

1961

RFE RESEARCH AND  
EVALUATION DEPARTMENT  
Yugoslav Special  
No. 1108/1961

News Background

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YUGOSLAV PAPER SEES SOVIET-CHINESE DISPUTE RECOMING  
EVEN MORE SERIOUS

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Munich, October 3 (Stankovic) -- The main battlefield in the ever growing backstage struggle between China and Russia is not Europe but Asia, says F. Barbieri, the Moscow correspondent of the Zagreb daily "Vjesnik".

In two articles published in the paper's October 1 and 2 issues, Barbieri makes the microscopically fine point that the Chinese leaders have never actually intended "to eliminate the leading role of a big socialist country within the bloc and to impose the creation of relations based on full equality, but rather to achieve a division of the leading role between the two socialist countries by creating separate spheres of influence and interests". The difference between the Chinese not wishing "to eliminate" the leading role of the Soviet Union and their desire to divide the "socialist world" into Chinese and Soviet spheres of influence, is something which the Yugoslav journalist does not explain. In any way he follows very closely Soviet aims and describes what the various observers in Moscow think will develop in Sino-Soviet relations.

It is significant that the Yugoslavs have now decided to discuss the problem of the Soviet-Chinese relations openly. While in the past they have not hidden the fact that the Russians and Chinese are in disagreement, their chief aim has been to create the impression a) that the Soviet attitude toward China has been very close to the Yugoslav attitude; and b) that Khrushchev has had to use Titoist arguments in fighting Chinese "dogmatism". Here they have usually referred to Khrushchev's July 1960 speech in Bucharest.

Stalinism Not Chief Reason for Conflict

Now, however, Barbieri has gone a step further and has tried to clarify "much deeper phenomena". In the past the Yugoslav Communists have tried to persuade the world that the Chinese leaders opposed Moscow's leadership because of Khrushchev's public condemnation of Stalin. But Barbieri now asserts the following:

"Here (in Moscow) it is very often claimed that everything (i.e. the conflict -- SS) started with the condemnation of Stalinism. However, it would be wrong to conclude mechanically that the conflict broke out just because the Chinese leaders voiced their defense of Stalin and thus opposed the Soviet leaders who have

condemned him. On the contrary, one may say that the first features of the present disagreements started coming into the open while Stalin was still alive. Even at that time the Chinese began voicing their demands that China should have been entitled to a role and place within the Socialist camp which would be greater than the position occupied by the small countries. Stalin's death and the disappearance of his personal authority only contributed to a full ripening of this demand because the people in Peking began to believe that the elements of the primacy of the Soviet leaders within the camp had weakened..."

From this time on the Soviet-Chinese conflict grew, and especially when "the difficult internal situation in China and her immediate needs were also out of harmony with the new orientation of the Soviet policy" under Khrushchev. This is why the Chinese leaders accuse Moscow of "non-revolutionary, pragmatic and empiric attitudes" believing that "Stalin's policy was clearer, more persistent and principled", Barbieri says. This is also the background of "the reserved Chinese attitude toward the new draft program of the Soviet CP which has received only a limited attention in the Chinese press".

### Chinese Aspirations

In Barbieri's opinion, however, "differences in internal orientation and the conditions of development in the two countries" are not the only source of disagreement. The area of difference embraces equally "foreign political plans and developments within the bloc. In this connection the Yugoslav journalist said:

"So far as it has been possible to conclude from the reactions in Moscow, the conviction has prevailed in Peking that China should take the place of a second equal big power within the socialist camp, not only because of its size, but also because of dynamism of its revolution. The roles should be divided so that one of the leading powers should decide what would be the policy for Europe and the other what would be policy for Asia. The Chinese believe that in respect of internal problems the Chinese revolution — because of its specific characteristics -- would have a much greater influence in the Asian countries than could be achieved by the Soviet Union; this is why they believe that such a function should be given to China. Besides, the Chinese have believed that current Soviet foreign policy has been predominantly a European policy, within the Western framework and that only in part it has been directed toward the Asian problems. In Asia too there is a 'Germany' and a 'Berlin', even several of them, such as Korea, Vietnam, Formosa. Therefore the Chinese



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think it is necessary to remove definitely these neuralgic Asian points. China demands that she either participate in this process actively and directly or be allowed to try to solve these frontier conflicts by herself..."

Barbieri adds that the Chinese leaders have concentrated their efforts "on creating a so-called leading Asian center of the Socialist camp in Peking", for which purpose they have sharpened the international situation. True, this sharp course has also been due to "internal economic and political difficulties" although it has chiefly reflected "the Chinese abandonment of the status quo in Asia".

China's Main Aim

In explaining the chief reasons for the present attitude of the Chinese leaders, the Yugoslav journalist claims that one can hear very often in Moscow "that China's desire to open up the thorny problems in Asia is chiefly intended <sup>to</sup> enable her to participate as an equal big power in their solution". And now Barbieri makes a point which sounds illogical when attributed to "opinions in Moscow". Here is what Barbieri claims:

"According to some opinions (in Moscow) the Western powers could best influence the possible re-orientation of the Peking's foreign policy course if they would finally accept the status of China as a big power".

If the Soviets are doing their best to prevent China from becoming a big power, why should then they advise the West to accept China as a great power! In other words, why should the Russians help the Western powers to undertake a policy move which is, according to Barbieri, directed against vital Soviet interests?! This question is not answered by the Yugoslav journalist. Instead, Barbieri describes Peking's inimical attitude toward the non-aligned nations as being aimed ("as it is believed in Moscow") at "the Soviet policy of co-existence and good relations between the Soviet Union and the Asian countries outside the socialist camp". Why this? "Because the Chinese believe that good relations between the Asian countries and the countries belonging to the camp should, above all, go through Peking rather than through Moscow".

On the other hand, although the Russians and the Chinese are quarreling, Peking has always supported Moscow when the international situation has reached "a critical point". But as soon as a difficult situation had calmed down, the Chinese found some pretext to demonstrate that "at the table of big powers only the Chinese themselves may represent their country".

To this end the Chinese leaders, "along with their direct or indirect criticism of Soviet policy", have undertaken

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various actions aimed at "the extension of independent Chinese relations with various countries, governments and movements". They have not hesitated even to send invitations to various "cosmopolitan personalities", such as the Belgian Queen-Mother and the former Italian Queen to visit China.

On the Eve of the Soviet Party Congress

In Barbieri's opinion the coming 22nd Soviet CP Congress will contribute to the clarification of the situation. He says:

"In the course of the Congress the observers in Moscow will be able to see from near at hand the atmosphere characterizing Soviet-Chinese relations. The Chinese leaders, it seems, have developed their criticisms for the benefit of various other Party leaders; their chief effort is directed toward persuading the Asian parties to take Chinese views. They have a relative success within the Korean, Vietnamese and Indonesian Communist Parties. To some extent a front against Soviet policies is being created by the party leaders of underdeveloped countries headed by China with the Soviet Union leading the developed socialist countries..."

But there is no word of any "public breach" between Moscow and Peking, Barbieri says. Both the Soviet Union and China "need solidarity, even of a limited kind". "The Soviet Union considers it important to speak at the international tribune in the name of a united bloc of socialist countries, while the Chinese leaders, on the other hand, considers it important that they have Soviet support if foreign pressures are exerted upon them", says the Yugoslav journalist. He adds, by way of conclusion that "This is the framework of interests within which take place the mutual agreements and disagreements, the mutual demands and concessions, and the mutual forces which condition Soviet and Chinese policies".