

19 March 1958

AMERICAN, SOVIET, BRITISH, POLISH AND
JAPANESE VIEWS ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF
EASTERN EUROPE AND, IN PARTICULAR, OF HUNGARY

(Texts and References)

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AMERICAN, SOVIET, BRITISH, POLISH AND
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(TEXTS AND REFERENCES)

A. UNITED STATES - SOVIET EXCHANGE

1. Letter of President Eisenhower to Marshal Bulganin, 12 January 1958

"The heads of our two Governments . . . agreed in 1945 that the peoples of Eastern Europe should have the right to choose the form of Government under which they should live . . . I propose that we should now discuss this matter."

For complete text see The New York Times,
13 January 1958.

2. Speech by Mr. Khrushchev at a conference of Foremost Byelorussian Republic Agricultural Personnel, Minsk, 22 January, 1958.

"What do Messrs. Eisenhower and Dulles want? Evidently they want to meet with us to speak about liquidating the Socialist system in the Soviet Union, to liquidate the people's democratic system in the people's democracies [Eastern Europe]. They evidently want us to turn from Socialist construction and restore the capitalist order . . .

"We said and we say, that on the question about the people's democracies and on the German question in the direction this matter is posed by Messrs. Eisenhower, Dulles, Adenauer - we will not gather for consideration. On these questions our position is clear."

See also editorial
comments in The New York
Times, 31 January and
1 February 1958.

For complete text see The Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, 5 March 1958, Vol.X, No. 4,
pp. 15 through 22. (Translation from Pravda
and Izvestia, 26 January 1958).

Further relevant extracts in News Items
Relating to Hungary, 31 January 1958.

5. Letter of Marshal Bulganin to President Eisenhower, 1 February 1958.

"As to the situation in East European countries, the Soviet Government's position requires no explanation and it is my opinion that any polemics on this question would be useless. It is permissible, however, to ask how is it possible while maintaining normal diplomatic relations with the People's Democracies or with some of them and consequently recognizing the sovereignty and independence of these countries, how is it possible to suggest to other countries to discuss the question of the internal situation in these countries? The Soviet Union cannot be a party to such a proposition which we can regard only as intolerable interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. I could also ask another question: are there any grounds for any country to assume the role of arbiter and take it upon itself to decide what social and economic system must be established in this or that state?"

"It was just for this reason that at the Geneva conference of heads of government in 1955 my colleagues and myself declared quite definitely that problems of such kind could not be the subject of international negotiations.

"In your argumentation in favor of your proposal for the discussion of this question you refer to the events in Hungary. But is it not a fact that the events in Hungary have demonstrated in the first place that the Hungarian people were able to give due rebuff to the elements which, acting on the instructions and with the support of definite foreign circles, have raised their hands against the social system chosen by the people of Hungary? For our part, we are firmly convinced that in the interests of consolidating universal peace it is imperative for all of us to concentrate our energies on those questions the solution of which would create conditions for the development of peaceful cooperation of peoples and not to allow relations between states to be poisoned by bringing up such questions which could sidetrack us from problems which are really important for the preservation of peace. In this connection, I think you would agree that if we are to be guided by a sincere desire to engage in fruitful negotiations, the persistent bringing up, the imposing, in fact, of such questions which do not meet the approval of other negotiators would be of little use."

For complete text see The New York Times,
4 February 1958.

6. 4. Letter of President Eisenhower to Marshal Bulganin, 16 February 1958.

". . . You have proposed, and insisted on, about ten topics which you want to have discussed at such a meeting. I, in turn, suggested some eight topics which I thought should be discussed - strengthening the United Nations, dedicating outer space to peaceful purposes, the reunification of Germany, the right of the peoples of Eastern Europe to choose the form of government under which they would live, and a number of specific proposals in the disarmament field.

"I wrote that, if there were to be a top-level meeting, I would be willing to discuss your proposals in good faith if you would so discuss mine. Your answer is that I must be prepared to discuss your proposals but that as regards mine there must, you said, 'be unanimous agreement of all participants as to the necessity for considering such proposals'. In other words, you demand the right to veto discussion of the matters I believe to be vital to peace.

"I noted that Mr. Khrushchev devoted a considerable part of his Minsk speech to a discussion of conditions in Hungary, Poland and East Germany. Does the Soviet Union claim such a proprietary interest in these lands and people that to discuss them is solely a matter of Soviet domestic concern? If not, and if these lands and people can be discussed by Soviet leaders as an international problem, why cannot we both discuss them?"

For complete text see The New York Times,
18 February 1958.

7. ~~8~~ Soviet Aide-Memoire delivered to Wewellyn Thompson, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 28 February 1958.

"The question brought up by the Government of the United States of America concerning the situation in the countries of East Europe relates to just this category. The discussion of this type of question would mean the impermissible interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, a path on which the Soviet Union will not tread in any circumstance.

"The Soviet Government in general cannot understand why it is addressed with proposals to discuss internal affairs of third countries that are sovereign states and with which both the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the United States of America maintain normal diplomatic relations. In the opinion of the Soviet Government to bring up questions of this type means deliberately to lead matters to a sharpening of relations between states, deliberately to subject to threat the achievement of understanding on urgent questions of liquidating the "cold war" and lessening international tensions.

"The Soviet Government thinks that, for guaranteeing the success of a conference at the highest level, it is essential that the attention of the participants of the conference be concentrated on such questions, the resolution of which will actually help to ease international tension, strengthen confidence between states, and consolidate the peace."

For complete text see The New York Times,
7 March 1958.

8. ~~7~~ ~~8~~ United States reply, 6 March 1958, to the Soviet Union.

"The Soviet memorandum indicates that the 'summit' meeting should mark a 'sharp break' in the direction of improving the whole international situation, of 'creation of conditions for the peaceful collaboration of all states.' This greatly-to-be-desired result cannot, however, in the opinion of the United States, be achieved if there are excluded from consideration the principal causes of international tension.

"A basic cause, perhaps the basic cause, of tension is the support by the Soviet state of the world-wide ambitions of international communism. Other major causes of tension, which are perhaps manifestations of the above-mentioned basic cause, are the enforced partition of Germany and external interference in countries of Eastern Europe which result in a denial to the peoples of their right freely to choose their own Government. The United States does not, as the Soviet Government suggests, seek interference in the internal affairs of other nations but rather the elimination of such interference."

For complete text see The New York Times,
7 March, 1958.

9. Khrushchev's interview

9. Letter of Marshal Bulganin to President Eisenhower, 6 March 1958.

"We do not believe and have never stated that a summit conference should discuss only those questions which have been suggested by the Soviet Union. I must recall that in our proposals of Jan. 8 the Soviet Government made it clear that it was prepared to discuss, by general agreement, other constructive proposals, conducing to the termination of the cold war, which may be advanced by other participants in the conference.

"This does not mean, however, that we can agree to discuss issues which fall within the province of the internal affairs of other states and the examination of which could have no other results than further aggravation of relations between the states. The situation in the countries of Eastern Europe and the uniting of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany into a single state fall precisely within that category. You, Mr. President, are aware of the Soviet Government's point of view in this respect and there is scarcely any need to elaborate on this again. A discussion of such issues would signify inadmissible interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, a course the Soviet Union will take under no circumstances.

"The question naturally arises why the Soviet Government is approached with a proposal to discuss the internal affairs of third countries which are sovereign states and with which both the United States of America and the Soviet Union maintain normal diplomatic relations. Indeed, if anything in the internal structure of any East European country is not clear to the United States Government then, as you are well aware, there is the age-long practice of clearing up such issues through the usual diplomatic channels and not by interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. We do not consider it possible to assume the role of a judge and solve problems pertaining to the internal structure of other countries. Nor can we recognize such a right for any other state and consider inadmissible not only the discussion but also the posing of such problems."

10. *Khrushchev*
Project
For complete text see The New York Times, 8 March 1958.

10. 8. Mr. Khrushchev's speech at the Lenin Sports Palace, Moscow, 14 March 1958.

"In his address Mr. Khrushchev demanded that the United States drop its idea of discussing the situation in Eastern Europe at a top-level meeting. This, he said, was an 'unheard ~~of~~ violation of the elementary standards of relations among countries' and interference in their internal affairs.

"He warned that the Soviet Union would intervene promptly if there were any attempt to alter by force the system prevailing in any of the Communist states of Europe."

The New York Times, 15 March 1958.

For complete text see Pravda, 15 March 1958.

C. Arnold

B. OTHER AMERICAN VIEWS

1. A Private View :-

u Extracts from the third of six Reith Lectures delivered on the BBC by George F. Kennan, 27 November 1957: The Problem of Eastern and Central Europe.

"I am sure there is no need for me to go into details about the situation in the satellite area. You all know what has happened in these past three or four years. The Moscow leaders made an attempt to undo some of the harm that Stalin had done with his policies of ruthless political oppression and economic exploitation. The first effects of this relaxation - as shown in the disorders in Eastern Germany and Poland and later in Hungary - was not to reconcile people to the fact of Soviet rule but rather to reveal the real depths of their restlessness and the extent to which the post-war arrangements had outworn whatever usefulness they might once have had. The Soviet leaders, startled and alarmed by these revelations, have now seen no alternative, in the interests of their own political and military security, but to reimpose sharp limits to the movement for greater independence in these countries, and to rely for the enforcement of these restrictions on the naked use or presence of their own troops.

The result has been, as we all know, the creation of an extremely precarious situation, dangerous and unsatisfactory from everyone's standpoint. The state of the satellite area today, and particularly of Poland, is neither fish nor fowl, neither complete Stalinist domination nor real independence. These things cannot be expected to remain this way for long. There must either be further violent efforts by people in that area to take things into their own hands and to achieve independence by their own means, or there must be the beginning of some process of real adjustment to the fact of Soviet domination. In the first of these contingencies, we in the West could easily be placed once more before the dilemma which faced us last year at the time of the Hungarian uprising; and anyone who has the faintest concern for the stability of the world situation must fervently pray that this will not happen.

Will the Hope for Independence Die?

As for the second alternative, which at this moment appears to be the more likely of the two, it seems no less appalling. If things go on as they are today, there will simply have to be some sort of adjustment on the part of the peoples of Eastern Europe, even if it is one that takes the form of general despair, apathy, demoralisation, and the deepest sort of disillusionment with the West. The failure of the recent popular uprisings to shake the Soviet military domination has now produced a state of bitter despondency throughout large parts of Eastern Europe. If the taste or even the hope for independence once really dies out in the hearts of these peoples, there will be no recovering it; then Moscow's victory will be complete. Eastern Europe will then be permanently lost to Europe proper and to the possibility of any normal participation in international life.

I can conceive of no escape from this dilemma that would not involve the early departure of Soviet troops from the satellite countries. Recent events have made it perfectly clear that it is the presence of these troops, coupled with the general military and political situation in Europe, which lies at the heart of the difficulty. Only when the troops are gone will there be possibilities for the evolution of these nations toward the institutions and social systems most suited to their needs; and what these institutions and systems might then be, is something about which I think we in the West can afford to be very relaxed. If socialism is what these people want and need, so be it; but let it by all means be their own choice.

It is plain that there can be no Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe unless this entire area can in some ways be removed as an object in the military rivalry of the Great Powers. But this at once involves the German problem. It involves the German problem not only because it implies the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Germany, but because so long as American and other Western forces remain in Western Germany it will be impossible for the Russians to view their problem in Eastern Europe otherwise than in direct relation to the overall military equation between Russia and the West. Any solution of the problem of the satellite area is thus dependent on a solution of the German problem itself. This is one of the reasons why I am inclined to feel that the German question still stands at the centre of world tensions; that no greater contribution can be made to world peace than the removal of the present deadlock over Germany; and that if, in fact, it is not removed, the chances for peace are slender indeed."

(The Listener, Vol. LVIII, No. 1496, 28 November 1957)

2. Congressional Views !

✱ Statement by Henry S. Reuss, member of the House of Representatives
(Democrat-Wisconsin) 27 January 1958.

In his statement to the House Mr. Reuss recalled (a) the statement he and 16 other democratic members of the House made on 16 March 1955; (b) and the letter he and 12 democratic members of the House sent in December 1956 to President Eisenhower. Both statements related to the future of Central and Eastern Europe and the following are relevant extracts from them:

- (a) "West German rearmament is underway, because Russia leaves the West no alternative. But if you agree, and if Russia will carry out her part of the bargain by withdrawing to her historic borders, we will welcome a unified and independent Germany; a free Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Rumania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic States, each independent but part of a larger central European community based upon a respect for human rights; and all without the capacity to make aggressive war."

(16 March 1955)

"Again, in December 1956, shortly after the Hungarian revolt had shown how shaky was the Soviet hold on the enslaved nations of Eastern Europe, 12 Democratic members of this body-- Hugh J. Addonizio, Thomas L. Ashley, Charles A. Boyle, John D. Dingell, Torbert H. Macdonald, Eugene J. McCarthy, Henry S. Reuss, George M. Rhodes, Peter W. Rodino, Jr., James Roosevelt, B.F. Sisk, Frank Thompson, Jr. -- wrote the President suggesting some concrete goals for United States policy in revolution-

torn middle Europe based on our own revolutionary ideals of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." (16 March 1955)

(b) "Concrete suggestions for U.S. policy in revolution-torn Middle Europe based on our own revolutionary ideals of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness":

1. Life: To bring an end to the threat of war in central and eastern Europe. A road toward that goal: creation of a demilitarized area, without the capacity to make aggressive war, for 1,000 miles from the Rhine to Russia's historic boundaries, with the demilitarization and the security of the area guaranteed by the East and West.
2. Liberty: To free the peoples of central and eastern Europe from foreign occupation or domination; to confirm their right to free elections, free speech, free worship, the civil liberties, protection for minorities; and at the same time to guard against the rebirth of totalitarianism from any quarter. A road toward that goal; embedding these human rights in the constitutions of the liberated states, with an international guaranty of their preservation.
3. The pursuit of happiness: To hasten the economic and social progress of the liberated areas, and to provide an alternative to the old nationalistic rivalries for territory and resources. A road toward that goal: encouraging (by such steps as economic aid under international auspices) regional federation and economic integration in central and eastern Europe. (December 1956)

Mr. Reuss added on 27 January:

"If accepted by the Russians, an offer to withdraw troops and create a demilitarized zone between the Rhine and Russia would greatly increase the chances of peace by widening the area where a mistake could be made without the catastrophe of all-out nuclear war. To those who say that Russia would reject such a proposal, I would answer that the scientific and administrative minds which sent Sputnik into orbit should also be able to grasp that such a proposal could be Russia's best assurance against the military threat of a rearmad Central Europe . . .

"Moreover, making some such disengagement proposal, even though the Russians reject it, is, I believe, necessary if the NATO Alliance is to go forward toward rearmament with any kind of unity."

(Congressional Record - Proceedings and Debates of the 85th Congress, Second Session, Vol. 104, No. 12, 27 January 1958, pp. 939-945.)

See also "Comments of Joseph P. Lash and William V. Shannon" in New York Post, 9 February 1958.

D. Unofficial British Views

C. BRITISH STATEMENTS

1. Views of Mr. Dennis Healy, M.P. (Leeds, East-Labour.)

- (a) Mr. Healy in a pamphlet written in 1957 suggested the creation of a "neutral belt" composed of the Federal Republic of Germany on the one hand, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary on the other. Other countries might be added as part of "bargaining" between East and West. "The West would offer for example Denmark, if the Soviet Union would agree to include Romania". There would be an agreement to withdraw foreign forces from the countries belonging to such a neutral zone.

(Fabian Tract, No. 1957;
France Observateur, No. 400,
9 January 1958, p. 8.)

- (b) Mr. Healey, speaking in the foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons on 19 February 1958, reiterated his views on "disengagement", and said that "Central Europe was the right place geographically to start". He added that there was an "impressive gathering of support" for it on the Western side, and "at least one Communist Government - Poland - was committed to it".

(The Times, London, 20 February 1958)

2. Views of Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, M.P. (Leeds, South-Labor)

- (a) In a television interview on 26 January, ^{Mr. Gaitskell} suggested that a central zone with controlled national armaments, a kind of "experiment in controlled disarmament", be set up in West and East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. After the establishment of the neutral zone, Germany should be reunited on the basis of free elections and excluded from NATO, while the three Eastern countries should withdraw from the Warsaw Pact.

(Associated Press dispatch from
London, 26 January 1958.)

- (b) Speaking in the foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons on 19 Feb. Mr. Gaitskell suggested that the Western Powers should withdraw armed forces progressively from West Germany, and the USSR from Eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In addition he proposed (1) that stock-piling of nuclear arms in those countries should be forbidden; (2) that Germany should be re-united; (3) that a European Security Pact be signed; (4) that the frontiers of de-nuclearized countries should be guaranteed and (5) that West Germany should withdraw from NATO and that Eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary should withdraw from the Warsaw Pact.

The following are relevant parts of The Times' report of Mr. Gaitskell's intervention:

"Finally, the third and most important subject--disengagement in Europe. Here he thought it was just as likely progress could be made.

"On both sides of the frontier there was substantial pressure for German reunification, and the possibility could not be ruled out at some future time of the German people infuriated by the Communist Government -- now becoming much tougher than ever before--doing as they did in 1953, staging a riot or a minor revolution against the existing régime. If this were to happen to-day or next year the danger of the situation must surely be apparent. It would be very difficult for the West German Government to restrain her forces from going to the help of their comrades on the other side of the frontier.

"There was also the possibility of further movement within the satellites. Nobody could see stability in that part of the world. Yet if there were to be another uprising, did we wish to go through again the appalling dilemma we faced in the autumn of 1956, when we had to choose between an inevitable third world war or leave the Hungarians to their fate?

"If trouble were to break out in central or eastern Europe, Britain would be faced with troops on the other side armed not only with conventional but nuclear weapons. The White Paper implied that we were to rely on massive retaliation for almost anything that happened. There was no indication of what we should do in the case of these minor incidents.

"The key to disengagement, the most important thing of all, was withdrawal of foreign forces from western and eastern Germany, and from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. (Opposition cheers.)

"The Rapacki plan involved some advance. For the first time Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as East Germany, were equated with West Germany.

"The major argument against it was that it did not involve real disengagement and did involve the West giving away the threat of Germany being armed with nuclear weapons, which was a thing none of them wished to see. It was a threat to the Russians and involved the West giving away this valuable bargaining counter for far too little in exchange.

"He regretted the exclusion of Hungary, but the Rapacki plan should be regarded as the start, and the basis for discussion. It was not good enough to say there were difficulties. What Britain should have done long ago was to put forward her own proposals for disengagement.

"What the Opposition would like to see done was: First, the gradual withdrawal of foreign forces from East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Secondly, an agreement to limit and control conventional forces, and no nuclear weapons permitted to the nations covered by this agreement. Thirdly, German reunification. Fourthly a security pact underwritten by the great Powers guaranteeing the frontiers of this neutral zone; finally, if everything else was agreed, an agreement for Germany to withdraw from NATO and for Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. "

- (c) Mr. Gaitskell made the following remarks on 12 March 1958 on CBS radio's "Radio Beat" programme:

"I wonder, if we could go back to disengagement -- which, in fact, we never got on to. I find a lot of people who take the view that if you are putting forward proposals for relaxing tension-- whether through disarmament or through what we call disengagement, some new ideas for trying to get a settlement with the Russians -- there are lot of people who think that that means you're soft on defense, that you're no longer keen about NATO, that you no longer care about the unity of the West. I want to say emphatically that I think that is absolute nonsense. And I want to declare my own point of view, which is that I've always been a strong supporter of NATO, the Atlantic Alliance, and I fully agree with what Mr. Stevenson said earlier-- that we have got to keep up our guard.

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"But I'm equally clear that to stand in a position of sort of frozen immobility -- what I describe, to mix the metaphors a bit, as a Maginot Line mentality--without any attempt to reach settlements with the Russians, or indeed cope with the propaganda war, if that's what it is which they're conducting--I believe that to do that is in fact fatal to the West; because it undermines the confidence and feeling of unity in the West, since so many people are desperately anxious to get some settlement.

"Now, then, what sort of settlement? Well, if we take Europe, I think it would be generally agreed that there are two major problems. One is the position of Germany today, and the second is the position of the satellite states. And it is no exaggeration to say that as far as Germany goes, if there were to be, say, next year a rising in East Germany like the one in 1953, a very dangerous situation indeed would develop. Because you will now have a West German army-- with a year's time it will be considerably stronger--and there will be an enormous temptation, to put it no higher, for the West Germans to go to the help of their East German comrades the other side of the Iron Curtain. If that were to happen, obviously the danger of World War III is immediately apparent. That's one reason why I think we've got to forestall it.

"And equally I don't mind saying that I don't want to get into the position again that we all found ourselves in the autumn of 1956 when the Hungarian uprising took place, and we had to stand by shamed and angry and helpless--because if we had moved in any military sense to help the Hungarian rebels, that might have precipitated World War III, too. If we can't do anything to help them directly--and I would take that for granted--in a military sense, then for heaven's sake let's see if we can do anything diplomatically. That's the background to the disengagement proposals which I would like to put forward...

"We have put forward a plan for the past 18 months, and I'd like to begin with that if I may. It's a quite straight-forward five-point plan involving the following changes:

"First of all, the withdrawal of foreign forces from East and West Germany, from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

"Second, an international control over the conventional national forces--or indeed, if you like, nuclear as well--but an international control over the national forces allowed to that area, and of course agreed with the countries in that area. So that in itself, the second point is really a pilot scheme in locally-controlled disarmament.

"Third, the reunification of Germany.

"And fourth, the signing of a security pact under which the frontiers of these countries would be guaranteed mutually by the countries themselves and by the great powers.

And finally, provided all the rest is agreed, then I would say: "Right! West Germany and East Germany say, 'We withdraw from NATO'; Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary withdraw from the Warsaw Pact."

"That is the full plan for what we call a neutral zone or a neutral belt. Now, I believe that if that could be agreed, it would be an enormous advance; it would first of all bring you your experiment in controlled disarmament, it would secondly solve the German problem and reduce the danger from that, and it would thirdly at least advance the prospect of a greater degree of freedom and independence for the three satellite states." (New-York Post, 16 March 1958)

- (d) An interview of Mr. Gaitskell on 16 March was reported in the following terms by The New York Times:

"Mr. Gaitskell does not believe that there is imminent danger of a Soviet attack or that the international situation is comparable to that of August, 1939. But he does see grave dangers to peace in Central Europe in the event of new uprisings in East Germany or Hungary.

Five-Point Proposal

"Having studied suggestions by members of his party and by Adam Rapacki, Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Gaitskell put forward proposals on behalf of the Labor party. They envisage five steps to disengagement in this order:

- "1. The gradual withdrawal of all foreign military forces from East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
- "2. An agreement to limit and control conventional forces permitted to the nations covered by the agreement. No nuclear weapons are to be allowed them.
- "3. The reunification of Germany in freedom.
- "4. The conclusion of a security pact by the great powers guaranteeing the frontiers of the countries in the neutral zone.

"5. The withdrawal of West Germany from the Atlantic Alliance and of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary from the Warsaw Pact.

"Mr. Gaitskell's approach to talks with the Russians is governed by his conviction that the West is at the beginning of prolonged negotiations with the Soviet bloc."

(New York Times, 17 March 1958)

E. An official Japanese statement:

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~~48~~ NOTE VERBALE OF 24 FEBRUARY 1958 OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN IN REPLY TO THE LETTER
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR DATED
10 DECEMBER 1957



(Translation from Japanese original)

"... The Japanese Government expresses its agreement with the righteousness of the development of young independent nations of Asia and the Middle East, and is determined to undertake efforts to assist the pacific development of these new nations freed from the dependence on, and oppression of, foreign countries. On the other hand the Japanese Government expresses the desire that the Soviet Government heed the many criticisms concerning the status of Eastern European nations and considers that it is an indispensable condition for the stability of Europe and the peace of the world that the people of Germany, on the basis of its freely expressed will, form a single Government and a single State..."

(Asahi-Shimbun, 26 February 1958)