perhaps raises as many questions as it answers, it could give rise to a great deal of fascinating and almost obsessive speculation. But from it there emerge the following indisputable facts: that there exists within Poland's Communist Party a determined and closely knit group of men bent on increasing their power, that they have steadily gained in influence and that their triumph would mean a great if not total reduction of the still considerable degree of Communist "liberalism" which has existed in Poland since October 1956.

Emergence of the "Partisan" Group

No one would question that Wladyslaw Gomulka enjoys unchallenged supremacy and authority within the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party. But this has led some observers to assume that this supremacy implied the absence of factionalism within the Party itself. This assumption seems to be based on the notion that factionalism always means a struggle for supreme power; since, therefore, Gomulka had supreme power there was little scope for factionalism as they understood it.

But it has been precisely this pinnacle-like supremacy of Gomulka, aided and abetted by his distant and remote personality and his inability to delegate responsibilities properly, which has facilitated the growth of an apparently bitter factional struggle in which the "Partisan" Group is on the offensive.

The hard core of this "Partisan" Group reportedly consists of men who, as the name implies, were during the war connected with the Communist resistance movement inside Poland. It should be stressed that by no means all members of the Communist underground are today necessarily connected with this group or are even in sympathy with it. But common experiences during the war are evidently the human bond which unites these men and there are enough of them to give the attractive title of "Partisans" some plausibility. (The analogy with Tito's "Partisans" is obvious but should not be overdrawn.) They are also bound by common ambition and common aversions. Their ultimate aim is to see a Poland run by dedicated, orthodox Communists brooking no opposition or deviation from a Stalinist type implementation of Marxism-Leninism. They are reported to be anti-Semitic, anti-intellectual and against those moderates who wish to preserve all or some of the so-called "gains" of October. To add to these almost nihilistic tendencies they are both anti-Western and anti-Khrushchev, seeing in the latter a dangerous revisionist and an obstacle to their aims.

Not even the most reliable and mutually confirmatory reports agree exactly on the membership of this group. But one can with some degree of safety name the following key people: General Grzegorz Korczynski, now chief of military intelligence, perhaps most accurately described as the "key figure" in the group; General Mieczyslaw Moczar, now Deputy Minister of the Interior, usually linked with Korczynski as belonging to the heart of the conspiracy; Colonel Marian Janic; Colonel Teodor Kufel; General Aleksander Kokoszyn; General Zygmunt Duszyński, Deputy Minister of National Defense and Chief Inspector of Military Training; General Bronislaw Bednarz, deputy chief of the Main Political Administration of the Army; Colonel Franciszek Szlachcic, also a Deputy Minister of the Interior; General Franciszek Ksiezarczyk. All of these except Bednarz were members of the Communist resistance.

Since Korczynski and Moczar are held by many to be the main driving forces in the group it is worth recalling some details in their interesting careers. Korczynski was born Stefan Kilanowicz in 1915. Attracted to Communism as a young man, in 1936, at the age of 21 he made his way to Spain to fight for the Republican cause. After the defeat of the Republic he crossed over into France, joined the French Communist Party and became active in its Polish section. In wartime France Korczynski distinguished himself by acts of sabotage. But in 1942 when the Communist underground People's Guard was formed in Poland many

Polish "Spaniards" living in France were summoned to the homeland and thus, in August 1942, Korczynski found himself back in Poland. An experienced fighter he soon rose in the ranks of the People's Guard and in October 1943 went to Warsaw to become the chief of the Guard's (clandestine) operational department. There can be no doubt that Korczynski was a man of great courage but during his activity in the Polish Communist resistance he became known for a most brutal anti-Semitism. According to Jozef Swiatlo, a deputy director of a department in the Ministry of Public Security who defected to the West in 1953, Korczynski took part in the physical liquidation of two Jewish underground units in the Lublin area during the war. By the end of the war he was one of the top commanders in the Communist underground. After the war, in 1946, he became a Deputy-Minister of Public Security under the notorious Radkiewicz and, even in such ferocious company, distinguished himself by his ruthlessness. But his power was not to last long. In 1948 during the struggle which saw the triumph of the Muscovites against the "home" Communists, led by Gomulka, Korczynski began a steady descent from power which in 1950 led to the prison cell. After four years in jail he was tried and sentenced to life imprisonment, a sentence later commuted to 15 years. In 1956, in the political thaw which began even before October, he was released and rehabilitated. Shortly after the October he became chief of Military Intelligence.

Moczar, born Mikolaj Demko, was in the pre-war Polish Communist Party, and served two years in prison. Released at the outbreak of war in September 1939 he made his way to the eastern part of Poland occupied by Soviet troops. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union Moczar became active and prominent in the Communist underground. Toward the end of the war he became a commander of a regional unit in the People's Guard. In this capacity, like Korczynski, he was very active in liquidating other, non-Communist, resistance groups although he is not recorded as having carried out actions specifically against Jewish units. Immediately after the war Moczar began a more than 10-year career in the Secret Police. After the fall of Gomulka, when men with backgrounds similar to his were cast out of office and many into prison, Moczar actually received a series of promotions in the provincial state administration. It is not easy to account for his survival in 1948 and 1949. True, he joined in the attacks on Gomulka; but so did many others who went down to disgrace. Possibly he was saved by differences in Bierut's new Politburo and was held to be used as a pawn against Radkiewicz. At any rate, again according to Swiatlo, he was for a time widely touted as Radkiewicz's successor at the Ministry of Public Security, a post he is said to have coveted. In April 1956 he did succeed Radkiewicz, not as Minister of Public Security but in the innocuous Ministry of State Farms to which Radkiewicz had previously been transferred. He survived the October with considerable aplomb praising Gomulka just as blithely as he had condemned him eight years earlier. In December 1956 he was made a Deputy Minister

of the Interior, the post which he still holds.

As a body the Communist war-time underground commanders came into their own, ironically enough, as a result of the Polish October. Some had held military positions of importance throughout the Stalinist period but others had either been side-tracked or kept chafing in junior positions by the fact that they were home Communists or by the presence of so many Soviet officers in the Polish military hierarchy. Yet others, and this includes Korczynski, had actually suffered in campaign against home Communists. When October came, however, the home Communists were vindicated, the vast majority of Soviet officers went home and the underground commanders really came into their own. When they were installed into their positions of importance, it was quite natural that they should generally keep together as a group and be on friendly personal terms with each other.

Entering the Political Field

It was also natural that these men should share the same rather primitive political views and the same prejudices, chiefly anti-Semitism and anti-intellectualism. They soon probably came to share a serious concern over the forces which the Polish October had unleashed. (To them the only good thing about the October was that it brought them all back to positions of power.) The October freedoms meant indiscipline -- in the Party, in the economy, in culture and education. To them there could be no Communism without coercion, no totalitarianism without terror. Nor need one assume that they were concerned only with the public good as they saw it. As men who had fought and suffered for Communism they may well have considered themselves both entitled and qualified to advance to high positions of power.

There is no recorded evidence of any concerted activity by these men until the autumn of 1959. What sparked off their activity at that time seems to have been the defection the previous summer of a senior security official, Pawel Monat. The consternation which this defection must undoubtedly have caused, together with the convenient fact that Monat was Jewish, reportedly gave the "Partisans" (as they were only to be called later) an opportunity to make political capital and to begin an anti-Semitic whisper campaign among the Party cadres. The campaign was reportedly aimed chiefly against those old Communists who had returned to Poland from the Soviet Union after the war. Chief target among these was the Jewish Roman Zambrowski, a Politburo member and a Central Committee secretary responsible for Party organization. Thus the old hostility between "home" and Muscovite Communists flared up again and was exacerbated by the fact that Zambrowski was a Jew.

It is known that in the summer and autumn of 1959 a

considerable number of Jewish personnel had been dismissed from the apparatus of Military Intelligence, Security, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade. It is believed that even at this time Korczynski and Moczar had access to Gomulka. They may have partly used the defection of Monat to urge on the First Secretary the need for closer security control in departments which were highly sensitive or which, by the very nature of their work, had close contacts with Western countries. Gomulka may have given them a free hand without realizing that this closer security would be aimed chiefly at Jewish personnel.

In October 1959 there began the first in a series of top level government and Party changes profoundly disturbing for the cause of "liberal" Communism in Poland. On October 27 the personable Wladyslaw Bienkowski, one of the most extreme and outspoken "liberals", was dismissed from the Ministry of Education. On the same day, two new deputy premiers were appointed. One of them, Julian Tokarski, had a notorious Stalinist past. There is, of course, no direct evidence connecting the machinations of the "Partisan" group with the downfall of Bienkowski and the return of Tokarski, and the case is perhaps weakened by the fact that the other new deputy premier, Eugeniusz Szyr, was Jewish. But Szyr was one of the many Jews who had been prominent in the Stalinist regime of Boleslaw Bierut and in general the "Partisans" must have looked upon the events of 27 October 1959 with great satisfaction. The recall of the old Stalinist Tadeusz Gede from the Embassy in Moscow to be deputy head of the Planning Commission must also have pleased them.

Two days later there was reported an even more serious defeat for the "liberals". This was the resignation from both the Politburo and the Secretariat of Jerzy Morawski. Himself of Jewish origin, Morawski, together with Jerzy Albrecht and Wladyslaw Matwin, had formed a group of three youngish secretaries who had played their part in bringing about the Polish October and were enthusiastic supporters of it. Morawski had always been regarded as very close to Gomulka and was even mentioned as a potential successor. Here then was the fall of perhaps the Party's most powerful liberal, and a Jew to boot; hence an obvious target for the "Partisans". But even more significant than Morawski's fall was the choice of Ryszard Strzelecki as his replacement in the Secretariat.

Strzelecki's relations with the "Partisans" will be discussed later but it should be stressed here that he occupies a key place -- probably the most important place -- in the whole story. Though by no means unknown in Communist politics, Strzelecki, who is now 55, had never been a really prominent figure. A member of the Communist resistance during the war and of the war-time Central Committee he was considered a follower of Gomulka before 1948. In Gomulka's first period of power up to 1948 he was a full Central Committee member and a Voivodship First Secretary. He survived Gomulka's disgrace by

joining in the chorus of condemnation against his leader. In the Bierut era he held the position of Deputy Minister of Communications and then of Minister of Railroads. He retained this office after October 1956 and only gave it up in January 1960, when he was appointed to the Secretariat. There had been little in his career to suggest that he was of sufficient prominence or promise for a place in the Secretariat. But his name was closely linked with the "Partisans" and immediately on his appointment to the Secretariat he was given charge of Security matters. Thus the control of the "Partisans" over this vital sphere was strengthened.

At about the same time another member of the old Natolin, or Stalinist group reappeared on the political scene. This was Kazimierz Witaszewski, Deputy Minister of Defense and head of the Army Political Administration before 1956, notorious for his strong-arm tactics and his anti-Semitism. On 11 November 1959 Witaszewski was recalled from his "exiled" position as military attaché in the Polish Embassy in Prague and made deputy chief of military intelligence under Korczynski. Five months later, in March 1960, he was transferred to the position of chief of the Administrative Department of the Party Central Committee.

Within six months, therefore, from the end of October 1959 to March 1960 perhaps the most prominent "liberal" in the government, Bienkowski, had been dismissed and the most powerful "liberal" in the Party, Morawski, a man of Jewish origin, had felt forced or had been forced to resign. Two notorious Stalinists, Tokarski and Witaszewski, had been brought back and the dubious, shadowy figure of Ryszard Strzelecki had entered the Central Committee Secretariat. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that this "liberal" eclipse and "conservative" victory, coming in the space of so short a time, were not the result of a deliberately concerted pressure on the Party leadership by a group bent on destroying its opponents and replacing them with its own members or sympathizers.

Flushed with success, the "Partisans" were reported to have increased their pressure in the spring of 1960. But it seems that their success had alarmed their opponents, who showed some determination in blocking their path. Thus an attempt to replace the colorless Wladyslaw Wicha as Minister of the Interior with Korczynski himself was said to have been successfully resisted, with Zambrowski, Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki and Albrecht objecting to Korczynski. These three men, in particular, would have every reason to fear the "Partisans". Zambrowski, as has been said, was their prime target, Albrecht was Jewish and a "liberal", Rapacki was a former socialist and very much a "Westerner".

But immediately after this rebuff the "Partisans" were reported to have come close to a great victory. It was reported

that shortly before the fifth Plenum of the Party Central Committee, which took place on 21 and 22 June 1960, Roman Zambrowski had been stripped of all his posts and had retired ill to Karlovy Vary. Albrecht was also reported to have withdrawn from the Secretariat. But these decisions were almost immediately reversed, at least in part. It was decided that Zambrowski, who was genuinely ill, would return to full political life after his convalescence, which he did with some ostentation. The big fish had, therefore, eluded the "Partisans" but the smaller one was soon disposed of. It was announced in November 1960 that Jerzy Albrecht had resigned his position in the Secretariat and been made Minister of Finance. Thus, of three "liberals" who had once belonged to the Secretariat, only Wladyslaw Matwin remained and since he is permanently based on Wroclaw, where he is First Secretary of the local Voivodship Committee, his influence on the day to day work of the Secretariat must be very small indeed.

In addition to these incursions into top-level politics the "Partisans" were also reported to have increased their influence, in May 1960, in an area where they were already very strong - in the military apparatus. On May 5 General Janusz Zarzycki left his position of Deputy Minister of National Defense and member of the Main Political Administration of the Army. He was replaced by an apparently weaker man, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, and this is said to have correspondingly strengthened "Partisan" influence in the political apparatus of the Army through Jaruzelski's deputies, General Bednarz and later of General Franciszek Ksiezarczyk, who was also appointed a deputy to Jaruzelski at the end of 1961.

"Partisan" Tactics

It seems clear from the reports of the "Partisans'" activities that the main instrument they use to achieve their ends is that of a personal denunciation of their victim, followed by pressure to try to ensure that the victim is replaced by a man of their own group or of their own persuasion. Up to now they have shirked the more overt tactics of Communist factionalists who declare their positions more or less openly and try at Party plenums and the like to force home their point of view. Either the "Partisans" are congenitally addicted to the secret police tactics of the smear and the personal file, or they may still regard the time too early, their position still too weak for a clear demonstration of their strength and intentions.

These conspiratorial tactics are shown most clearly in a series of machinations which were reported to have taken place at the end of 1961 and at the beginning of 1962. The machinations were directed chiefly at the Prime Minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz, a former Socialist and a man regarded as a patron of intellectuals. It is perhaps precisely because these

machinations have so far failed that they provide such clear examples of the Partisans' tactics. For if these tactics had proved successful and the prime minister had fallen, then many observers, both inside and outside Poland, would inevitably have adduced more "objective" or far-reaching reasons for his fall than the rather squalid intrigues of a determined group of men.

In September 1961, a well-known leftist writer, Jerzy Kornacki, was arrested. He was a mental case and it was known that shortly before his arrest he spent some time in a lunatic asylum. He was charged with writing anonymous letters of a derogatory nature to Gomulka and other top personalities -- hardly an indictable offense for a man with mental trouble. But Kornacki was known to have been on fairly intimate terms before his illness with Cyrankiewicz, as well as with Rapacki and Bienkowski. These men, in the irreverent privacy of Kornacki's company, apparently used to blow off a good deal of verbal steam which Kornacki unfortunately recorded in a diary he kept. This diary was reported to have been seized during the search of Kornacki's apartment and may well have caused the end of the private association between Bienkowski and Gomulka which had continued even after the former's political disgrace. If this is true, all contact between Gomulka and a really "liberal" source of information had been severed.

Shortly before Christmas 1961 there occurred the tragic suicide of Henryk Holland. A Jewish journalist and sociologist of some professional and social prominence, Holland had apparently related to Western journalists what Khrushchev had told the Polish delegation to the 22nd CPSU Congress about the death of Beria. A member of this delegation had passed it on to Holland. It was widely believed that this person was Cyrankiewicz. Holland was charged, went to his apartment while the police searched it and then jumped through a window. What is most important, however, is that neither Gomulka nor even the Minister of the Interior, Wicha, is thought to have known of Holland's arrest. When the First Secretary did hear of the tragedy and intrigue, he ordered immediate investigations and the arrest of the Public Prosecutor responsible. This incident is important in several respects. It shows clearly the "Partisan" tactic of trying to get at a big man by incriminating one of his lesser associates and it shows the lengths of intrigue to which they are prepared to go to achieve their aim. But it also showed that Gomulka was not prepared to tolerate such activity behind his back and, since the funeral of Holland turned out to be a most impressive demonstration not only of sympathy for the dead man but of hostility toward those who had caused his death, the incident showed that not only had the conspirators failed badly but that for the first time they had aroused an active demonstration against themselves by their main opponents.

But the "Partisans" evidently continued their campaign to discredit Cyrankiewicz. Some people known to have contact with him were among a number of people arrested on charges of

currency smuggling. A great deal of publicity was given to the affair but, in the trial which ended on April 12, relatively light sentences were handed down for what seems to have been only a minor series of offenses.

In the meantime, at a much higher level, the "Partisans" were reported to have been increasing their pressure. At the beginning of March 1962 Ryszard Strzelecki's responsibilities in the Secretariat were considerably extended. In addition to security matters he was entrusted with supervision of the press and of cultural affairs, thus being placed in a strategic position to fight one of the main targets of the "Partisans", the intellectuals. But even this notable success was eclipsed on May 4 by the removal of Antoni Alster as one of the deputy ministers of the Interior. This removed perhaps the last determined opponent of the "Partisans" at this ministry; it certainly gave Moczar, one of the two or three most determined conspirators, more or less complete control over the Security Police. He had previously had to share this responsibility with Alster, who as friend of both Zambrowski and Ochab, and as a man of Jewish origin, was an obvious target for the "Partisans". Alster's place was taken by the Militia Colonel, Franciszek Szlachcic, who, as has been mentioned, is considered to be a member of the conspiratorial group.

On the face of it, of course, this removal of Alster hardly seems a dramatic coup, but it is most reliably reported to have thoroughly alarmed the opposition, to have been a move of outstanding importance and a major defeat for the "soft liners".

At the end of May there occurred another event which, again, can only be interpreted as a triumph for the "Partisans", or at least for the "hard liners". On May 28, at the plenary meeting of the Supreme Committee of the United Peasant Party, Stefan Ignar was removed from his post as chairman. Ignar was known as a champion of reforms in agriculture along the lines advocated by the "liberal" wing of the Communist Party. While Czeslaw Wycech was elected nominal chairman, the real control over the Peasant Party passed to Jozef Ozga-Michalski, who during the war cooperated with Moczar and others now in the "Partisan" movement and subsequently was reported to have been a security agent. The shift once again confirmed the general trend and provided the "Partisans" with an important foothold in the peasant sector.

Support for the Group and Its Real Power

From the above chronology of events it can be quite clearly established that the "Partisan" group exists, that it has a definite line of action, and that a whole series of events has taken place in Poland since October 1959 in which it has

either had a hand or from which it has benefited greatly.

One must, however, assume that a group of middle level men could not have achieved all this single-handed, and that, for these events to have happened, active support from top-level Communist politicians must have been forthcoming. If one accepts this premise one is faced with the greatest problem of the whole "Partisan" question. Are these powerful men active members of the group or do they simply support it for tactical or political reasons of their own? Or, on the other hand, do they just sympathize with the "hard line" political philosophy of the group and, while not actively supporting them, are quite happy to see men like Morawski and Bienkowski fall as a result of their machinations?

Even the most reliable reports do not satisfactorily answer these questions. One has the impression that there is a tendency to draw a broad dividing line between the so-called "hard liners" and the "soft-liners" in the leadership of the Party and to place the former in varying degrees of membership or association with the "Partisans".

But, even allowing for this, there seems little room for doubt that one man, Ryszard Strzelecki, is either the real leader of the "Partisans" or else so closely associated or involved with them as to make any distinctions of the above kind rather academic. Not only the bulk of the direct evidence but also the circumstantial evidence of Strzelecki's past, his current rise to prominence and his impressive accretion of powers, testify to this. Nor need one have too many doubts about Stalinists like Witaszewski, Tokarski or of Zenon Nowak, a deputy premier who is allegedly the "Partisans" nominee for the premiership if and when they should succeed in ousting Cyrankiewicz. It is when one comes to men like Zenon Kliszko, Ignacz Loga-Sowinski and Marian Spychalski that great caution is needed. All three are Politburo members; Kliszko is also a Central Committee secretary, Loga-Sowinski the regime's trade union leader and Spychalski the Minister of National Defense. All three are close to Gomulka with Kliszko being regarded as the Party leader's closest friend. All three were members of the Communist underground during the war and, in their outlook, certainly Kliszko and Loga-Sowinski favor a hard approach. Kliszko in particular is quite well known for his advocacy of this line. Thus some reports specifically mention Kliszko as being a member or a leader of the group; others mention Loga-Sowinski and Spychalski as being deeply involved. One can only urge great caution and, especially in the case of Kliszko, mention that these men are believed to be very loyal to Gomulka and would probably not lend their active support to a movement which, though not directed against the First Secretary, uses methods of which he is not fully aware and of which he would hardly approve.

In the middle levels of the Party, among the so-called "apparatchiki", there is probably a great deal of instinctive support for the aims of the "Partisan" group. After all, "Stalinism" and the hard line is a guarantee of the authority of these men, an authority which was so badly shaken in 1956.

And now to the areas of influence. At least two of the "Partisans", Strzelecki (including him as a full member) and General Moczar, are reported to have direct, everyday contact with Gomulka. (This ready access in Moczar's case is rather curious.) The only other people reported to have such close contact are Kliszko and Loga-Sowinski. The "Partisans" are at present believed to be in almost total control of the Security Service and of Military Intelligence. They also have some influence in the Ministry of National Defense and considerable influence in the political and intelligence sections of the Army. In addition, Strzelecki's appointment as Central Committee Secretary in charge of culture gives him an important vantage point from which to control and stifle intellectuals. One may also assume that in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Foreign Trade where considerable purges are reported to have been carried out, "Partisan" influence is growing.

In the top Party apparatus their influence appears to be yet relatively slight; despite the presence of a man like Witaszewski as head of the Central Committees administrative department. In a Central Committee Secretariat of eight there is only Strzelecki, in a Politburo of 11 there is nobody, although the presence in the Politburo of Kliszko, Loga-Sowinski and Spychalski, and of Kliszko in the Secretariat should be noted. Nor in the top levels of the government apparatus does the group seem to have made much headway although, again, two of the deputy premiers, immediately under Cyrankiewicz, are Zenon Nowak and Julian Tokarski. Cyrankiewicz himself, (though this may not have real significance) is reported as having been deprived of some of the more luxurious perquisites of his office.

The "Partisans" Opponents and Targets

The opponents and the targets of the "Partisans" belong to many loosely connected groups with a whole variety of motives and views. One can list the following groups to whom the "Partisans" must represent a considerable danger:

(a) The Moscow group *sensu stricto*, e.g. those Communist leaders who spent the war years in the Soviet Union and were active in the "Union of the Polish Patriots" and Berling's Army. Of those, Aleksander Zawadzki, Edward Ochab, Roman Zambrowski and Stefan Jedrychowski remain in the Party leadership. The, as yet unsuccessful campaign against Zambrowski has been mentioned. Also worth mentioning in this connection

(although one cannot draw too many conclusions from it) is the peculiar career of Edward Ochab since October 1959. In that month, immediately after his return from a visit to the United States in his capacity as Minister of Agriculture, he was relieved from this post. The move was decided at a Plenum which he could not possibly have attended. He did, however, retain his Politburo seat and was subsequently transferred to the Secretariat in charge of cultural policy. It was precisely this function which Strzelecki took over in March 1962 when Ochab was assigned to economic tasks.

(b) Former members of the Polish Socialist Party like Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Adam Rapacki, Oskar Lange, Lucjan Motyka.

(c) "Liberals": Jerzy Morawski, Jerzy Albrecht, Wladyslaw Ratwin, Michalina Tatarkowna, Wladyslaw Bienkowski, Artur Starewicz, etc., most Party intellectuals, journalists, writers, etc.

(d) All Communist functionaries of Jewish origin, and there are still enough of them to make anti-Semitism a real issue.

This is a very heterogeneous body of people, some of whom must dislike each other. They may seem an easy prey to their determined opponents. But, obviously, the more active and successful their opponents become the more alarmed and probably the more united they will be. Already, in the Holland affair and in the survival of Zambrowski, they have had some success in holding off the "Partisans". Finally it is also perhaps dangerous to overestimate the cohesiveness of their opponents. The hard core of the "Partisans" is certainly a cohesive group but, as has been suggested, those who support them or sympathize with them probably do so in varying degrees and from a variety of motives.

The Position of Gomulka

To end this report one must say something about the position of Gomulka in this whole affair. For as long as he is First Secretary the "Partisans" cannot achieve the really basic victory for which they are hoping without his active support or connivance.

One of the main points facilitating the successes of the "Partisans" so far has been the self-imposed personal isolation of Gomulka. There are believed to be now four men who have the easiest daily contact with him. Two of these are Strzelecki and Moczar; the other two are Kliszko and Loga-Sowinski who, even at best, would hardly advocate the crushing of the conspirators. Thus no real opponent of the group has the ready ear of the First Party Secretary. Then there is the very

important question of Gomulka's personal temperament and outlook. In personal background he has a good deal in common with some of the "Partisans", he is dictatorial by nature and would almost certainly prefer a much harder line and tighter discipline than that which is still prevailing in Poland. But, from the Holland affair, one can assume that he would hardly tolerate the presence of a conspiracy carried on behind his back, especially of course, if he knew of its full ramifications. One might also assume that he has a personal distaste for the methods used by the "Partisans". Not is there any evidence whatever to suggest that he himself is in any way tainted with anti-Semitism. And, finally, as a politician, he must, Communist dictator though he is, take cognizance of the moods and the fluctuating balance of power in the Party itself, and of the sentiments of broad sections of the population. He must also attempt to see the whole problem in terms of his relations with the Soviet Union. The "Partisans" are very credibly reported to be against Khrushchev, against the spirit of the 22nd Congress; Gomulka has made the alliance with Khrushchev a cornerstone of his policy. He must also be aware of the fact that the "Partisans'" policy such as it is, is completely antithetical to everything happening in the Soviet orbit at present.

But these are political implications which presuppose a full knowledge of what is going on. What is perhaps the most curious thing about the whole story is that an all-powerful Party leader can allow himself to arrive at a position where this full knowledge is denied him.

End