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SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEM OF HUNGARY

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FIFTY-NINTH MEETING (CLOSED)

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 10 April 1957, at 10.00 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Alsing ANDERSEN

(Denmark)

- RRR Kadar asks Kovacs, Tildy and Antai to join Govt., Ruman prohibit
- SSS. Released from jail 1 Nov. - Judge Domonkos deleted testi-
mony again Sov. Gen. Bjelkin.
- UUU. Horvath goes to Bratislava as Nagy envoy to U.N. on 1 Nov
Taken to Prague. 2-3 days later. Told that Rumania
will attack Hungary on 2 or 2 Nov. Kadar
in Moscow on 4 Nov - Chen en Lai calls situation in
Hung. a counterrevolution. Serov arrests Maleter
Matyas. Head of AVH out on 10 March
Nagy group did not know where they were going
now in prison suffering of hunger.
Kadar initiates shootings

At the invitation of the Chairman, Witness RRR took a place at the Committee table.

The CHAIRMAN: I bid you welcome again and I have two questions to ask you. I apologize if my first question has already been answered but to be frank I do not remember whether you told us in what capacity you were present in the Parliament building and attended many of the meetings and negotiations which took place there. I would therefore ask you to tell us that. Secondly, I would like to know whether you were personally present during Suslov's conversations with Kadar and Nagy or from what source you had reports of these conversations.

WITNESS RRR (interpretation from Hungarian): I was present in the Parliament building as a representative of the Revolutionary Council, to act as liaison with the Government and to inform the workers what the Government's future policy would be and how the Imre Nagy Government was reacting to the workers' demands. I took part in discussions of several important questions -- for example in some of the discussions with Antropov. My principal role was to give political and moral support to the Imre Nagy Government so that its position as regards both internal and external policy might be strengthened.

My further task, which would have begun after 4 November had it not been for the second Soviet intervention, was the leadership of the Ministry of Labour. A strike was begun in the first days of the revolution and my job would have been to ensure the resumption of work on a new basis, with new conditions and salaries.

I was not personally present at the Suslov-Kadar-Nagy discussions. I received my information about those direct from the members of the Government, Imre Nagy and Zoltan Vas. Those decisive discussions took place on 29 October, 30 October and 1 November. On 1 November several workers' delegations attended at the Parliament building and one of my functions was to keep them informed of events and of the Imre Nagy policy, and also to put the demands of the Workers' Councils and the Revolutionary Councils to Imre Nagy and try to get him to accept them.

The CHAIRMAN: I think that is a sufficient answer to my questions. Are there any other questions from members of the Committee? There are no other questions, so we thank you for your appearance.

Witness RRR withdrew.

At the invitation of the Chairman Witness SSS took a place at the Committee table.

The CHAIRMAN: On behalf of the Committee I bid you welcome. I understand you are able to tell us something about Kadar's attempt to form a coalition government on 4, 5 or 6 November, and the Russian intervention against that. I ask you to give us your statement.

WITNESS SSS (interpretation from Hungarian): In the first half of this year I had friendly conversations in Budapest with Dr. Jozsef Antal, former minister, and with Bela Kovacs, former chief secretary of the Smallholders' Party. From them I learned that on 5 or 6 November Kadar returned to Budapest and had decided to form a coalition government and for this purpose he invited Zoltan Tildy, former President of the Hungarian Republic, Bela Kovacs, and Dr. Jozsef Antal to take part. All three had been leaders of the Smallholders' Party. At first they hesitated to take part in a coalition government but in view of the killings which were then going on and the troubles in the country, they decided to do so, and informed Kadar accordingly. This was approximately on 6 November 1956. Two days before that Russian intervention started, street fighting was going on, strikes were in progress, and there was a great deal of unrest in the country. The next day -- I may be a day or two out in these dates, and so may my informants have been -- but about 7 November Kadar informed Antal, Kovacs and Tildy that the Russian military high command did not approve in principle his plan for a coalition government. He thought a coalition of the old non-Communist and popular leaders would be the only way to solve the problems of the

country but the Russians would have none of it. He advised the three leaders of the Smallholders' Party to seek out the Soviet military commander. He did not know his name, and neither do I, but it was the Soviet military commander who was filling that post in Budapest on 7 November 1956.

The three leaders reported at the Soviet military high command but they were not received. They informed Kadar of this but he said he had no means of doing anything about it. I would also say that in the second half of November -- I cannot give a more exact date -- Kadar started new negotiations towards coalition because he had become convinced that the original conception was the right one and the only way to achieve a solution and stop the murdering on the streets was to form a coalition government. Those negotiations were also fruitless because the Soviet diplomats in Budapest at that time, Malenkov and two or three other prominent people, according to the information I had from Antal and his friend, again opposed the formation of a Hungarian coalition government. That is all I know about that.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Were only representatives of the Smallholders' Party invited to take part in the possible coalition government, or were representatives of other parties also asked?

WITNESS SSS (interpretation from Hungarian): The so-called Workers' Party, the Smallholders' Party and the Peasants' Party were all asked to form the coalition government. I did not mention the Peasants' Party because I have no direct information about them.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Are there any further questions?

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): How did you know that the Soviet high command blocked this proposal? Who told you?

WITNESS SSS (interpretation from Hungarian): As I said, Kadar personally told this to Doctor Josef Antal and to Bela Kovacs, and also to Zoltan Tildy, and they told me. Whether this was the true reason for Kadar not forming a coalition government I do not know; there is no concrete proof but it is a fact that he told them that.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): He told that to all three of them, Antal, Kovacs and Tildy?

WITNESS SSS (interpretation from Hungarian): Dr. Josef Antal told me.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): I would like to know on what date the witness left Hungary.

WITNESS SSS (interpretation from Hungarian): On 3 February.

I would like to ask the Committee that I remain anonymous because my family is still in Hungary. The rest of my testimony may stand.

Witness SSS withdrew.

At the invitation of the Chairman, Witness TTT took a place at the Committee table.

The CHAIRMAN: On behalf of the Committee I bid you welcome. We know that you were one of the chief accused in one of the Rajk trials and that you were released in 1957. Please begin your testimony now.

WITNESS TTT (interpretation from Hungarian): In the spring of 1945 I was taken to Germany as a political prisoner. On 10 June, 1949, the NKVD lured me to Vienna and then I was taken to Hungary. There I was brought to trial and appeared before a Hungarian court. The Russian General, Bjelkin, was in command of that trial throughout its entire duration, the preparations for the trial being made by the Russian secret police. All the questions which were put to us by the judges during the public hearings were prepared by the NKVD officers and all the

(Witness TTT)

testimony and answers which we were forced to give were arranged beforehand by the secret police. A sort of rehearsal was held with the witness on each night preceding his appearance in court. As a consequence of one of the Rajk trials fighting once broke out on the Hungarian-Yugoslav border which resulted in several hundred casualties; many people were executed and many others were imprisoned. From 1953 to 1956 a re-examination of the Rajk trials took place. The aim of that re-examination was to conceal the truth, namely that there had been illegal Russian intervention and that the trials were prepared and directed by the NKVD. We, the witnesses, were visited by several detectives, acting in the name of the Hungarian Inspector-General's Department, and they ordered us to say nothing about the role performed by the Russians. During the re-examination I was brought before the highest court in Hungary on 29 October 1956. I was asked whether I had appeared as a defendant during the Rajk trial; I replied that I had been. I was then asked before whom had I appeared and I answered that I had appeared before General Bjelkin. That was the truth; no one else had been present except Laszlo Rajk, Bjelkin and myself. This testimony of mine was deleted from the cinematic record by the judge. I have here an issue of 30 March of the newspaper Nepszabadsag from which it can be seen that Dr. Jozsef Domonkos presided, at that time, over the chief examination court. He is today the chief judge of the court. This fact proves that those people who, in 1955, were instrumental in hiding the truth of the Russian intervention in the trials are still holding the same positions today. I know Dr. Jozsef Domonkos still holds the same post. That concludes the main part of my testimony and I would merely like to add that, as far as I know, no international agreement exists between the Soviet Union and Hungary which could possibly justify the Soviet Union in **staging** a trial in Hungary. The German translation which I have here mentions that the Communist leaders recognized that only lies and distortion of the facts were published during the Rajk trials.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): I suppose that, under the Hungarian constitution, there is a Minister of Justice?

WITNESS TTT (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): Who was the Minister of Justice at that time?

WITNESS TTT (interpretation from Hungarian): As far as I know it was Dr. Erik Molnar.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): Did he hold any office just before the revolution?

WITNESS TTT (interpretation from Hungarian): Molnar was head of various ministries at various times. He was Minister of Justice at the time of the Rajk trials.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): He made no protest against a Soviet trial being staged in Hungary?

WITNESS TTT (interpretation from Hungarian): As far as I know Minister Molnar made at least one public statement in which he condemned the illegal bases of the trials. According to him Gabor Peter, the head of the political police in Hungary, was still in office; however Molnar's objections never made the slightest reference to the Soviet intervention and he actually concealed the true background of these trials.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): On what date was the witness released from prison?

WITNESS TTT (interpretation from Hungarian): On 1 November 1956 I was released from Koebanya, at Budapest, by the Revolutionary Council of the Attorney-General's Department.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): On what date did you leave Hungary?

WITNESS TTT (interpretation from Hungarian): On 15 November 1956 I crossed the Austrian border.

The CHAIRMAN: How did they compel you to make confessions during the Rajk trials?

WITNESS TTT (interpretation from Hungarian): The Russian secret service, across the border from Hungary, had already interrogated me in Vienna and at Baden bei Wien. In both places they used physical torture. I was imprisoned in the subterranean cell and left without any food or water. They forced me to stand at attention facing the wall. Several times I tried to lie down because I was completely exhausted whereupon they beat me again with rubber truncheons and Russian soldiers kicked me with their boots, and hit me. It was completely dark in the cell and I could not tell night from day but finally, I guessed that about three days had passed, when I was trying to lie down more frequently, they tied a thin wire around my two thumbs thus nailing me to the wall. In this way they managed to keep me standing up all the time.

(Witness TTT)

I tried to tear the wire but it cut into my thumb down to the bone and that scar can still be seen here on my thumb. When the Russian guards noticed that I was bleeding profusely they stopped this procedure and gave me a brief rest. A few hours later they took me to an interrogation at which General Bjelkin personally gave me a two-hour lecture. He put it to me that no one in the world would be able to do anything to help me if I disappeared without trace because no one knew where I was. Therefore, I had no choice but to do what they intended telling me to do. At that time they did not specify what they desired of me. Apart from threatening me he also referred to the fact that as a general and a member of the NKVD he would give me his word of honour that if I did what they wanted me to do I would not only be unharmed in the future but they would do a good deal to make me forget the sufferings I had gone through. He gave me his promise that in one or two months I would be freed and later at the expense of the NKVD I could go to the Crimea or if I did not trust them to another spa to rest.

Later, in Hungary, when I again tried several times to withstand them they once more used force on me but this was not done by the Russians but by the Hungarian AVH working directly under the leadership of the Russians. This time the means used was to literally starve me. Apart from that for about two weeks I was placed in a cell two floors below ground which was completely damp. Bread given to me in the morning became mouldy by the afternoon. They had taken everything away from me except my pants and shirt. The cell was so cold and so damp that I could not sleep for more than one or two hours at a time because my teeth chattered so much from the cold that I awoke. I was in that cell for about two weeks. In general, these were some of the means of force which they used against me.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): Where did these tortures take place, in Vienna or in Hungary?

WITNESS TTT (interpretation from Hungarian): The beatings and being made to stand against the wall took place in Baden bei Wien. The things I talked about later, for instance, being held in a cell below ground, that was in the AVH prison in Budapest.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Was that in the Russian sector in Vienna?

WITNESS TTT (interpretation from Hungarian): Baden bei Wien was then in the Russian sector of Vienna and it was common knowledge that at that time the NKVD had a main prison in that sector.

The CHAIRMAN: As there are no further questions we thank you for your testimony and your answers.

Witness TTT withdrew.

At the invitation of the Chairman, Witness UUU took a place at the Committee table.

The CHAIRMAN: On behalf of the Committee I bid you welcome and ask you to give us your statement.

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): First of all, I should like to ask the Committee if they would use great secrecy and discretion in connexion with the data and the names that I shall be forced to mention. I gave them to the Secretary of the Committee during a preliminary conversation. If during the questioning the checking of names and addresses is required I should like to hand in this data afterwards because the persons who have given information can be very easily recognized and would undergo great hardship if their names became known.

The CHAIRMAN: We will, of course, respect your wishes.

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Thank you. The Secretary of the Committee asked me to tell you a few words about my own career and I will try to summarize this briefly. After that I should like to go on to the Rajk case which I shall also briefly refer to in my own biography. I should like to illustrate mainly the means of the Russian intervention.

I am from a provincial town in Hungary. My mother and her family were an Austro-Hungarian military family and I studied at the Diplomatic Faculty of the university. In the beginning I was in a military and religious atmosphere but I went to the Sorbonne in Paris where I spent two and a half years and liberalized my views. In the French students' movements I met Communist students and I first joined the Social Democratic Party and later on the Communist Party. In 1932 I was even sentenced as a Communist. Later on I did not take part in Party activities and in 1937 I emigrated to France where I chiefly occupied myself with matters in connexion with films and was an assistant manager. After the outbreak of the war I became the general secretary of the political movement of Count Michael Karolyi and the publisher of its newspaper.

In 1946 I returned to Hungary where I became the publisher of a weekly periodical. After that I went to the Foreign Office, at first to the section of the Presidency of the Council and afterwards the Press section and had the rank of Assistant Secretary of State. From there I was transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture and I was in charge of the Press section and the international organizations.

In the Ministry of Agriculture I found myself opposed to the Party people and I should like to cite one characteristic episode. One day I was called into Party headquarters and asked to issue a communiqué saying that in the northern provinces of Hungary the Kulaks were sabotaging production but as my paper had correspondents in the north we knew that they could not produce because snow was falling. I knew that if I printed what they asked me to this would start a manhunt and I objected to that. I told them that even if I agreed with their policy I would not issue such a statement because even from their point of view I considered it inadvisable and as long as I was at the Ministry of Agriculture I would not permit such lies to be printed. I was not very long in the Ministry of Agriculture. Two months after this I was arrested but I did not know why I was arrested.

In the beginning the accusation said that I was a British agent. In the Rajk trial I was to play a big role and be the main witness. I spent a year and a half in certain houses in Budapest that belonged to the AVH, as well as their prisons. They built up the case against me as follows: I had previously known Rajk during my student years when he was a colleague of mine. At that time he was studying French literature and I was studying French and Hungarian literature. It was during our years at the university together that I learnt that he was an informer for the Hungarian

(Witness UUU)

police. The accusation said that I went to a foreign country where I was taken into the British Secret Service as their main agent in Hungary. I was returned by them to Hungary in 1946 and my first action was to call on Lazslo Rajk who was then Minister of the Interior and blackmail him saying that he was a police informer during his university years. They said that I threatened him that if he did not agree to serve as an agent for the British Secret Service I would bring this information to the attention of the public. According to the accusation, in the years that followed Rajk was supplying me with information about the most secret workings of the Communist Party which I then forwarded to my English superiors.

(Witness UUU)

I did not accept this kind of accusation. I belonged to those people who do not accept it even though I underwent the most varied kind of tortures. This plan of accusation was forced on me more by the Russians than the Hungarians. The Russian secret service had as their central European head Lieutenant-General Fedor Bjelkin, and he questioned me three times extensively, and once only cursorily, and it was he who tried to make me admit this type of accusation.

Before this they used very strong arguments with me. For example, thirty-six times they made me go through a procedure which involved beating the soles of my feet. They did that thirty-six times, and each occasion involved twelve individual beatings. Afterwards I had to spend **nine days standing**, during which time I received no food or water. It later transpired that **five** of my ribs had been broken and that I had apparently been standing for those nine days with five of my ribs broken. I received altogether 500 blows with a rubber truncheon on the sole of each of my feet, and my kidneys were bleeding. The situation was therefore not very easy. After three or four weeks of this treatment the deputy head of the AVH, who was really the interpreter between Bjelkin and myself, indulged in self-criticism: he said, "We should not have talked to you in this way. We knew you were not a spy, but you must be ready for the Party so that we can beat the imperialists. You should not think that we want to execute you; we need the kind of people who can withstand so much, we need you for a certain role, and after the trial you will be sent in the best conditions to the best hospitals and sanatoria." I naturally did not accept, and so I spent a year and a half in detention, even after the execution of Rajk. After this year and a half I was sentenced, but they did not have any data against me except that Rajk and Tibor Szoenyi had confessed, both had confessed that they were supporting me in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and wanted to send me to Vienna as chargé d'affaires because I was an English agent. Beyond that there was no information against me, and therefore they had to condemn me at a closed trial in a very grotesque way. They sentenced me because I was supposed to have spied during the war. As a matter of fact I was in Argentina, a neutral country, during the war and the system of the People's Republic did not exist during that time. It was thus absurd to suggest that I was spying against a non-existing system as being the reason why I was sentenced.

(Witness UUU)

During the whole period of the Rajk affair the Russians had a separate section in the AVH. After our arrest they transformed part of the AVH on the ground floor, which was separated from the other part by iron doors, and that is where Bjelkin and his staff were. Furthermore, in several private houses at the Svabhegy and other villas, which looked like summer places and seemed innocuous outwardly, he had all kinds of cells, one metre wide, in the lower structure. I spent fourteen days there while the Russians were questioning me for that length of time day and night, and Bjelkin himself often appeared at the questioning. As a matter of fact, in certain cases he appeared alone with an interpreter. On one of these occasions when Bjelkin came to my cell he had with him an interpreter, whom he called a colonel, who said, "Get up, because this is the Governor." Later on, when Bjelkin left the room, he said, "This is a much bigger man than Horthy was in former times, because he is not only Governor of Hungary but also of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania"; because this Bjelkin was of course the chief of the Russian secret service in south-east Europe.

It was this Bjelkin who organized the trials, and one can see the same type of organization throughout the trials in these countries. I could add a lot more, but I will not do so now because I have referred to the essential parts and I shall be glad to answer any questions the Committee may wish to put.

It is characteristic of the Hungarian police methods that in the course of interrogations the Hungarian policemen bragged about their excellence. Thus a policeman called Gyula Princz, who was connected with the Rajk affair, bragged that he was the only Hungarian policeman from whom even the Russians took over some methods, and these were the methods of getting agents. He himself told me that his method of procuring agents was as follows: The son of a couple goes to school, and does not come home. He meets a nice young man on his way home, who takes him for a tour in a car. The parents go to the police and to the hospitals but they cannot find their son anywhere. For two or three days they are in a terrible state and then a nicely groomed young man appears at their home and says, "Little Johnnie is very well. He is in security. Nothing has happened to him and you can get him back if you are ready to help the Hungarian secret police to procure certain information and to provoke certain people." If the parents are unwilling the young man politely says, "Good-bye," leaves the parents for two

(Witness UUU)

or three days and then returns and renews the offer. According to Gyula Princz this method worked in every case and led to such people being enlisted as agents. After my liberation I did not of course accept any post. I was invited to return to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and become a Minister, but they also offered me the post of deputy Minister at the Ministry of Agriculture, but I did not accept. I referred to what a Hungarian writer had said about the work of Anatole France, who said, "One of the first duties of man is to doubt," and I said, "I cannot accept solidarity with the party, the Leninist principle that everything that is useful to certain classes is at the same time moral." I also said that I was most inappropriate for any public position, and I therefore accepted a position with a book publisher and translated classical works. As I know Spanish quite well I translated Cervantes and other classics. That is how I made a living, and that is how I reached free soil in March.

In the meantime I learned of one or two things that might interest this Committee. I had close links with the Nagy group of the Communist Party, even though I did not accept the views expressed by this group. As I said earlier, I did not want to accept solidarity with them, and I could not give them carte blanche to act in my name. However, they did often discuss things with me, and this is how I learned of certain matters which might be of interest from the point of view of the Russian intervention in Hungary.

The Government of Imre Nagy called back the delegation led by Imre Horvat which was scheduled to be the Hungarian delegation to the United Nations. This delegation was recalled, as I remember, by Imre Nagy on 28 October. It was unable to cross the Austro-Hungarian border and therefore went towards Pozsony-Bratislava. The delegation arrived in Pozsony on 1 November where, it being Czechoslovakia, the Czechs put them in an hotel. In the morning the members of the delegation, on looking out of the window, saw Czech secret service men surrounding the hotel. Later the Slovak Party secretary called upon the delegation and told them that they would be staying temporarily in Bratislava, there being more security for them there, because Hungary was going to be attacked by Soviet armed forces. I emphasize the date; this was on 1 November. The members of the delegation therefore stayed a few more days in Bratislava. On the other hand, Imre Horvat,

(Witness UUU)

accompanied by the Slovak Party secretary, went to Prague. Horvat spent one and a half days in Prague and on 3 November arrived in Moscow. I have already told the Secretary of the Committee the source of my knowledge of this, and I should be delighted to elaborate the details later in private. I can add to my information in order to show that it is likely; I daresay it is at least ninety-five per cent accurate.

Imre Horvat met Kadar on 4 November in Moscow, just after the time when Kadar, on 4 November in the hours following the Russian intervention, made his speech on a tape recording which was broadcast the next day, the 5th, on the Szolnok Radio.

So Kadar recorded his speech on tape some time on the 4th and it was broadcast for the first time on the afternoon of the 5th. We heard afterwards that the tape recording was brought by aeroplane to Hungary. Russian troops attacked in the early morning of 4 November and Kadar recorded his speech after this attack and it was reproduced on the 5th. To put it simply, it was not Kadar who called in the Russians but the Russians who called in Kadar. After the broadcast Kadar informed Horvat that the three of them -- that is, Horvat, Muennich and Kadar -- would form the Hungarian Government. The fourth member of this Government was a man called Doegei who was not in Moscow at the time but in Prague. After leaving Moscow Kadar and the others went to Prague, where they met Doegei. This was on the 6th or 7th. There is no question therefore of Kadar having left the Government because when one leaves a government one announces the fact. Furthermore I was in continuous telephone communication with Parliament because, as I have said, I was sick at the time and had the telephone near me as well as the radio, and I received continuous information from the secretariat of Losonezi. On 1 November I was informed that Kadar and Muennich had disappeared. The chauffeur who drove them from the Parliament building said that he had left Kadar and Muennich on the road leading to the Soviet Embassy and had seen them after they left the car discussing something very animatedly. I told Losonezi that I thought this should be brought to the attention of the public immediately because, whether Kadar had been kidnapped or had arranged this himself, the people should be told, but this unfortunately was not done.

I should also like to call the attention of the Committee to another interesting incident. On 28 October a Hungarian military choir went to China. They saw Chou En-lai himself and he made a long speech in which he explained to them that there was a counter-revolution in Hungary. I find this interesting because at that time the Russians had not taken a definite position as to the situation in Hungary and I think it is very likely that the Czechs and Romanians and Chinese, who were themselves toying with the idea that they should crush the revolution by force, strongly influenced the Soviet Union to take over the attack themselves.

You probably know more than I do about the conduct of the Russian troops. You know they were looking for the Nile and the Suez Canal. However, I would like to mention one episode. When the revolution had been crushed the Russians tried to prove that it had really been a Fascist uprising, and the following incident has been told by Hungarian writers: In the 8th District of Budapest a film was made of Russians attacking a building. It showed people entering this house, and finding men sitting at

a desk wearing uniforms of the time of Horthy, and then these men being taken out of the building by the Russians. When this happened the Fascists shed their uniforms and left. In another locality of the same district a film was made showing people wearing the insignia of the former Hungarian Nazi Party. Such uniforms and insignia no longer existed in Hungary except perhaps in theatre wardrobes.

I should also like to speak about the arrest of Maleter, and I guarantee that this is absolutely true. The first meeting of the Hungarian and Russian delegations was in Parliament but as their business was not concluded it was arranged that, according to the law, the next meeting should be at Russian headquarters at Toekoel. The Hungarian delegation was received at Toekoel with full Russian military honours and a very lavish dinner. After dinner they sat at an oval table with Maleter, Erdei, Kovacs and the other Hungarian delegates on one side and General Malinin and the other Russians opposite. The discussions were on rather childish subjects such as the re-establishment of Russian memorials and the ceremonies that must accompany the withdrawal of the Russians. When the discussion of these points was practically finished footsteps were heard and a door opened. Russian officers entered led by one without insignia of rank. This was Serov. Two Russian officers stood behind each of the Hungarian officers and then Serov announced that he was arresting the Hungarians. Malinin jumped up and went to the telephone to call Russian headquarters. Serov went over to him, put a hand on his shoulder and whispered something into his ear. Malinin banged down the receiver, shrugged his shoulders and ordered the Russian officers to leave. Malinin himself knew nothing about this intervention by the Russian secret police, partly because the latter did not trust their own military leaders. The Hungarians were put in separate cells and Serov tried to persuade Erdei to join the Russian secret service. He went himself three times to Erdei's cell and spoke to him in Russian. Erdei pretended not to understand and Serov abandoned the attempt, not considering it prudent to enrol a Minister of State in the secret service organization through an interpreter. Kopacsi, the former police chief, was also arrested in this way while taking part in negotiations and this happened too with several members of the Workers' Councils and with Dudas.

According to my information the behaviour of the Yugoslavs during this period was open to suspicion. As I have mentioned, I was at home sick and on one occasion a counsellor from the Yugoslav Legation came to my house. He brought a letter from Mrs. Laszlo Rajk whom I have known for a long time and who was at the Yugoslav Legation. In this letter Mrs. Rajk asked my opinion as to whether she should stay at the legation

or leave it. I did not write her a reply but informed the counsellor verbally that in my opinion she should leave the legation. I had several reasons for giving this advice. In the meantime the counsellor and I spoke of political matters and he made a very strange insinuation. He said that if the Russians really withdrew from Hungary it would be advisable for a friendly group such as a Yugoslav group to come into Hungary and take over the Russian role.

Another incident concerning the behaviour of the Yugoslavs might be of interest. When Imre Nagy left the Yugoslav Legation two Russian and two Hungarian officers went to the Legation to accompany him to the bus. One of the Hungarian officers went up to Nagy and said, "We are not going home." At this Imre Nagy asked the Yugoslav Minister, Soldatich, what this meant, and Soldatich reassured Nagy. Even before that the Yugoslavs had made it almost impossible for Nagy to take asylum and they now made it impossible for him to stay at their legation.

It is also of interest that the Yugoslavs tried to question one of the people at the Yugoslav Legation at that time. This put him in a very difficult situation as regards the Hungarian authorities and he later had to go underground.

(Witness UUU)

I should like to say a few words about the persecutions in Hungary. It already seemed clear in November that the regime had tried to liquidate the opposition according to plan. The plan seemed to be that first the armed fighters, then the intelligentsia and the workers' representatives, and finally others who were suspect, should be liquidated. They even organized certain trials but this was not usual. The country was riddled with special security units and at certain provincial places where not even a shot was fired such as Kiskunmajsa, they got hold of sixty or seventy young men who were beaten until they bled, and of whom six or seven were executed. This information is 100 per cent sure. Their families received a printed notice saying that so-and-so because of his counter-revolutionary activities had been condemned to death and the sentence had been executed. Only the name of the executed person was written in. There was no tribunal functioning there but this was done by a kind of militia, a sort of AVH, which when its work was done at one place went on to another place.

I also have reliable information that a lawyer for the defence of a freedom fighter who was being tried had to wait for him in the prison at Marko Street, where there had never been executions. While waiting in a corridor he looked down on the courtyard of the prison, and during half an hour he saw six executions, including that of a young man between sixteen and twenty-two. These executions were never brought to the notice of the public.

This regime of terror culminated in the second part of February with 600 executions. This piece of information is 60 per cent sure.

I should like to call the Committee's attention to one more thing; in the Hungarian secret police as well as in the State organization, the old Stalinist and Moscovite point of view has become more prominent. I have definite knowledge of the fact that Laszlo Matyas, the leader of the AVH who did not want to have rigged trials, and who was himself a former victim of such a rigged trial in connection with Rajk, was dismissed from his post about 10 March, and was in all probability arrested by the Russians, though I have no definite information about his arrest.

The Nagy group were first taken to Romania, and from the first letters received from them it was learned that they did not know where they were going. The wife of Gyorgy Lukacs wrote a letter in which she said they were put on an aeroplane without knowing where they were going, therefore the request for asylum did not take place even as a formality. The Kadar Government made much of this fact that they had

(Witness UUU)

asked for asylum. Mrs. Lukacs described the localities over which they flew, one of which was Bucharest. At first it seems these people were held in relatively normal conditions in private houses, but Nagy, Geza Losonczi, and Ferenc Donat were separated from the others. These three, according to our information, were in Doftana in Romania, but I am not 100 per cent sure about this either, or whether they were put in prison. It is a fact that Imre Nagy, Losonczi and Donat did not write any letters home. The smaller fry wrote in December and again in March, about the 8th or 10th. The December letter was more optimistic, but in the letter of March the women were asking for summer clothes which seemed to indicate that they did not expect to return home by the summer.

Furthermore, a newspaperman called Fazekas, who was in that group, asked for lard. The former secretary of Losonczi also asked for lard, because she said her little daughter would like to eat bread with lard. This seemed to indicate that they needed extra food and were only being given prison fare.

I can give you further characteristic information about the Hungarian situation, to show how Kadar was unable to get people on his side, particularly the youth, and was only able to persuade corrupt people to join him. As my time has elapsed, perhaps you will let me know if you wish me to speak about this.

The CHAIRMAN: At this point perhaps we should proceed to ask some questions.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): Before we start asking questions, the witness has given a great deal of information which is interesting, but in order to establish its veracity -- and none of it is as yet established -- we must be able to ask questions as to the sources of the information and the manner in which he received it; also why he is able to say with such confidence, for instance, that some part of his evidence is 100 per cent, some 95 per cent, and some 60 per cent correct, and so on. Is the witness prepared to describe the sources and give the names? This is a private meeting; is he prepared to do this, would he prefer the names to be left blank in the verbatim record, or exactly how should we go about this? In my view, it is impossible to establish to our own satisfaction whether what he has told us is true or not unless we can get some indication --

(Mr. Shann)

and he was in bed all this time -- of how he managed to acquire this information.

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): I gave to the Secretariat in the preliminary conversation the names of my informants, and I believe the members of the Committee will be informed of these names.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): I am afraid that will not do. In trying to ascertain the validity of the evidence, if he says so-and-so provided this information, we may have to establish whether the provider of the information was a man who was in a position to do so. It seems to me quite simple; if the witness is prepared to give these names in answer to questions, we can arrange that they do not appear in our records, and the only occasion when the names occur would be through our ears, while we are trying to establish the validity of his information. It seems to me that this is just as secure a method of going about this thing as handing the information to the Secretariat where the names would presumably be recorded somewhere or other. It is not possible for us to accept this information and go to the Secretariat and ask, where does it come from? It does not make sense as far as evidence is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN: I think the representative of Australia is right, and I think the members of the Committee on that point, that it is necessary for us to know from what sources the different kinds of information came.

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Then I should like to ask the ladies and gentlemen present to observe the greatest possible secrecy as to these names, which should not figure in the record.

As to the fate of the delegation to the United Nations, my informant was X
..... It was he who told me what happened to Horvat, because
when this delegation returned to Hungary, about 8, 9 or 10 November I do not know exactly, Horvat called the other members of the delegation into Parliament and told them about his trip to Prague and to Moscow.

(Witness UUU)

At that time Imre Horvat was a little hesitant about continuing in that post because it was not yet certain that the Russian intervention would be successful. They all feared for their lives. X announced that he was sick and unwilling to continue but later on, when the regime gained in strength, he accepted the position of After that he ceased giving me information. However, during the intervening period of his simulated illness he did show some resistance and tried to establish contact with us and with me personally. He informed me of the fate of the first delegation which was called back from ... He had learnt of that from Imre Horvat himself.

As regards the executions, I received that information from a writer, the wife of a friend of mine, who was herself in that locality where the young people I mentioned were executed. She knew the youngsters personally. I could mention her name, but I prefer not to; however, this did take place in her locality, which is a very small one. I could also give the name of that lawyer who saw the executions in the prison of Imet.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): The first gentleman you mentioned presumably gave you information about the intention of the Soviet Union of 1 November to attack and about what happened in Bratislava, Prague and Moscow, and the information about Horvat meeting Kadar in Moscow, and the tape recording that was made in Moscow and broadcast in Csolnok, and the fact that Horvat, Muennich and Kadar came on 6 November to Prague. How was that information transmitted to you? Personally, by telephone or by some other means? How long had you know the informant and what had been your previous association with him?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): I met X in prison where he, as a ... had been condemned as a Social Democrat; we spent a long time together in prison. When we were released X at first accepted the point of view of the opposition and during that time I was in constant contact with him. As far as the events in Bratislava are concerned, X and lived through those events. He did not tell me about them on the telephone but came to see me when I was ill in bed -- we lived near each other in the same residential district of Budapest.

(Witness UUU)

The information concerning Imre Nagy was given by Imre Horvat to X who told me -- naturally not on the telephone. As to the disappearance of Muennich and Kadar, I was informed about this by the President of the Council of Ministers on the telephone on 1 November, before the second Russian intervention. X also told me about the tape recording of the Kadar speech; he had heard it from Horvat.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): Your informant was not, I take it, actually with these people in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union but was advised of what had taken place by Mr. Horvat after he returned to Budapest?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): No, that is not so. X was a member of ... The events, therefore, that took place in Czechoslovakia were a personal experience to him; he heard with his own ears on 1 November in Bratislava what the Slovak Party Secretary had said. From Bratislava the whole delegation went to Prague but Horvat went there earlier and he related his personal experiences to X after his return to Budapest. The conversation with the Slovak Party Secretary and the events leading up to it were experienced by X personally. It was Horvat who informed me of what happened to himself, Kadar and Muennich in Moscow.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): I was particularly interested in what you said about the circumstances surrounding the arrest of General Maleter; you said that you were 100 per cent sure that your description of what took place was correct. Would you please tell me why you are 100 per cent sure?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): The information was given to me by a friend of mine who had received it from Y who had been released by the Russians and then withdrew into his private life. He spoke to only one or two people and from one of them I heard the story. Y was

Mr. SHANN (Australia): We are aware of that. My first question relates to what you have said about the party of Mr. Nagy. Do you know all their movements and the conditions under which they are held from actually seeing a communication from one of the party or was this also told to you by someone who had seen a communication?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): I saw one letter because I was in contact with the families. I have heard about the other letters from people whose word can be trusted and who are in very close contact with the families. Imre Nagy himself had not written, nor had Donat or Losonczi. Photographs were even enclosed with the first letters, in which the mother could be seen together with the children in a garden, or at least somewhere in the open air and the surroundings seemed to be fairly civilized. The family received the first letter through the Romanian Legation and the second one through the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The second letters seemed rather depressed. They asked for food and summer clothing by which they probably hoped to indicate to their families that they did not anticipate leaving their present surroundings in the near future. One might also gather that their nutrition is not very good. They did not acknowledge the parcels which had been sent by the families which would appear to indicate that they had not received them even though they had been taken to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as instructed. Some of the parcels had contained books and dictionaries, as requested.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): I understand from your statement that you have been in Latin America. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask certain questions of the witness in Spanish as I understand he is able to speak that language.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): I would like to ask you at what period you were in Argentina?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Spanish): From 1939 to 1946.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): Have you ever lived in Spain?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Spanish): No, I have never been in Spain.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): I understood from your statement that you had done work as a translator.

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Spanish): Yes. I worked as a translator after I was released from prison. I have translated Don Quixote by Cervantes, and also one of the works of Perez Galdos from German for a Hungarian publishing company. This was my only way of earning a living without having to serve a political regime which put me in prison.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): The political system that put you in prison in Hungary before 1939?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Spanish): I was put in prison in Hungary in 1949.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): I thought I understood you to say that you were in Argentina from 1939 to 1946, is that right?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Spanish): Yes.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): Your translation work was then done after 1946?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Spanish): Yes, quite a time after 1946. Until 1949 I was with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and it was in 1949 that I was put in prison. I was released in 1954 and it was from then until I left Hungary that I acted as a translator of literary works.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): What was your main work in Argentina from 1939 to 1946?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Spanish): I was general secretary of the Hungarian liberation movement which was fighting against Hitlerism and our centre was in London. Our leader was Count Michael Karolyi and my function was to publish a two-page weekly newspaper in Hungarian in Argentina and this paper was the official organ of our movement of Free Hungary.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): At that time did you have any connection with Spanish political organizations that were near the Rio de la Plata? I am naturally speaking of the anti-Francoist movements to which I belonged as a matter of fact and which were in the region of Rio de la Plata.

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Spanish): Naturally, I was in touch with all the anti-Fascist movements including the anti-Francoist movements and with many Spaniards who were exiles. I was also in touch with the de Gaulleists and with several embassies of the United Nations. It is for this reason that after 1945 I was accused of being an English agent because naturally I was also in touch with the English, French and Dutch — all those who were attacked by Hitler, in other words.

At that time in Argentina an inter-allied committee was formed for the purpose of co-ordinating all these anti-Fascist and anti-Hitler movements. As the delegate of my movement I participated in the work of this committee.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): Were you particularly in contact with the British movement in the Rio de la Plata?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Spanish): In Argentina there was an allied committee called the liaison or contact committee and the central part of this organization was formed by the counsellors of the allied embassies. The liaison section was led by an Englishman called Mr. Smith. We were in touch with that committee which was one of the executive groups of the council of ambassadors.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): I should now like to come to another matter. You spoke to us about the executions in your country and I should like you to confirm this fact. I think you said that at the end of February there were 600 executions, is that correct?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Spanish): During the last week in February, according to information that I have been unable to check 100 per cent, the wave of executions reached its height. During that week as was said -- and I should put the possible accuracy of this at sixty per cent -- the number of people executed was 600. What I was able to verify was the events that took place in a small village in Hungary, , where not one shot was fired either before the 4th or after and there were six executions there in one day.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): What was the date?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Spanish): This happened approximately between 5-10 February.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): When you tell us that you estimate the truth to be about 60 per cent accurate why do you estimate this to be 60 per cent rather than 20 per cent or 30 per cent? This is a very important question. It is important to say that there were 600 executions and that 60 per cent of them are definite.

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Spanish): I said I thought it was 60 per cent accurate because I have not got firsthand information, this was information which reached me in the following way. During these last weeks I was

(Witness UUU)

in contact with several people. I am not speaking to you about the resistance that is taking place at present in Hungary because it does not directly interest this Committee and this resistance does not need any publicity however discreet. This number comes from certain information which was estimated by the resistance movement on the basis of information received from lawyers and other people who are still working in Hungary in certain official or public capacities. There is a certain contact between people who resist but I personally was unable to check these figures. However, several people have estimated on a certain basis the number of executions and these were added up. I said I could not give it more accuracy than 60 per cent but I could have said 100 per cent because many people say that it is 100 per cent but I do not want to estimate here so highly information that has gone through several hands before it reached me.

The CHAIRMAN: If I may say so, the Committee could not of course use such figures without their being confirmed from several sources. We are a fact-finding Committee, and so I do not think we need pursue that point further.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): Do you know whether, during the time that this Committee of the United Nations has been meeting, there have been further executions?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Spanish): I would like to give you an example of the atmosphere existing at the present time in Hungary. A friend of mine, living at the house where the event I am going to mention took place, told me that Kadar's men, in the search for a certain person, entered a house in the centre of the city. The janitor did not give them the information they wanted, they shot at him five times and he was killed immediately. That gives a general idea of the kind and extent of the terror that is practised in the city itself. I have already told you that I could give you information about the way in which Kadar's police are persecuting even children, because children owing to their temperament often do not know how to exercise sufficient caution.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): Are you at the present time still in contact with Hungarian centres in Buenos Aires, Montevideo and other Latin American cities?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Spanish): No. I have had absolutely no contact with Latin America since 1949.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): In your capacity as a fighter, why did the Soviets accuse you of serving another government than your own, as if you were the agent of a foreign power?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Spanish): There was a change in the direction of Soviet policy after 1948, probably because they were thinking of provoking a war, as they provoked one in Korea; and they wanted to get rid of all those people who thought, who exercised their minds. I told you, for example, what happened to me when I was head of the press section in the Ministry of Agriculture; they wanted me to

(Witness UUU)

give a press statement which was inaccurate and which I had the occasion to check. They could thus see that I was not a person who could be used for any kind of purpose, that I had my own ideas, and that I was not ready to persecute Hungarian agriculturists or peasants or anyone of the kind. Furthermore, the Soviets hate all people who have been in Western countries. They cannot visualize a man who has seen the Western countries and would approve of their so-called socialization, and therefore they think of such people as being at least suspect. Russian was a compulsory subject in the schools, many people had to speak some Russian, and there was thus some contact between the Soviet forces and at least Hungarian youth. Thus the Soviet military personnel who took part in the Soviet intervention in Hungary knew well that they would not live as free men, even in the relative freedom of the Soviet Union, when they left Hungary; they know they would be sent to concentration camps. For example, on 4 November the commander of the Soviet forces in Szombathely, which is close to the Austrian border, fled to Austria with his whole family. I know this through my mother-in-law who lives in that town.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): Are you still continuing your work as a translator now?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Spanish): There is no occasion now to make such translations into Hungarian.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): We both of us believe, I am sure, that Don Quixote de la Mancha will continue to fight for the freedom of us all. That is what I conclude from your statement today, to which I have listened with great interest.

Mr. GUNEWARDENE (Ceylon): I understand that you were bed-ridden during the revolution. What illness were you suffering from?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): I contracted hepatitis on 10 October. That is a liver complaint which is also contagious, and one has to stay in bed for about two months. In the early part of this illness I was taken to the Laszlo isolation hospital in Budapest. I spent there the first part of the time, until 30 October. The Russians were passing at a distance of 25 metres from my room, fighting regular Hungarian army units, and they were so close that the spent

(Witness UUU)

ammunition could actually be heard falling on the floor. According to their custom the Russians also shot into this hospital, and I believe the number of machine gun shots fired into the wing next to mine amounted to eight.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): You are an intellogent witness and I would ask you to answer my questions without any extrancous material. I want straight answers to straight questions. When did you return home?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): On 30 October.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): So from 30 October until you left Budapest you were at home?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): I was in Budapest and it was in December that I left my bed.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): You were in Budapest in your own home?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): In my own home, yes.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): How long did you know X ?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): From 1950.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Before then was it X who gave you valuable information? What were the contacts you had before then? When did X last see you?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): X and I were on the same floor of the prison, and throughout the years we met during the walks in prison or at bath. To spend some time together in prison makes for intimacy. In a prison people get to know each other better in five days than in five years outside in private life. Later on a translation office was established in the prison, where ... and myself were working as we spoke different languages. We were together there too. That was in 1953.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): Since leaving prison how often have you, between 1953 and 1956, met X ?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): X left prison later than myself. I was freed in 1954, X in 1955.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): How often did you meet between 1955 and 1956?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): X, on coming out of prison, immediately came to see me, and thereafter we met several times. X was released in April 1955 and we met perhaps twelve or thirteen times in society, and X also came to see me individually.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): How many times did you see X individually?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Perhaps eight, but I cannot be absolutely accurate.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Did he visit you in hospital?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): No, I could not receive any visitors because there was fighting in the streets.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): When did he give this information to you about the Czechoslovakian incident -- what date roughly?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): In the middle of November. I should say it was the 14th or the 15th, possibly the 17th, but within those limits.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Before he gave this information to you did he meet you in your house during November?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): No, not before that because that was the period when he was simulating illness.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): You say he was

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): He was

.....

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): After the 15th or the 17th, did you see him again before you left?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes, but only very briefly because he then went away again

.....

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Is he now in the service of the Kadar Government?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): When he returned home his old friends and acquaintances did not renew their connection with him and I myself did not make contact with him either. He presented his own role in a way that indicated that he would have liked to get material aid for Hungary in any circumstances because this was necessary whatever government Hungary had. His old friends disapproved violently of such an attitude. According to my information when he came home he was offered the position of and they spoke of the possibility of asking him to fill a certain government role but this had not happened by the time I left.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): You are not aware of his serving in any capacity at the moment?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): No.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): When did he return from Czechoslovakia?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): I believe it was around the 8th.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Between the 8th and the 17th were you in telephonic communication even?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes, once.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): When was it, roughly?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): This I do not know. A friend came to see me who had seen X first because we lived near each other. It was that friend who told me that X was in bed and said he had high blood pressure because he had been called to Parliament and did not want to go.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): When you heard of his illness did you go to see him?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): I myself was sick in bed and therefore did not go to see him.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): So you did not in fact receive any telephone communication, any kind of information?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Not from X but from the friend I have mentioned who had been to see him and then came to see me and told me about X's illness. This friend had been in prison with me and was a friend of us both.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Then in point of fact you did not have any telephonic communication with X ?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): As I said, I spoke to him once by telephone.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): On that occasion did he mention anything of any importance to you or was it just an enquiry about your health?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): As a matter of fact we did not speak of anything important because we were not at all sure that our telephone was not monitored.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): The Czechoslovakian incident, you say, was X's own experience?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes, definitely.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Did X go to Moscow?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): No, he went from Bratislava to Prague and from Prague to Budapest. Only Horvat went to Moscow. When Horvat returned to Budapest he called X to Parliament and there he related the events that had taken place since they had separated. At that time even Horvat was hesitating about accepting the post offered to him because he found the position of the Government to be most insecure.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): When did Horvat return from Moscow?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): I cannot tell you the exact date but reconstructing the course of events I think it must have been the 8th or the 9th because it was following this that he spoke to X. He must have spoken to X on about the 10th and I spoke to X around the 15th.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): I thought you said X was ill?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes. He was called to Parliament on the 7th but said he was ill and stayed at home. He went out on the 13th perhaps and I spoke to him on about the 15th, by which time he had already been to Parliament. When he was first called to Parliament by telephone he said he was sick but later he did go saying he was very weak but had made an effort to go to Parliament. He said he was still feeling ill and he went back to bed. He may have gone out for a few hours because he said he was suffering from blood pressure, so he would be able to go out. He used the excuse of high blood pressure as a reason for not accepting any post but later he did accept the position with

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): When did you receive your information from X?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Before the 15th but exactly what date I do not know.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): You cannot explain why he gave you this valuable information which involved him in great risk?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): He might have given me the information because he wanted to ensure his position with us who were opposing the regime since the situation of the Government was still not clear. At that time he did not accept any role in the Kadar Government and he may therefore have felt that he was not bound to secrecy and that if there was a change it might tell in his favour that he had advised us of the situation.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Were you suspected by the Kadar Government?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): I think I was undoubtedly a thorn in their side because I had good contacts with their opponents and I received an offer from the Coalition Government that at least until the elections took place I should go as Hungarian Minister to Paris. This was probably known to Kadar.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): You even feared that your telephone might be interfered with?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes, they were monitoring the telephone. I called in a workman privately to put my telephone in order and when I gave him a tip he showed me how my telephone was monitored. However, this monitoring was fairly general and as I was sick and did not play any part in the revolution I knew very well that I would not be in the first group held responsible as they would start with those who had fought actively. Their police, their militia, and so on were still unorganized.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Did I take a grave risk therefore in coming to see you, apart from conveying information?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): There was not really so much danger attached to his coming to see me. The police system was not then so well reorganized that they could check what neighbour visited another and use this as an accusation.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): So the information with regard to Horvat's movements in Moscow was related by Horvat to X and by X to you?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): That is so.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Did you convey this information to any of your friends?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Several people in Hungary knew about this.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Did you convey the information? That is the question.

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): I heard the same information from other people too — namely from my friend who saw X and me on the same day, and who had been our fellow-prisoner. X told it to him too. Furthermore X maintained contact with the Hungarian Social Democrats and a certain faction among the Social Democrats also knew about it.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): That is not the answer to my question. Did you convey the information to anybody?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes, I did.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): To whom did you convey the information?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): To my friends at home who were active in the resistance.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): The resistance movement is still going on, is it?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes, that is so. It is active in the sense that the opposition groups itself around certain persons who are in contact with each other and who have a certain platform, starting from the Left Wing and the Catholic Group through the Social Democrats and the Smallholders' Party, and as far Left as the Imre Nagy group who do not call themselves Communists any more, but Independent Socialists. If you are interested I can tell you about quite a few of the acts of the resistance.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Are you in contact with the resistance movement now?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): At present it is very difficult to establish such contact, but we are trying to do so.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Do you receive any communications from Hungary?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Only from my family at present.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): From no-one else?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): I have not received any information of a political nature.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Then how did you know in the first week of April about the executions?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): I did not speak of April, but of the second part, the last week, of February.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): I thought the representative of Uruguay put it to you?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): No, there was a misunderstanding.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Very well. You referred to an execution in the village, when about six people were shot.

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): This was Kiskunmajsa.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): How and when did you get this information?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): The wife of a friend of mine, who is a writer, is from She went there to visit her parents and when she returned from there she related this. She knew all the people who were executed. This is a very small village where everybody knows everyone else, and there is no possibility of error.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): You heard about it from her while you were in Hungary?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): That is right, yes.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): With regard to the story of the lawyer, when did you hear that?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): At the same time.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Also in Hungary?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes, In Hungary, and also from a Hungarian writer who had close contacts with lawyers and solicitors who tried to inform us of the events.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): So your friend heard it from somebody and I suppose he heard it from somebody else, and he conveyed it to you?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): There was an error in translation here. I received the information from my writer friend who got it from the lawyer; there was no longer process.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): The lawyer told your friend and your friend told you?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): That is so, but I also know the lawyer personally.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Yes, but the information was from your friend and not from the lawyer you said, unless you change it now?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): That is correct, I received it from my friend, who received it from the lawyer.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Your friend is in Hungary now?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes he is.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): So you speak of 600 executions, but those are the only two specific pieces of information you have?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): As I mentioned earlier, the figure of 600 was arrived at by the resistance movement from data received from different parts. As this information relies on several informants I gave it a smaller percentage of truth relative to the other information. I myself am personally convinced that it is 100 per cent true, but I did not want to give information to the Committee which I had not received directly, or through people whom I considered to be absolutely reliable. This information was put together by several people.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): When did you receive this information from the resistance movement?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): This information was received by the resistance movement in the first few days of March, and was the culmination point of the events at the end of February.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): When did the resistance movement convey this information to you?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Approximately about 12 March, at latest 15 March.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): That was again while you were in Hungary?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes, naturally.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): The resistance movement is a wide term; who of the resistance movement conveyed this information?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): I cannot mention the name here. He was a prison cell-mate of ours, and is in Hungary, a very important man, one of the most important, and his name I cannot give at any cost.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): What was the source of your information with regard to the Maleter incident and the very fine picture of the situation which you gave? How did you get that information?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): From a man of the resistance movement who spoke personally to Y, and to whom Y gave it in order that the resistance movement should be informed.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): You said you had only one letter from the Imre Nagy party. Did you read any letter?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes, I read that letter.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): When was that letter received?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Between 6 and 8 December.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): To whom was that letter addressed, obviously not to you?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): To the parents of the person who wrote the letter. I received it from the husband — the person was a lady who was secretary to — her husband stayed in Hungary, whereas the woman and child were taken together from the Yugoslav Legation to Romania. I received the letter from the husband who was also in the illegal underground movement.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): That letter is in your possession I take it?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): Oh no.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Thereafter you had no letters from the Party?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): I did not see any, but I know their texts practically by heart because they were told to me verbatim.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): By whom?

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): People who were in close contact with the families informed me.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions? Then we thank you very much for your appearance before the Committee.

WITNESS UUU (interpretation from Hungarian): I should have liked to add some data on the persecutions, but I believe this is not among the terms of reference of the Committee. I should like to thank you for having heard me.

Witness UUU withdrew.

The CHAIRMAN: Now for various reasons there are no witnesses to be heard this afternoon, so this afternoon's meeting is cancelled. Tomorrow we will meet at 3 p.m., first for consideration of the report, and after that if there is time, as we hope, for the continued hearing of witnesses.

Mr. JORDAN (Secretary): I should like to mention that I already have the French and Spanish translations of the revised outline of the report, but I am in the curious position of not having the English, which is a reversal of the usual procedure. I mention this because I should like to know how to get into touch with members of the Committee this afternoon to let them have the English version of the revised outline of the report.

The CHAIRMAN: The meeting stands adjourned until tomorrow afternoon at three o'clock.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.