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ENGLISH

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEM OF HUNGARY

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SECOND PART* OF THE FIFTY-THIRD MEETING (CLOSED)

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 3 April 1957, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Alsing ANDERSEN

(Denmark)

Attack of Gyor on 2 Nov (?)

Tildy in favour of fighting 3 Nov.

Info on Rev Council & Buda W.C. -

000 Discussion with Russians for release of deportees

Intervention in judicial procedure

Maintenance of democratic appearance

Important

Russian arrests for months

Protest by Konyá on deportation

Prohibition of meeting at Kesternet on 9 Dec

Presence of Russians in negotiations with Kadar

Troops in Dunabaras on 2 Nov

*For the first part of the meeting there is a summary record (A/AC.88/SR.53)

Pers. Commands Hovred Heason

Fighting in Mecsek mountain, Killing of Soviet Command

Atrocities by Soviet

At the invitation of the Chairman Witness NNN took a place at the Committee table.

The CHAIRMAN: On behalf of the Committee I bid you welcome. I understand you were a leading member of the Revolutionary Council of Győr and we are particularly interested in hearing about the role and activities of the Soviet commander in Győr. We have had much testimony and evidence about the general development of the revolution, so we are not interested in that. We are interested in hearing new facts and I understand that you have information with which we are not so far acquainted, including facts about the behaviour of the Soviet commander at Győr, so would you please concentrate on that for the time being.

WITNESS NNN (interpretation from Hungarian): In the evening of 24 October about thirty or forty T.34 Russian armoured units reached Győr and stayed there all night. The people demonstrated throughout the night against the Russian troops and demanded their withdrawal. Towards morning the Russians gathered together their civilian and service people in Győr and went to Győrszentivány, a small town outside Győr. The next day reports were received that the Russians in Győrszentivány had got hold of spirits and were preparing to attack. The people became frightened as the town was without means of defence and the Revolutionary Council sent a delegation from Győr to the Russian commander there, Colonel Schwartz. This man, who was the Russian military commander at Győr, made the following statement to the editor of the newspaper Győr-Sopronmegyei Hírlap. He said that the Russian troops had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Hungary and that in his opinion the Hungarian uprising was completely right and justified. Then he expressed his thanks to the city for taking care of Russian civilians and giving 40 or 50 litres of milk to the children of the Russian civilians and the families of the soldiers. He assured the people that there was no question of an attack being prepared against Győr because it was just as important for them as for the Hungarian people that Győr should be protected.

(Witness NNN)

I know too that the Revolutionary Council of Veszprem also had discussions with the Russian commander who put it in writing that the Russians had absolutely no intention of attacking the Hungarian people. He said they understood the Hungarians and wished them luck in the revolution. I saw this written document with my own eyes as it was shown to me by a member of the Veszprem Revolutionary Council. The statement to which I referred previously was published in the 28 October issue of Gyöer-Sopronmegyei Hirlap.

That is the end of my statement.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, but I understand you have other points which, in your judgment, would interest the Committee and of course you may talk about them too.

WITNESS NNN (interpretation from Hungarian): On 24 October the demonstrating crowd was led by communists, and in particular by Mihaly Farkas, an electrical technician who was a member of the Communist Party and a so-called people's educator. There were several hundred people present, and Gabor Foeldes, the Party secretary of the Kisfaludy theatre, Ingoer, made a speech. They made a declaration over the radio in which they said Fascist agitators had attacked public buildings, and they announced to the provincial Party secretary that the uprising in Budapest was not by rabble but by freedom fighters, and that they should see that nothing of the kind that happened outside the radio building at Budapest should happen at Gyöer.

There were communists included in the Revolutionary Council. The chairman, Attila Szigeti, although not a communists, was a provincial representative under the Communist regime, and continued to be so until the outbreak of the revolution. He was a personal friend of Imre Nagy, and was in close communication with him. There were certain communists in the Revolutionary Council from the date of its formation until 4 November, who played an active role. The military commander was a man named Major Krebs, and the commander of the police was Major Elias. The Gyöer State Prosecutor was a man named Keri — I think his first name was Stephen but I am not sure of this. He also took an active part in the Revolutionary Council.

I think it is necessary to emphasize that the workers of the Wilhelm Pick wagon factory in Gyöer took a leading part in the demonstrating crowd which started the revolution, and there were no so-called Horthyists, land owners or anti-class elements in this demonstrating crowd. Various delegations from different parts of Trans-Danubia arrived daily in Gyöer which was the centre of the Trans-Danubian revolution. These delegations were of such a character that it would be impossible to assume that they wanted to bring back the state of affairs existing before the war. They represented the Trans-Danubian Revolutionary Councils, which had an overwhelming majority of miners.

As regards the character of the revolution, on 28 October the Gyöer-Sopron Hungarian Workers' Party newspaper Gyöer-Sopronmegyei Hirlap published a declaration in which the Gyöer-Sopron province Communist Party demanded the immediate disbanding of the AVH in Budapest and in various parts of the country, also that the secret members of the AVH must be unarmed and the weapons handed over to the Hungarian regular army; further, that Russian troops should immediately cease fire and leave the

country. They also emphasized that this was not a counter-revolution, but the realization of the Hungarian working people's national aspirations. The Gyöer-Sopron province workers and agriculturalists did not wish for the re-establishment of the pre-war system; the aim of the revolution was not to re-establish the old order, but to realise national unity.

I should like to say something about anti-semitism. To my knowledge the Kadar Government is at present taking steps to obtain statements from the lay leaders of Hungarian Jewish communities. Everywhere in Hungary, but particularly in Gyöer there are Hungarians of Jewish origin who played a serious part in the revolution. Gabor Foeldes, whom I mentioned before, is a Hungarian fighter of Jewish origin. The leaders of the Gyöer-Sopron Jewish lay organization declared themselves in complete unity with the revolution and gave a donation of 10,000 forints, a considerable sum of money, to the freedom fighters.

As regards the guarding of the Austria-Hungarian border I would say that after the outbreak of the revolution the border continued to be guarded and it was only at so-called transfer points that people could come into the country, that is, at Sopron, Hegyeshalom, Kolszeg, Szombathely, and Szentgotthard, the area of the Gyöer-Sopron Revolutionary Council. Hegyeshalom was the most important because it is quite near the main Budapest-Vienna road. The guards were under the command of Major Flexi, an officer of the regular army and as far as I know a member of the Communist Party, who only allowed people to go in and out if they had valid documents.

It is characteristic that on 30 October or 31 October the Trans-Danubian Revolutionary Council tried to send a four-member delegation to the United Nations. They got only as far as the Ministry of the Interior. The guard at the border called up the Revolutionary Council in order to confirm whether the documents they carried were valid. A great many newspaper reporters who had visas permitting them to enter the territory of Hungary were faced with difficulties at the Gyöer frontier. Many of the correspondents wanted to go back from Hungary, and I myself issued papers allowing them to spend a night in Austria and come back into Hungary again as further documents were needed to cross the border again.

Major Krebs was working in a room near where I was and we maintained continuous communication with the military guard under his command. The Revolutionary Council received no reports of shipments of material crossing the frontier. As to shipments of weapons, in the city of Gyöer there were various consignments of food and drugs being distributed from warehouses and sent in various directions, mainly to Budapest. There was a committee formed of doctors and medical personnel to classify these

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(Witness NNN)

consignments but we never got any reports that there were weapons or arms among them.

Reverting to the guarding of the frontier, I could if necessary refer you to other witnesses in Switzerland as one of the members of the Szentgotthard Revolutionary Council, one from Szombathely, and one or two others are here. Talking to them, I was told that there had been no evidence at other parts of the border of shipment of weapons from the West.

(Witness NNN)

As regards the Russian intervention, I can tell you that Russian troops left Győr on the 24th but on 2 November the airfield of Győr and the bridges of the city were attacked by Russian armoured cars; the attack at that time was not really fierce and the Revolutionary Council was still in operation. However on 2 November all foreign newspaper correspondents who tried to enter or leave the city were arrested at Moson-Magyaróvár where Russian troops had barricaded all the roads.

I have given you the substance of my statement and am now willing to answer questions.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): I have just two questions. Was the Revolutionary Council in Győr elected by anyone and, if not, how was it appointed?

WITNESS NNN (interpretation from Hungarian): The Revolutionary Council at Győr was elected on the 24th, when the first demonstration took place in front of the Party's headquarters during which political prisoners were liberated. The AVH then intervened and fired into the crowd; four people were killed and four were wounded. During the following night several people were arrested and on the next day the demonstrators made more precise demands. Kéry succeeded in halting the demonstration and talked with the AVH at the Town Hall. Subsequently the demonstrators, who by then numbered ten or fifteen thousand people, published a notice in the newspaper that every industrial plant should elect its council members and such elections should be made in proportion with the size of the plant. It was also announced that the elections should be completed by 9 a.m. on the 26th. The elections were held; the smaller plants elected two or three members and the larger elected seven members. The next day at 10 o'clock two delegates from each plant (a total of 300 in all) elected Attila Szigeti as chairman and a small committee was formed. Thus, it is evident that the elections took place in a democratic way, by secret ballot, in which I took part myself. Later the Executive Committee was elected in the Town Hall at Győr.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): My second question is: what contact did the Revolutionary Committee have with the Central Council at Budapest?

WITNESS NNN (interpretation from Hungarian): We tried to contact Imre Nagy several times. Although there was a so-called "private line" from the ministries of the more important cities to Nagy we never succeeded in talking to him on the telephone. We talked to Ferenc Erdei, to the members of the Writers' Union and to the wife of Erdei, but never to Nagy. The Revolutionary Council of Győr could not estimate the position clearly and was not convinced that there would be free and democratic elections in Hungary. Continual demands for reorganization of the Government were made. We even presented two demands to the Imre Nagy Government, one on the 28th and one on the 29th. On 30 October a government was formed and we reported to the Secretariat that a five-member delegation wished to go to Budapest. That delegation was received by Nagy on 31 October and informed him of our wishes, one of which was that the Government should negotiate for the withdrawal of Russian troops, for free elections to be held, and for preparations to be made for the formation of a coalition government. It was hoped that this could be effected by the cooperation of the Social Democratic Party, Communist Party and the other parties which had existed in 1945.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Will the interpreter please tell the witness that I wish to ask him a few straight questions to which he should give me concise replies.

The demonstration took place on the night of the 24th, is that correct?

WITNESS NNN (interpretation from Hungarian): On the 24th at 2.30 in the afternoon.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): How big was the crowd?

WITNESS NNN (interpretation from Hungarian): The first crowd which assembled in front of the Party headquarters numbered about six or seven hundred people, I think. At 2.30 p.m. the factories at Győr stopped work and the workers then joined the demonstrators. At the time the prison was attacked I think the crowd numbered about ten thousand people.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): That crowd of demonstrators, numbering ten thousand, was opposite the prison?

WITNESS NNN (interpretation from Hungarian): The demonstrations started in front of the Party headquarters at the Town Hall. In order to understand what I am saying you should know the geographical layout of Győr. The road in front of the prison ~~is a~~ very long one and leads to the Party headquarters. The demonstration began in front of the Party headquarters; the crowd tore down the Russian emblems and cut out the Soviet insignia from the flags. Another part of the crowd surged down a narrow street opening off the square, which leads to the prison. About two or three thousand people then assembled in front of the prison.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): How many political prisoners were in the prison?

WITNESS NNN (interpretation from Hungarian): I cannot give you an exact number. Some of the youths among the demonstrators sent a delegation into the prison who negotiated for the liberation of the political prisoners.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): Approximately how many prisoners were released?

WITNESS NNN (interpretation from Hungarian): While I was there, and until the firing started, I saw about fifteen or twenty people emerge from the gates. They had been released. The next day about two hundred people were liberated by the crowd which had assembled in front of the AVH headquarters after it had surrendered.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): At what time did the fighting take place?

WITNESS NNN (interpretation from Hungarian): It could have been at about 6 o'clock in the evening.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): Did the firing take place opposite the prison?

WITNESS NNN (interpretation from Hungarian): I must explain that there are two streets surrounding the prison which form an "L" shape. The main entrance is at the stem of the "L". That is where the police car entered the street and fired upon the crowd assembled opposite the main entrance of the prison.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): Was it the AVH who did the shooting?

WITNESS NNN (interpretation from Hungarian): There were police, AVH and civilians. Voices from the crowds cried that there were AVH men disguised in civilian clothes. I should tell you that the AVH officer who gave the order to fire committed suicide the next day when the AVH headquarters were attacked.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): Did the firing take place before or after the release of the political prisoners?

WITNESS NNN (interpretation from Hungarian): After the political prisoners were released. They were not released by force because a delegation had entered the prison and negotiated for their liberation. After that the police car arrived and commenced firing into the crowd who then dispersed.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): The witness spoke to us of an event in Győr — a statement which was made by the Soviet commander — could he please tell us of the date of that statement?

WITNESS NNN (interpretation from Hungarian): It was on the 27th when the delegation went to the Russian command and the papers and the radio published the declaration of the Russian command on the 28th.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: There are no further questions and on behalf of the Committee I thank you.

Witness NNN withdrew.

At the invitation of the Chairman, Witness 000 took a place at the Committee table.

The CHAIRMAN: On behalf of the Committee I bid you welcome. I understand that you are a professor of law and that you have already been informed of the questions in which the Committee is particularly interested. I ask you to give us your statement.

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): In 1947 I was elected as a professor of the Faculty of Law at the university. I came back in 1947 after three years of imprisonment in Soviet Russia and until 1949 I was the leader of the Faculty of Law at a reformist university. In 1949 when the Academy of Law ceased to exist I became a professor of the Budapest university. In 1951 they demoted me to docent — that is a professor in a lower grade — and I remained in that position until the present day.

I was a member of the Smallholders' Party since my student days at the university until 1949 by which time the Party was banned. On 30 October 1956 I organized the Smallholders' Party group of the Budapest university and I became the chairman. In December I became a member of the National Action Committee. In the revolution I was one of the leaders of the struggle by the youth, and chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Eötvös Loránd University at Budapest, and as such the

(Witness 000)

leader of the university national guard. Our work consisted mostly of trying to bring together during the fighting the various student councils which were working in isolation in Buda and in Pest and to try to bring them into communication with each other. This attempt was not completely successful.

On 28 October at a university meeting, with the participation of Geza Losonczi, later Minister of State, we tried to achieve some order but even then we did not completely succeed. However, our activities in trying to arm the national guard university groups achieved more success and the weapons for this purpose were placed at our disposal by Sandor Kopacsi.

After the victory of the October revolution until 4 November we tried to prepare against a possible Russian attack and at the university we adopted the position that in the event of a Russian attack we would not oppose them with arms or by force but with passive national resistance. As leader of the university delegation, on 3 November in the afternoon and evening, I had a meeting with Zoltan Tildy to discuss this matter — I have known him since my childhood — but he rejected our proposal and as a consequence of this, on 4 November, the students took up the fight against the Russians with all their might.

After 9 November when the fighting stopped we started to win politically what we had lost militarily. Unfortunately, in this attempt the political parties did not offer us any help. First of all we tried to bring together the various revolutionary councils or committees — there were several names under which they were organized. There was the so-called top committee which was called the Executive Committee of the Revolutionary Councils. Since this was not working well in the middle of November we again organized the Hungarian intellectual Revolutionary Council which had ceased to function on 4 November. As chairman of the university Revolutionary Council I was a member of this intellectual Revolutionary Council and this Council was working in very close touch with the Workers' Councils. We attended the meetings of the Workers' Councils and advised them of the position they might adopt in carrying on negotiations with the Government. In this way I was also elected as a member of the Greater Budapest Workers' Council at one of these meetings of delegates which as a professor I rejected but at their request I assisted them as an adviser until the end.

(Witness 000)

The intellectual revolutionary council worked out a programme in relation to further developments which was accepted officially by the Peasants' Party, the Petoefi Party and the workers. This programme was to have been a national programme which we proposed putting in front of the government and the authors of it were two university professors. I can tell you their names but I should not like it to become public knowledge. If the Committee is interested I can give you the exact points of this programme.

Meanwhile, as chairman of the university council I carried on discussions with the Russian military command at their headquarters at No. 21 Ajtosi Duerer Street. We carried on discussions in regard to the return of university students who had been arrested and deported. Other university leaders also took part in this. We took part in the organization of the strike on 10 November and I was also the liaison member of the delegation sent to the public prosecutor by the intellectual workers' council. As a delegate I had the means to gain information in regard to the illegal and unjustified interference by the Russians in Hungarian internal affairs and Hungarian justice and judicial procedure. I knew the whole officers' corps of the AVH because as a professor of law I taught the AVH officers and they had to take examinations under me.

I stayed at home in Hungary until 26 January. On 21 January the chief prosecutor wanted to arrest me because the People's Democracy was preparing an indictment against me for incitement. On the 22nd, I left and before I crossed the Yugoslav border on the 26th I was successful in meeting one group of partisans which was still operating in the Mecsek mountains. They were still carrying on regular guerrilla warfare against certain troops of the Russian army.

I would like to point out two more factors. One is that the revolution had no anti-Semitic character at all.

(Witness 000)

We were accused by some at home before the chief prosecutor with having certain anti-Semitic people at the head of the revolution, and with having anti-Semitism as part of our aims, but I declare that I myself saw the following occurrence. On 25 October, at 10 a.m., at the time of the butchery in front of Parliament, student youth were rushing back from Parliament Square when in Vecsey Street an AVH colonel fell into their hands; a worker amongst the students seized him, tore off his insignia of rank and said to him, "Because of the butchery we ought to shoot you now, but as you are a Jew we will not hurt you because it would be said that we are anti-Semitic, but none of us is anti-Semitic and never will be." There was also a representative proportion of Jews in the leadership of the students.

As to other events I would very much like to say something about the Russian pressure which was exerted in the Hungarian judicial procedure, and afterwards I would like to say something about the contacts between the Nagy Government and the Kadar Government, the unconstitutional organization of the Kadar Government, and generally about the fact that the Hungarian judiciary is not in a position to arrive at judgments independently because the hand of the party is at work in every hearing before a judge. In so far as the Committee wished I could point out in a few sentences how the party apparatus is connected with the government apparatus and how the terrorist regime is able to exercise its power under democratic appearances.

As to these other matters I would be very glad to answer any question the Committee might wish to put to me.

The CHAIRMAN: You mentioned deportations of students. Have you any facts relating to those?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): It was not only students who were deported by the Russians. The general practice was to close off part of a street by stationing a tank at each end, and anyone found within was put into a tank or armoured car and taken away. I was an eye-witness of such events on more than one occasion. Perhaps the most terrible was on about 10 November when Semmelweis Street was so closed. Young and old people were both taken away. I know of another such occurrence on 12 November when one of my students was taken

(Witness 000)

away by the Russians in the following circumstances. The boy was living at Rozsadomb; Mihaly Oeri, an AVH man, with Russians he had brought attacked the AVH building at Rozsadomb and everyone found there was taken away to Russia. Two of us in the name of the University Revolutionary Council went to protest against this action of the Russians. The two were myself and Zoltan Garamvoelgyi, an assistant professor and secretary of the party organization, who is now in Yugoslavia. The central military command sent a political lieutenant-colonel Sidorenko who at first did not want to admit that there had been any deportations, he denied the fact; he said that the Russians had not given orders to deport anyone, and if it had happened it was an individual action. Upon this I gave him a list of names which had been thrown out of a train by some who had already been deported, and I referred to several fourteen or fifteen year old children who with heads shaven bare had been brought back in earlier days, some from Ungvar and some from Kolomea. Then he admitted deportation but said that its only aim was to get students out of the fighting and that they would be brought back from Russia when order had been restored, they would be handed over to the Hungarian authorities for further action. I then told him that Russian guards had been seizing members of the civilian population one by one and taking them into Foe Street AVH prison where the Russians were keeping them captive and interrogating them. At first lieutenant-colonel Sidorenko denied everything, he refused to admit anything, but later when I referred to my own students he made an admission and said that the supervision of those people would also be transferred in the near future to the newly organized Hungarian political police.

It was not only I myself who went to the Russian central military command to protest against deportations but also a professor of law, Endre Nyizsalovszky, and the then Deputy Minister of Education, Albert Konya. They protested against the Russians taking away from Veszprem seventy-two people including the students of the Veszprem Technical Academy and several teachers. The Russians gave a completely circuitous answer to this protest; they said, "Give us the names. Tell

us who ordered these deportations. Who carried them out? Who was taken and where were they taken? Without this information we are not willing to do anything in the matter."

Since most of the people maintained liaison between the prosecutors and the University Revolutionary Council I appeared daily at the prosecutors' office in the interests of liberating the arrested students and writers, and from what I learned there I have knowledge of the following. On about 14 or 15 November, in front of the Yugoslav Embassy, two newspaper reporters, amongst others, were arrested because they were inside the Yugoslav Embassy. The Yugoslav Embassy was kept under observation and a Hungarian-Russian guard took everybody coming out first into the collecting prison and then to Foe Street where they were interrogated by Russians. We succeeded in getting them liberated fairly quickly, but as to my own students I was in the chief prosecutor's office on 21 January and even then he said that the endeavour to get the students back from the Russians had not yet succeeded. He said that he himself had talked with the Russian commander of the OGPU in Budapest, who kept delaying the matter, saying that as soon as the interrogation was finished the captives would be handed over to the Hungarian authorities. This, however, had not happened by 21 January, and on that date seventy-four Hungarians were still held captive by the Russians. Many young Hungarians were handed over to the Hungarian political police for them to guard subsequently, but they were not liberated because the Russians still needed them for getting certain information about them.

I should like to mention that the contact with the Russians in the chief prosecutor's office was the son of a 1919 communist, a man called Eugen Hamburger, a lawyer.

(Witness 000)

He went to the Russian command daily. I would like to speak also about the extent to which the Russians kept the Hungarian judicial process in their own hands. From 4 November declarations to the civilian population were issued as orders by the Russian military command. At Budapest, for example, the signature first of Grebenik and later of Laschenko appeared on these orders. Thus the people were informed of the imposition of a curfew. In country towns outside Budapest this terror was carried even further.

On 9 December I went to the city of Kecskemet as an emissary of the Revolutionary Council to discuss the holding of a general meeting of intellectuals on 16 December. I was told that this must first be discussed with the Russian military commander at Kecskemet, and this answer was given to me by the chairman of the council at Bacs-Kiskun Province, Ferenc Dallos. The following day, 10 December, he got in touch with the Russian command and a few days later they told him that the Russian troops would not permit such a general meeting.

Regarding martial law, on the afternoon of 9 December they announced that martial law would become effective at 6 p.m. On 11 December. In spite of that, however, the courts passed judgment on events which occurred half an hour before martial law was supposed to come into force. This happened in Kecskemet in the case of a man named Gobor. The courthouse was surrounded by Russian tanks; no one could go into the building and the trial was held behind locked doors. Several defence lawyers were however admitted and it is from them that I know about this. A sentence of death was passed on this man and he was later executed. I have heard that in other places also martial law was put into effect with the aid of Russian armed troops.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): Would you tell me in what field of law you have specialized?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): In Hungarian and comparative law.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): You have not spent any time studying international law?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): I did not spend much time on international law but I did on constitutional law. In this connection I should like to discuss whether the replacement of the Nagy Government by the new Kadar Government was in conformity with the Hungarian Constitution or not.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): That is certainly not a question I was proposing to ask and as you have not specialized in international law I do not wish to ask any further questions.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I would like to ask you a question as a professor of Hungarian constitutional law. Does there exist under the Hungarian Constitution any provision whatsoever that allows a person to be deprived of his freedom, interned, imprisoned, or deported without this being decided on the basis of a judgment by a tribunal?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): Deportation as an institution is unknown under the Hungarian Constitution and it is not within the competence of the police to deprive a person of his freedom. The police are allowed to keep a person under arrest for forty-eight hours, which is really preventive arrest. After forty-eight hours he must be handed over and if there is no good reason to hold him, he must be released. This, however, is not what happened. One of my students named Lajos Baranyai -- a third-year law student and a member of the university council -- was arrested on 14 November and on 21 January he was still in the hands of the Russians, namely the political police, without his family knowing anything about him and without anybody being able even to provide him with fresh clothing. He simply disappeared and it was only indirectly, through contacts between the AVH and the university, that we learned of his whereabouts and that he was guarded by Russians. Later on he was handed over to the Hungarian political police who could not release him until such time as the Russians explicitly relinquished him.

Mr. SLIM (Runisia) (interpretation from French): Outside of the tribunals is it possible for a Hungarian administrative authority legally to proceed to arrest or to remove a Hungarian citizen from his domicile?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): For a long time the police had the right to do this. There was a police judge who was authorized to carry out such a procedure, but this institution had already been dissolved before the revolution so that during the revolution the police no longer had the right to bring judgment on people.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): Under the former law therefore it was possible for the police to make an administrative arrest by going through what you have called a police judge. What is a police judge?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): This ordinance was in force long before the revolution and no longer existed at the outbreak of the revolution, by which time the system of police judges had been completely stopped.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): You told us that the Russian authorities and the Russian commanders proclaimed martial law, imposed a curfew and then proceeded to arrest people. Could Hungary on the basis of its Constitution allow a foreign authority to proceed by itself to carry out such measures?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): Martial law was not imposed by the Russian authorities but by the Hungarian Government. The Russians simply informed the Hungarian population that they would only be allowed on the streets between certain hours and it was they who forbade public meetings, but under the Hungarian Constitution they had absolutely no right to do this.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): I will try to put my question more precisely. Was the martial law proclaimed by the Hungarian Government? Was the martial law established by the Hungarian Government replaced by that of the Soviet authorities?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): No, definitely not. The Russian authorities had absolutely no right to administer justice under our Constitution.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): In the decree of marshal law by the Hungarian Government did it say the military authorities were entrusted to the Russians together with police duties? Did it relinquish its authority to the Russians?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): No, this was not mentioned in any kind of law, the word "Russian" did not appear. It was intended to show the outside world that the Hungarians exercised sovereign rights and that order was brought about by the Hungarian Government.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): Therefore there was no relinquishing of Hungarian rights into the hands of the Russians, no delegation of power to the Russians?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): No, such a thing never occurred, and nowhere was it mentioned that the Hungarian Government would relinquish any of its rights to the Soviets. As a matter of fact, on the contrary, the Kadar group always emphasized the independence of Hungary and its right to self-determination.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): Nevertheless, during the time he was in Hungary the witness states that it was the Russian authorities who were exercising police powers?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes, I do affirm that. I saw with my own eyes the arrests that were made, and I learned from the military Attorney-General, Colonel Pal Kispal, who was one of my students, how the Russians released some of the people and kept some of them for their own purposes. I spoke to Colonel Kispal about this only the day before I left Hungary, 21 January.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): I think you said from a political point of view you were the chairman of the Smallholders' Party but I should like to address some questions to you in your capacity as a professor.

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): I was the chairman of the university branch of the Smallholders' Party. Later, in December, I became a member of the National Committee of the Smallholders' Party.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): I should like to get this correct; you told us you were the chairman of the university branch of the Smallholders' Party?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): I was the chairman of the Smallholders' Party of the university and afterwards I became a member of the National Committee of the Smallholders' Party.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay)(interpretation from Spanish): Within the framework of the revolution did the university section of the Smallholders' Party and you yourself accept the leadership of the Communist Imre Nagy?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): The University organization wanted Bela Kovacs as Prime Minister. We were forced to this decision by the fact that it was in the name of Imre Nagy that martial law was declared. Furthermore, Imre Nagy seemed to us to be undecided at the most important moment; he was hesitant, and therefore we found him unsuitable to direct the events, in our opinion he was always following the events instead of directing them. We voiced this opinion and between 30 October and 4 November I received a kind of rebuke from the Ministry of Education because of it, the accusation being that I wanted to dissolve national unity.

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Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): Do you think Nagy, as a Communist, would have approved the system of private ownership of land?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): No, I found that for myself, Imre Nagy as a Communist could not support the principle of private property ownership. The Smallholders' Party was of course in favour of private property, so much so that the Revolutionary Council of the intelligentsia and the peasants accepted the Nizsalovszky-Varga Plan which we made and accepted in December and which dealt with the action to be taken after the revolution, this was on the side of public ownership namely State ownership of banks, big enterprises and large landed estates. The small estates and the small industries were to be kept in private ownership.

I should like to clarify exactly what we meant in regard to the industries. We wanted not so much State ownership but a kind of mixed public ownership; each factory would have been a society where the State held a certain percentage of the shares and the rest would be owned by the workers. The proportion between State and workers' ownership would have been different according to whether the industry was heavy or light. In light industry the shareholding of the State would have been more, whereas in heavy industry it would have been less; that was how we wanted to prove that the worker was the owner of the factory.

So far as land was concerned, we were definitely in favour of maintaining private property.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): Can you tell us whether the Hungarian peasants who had fought against the old system of the large landed estates, were in favour of individual ownership of small pieces of land? Did the revolution approve of a return to private property ownership?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): The peasants who, in 1945 had received the lands which were distributed at that time, had already lost them by the time the revolution broke out. From 1949 onwards collectivizations were started in the course of which the peasants were forced to enter into collectivization "Kholchoz". The peasants were not prepared to recognize such collectivization and when, in 1953, Imre Nagy made it possible for them to withdraw from those "Kholchoz" most of them did so. However, later on, Rakosi forced them to join them again and it was the revolution which finally gave them the opportunity of breaking with the "Kholchoz" system for good. The peasants left the collectivizations, took back their small lands, and wanted — as they still want today — to cultivate the soil in accordance with the new principles of agrarian reform. Nobody desired, or desires nowadays, a return to the system of wide landownership. I was not present on 30 October but it is said that at that time Mindszenty and the Catholic Party wished to regain possession of the Church properties; however everybody else was strongly in favour of maintaining the agrarian reform which had been established in 1945.

In the course of December 1956 the two parties of the Revolutionary Council, and the intelligentsia of the Nizsalovszky-Varga Plan which had been accepted by the workers, wanted to regulate private ownership in such a way as to enable each peasant to have a definite tithe of land; such tithes would however be limited. That would have meant that, of the better land, such as that at Bacska, they would possess eighteen cadastral acres (nine and a half hectares) and of the poorer land, such as that at Tizsakoez, sixty cadastral acres (about thirty hectares). That plan could however result in those holdings being increased two-fold by inheritance or by purchasing.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): I should have been interested to know what would have been the situation of the peasant who did not have any land at all. However, that is no longer relevant, and I thank you for your answer.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): When was the system of police judges abolished?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): I do not recall exactly but it was between 1954 and 1956.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Martial law was proclaimed by the Hungarian authorities -- you have no doubt about that?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes, that is correct.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Whose duty was it to sign the proclamation of martial law?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): In principle, the Minister of Justice.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): A declaration of martial law infers the existence of a state of emergency?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): According to all concepts of law the ordinary law of the land is set aside while that situation exists?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes, that is correct.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): In your opinion the Hungarian authorities (whether they agreed or did not agree is not the question) purported that the Soviet occupation aimed to restore law and order? That was Kadar's excuse?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes, that was undoubtedly his explanation.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): You referred to certain orders, which you had seen, signed by Russian officers?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): They were all orders which referred to the maintenance of law and order?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): No, they were much more than that. They interfered with Hungarian internal affairs. It was a Russian commander who forbade public meetings and demonstrations and who imposed a curfew. Such orders were signed by the Russians in the name of the Russian command, and were posted in all the streets of Budapest and Kecskemet. Russian troops and Hungarian security policemen also distributed those notices from their cars while driving along the streets.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): Please answer my question; whether they interfered or not is for us to judge. What were the specific orders relating to the holding of public meetings, as far as you know?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes, they referred to public meetings, demonstrations and the restrictions forbidding people to leave their houses at night.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): You mean you refer to the curfew which was imposed. You were not aware of the fact that curfew orders are always proclaimed by military authorities, that is if there is a military occupation, of course?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes, but one should not consider the Russian occupation as a military occupation according to the Kadar Government.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): The orders referred to the holding of public meetings, demonstrations and the imposition of a curfew. Is that all?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes, only those three.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Who was in charge of internal affairs at the Ministry of the Interior?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): Ferenc Muennich was the Minister of the Interior.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): The Minister of the Interior would naturally be in charge of all matters connected with peace and order in the country in ordinary circumstances?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): What arrangements did the Minister of the Interior make with the Soviet commander of which you are aware?

WITNESS 000 (interpretation from Hungarian): I cannot tell you anything about that. I can only tell you that I heard from leaders of the workers' groups on several occasions that when their delegations were negotiating in Parliament with the Russians Kadar and Muennich were present, together with one or two Russian officers from the Russian command. Istvan Traeger could give you information about that because he was, until 21 January, the member of the workers' delegation which was always in close contact with the Government and on several occasions, and each week, he negotiated with the Government and with Kadar and Muennich personally.

The CHAIRMAN: There are no further questions and I thank you for your statement.

Witness 000 withdrew.

The CHAIRMAN: I propose to call one more witness today whose evidence will only last for half an hour.

(The Chairman)

At the invitation of the Chairman Dr. Geza Horvath took a place at the Committee table.

The CHAIRMAN: I understand that this witness is No.3 on page 1.

On behalf of the Committee I bid you welcome. You are aware of the matters which are of particular interest to the Committee and I ask you to commence your statement.

Dr. HORVATH (interpretation from Hungarian): My name is Geza Horvath and I am a doctor of medicine. The eleven years which culminated in the outbreak of the revolution make it possible for me to address a few words to the Committee on behalf of the Hungarian cause.

I was a commander in the fighting which took place around the Mecsek Mountains, which are in Trans-Danubia, the capital of which is Pecs. No events of particular importance occurred between 23 October and 1 November; the people of that region did not participate in public life to any great extent because they did not fully recognize the government of Imre Nagy. They felt that Nagy's Government was not in a position to ensure a safe future for the Hungarian State and considered it a transitional government only. The Revolutionary Council at Pecs was composed of communists who had been in office a few weeks earlier. The AVH had initiated a reign of terror which culminated in the outbreak of the revolution. On 23 October a crowd of demonstrators assembled in Szechenyi Place in Pecs, after the curfew, and were attacked by armed AVH. On 30 October I met a friend of my from Szeged who put certain questions to me on behalf of the Hungarian commander at Szeged; one of those questions related to the state of affairs which might arise if the Soviet authorities were to occupy the country for a second time.

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I then answered "It is very likely that the Soviet will again intervene, therefore, the line of the Danube should be organized as a defensive post and should there be a Soviet intervention then we will show the western world that in Hungary there is a war and it is more likely that aid will come from the west."

In southern Trans-Danubia the real serious demonstration and preparation for getting rid of the communists started on 1 November. This started at two o'clock at Pecs. I had previously been to order a wreath in order to lay it in front of the statue of Kossuth and we planned to hold a demonstration at two o'clock. I was only with the students at that time because it was the youth who understood more fully the aims of the revolution. Unfortunately, we had no arms.

At two o'clock we put the wreath in front of the Kossuth statue and approximately 5,000 people were there but half an hour later there were about 15,000 to 20,000 people at Szechenyi Place. It is here that we read our twenty point demands addressed to the town councils and the councils of the provinces. I should like to mention only one, the first one and the most important -- the immediate withdrawal of the Russians from the country. The other points included free elections, free party organization and so on. A very important point was, of course, the question of the uranium mines because these mines are very significant for the economy of the country. We demanded that the uranium mines be immediately taken out of the hands of the Soviet. We also asked for the immediate disbanding of the AVH.

On Szechenyi Place this huge demonstration started with the removal of the red star from the top of a hotel. I was travelling by car from one group to another and we did not need slogans any more because the population already knew what they had to do. We occupied party headquarters with a group of twenty-five armed men and in the party headquarters we took over whatever was there as the communist leaders were at that moment dividing everything amongst themselves.

At eight o'clock in the evening the crowd went to the AVH headquarters where I was negotiating with the commander of the AVH called Bradacs. He said he was in full agreement with our demonstration and our aims and that he wanted to be one of us. We did not arrest anybody, we only asked their identity and took their address. The officials and functionaries of the uranium mines were asked by us

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to take their belongings and go to Szekszard where there were some Russian units and therefore these Russian officials left unharmed. The AVH people fled during the night.

It was during that night that Bela Kovacs went to Budapest as he had already been asked on the 28th to join the government but until then he had not accepted. However, as the demonstration broke out at Pecs he did leave for Budapest.

For two days we started a reorganization at Pecs as we wanted to achieve the aim that in the provinces we should transform the Revolutionary Council of each district so that only people should be brought into these councils who understood the Hungarian people and supported their demands.

On the second and third from Szekesfehervar, Szombathely and Budapest Russian troops started to arrive. On the second, three armoured units arrived at Dombovar and they were mostly composed of ST.2 and T.34 tanks.

On the third, in the evening, I was discussing several problems with the military commander of Pecs. He said that it was obvious the Soviet troops were not just driving through but that they were there for the purpose of intervening once more. The military commander, Lieutenant Colonel Csikor, promised that the military units in Pecs would be used to stop the Russian units but at seven o'clock in the evening we were still discussing the possibility of fighting against the Soviet arrivals. By eight o'clock the commander gave the order that the Hungarian soldiers should be disarmed. These young men approved of this because they were not clear about the meaning of the Hungarian revolution and as their military leaders were communists the real significance of the revolution had been kept from them.

During the night of 3-4 November at two o'clock in the morning the Soviet occupation started in and around Pecs. In the first group there were 153 tanks, 250 armoured cars and about 3,000-4,000 infantrymen. On the outskirts and the localities of Dombovar, Komlo and Vasas Russian units had already arrived but new units arrived that night. These Soviet units had not been there during the occupation of Hungary but were a completely new group and consisted mainly of young

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men between the ages of twenty-two and twenty-five.

When the Russians entered Pecs I decided to profit by the example of Budapest which had been completely destroyed by the Soviet and to withdraw into the Mecsek mountains as they had certain geographic advantages. They were close to the city and even though we knew it to be hopeless we decided we would try to fight from there so that we could let the outside world know that there was a war in Hungary. We started at six o'clock in the morning and I established our quarters in a private house. During the course of the morning the people of Pecs started to evacuate the city and to take refuge in the mountains.

In the meantime we received news that a Russian military dictatorship had started in Pecs, a bank holiday was decreed and civil government ceased.

We spread the news through the university that we were in the Mecsek mountains and were trying to start an armed battle against the Soviet. During the night, from the empty barracks we received arms and ammunition as well as food supplies. By about three or four o'clock in the afternoon there were already approximately 5,000 people who wanted to fight with arms on the side of the revolution.

The Soviet made six attacks that afternoon against the Mecsek mountains which one could only reach through narrow, winding roads and my guerrilla troops were able to repel these attacks. On the same day a very unhappy betrayal occurred. A man arrived and asked to be allowed to join our group. He was a major and his name was Tomecsko. However, later in the afternoon he fled and the next day we discovered that he was giving the Soviet command information about our positions and the Soviet was able to re-group its troops and start their preparations for using artillery.

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By that time we had left that place and transferred our headquarters elsewhere. During the next three weeks we the Mecsek fighters upheld the revolutionary spirit and tried to prove to the civilian population and to the world that a war was going on, that we were able continually to outmanoeuvre the Russians and were one move ahead, that we always knew what they were trying to do and were always able to prevent them attacking us. That is how we qualified for the name "The unseen". The Press spoke of "The unseen". We then carried out several attacks against the Russian troops during one of which, on the 8th, we attacked and destroyed the car of the Russian commander of the Baranya province. Next day a new commander, Bojcov, was appointed. The name of the previous commander was Korjusin. The death of the Soviet commander of course instigated a heavy attack by the Russians and they fired at the Mecsek territory with heavy artillery.

I would like to mention here that the Soviet troops committed the gravest atrocities against our wounded. Daily they searched five or six times the hospitals around Pecs, and when they found wounded they shot them in the head after much brutality. I was eye-witness on the 13th in the Mecsek locality where we had two wounded. This I knew from my couriers and as there were no other doctors beyond myself I wanted to see them and if possible bring them to our headquarters. When we were near the locality we learned that it had been surrounded by Soviet infantry and armoured cars, that there was a huge crowd of Russians and AVH men in a quadrangle in the main square, and that all the population had been forced to be present as onlookers. The two wounded were made to kneel in the square, their hands were tied together and both of them were killed by a volley.

Daily I received information of how many corpses at the clinic of the Pecs University were those of people executed by the Russians. This was all done by shots through the head. Many of them were tortured beforehand.

We of course went from one place to another in the Mecsek mountains. We tried to be as invisible as possible, and our attacks against the Russians were generally made in the form of raids. We tried to attack from five or six places at the same time, so that we were able to start an attack against them within a radius of about thirty to forty kilometres and they did not know where our troops were.

I would now like to speak of the part played by the radio in our territory during the revolution, and to say a few words especially about the role of Radio Free Europe. The radio is a very important element in the life of modern civilized man, but from the point of view of the Hungarian revolution it did much

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damage because it was through the radio that we learned what the Western world thought of the Hungarian revolution. Other Western stations continually reproduced what the Press had said, the declaration by General Franco about these events; and generally we always heard that the whole world was on the side of the revolution. The meetings of the General Assembly of the United Nations brought one resolution after another, and they all called for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Hungary. For a time we had confidence that these negotiations would have a successful outcome, but later on it dawned upon us that the Hungarian revolution could not bring about a possible new world war. Then we carried on the fight only to prove to the world that the Hungarian people, though it knew that no help would come from outside, would nevertheless uphold the ideals of the revolution, and fight against Bolshevism to the last drop of blood. Therefore the radio was injurious from our point of view because we believed that there would have been fewer victims if the radio, especially Radio Free Europe, had presented news to us more objectively, with less enthusiasm, because the revolutionary atmosphere was already strong enough amongst the youth and the news from the radio only strengthened us in the belief and knowledge that aid would come. Just as United Nations troops had been sent in the case of Suez, so we thought that help might come to Hungary too. In that case, had United Nations' contingents come to Hungary all Hungary would have taken up the battle immediately. Unfortunately, however, this did not happen. On 21 November, when our situation was already completely hopeless, when new Russian troops were arriving in Hungary and Trans-Danubia, we had already run out of ammunition irreplaceably because we could only renew supplies from the Russian troops. Our troops had been decimated and we therefore decided to leave the territory of Hungary. As the Austrian border had been fortified to a large extent by that time, and as we learned that Yugoslavia would not return emigres to Hungary, we decided to cross the Yugoslav border which was very close at hand. On 22 November we crossed to Yugoslavia where we were interned. I was in the camp of Geroovo for three and a half months, from which I was able to go to Italy after the Hungarian Government had done all it could to get me returned to Hungary. There was an uprising in the Geroovo camp when the delegate of the Hungarian Repatriation Commission arrived to take me back. The whole camp rose like one man, and next day the Italian Consul arrived, to whom I explained my situation and who made it possible for me to go to Italy.

It is in these circumstances that I now come before the Committee, and I should like to explain that the revolution in Hungary was free of any kind of "ism" -- there

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was no Communism, no Socialism, no Titoism, no Gomulka-ism; the revolution in Hungary was solely a spontaneous movement on the part of the people who wanted to shed the Communist terrorism. Communism, or any other movement of the extreme Left, is not appropriate for Hungary because of Hungary's background. A democracy of the middle Right would be the most appropriate for Hungary. That is what we wanted.

As to the present-day situation, I believe you know that better than I do. Let us not forget that in Europe Hungary unfortunately is for the moment a part of the pan-Slav bloc. Bolshevism represents a terrible threat to the world and we must do everything to annihilate it. Hungary itself is too small to do that, but if the Committee and the United Nations are able to prove that the Russians interfered in Hungarian questions unlawfully and in breach of international agreements, then it may be that all the other satellites can also be released from Soviet domination.

I have now finished what I wanted to say, but I shall be pleased to answer questions.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for your interesting statement.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): You said that you went to Yugoslavia from Hungary. Were any difficulties put in your way at the Yugoslav frontier?

Mr. HORVATH (interpretation from Hungarian): There were no difficulties in crossing the border, partly because we left Hungary with an armed group and partly also because at that time, 22 November, the Hungary-Yugoslavia border was not yet manned by Hungarian guards.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): You mentioned that Soviet troops returned to your area round about 2 November. You later said that more Soviet troops appeared about the 3rd or 4th, the latter being in your view troops from the Caucasus who were quite different from the earlier troops. From that am I to understand that the troops who returned on the 2nd were Russians who had been in occupation in Hungary for some time prior to that date?

Mr. HORVATH (interpretation from Hungarian): No, they were not occupying troops who had been in Hungary for a long time. Those who came in the night of 3-4 November were not completely new. Those who came into our vicinity on the 1st and 2nd were in general Soviet troops who came in on the 23rd.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): You told us that you had heard about destruction in Budapest and that therefore a decision was taken to leave the town and fight in the mountains to avoid this kind of destruction. Could you tell me what kind of contact you had in the southern area of the country with the central Government? Did you receive any orders from the centre, were your actions coordinated with any action which may have been taking place in other parts of Hungary, or were you merely acting on your own initiative, knowing I suppose that you were behaving in a similar manner to people in other parts of Hungary?

Mr. HORVATH (interpretation from Hungarian): I am not sure which period of time you are speaking about.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): Any time from 28 October on.

Mr. HORVATH (interpretation from Hungarian): From 23 October on Pecs naturally carried out orders from the central Government possibly with the further action necessitated by the organization of its own groups. Owing to the fact that the AVH and the Russians were much stronger around the uranium mines we could not always carry out orders precisely and from the 2nd onwards we acted entirely on our own, and I was the organizer and later the commander of our activities. At that time our troops had no contact of any kind with the Government in Budapest.

Mr. SHANN (Australia): My other question is addressed to the Chairman. So far as the report is concerned it would be of importance to have most carefully checked what this witness has said about Russian tank types and so on. I am wondering whether you could ask the witness if he would be prepared to check very carefully through the translation of his testimony.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, I would ask the witness to do that in collaboration with the secretariat.

Mr. HORVATH (interpretation from Hungarian): I would like to tell you, if I may, about one more person who is in Italy at the present time and who was herself deported to Russia. She was in Hungary, seven months pregnant and with a two and a half year old child and they were deported with her husband. The men in the wagon broke open the doors, the Russians saw this and attacked them and this woman's husband was shot dead. She succeeded in escaping and is now in Italy. Besides this, I have received a letter from my group leaders in Yugoslavia only this week. They write as follows. "Our situation is the same as yours was. Please do whatever you can urgently to enable us to leave here. We are in a very bad position and we are willing to do anything. S.O.S." This refers to the fact that in Hungary some weeks ago they held my open trial at Pecs and sentenced me to death. My wife, my children, my mother-in-law and all my relatives had to be present at this trial. The people who wrote that letter have learned in Yugoslavia that the same has happened to them. For some reason unknown to me the Hungarian authorities are doing everything possible to get hold of the members of my particular group and even the March issues of the Hungarian press were occupied with this. I would like to ask the Committee to use any means at its disposal to persuade the Italian Foreign Ministry or the representatives of any other government to intervene with Yugoslavia to enable these poor unfortunates to come to the West because Yugoslavia is not very different from the Bolshevik countries.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ-FABREGAT (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): The interpretation in Spanish was not very clear. Would you repeat the last paragraph of what you said about Yugoslavia.

Mr. HORVATH (interpretation from Hungarian): I am acting in the interests of my men and asking the Committee to help those who are in Yugoslavia because they are in a terrible situation. There are sixteen thousand Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia and the same kind of Communism exists there as in Hungary. We do not know what the Yugoslav Government will do with the Hungarian freedom fighters there -- what kind of exchange agreements they are willing to enter into. To give you a characteristic example of the position, I crossed the Italian border on 9 March. One hundred and ninety-four people got from Yugoslavia to free soil and at the same time about fifteen hundred were sent back from Yugoslavia to Hungary because they

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were so shattered morally and physically that they were unable to wait any longer in Yugoslavia. This is the plight the Hungarians in Yugoslavia have reached.

The CHAIRMAN: I can tell you that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has just appealed to the members of the United Nations to help Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia to find a home in some other part of the world.

Mr. HORVATH (interpretation from Hungarian): I would like to thank you very much for this but for us this is now a matter of life or death and every moment counts. I am speaking now of only those few people who took part in the battles with which I was concerned and it is for these people that I ask your urgent help.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): How many of these freedom fighters are in trouble in Yugoslavia?

Mr. HORVATH (interpretation from Hungarian): Those in particular trouble are the ten or twelve, at the most fifteen, who are known in Hungary and were so exposed that the Hungarian Government is doing everything possible to get them back through exchange agreements with the Yugoslav Government or otherwise. The rest of the freedom fighters are not in such immediate danger.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): I suppose you would be in a position to give a list of these names to the Chairman confidentially?

Mr. HORVATH (interpretation from Hungarian): Yes, I should be glad to do so. I would like to ask one more thing. Naturally I can only say what I have said about Yugoslavia in the utmost secrecy because if it were known it would only make the situation of the people of whom I spoke in Yugoslavia even more grave.

The CHAIRMAN: The verbatim record of your statement here is confidential and will not be published. As there are no further questions we thank you once again.

Mr. HORVATH (interpretation from Hungarian): I would like to thank the Committee very much for having heard my statement. I would ask only that the Committee should spare no effort in this matter because it is a question of the life of a whole nation, and through publicity and in other ways I beg the Committee to do whatever it can in Hungary's interest. I am confident the Committee will do this.

Mr. Horvath withdrew.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the next witness we shall be hearing is Mr. Lajos Varfalvi whom we heard twice in Rome. The record of those hearings has been distributed so you may like to go through this and prepare your questions for tomorrow afternoon at 3 p.m.

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.